Strategic actions and public policy choices by Silva, Luis Paulo Mah
STRATEGIC ACTIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY CHOICES: 
LEADERSHIP AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN SOUTH KOREA,
1 9 6 0 s-1 9 9 0 s
L uis P a u lo  M ah S ilva  
D e v e lo p m en t S tu d ie s  In s t i tu te  
L ondon S ch o o l o f E c o n o m ic s  a n d  P o litic a l S c ie n c e
UMI Number: U615619
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U615619
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
OF '  
POLITICAL
& AND Pi
f
?Z3 O
1772kZ
ABSTRACT
South Korea has long been touted as an outstanding model of economic 
development. Despite poor resource endowment and a large population, a 
colonial legacy, the devastation following a civil war, persistent political 
instability, and the lingering military confrontation with her northern neighbour, 
Korea’s  role in the international economic system  has rapidly increased in 
im portance since the 1950s. For nearly four decades, Korea has achieved a 
rem arkable economic performance tha t transform ed the  country from a typical 
case  of a developing nation trapped in a "vicious circle of underdevelopment”, 
into one of the largest econom ies in the late 1990s. Several factors account for 
the Korean economic success, from high levels of dom estic investm ent and 
savings and a growing volume of exports, to the improvement of the quality of 
life i effecting decreased  poverty levels, longer life expectation and lower 
fertility rates. Beneath the economic su ccess  lays a system  of "socialisation of 
private risk”, a particular mode of organising the market, as  the  "visible hands” 
of a strong and developmental s ta te  w as able to acce lera te  the pace of 
economic growth by identifying s trateg ic  industrial sectors, making 
discretionary allocation of resources to those sectors, and minimising the 
collective action dilemmas pervasive in m ost developing countries. Yet, how the 
developmental s ta te ’s  policy goals w ere designed, negotiated and implemented 
remains much of a "black box”. This research argues that to understand the 
policy process in Korea, it is crucial to  exam ine the  central role played by 
Korean leaders and how their policy choices are shaped by the dynamic 
interaction of institutions, history, context, ideas and coalition politics.
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1. CHAPTER ONE - S tra te g ic  A ctions an d  Public Policy C ho ices: 
L eadersh ip  and  In stitu tional C hange in S ou th  K orea, 1960s-1990
1.1 Introduction
South Korea has long been tou ted  a s  an outstanding m odel of 
econom ic developm ent.1 Despite poor resou rce  endow m ent and a  large 
population, a colonial legacy, the  devasta tion  following a civil war, 
p e rsis ten t political instability, and th e  lingering military confrontation 
with her northern neighbour, Korea’s  role in th e  international econom ic 
system  has rapidly increased  in im portance s in ce  the  1960s. For nearly 
four d ecades, Korea has achieved a rem arkable econom ic perform ance 
th a t transform ed the  country from a typical c a s e  of a developing nation 
trapped in a ‘vicious circle of underdevelopm ent’, into one of th e  la rgest 
econom ies in the  la te  1990s.2 Several fac to rs  accoun t for th e  Korean 
econom ic su ccess , from high levels of dom estic  investm ent and savings 
and a growing volume of exports, to  th e  im provem ent of th e  quality of life 
reflecting decreased  poverty levels, longer life expectancy  and lower 
fertility ra tes. 3 Beneath th e  econom ic s u c c e ss  lies a system  of 
socialisation  of private risk, a  particular m ode of organising th e  m arket, 
a s  th e  ‘visible hands’, of a strong and developm ental s ta te  w ere able to  
a c ce le ra te  th e  pace  of econom ic growth by identifying s tra teg ic  industrial 
sec to rs , making discretionary allocation of reso u rces  to  those  sec to rs , 
and minimising th e  collective action  dilem m as pervasive in m ost 
developing coun tries.4Yet, how th e  developm ental s ta te ’s  policy goals
'Hereafter Korea.
2“Vicious circle of underdevelopment” is taken from II Sakong, one of the country’s most prominent economists 
and a former policymaker. See II Sakong, Korea and the World Economy (Washington: Institute for International 
Economics, 1993), p.xv. II Sakong describes the situation of the country in the early 1960s in these terms:
With a per capita GNP of less than $100 dollars, domestic savings were negligible, and accordingly, foreign aid 
financed well over 50 percent of the nation’s investment. Unemployment and underemployment were 
widespread; urban unemployment in particular reached as high as 20 percent. Over 40 percent of the nation’s 
population was suffering from absolute poverty. At the same time, as a resource-poor nation, Korea had no 
significant exports ($55 million in 1962), and the balance of payments had shown a chronic deficit since 1945.
3Sakong, Korea and the World Economy, p.7.
4See pp.9-10 for a brief introduction to the system of socialisation of private risk and Chapter Two for a more 
detailed explanation of the economic and political features of this system of “socialisation of private risk”.
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w ere designed, negotiated  and im plem ented rem ains much of a  ‘black 
box’.
1.1.2 R esearch Focus
This research  is an a ttem pt to  open th e  Korean developm ental 
s ta te  ‘black box’ and expose th e  logic behind th e  s ta te ’s  decision-m aking 
p rocess .’lt com bines an institutional and political analysis to  explore the  
dynam ics of th e  policy p rocess behind th e  Korean developm ental s ta te . 
This th e sis  is particularly in terested  in analysing the  role of political 
leaders in inducing institutional change, and how their policy ch o ices  are  
shaped by the  interaction of institu tions, history, con tex t, ideas and 
coalition politics.'This is expected  to  advance our understanding of the 
fac to rs  accounting for the  behaviour of Korean political leaders  th a t 
stim ulated them  to  initiate p ro cesses  of institutional change, the  
m otivations and preferences th a t led them  to  favour and reinforce som e 
institutions but not o thers, and the im pact of institutional change on the  
nature  of political in teractions in Korea. To accom plish this, I focus on 
the  political dynam ics underlying the  creation , m ain tenance and change 
of th e  rules em bodied in the  system  of socia lisation  of private risk:
(1) What drove Korean political leaders during the  early  1960s
to  c rea te  and develop th e  system , which becam e 
assoc ia ted  with the  country’s  successfu l econom ic 
perform ance?
5State is here defined as ‘a set of organizations invested with the authority to make binding decisions for people 
and organizations juridically located in a particular territory and to implement these decisions using, if necessary, 
force’. See Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Peter Evans, ‘The State and Economic Transformation: Toward An 
Analysis of the Conditions Underlying Effective Intervention’, in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and 
Theda Skocpol, eds, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp.44-77, 
pp.46-7.
6Policies can be interpreted as ‘broad statements of goals, objectives, and means’ that are turned into ‘action 
programs’ aiming at realizing the specific ends stated in the policies. The intention of these ‘action programs’ is 
to eventually produce a change in the policy environment. See Merilee S. Grindle, ‘Policy Content and Context 
in Implementation’, in Merilee S. Grindle, ed, Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), p.6.
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(2) How did th e  rules em bodied in the  system  mould the
behaviour of the  contending groups in Korean s ta te  and 
society , in particular th e  Korean presidency?
(3) How did th e se  rules influence th e  distribution of power and
with w hat consequences in te rm s of policy and political 
outcom es?
(4) Why and how did th e  Korean leadership  s in ce  th e  early
1990s a ttem p t to  transform  th e  rules of th e  gam e of the  
system , and with w hat consequences?
Studies of th e  Korean and T aiw anese developm ental s ta te s  often 
reduce their analysis of th e  s ta te  to  th e  exam ination of an autonom ous 
and capab le  bureaucracy  th a t se lec ted  and im plem ented policy goals th a t 
did not necessarily  reflect th e  dem ands or in te re sts  of th e  socie ty .7ln th is 
sen se , autonom y w as seen  a s  holding th e  ‘ability to  form ulate in te re sts  of 
its  own, independent of the  will of divergent socia l in te re s ts ’, while 
capacity  brought ‘th e  ability to im plem ent s tra te g ie s  to  achieve its 
econom ic, political, or social goals in socie ty .’'T h e  literatu re  on th e  
Korean developm ental s ta te , however, by confining its  research  
essen tia lly  to  the  study of th e  role played by the  strong bureaucracy  in 
fostering econom ic growth and developm ent, fails to  cap tu re  a  com plete 
portrait of the  multiple, dynamic and in teractive levels within the  s ta te  
s tra ta . Additionally, such  literature neg lec ts  also  in teractions betw een 
th is  com plex s ta te  and society . Hence, th e re  is a  need to  analyse the  
s ta te  with regard to  its  several layers: execu tive leadership , executive- 
bureaucratic  ties, in tra-bureaucratic dynam ics, executive-society  tie s  and
7Alice Atnsden, Asia Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989), Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role o f  Government in East Asian 
Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), Ziya Onis, ‘The Logic of the Developmentalist 
State’; Comparative Politics, 24 (1991), 109-126, and Jung-en Woo, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in 
Korean Industrialization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).
8Karen Barkey and Sunita Parikh, ‘Comparative Perspectives on the State’; Annual Review o f Sociology, 17 
(1991), 523-549, pp. 525-6.
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bureaucratic-society  rela tions.9Ultimately, the  capacity  of th e  s ta te  to  
pursue developm ent-oriented public policies relies on ongoing political 
relationships betw een  th e se  s tra ta , in particu lar th e  execu tive with th e  
o ther s tra ta .
The Korean s ta te , a s  any o ther s ta te , is a  political realm  th a t 
en com passes d istinct, contending and a t  tim es colliding ac to rs . J u s t  a s  
ru lers ' s tra teg ies  a re  sub jec ted  to  th e  in terference and possible 
neutralising power of th e  political soc ie ty  (w hether political parties, 
unions, or in terest groups, a s  well a s  to  th e  needs of regim e survival), th e  
activ ities of the  bureaucracy  are bounded by political leaders, com peting 
s ta te  m inistries or agencies, and their own c o n s titu e n ts .10 Industrial 
change has the  ‘policy feedback’ of arousing political fo rces and shaping 
new  political coalitions, and th is leads to  a new  s e t  of co n stra in ts  and 
opportunities for ru lers and bureaucra ts , and ultim ately influences th e  
em ergence of new  institu tions and policy reform s.11As Hagen Koo points 
out for Korea:
In efforts to  highlight th e  significance of th e  s ta te  a s  an autonom ous actor, 
analyses conducted in th e  s ta tis t  perspective often ignore th a t the  s ta te  is 
em bedded in socie ty  and draw s its e ssen tia l ch a rac te ris tic s  from socie ty  
itself. Both s ta te  autonom y and s ta te  s treng th  a re  th e  products of 
in teractions betw een th e  s ta te  and society , in which even a  w eak  soc ie ty  
finds diverse w ays to  influence s ta te  struc tu re . S ta te  s treng th  is neither 
abso lu te  nor fixed, but ra ther varies according to  socia l s truggles and 
accom m odation in m ultiple a ren as .12
9Chung-in Moon and Rashemi Prasadh, ‘Beyond the Developmental State: Networks, Politics, and Institutions’; 
Governance: An International Journal o f Policy and Administration, 7 (1994), 360-386, p.364.
10Political society can be identified as the ‘arena where one endeavours to strike a balance in one’s political 
activity between what is desirable and what is possible.’ In this arena, political parties, unions or interest groups 
seek support through the mobilisation of the individual outside his or her ‘ascriptive’ group, i.e., the group to 
which one is bom such as ethnicity, religion, class and region. Within this arena, the individual's primary 
‘ascriptive’ identity is expected to become subjugated to the collective interests of the political parties, unions, 
interest groups or elites. See A.H. Somjee, Political Society in Developing Countries (London: The Macmillan 
Press, 1984), pp. 1-6 and pp.26-35.
1 'See p.25 for a definition and analysis of ‘policy feedback’.
12 Hagen Koo, ‘Introduction: Beyond State-Market Relations’, in Hagen Koo, ed, State and Society in 
Contemporary Korea (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 1-11, pp.5-6.
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This is an im portant argum ent b ecau se  it implies th a t the  streng th  of 
th e  s ta te  is not s ta tic , but ra ther changes in acco rdance with the  ability 
to  gain th e  support of a social base. This scenario  of th e  political fabric 
within th e  Korean s ta te  is one far from th e  portrait painted by the  
developm ental s ta te  literature th a t underlines harm onious and s tab le  
fea tu res . In view  of th is  d issonant and dynamic nature of th e  Korean s ta te , 
political leadership cannot be assu red , and like all o ther social ac to rs, 
political leaders have also  to  p ro tect their political in terests . The 
developm ental s ta te  literature, by equating s ta te  with bureaucracy, 
neg lec ts  the  key role of those  who control and d irect the  activ ities of the  
s ta te .13ln fact, th e  developm ental s ta te  literatu re  has little to  say  about 
leadership, and about w hat s tan d s  a t  th e  ‘heart of a  politics of econom ic 
grow th’: ‘rulers and would be rulers calculations, th a t is, how they  
a ttem p t to  secu re  support, by w hat mix of policies, designed to  appeal to  
which groups, with w hat political su cc e ss , and a t w hat econom ic 
c o s t.’14Policy cho ices and im plem entation re s t on th e  s tra teg ie s  designed 
by th e  rulers to  boost their political legitim acy, to  streng then  their power, 
and to  guaran tee  regime survival.
S tra teg ies  are not only a  product of institutional opportunities and 
constra in ts , but also of history, con tex t, coalition politics and ideological 
tem p la tes  involving the  ac to rs  a t  th e  tim e of action. The m agnitude of 
political struggle is affected  not only by econom ic institutions, w hether 
property rights laws, industrial organisation - legal rules on contracting  or 
com petition, and firm s tru c tu res  - or o ther forms of econom ic regulative 
m easures, but also  by political institutions. These can  include rules about
13William Liddle, ‘The Politics of Development Policy’; World Development, 20 (l 992), 793-807.
l4Robert Wade, ‘East Asia’s Economic Success: Conflicting Perspectives, Partial Insights, Shaky Evidence’; 
World Politics, 44 (1992), 270-320, p.309. See also Wade, Governing the Market, pp.228-255. In his seminal 
work on Taiwan, however, Robert Wade fails exactly to undertake such analysis. In relation to Taiwan’s 
developmental state, Robert Wade argues that ‘if we want to know the source of state power and autonomy, we 
have to understand the organisation of the Nationalist Party and its strategy to rule.’ Yet, while the analysis is 
rich in the way the party interacted with the society, Wade rarely looks at the workings and politics of the party’s 
hierarchy. He neglects in particular the role of the party chairman who also happened to be the island’s president. 
In this sense, the analysis does not acknowledge that control over policymaking rested in the hands of the top 
party leadership, and that this control was delegated not to formal bureaucracies but to a few trusted individuals 
with personal ties to the leadership. On the role of political leadership in Taiwan, see Gregory Noble, Collective 
Action in East Asia: How Ruling Parties Shape Industrial Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p.35.
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executive-legislative ties  which vary depending on the  type of political 
system  (parliam entary, presidential, or sem i-presidential), rules 
com prising regim e type such a s  s ta te  or social corporatism  or 
governm ent under m ultiparty coalitions, ru les of electoral com petition, or 
judicial rulings. In sum, s ta te  domination over socie ty  is far from being a 
fixed condition in Korea. It varies over tim e and sp ace , sub jec ted  to  
institutions, history, context, ideas and coalition politics and how they 
shape  policy cho ices undertaken by political leaders. Thus, the  
developm ental s ta te  literature on th e  Korean s ta te  needs to  be 
redesigned to  s ta r t  accounting for th e se  variances and w hat im pact they 
have on th e  policy process.
This ch ap te r first looks a t th e  main fea tu res  of th e  system  of 
socialisation of private risk, a t  the  core of th e  Korean developm ental 
s ta te . It then  challenges accusa tions th a t th is  system  had bred crony 
capitalism  which ultim ately led to  th e  IMF crisis  in 1997, by showing how 
recen t research  has exposed how th e  w idespread p rac tice  of rent-seeking 
in East and S ou theast Asia contributed to  rapid econom ic growth. Instead, 
the origins of the  crisis  need to  be a s se s se d  in term s of the  w eakening 
role of th e  s ta te . However, the  tendency to  em phasise  th e  role played by 
external p ressu res  in w eakening the  capacity  of the  Korean s ta te , fails to  
dem onstra te  how th e se  exogenous fo rces in terac t with dom estic politics 
to  produce institutional change. The ch ap te r proposes an alternative 
in terpretation of the  system  of socialisation of private risk based  on a 
polished version of historical institutionalism  cen tred  on th e  role of 
political ac to rs  in inducing institutional change, and how their cho ices are  
a rb itrated  by institutions, history, con tex t, ideas and coalition politics.
6
1.2 Socialisation of Private Risk: S ta te  Finance, Chaebol and Industrial 
Development In Korea
1.2.1 B ureaucratic Guidance, Industrial Policy and Financial Control
Korea is usually portrayed by the  developm ental s ta te  school a s  an 
exem plary c a se  of successfu l s ta te-led  econom ic and industrial 
developm ent.19 Specifically, th is school posits th a t governm ent control 
over banks in th e  Korean credit-based system  w as the  critical tool to  
guide and discipline th e  business sec to r  tow ards an effective industrial 
policy.16ln acco rdance with th is view, the  Korean s ta te , following the  five- 
year econom ic developm ent plans prepared by th e  Economic Planning 
Board (EPB), se lec ted  several export-oriented industrial sec to rs  a s  
priority sec to rs  (such a s  autom obiles, s tee l, shipbuilding, m achinery and 
electronics) and provided them  with m assive aid, notably in term s of 
financial benefits.17The chosen  ones would have preferential a c c e s s  to  
rationed and subsidised credit, foreign exchange, s ta te  investm ent funds, 
tax  advantages, a s  well a s  o ther supportive m echanism s such a s  import 
protection and sec to ra l entry restric tions. But on th e  o ther side, through 
so-called ‘adm inistrative guidance’, the  governm ent would s te e r  th e se  
industries in term s of acquisition and deploym ent of technology, capacity  
expansion, and prices.
The ultim ate consequence of th is econom ic in terchange betw een 
s ta te  and business w as th e  institutionalisation of a system  of 
socialisation of private risk in which th e  s ta te  susta ined  th e  potential 
risks asso c ia ted  with private investm en ts.18 This socialised  risk would 
tak e  such  forms a s  deposit insurance, lender-of-last-resort, s ta te  
g uaran tees, or subsidies to  banks th a t becom e critically exposed to  firms 
in financial difficulties. In the  ca se  of Korea, the  s ta te  raised capital on
l5Amsden, Asia Next Giant, Wade, Governing the Market, and Onis, ‘The Logic of the Developmentalist State’.
l6See, in particular, Woo, Race to the Swift.
nHa-joon Chang, ‘The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Korea’; Cambridge Journal o f Economics, 17 
(1993), 131-157.
18Wade, Governing the Market, p.366.
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th e  international m arkets and allocated  th e  financial reso u rces  to  private 
firms, a  policy which Wonhyuk Lim described  to  have had th e  effec t of 
*contracting out th e  provision of goods and serv ices to  th e  private sec to r  
under a  system  of governm ent monitoring a s  well a s  a  gu aran tee  on 
loans.’19
For the  developm ental s ta te  literatu re  w hat seem s to  have 
distinguished Korea from m ost o ther la te  industrialising coun tries w as the  
discipline exerted  by the s ta te  over private firms through its control of 
capital flow s.20Thus, in the  fast-growing econom y of Korea, subsid ies 
w ere provided under the  principle of reciprocity, i.e., th e  recip ient of 
subsid ies had to  obey certain  perform ance s tan d ard s  in te rm s of output, 
product quality, investm ents in training, research  developm ent, and in 
particular, export ta rg e ts . Export perform ance em erged a s  th e  s ta te ’s  
main benchm ark to  a llocate  credit to  private firms. While th e  system  of 
socialisation of private risk encouraged private investm ent, th e  Korean 
s ta te , through d irect monitoring and a  m arket te s t  based  on export 
perform ance, contained th e  potential c o s ts  of ’moral hazard’ th a t could be 
c rea ted  by sta te-guaran teed  debt financing.21 Discipline in Korea took 
mainly tw o forms: (1) rationalisation of industries which succum bed to  
overexpansion; (2) and bankruptcy of badly m anaged firms in o therw ise 
healthy industries.22
1.2.2 The IMF Crisis, ’Crony Capitalism ’ and Value-Enhancing Rent-Seeking
In th e  w ake of th e  financial crisis in 1997, th is  system  of 
socialisation  of private risk which had nurtured w hat w as once regarded 
as  ’alliance capitalism ’ w as overnight blam ed for fostering ’crony 
capitalism ’, i.e., ’’the  netw ork of businessm en who gained a c c e s s  to
19Wonhyuk Lim, ‘The Origin and Evolution of the Korean Economic System’; KDI Policy Study 2000-03 
(Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 2000), pp.25-6.
20Amsden, Asia Next Giant, p. 14 and Woo, Race to the Swift, p.2.
21Lim, ‘The Origin and Evolution of the Korean Economic System’, p.26. The concept of moral hazard derives 
from the insurance literature and describes borrowing situations in which borrowers will have the propensity to 
be less cautious with borrowed money than if its was their own money.
22Amsden, Asia Next Giant, pp. 14-6.
w ealth through their connections to  th e  president and channelled  it 
largely into non-productive personal fortunes a t  hom e and 
abroad”.23Empirical evidence in th e  developm ental East Asian s ta te s  such  
a s  Korea reveals however, th a t corruption, patronage, k ickbacks and 
o ther forms of rent-seeking w ere not only common but a lso  w idespread 
p rac tices  during th e  years of high econom ic growth in th e  region. What 
seem s to  have differentiated East Asian developm ental s ta te s  from o ther 
la te  industrialising nations w as not th e  absen ce  of s ta te -b u sin ess  
corruption netw orks, but instead  th e  fac t th a t ren ts  w ere predom inantly 
used to  achieve productive goals ra ther than em bezzled for private 
consum ption.
S tate-cen tric  analysts  like P e ter Evans acknow ledge th e  ex isten ce  
of corruption, inefficiency, nepotism  and favouritism  in Korea, arguing 
th a t such  ‘deform ities w ere simply m ore successfu lly  contained  than  
th o se  in less  well developed bureaucrac ies.’24Alice Amsden adds th a t 
bailouts of failing firms w ere not ab sen t in Korea and w hen they  occurred 
would be highly politicized a s  th e  s ta te  picked c lose  friends to  tak e  over 
the  troubled firms. But she  also s tre s se s  th a t w hat kep t th e  authority  of 
the  disciplinary process in tact w as th e  s ta te ’s  ability to  ensure th a t its  
c lose  friends would generally perform well.25However, th e  recognition by 
th e se  au thors th a t ren ts w ere widely used in Korea is not com plem ented 
with an explanation of why th is exchange for favours w as successfu lly  
contained  so  a s  not to  de terio ra te  into full rent-seeking and corruption 
which would put a t risk econom ic growth. The issu es  of rent-seeking and 
corruption a re  particularly relevant, not only due to  th e  claim s th a t they  
w ere th e  cau se  of th e  1997 financial crisis in Asia, but a lso  b ecau se  it has
23For the origins of the term and a critique of this labelling, see Janies Putzel, ‘Developmental States and Crony 
Capitalists’, in Pietro Masina, ed, Rethinking Development in East Asia: From Illusory Miracle to Economic 
Crisis (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2002), pp.161-188, p.162. See also Ha-Joon Chang, ‘The hazard of 
moral hazard’, Financial Times, 8 October 1998, p.7.
24Peter Evans, ‘State Structures, Govemment-Business Relations, and Economic Transformation’, in Sylvia 
Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, eds, Business and the State in Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1997), pp.63-87, p.72, fn.ll.
25Amsden, Asia Next Giant, p. 16.
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becom e commonly accep ted  th a t th e se  p rac tices  are  conducive to  poor 
econom ic perform ance.
But for Mushtaq Khan, the  conflation of w idespread rent-seeking 
activ ities with high econom ic growth p a tte rn s in Asia requires a new  
understanding of the  different types of ren ts th a t ex is t in any given 
econom y, a s  well a s  an analysis of th e  institutional and political variables 
underpinning th e se  econom ic exchange.2'Khan co n tras ts  th e  developm ent 
p a tte rn s  of South Asia (Indian subcontinent) with East Asia (Korea) and 
S ou theast Asia (Malaysia and Thailand) until the  la te  1990s. He contends 
tha t, desp ite  their differences, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand show  th a t 
rent-outcom es of the  rent-seeking p rocess w ere conducive to  productive 
investm ents and high econom ic growth. In face  of th e  evidence, Khan 
argues th a t ren ts can  be seen  not only a s  value-reducing but also a s  
value-enhancing. These value-enhancing ren ts  are  nonetheless expected  
to  occu r only under certain  political and institutional conditions. Once 
th e se  conditions alter, there  is the  possibility th a t th e  natu re  of th e  ren ts 
can  also  change and turn into value-reducing ren ts.27
Patron-client relations are  here seen  a s  the  crucial political 
elem ent behind th e  p rocess of rent-seeking, and a n ecessa ry  explanation 
for th e  variance in rent-outcom es. Khan argues th a t th e  distribution of 
organisational pow er within th e  patron-client netw orks involved in the  
rent-seeking exchange in th e  four c a se  s tu d ies  analysed provides the  
explanation for their variance in econom ic perform ance. While in th e  c a se  
of th e  Indian subcontinent, resou rces w ere allocated  to  non-capitalists 
(‘in term ediate’ or ‘middle’ c lasses), in E ast and S ou theast Asia, they w ere 
mainly routed to  the  business sec to r. The Korean ren t system  w as one
26Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo K.S., ‘Introduction’, Mushtaq H. Khan, ‘Rents, Efficiency and Growth’, and 
‘Rent-Seeking as Process’, in Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo K.S., eds, Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic 
Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 1-20, 
pp.21-69, and pp.70-144, respectively. Rent-seeking is understood as the ‘activities which seek to create, 
maintain or change the rights and institutions on which particular rents are based’, while rents are defined as 
‘excess incomes’ or incomes higher than the minimum someone would have received, the minimum being 
usually defined as the income on his or her next-best opportunity.
27Khan and Jomo, ‘Introduction’, p.24.
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ch arac terised  by the  g rea te r political pow er of th e  s ta te  vis-a-vis th e  
w eak  organisational pow er of in term ediate  groups, in a way th a t 
streng thened  the  capacity  of th e  s ta te  to  c rea te , m aintain or tran sfer 
ren ts  and rights in acco rdance with its  own econom ic agenda. In Malaysia 
and Thailand, although in term ediate groups w ere not a s  organisationally 
w eak  a s  in Korea, productive investm ent and rapid growth w as not 
affected . The d istinct feature of th e  M alaysian ren t system  w as w hat 
Khan nam es ‘cen tralised  clientelism ’ in which the  ren ts  paid by the  Malay- 
Chinese cap ita lis ts  w ere redistributed in a  cen tra lised  w ay to  the  Malay 
interm ediate groups, th e  political basis  of th e  country 's ruling coalition, 
UMNO (the United Malay National Organization). The stren g th  of UMNO 
rested  then  in its  su c c e ss  in using ren ts  to  bring to g e th er com peting 
Malay clien te list groups in a unified political m ovem ent.2*ln Thailand, on 
the  o ther hand, w hat w as in p lace w as a  ‘capitalist-led decen tra lised  
cliantelism ’, i.e., redistributive ren ts  w ere  essen tially  sought by Thai 
cap ita lis t groups com m itted to  primitive accum ulation and therefore in 
developing their business in te re sts .29
The contribution by Khan is significant b ecau se  he offers a  valid 
and a lternative econom ic understanding of rent-seeking th a t goes beyond 
the  general view focusing on its  negative socia l c o s ts  and eschew ing its 
potential use  to  c rea te  value-enhancing ren ts  and rights.30 Khan does th is 
by underlining the need to  understand  th e  political and institutional 
con tex t under which ‘good’ or ‘bad’ rent-seeking p ro cesses  tak e  place. 
This analysis of rent-seeking and corruption and how they  coex isted  with 
fast econom ic growth in Korea defies a  m uch-voiced view by neo-liberals 
blaming fundam entally ‘crony capitalism ’ for th e  crisis  in 1997.31The work 
of Ha-joon Chang, Hong-Jae Park and Chul Gyue Yoo appear to  s treng then  
the  argum ents postu lated  by Khan a s  they  illustrate how policy reform s
28Khan, ‘Rent-Seeking as Process’, pp.98-101.
29Khan, ‘Rent-Seeking as Process’, pp. 101-4.
30See for example, Anne O. Krueger, ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’; The American 
Economic Review, 64 (1974), 291-303.
31 For an overview of the neo-liberal explanations for the crisis, see Mark Beeson and Richard Robison, 
‘Introduction: Interpreting the crisis’, in Richard Robison et al., eds, Politics and Markets in the Wake o f the 
Asian Crisis (London: Routledge, 2000), pp.3-24, pp. 19-20.
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th a t w eakened  the  Korean s ta te ’s  capacity  to  c rea te , m aintain or transfer 
ren ts  and rights ultim ately contributed to  th e  crisis.32
1.2.3 From Strong S ta te  to  W eak S ta te
For Ha-joon Chang, Hong-Jae Park and Chul Gyue Yoo, th e  crisis 
w as cau sed  mainly by the  dism antling of the  planning econom y 
undertaken a t  a  rapid p ace  during th e  presidency of Kim Young Sam 
(1993-1997). These au thors claim th a t ill-designed financial liberalisation 
and further w eakening of industrial policy undertaken during Kim Young 
Sam ’s  presidency negatively affected  th e  country’s  econom ic conditions. 
First, th e  p rocess  of designing five-year developm ent plans cam e to  an 
end, desp ite  the  fac t th a t it had been a useful fram ew ork to  co-ordinate 
investm ents since  1962. Together with th e  m erger of th e  Economic 
Planning Board (EPB) and th e  Ministry of F inance (MOF) in 1993, to  c rea te  
th e  Ministry of F inance and Economy (MOFE), th e se  policy and 
organisational changes rep resen ted  th e  sym bolic ’dem ise of (indicative) 
’planning’ in Korea’. Secondly, th e  governm ent led by Kim Young Sam 
h astened  th e  dism antling of se lec tive  industrial policy which had begun in 
th e  la te  1980s. This policy had been a  crucial m echanism  to  check  
’excessiv e  com petition’, therefore  its term ination led to  over-investm ent.
As governm ent p roceeded with financial liberalisation, the  
loosening of financial regulations further aided over-investm ent. With 
financial deregulation taking place, restric tions on foreign borrowing by 
conglom erates w as reduced  and foreign deb t grew  rapidly from US$44 
billion in 1993 to  US$120 billion in S ep tem ber 1997. The sh are  of short­
term  deb t (which is defined a s  debt with le ss  than a year’s  maturity) in 
to ta l ex ternal debt, however, rose from 43.2 p ercen t in 1992 to 57.6 
percen t in 1997.33 This placed th e  country in a position sensitive to  
fluctuations in foreign confidence over th e  soundness of th e  Korean
32Ha-Joon Chang, Hong-Jae Park and Chul Gyue Yoo, ‘Interpreting the Korean crisis: financial liberalisation, 
industrial policy and corporate governance’; Cambridge Journal o f Economics, 22 (1998), 735-746.
33 Asian Development Bank, Rising to the Challenges in Asia: A Study o f  Financial Markets, Volume 7: Republic 
o f Korea (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1999), p. 11 (table 4).
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econom y. For Chang e t  al. it w as not only th e  scope of th e  liberalisation, 
‘but also  its  design th a t contributed to  the  crisis, a s  it gave the  incentive 
to  borrow ers to  co n trac t short-term  loans and allowed poor asset-liability 
m anagem ent to  go unchecked.’34While Chang, Park and Yoo’s  approach 
offer a compelling analysis of th e  im pact of th e  transform ations 
engineered by th e  Korean s ta te  during th e  presidency of Kim Young Sam, 
tw o puzzles are  nonethe less  left unansw ered:
(1) If industrial policy and financial regulation underpinned the
su c c e ss  of Korean developm ent, why did th e  s ta te  s in ce  the  
early 1990s move to  transform  th e  system  of socialisation of 
private risk?
(2) If successfu l developm ent in Korea w as a  product of a
strong and disciplinarian s ta te , why then  did th e  s ta te  fail to  
supervise th e  financial and corporate  se c to rs  a s  w as expected  
within the  system  of socialisation or private risk?
For Robert Wade, th e  dism antling of th e  rules of th e  gam e th a t had, 
for alm ost tw o d ecad es , underpinned th e  capacity  of th e  Korean 
developm ental s ta te  w as greatly  determ ined by U.S. p ressu re  in th e  early 
1990s.39He argues th a t under in tense  dem ands from th e  U.S. Treasury, 
Korea not only allowed (higher ceilings on foreign participation in the  
Korean s to ck  m arket, guaran teed  entry for som e type of foreign financial 
institutions, higher ceilings for foreign ow nership of Korean com panies’, 
but also  introduced tw o m ajor policy changes th a t would directly lead to  
th e  crisis: Korean conglom erates w ere given freedom  to  borrow in 
international m arkets and; th e  estab lishm ent of new  m erchant banks a s  
well a s  their capability to  borrow abroad w ere liberalised. This changing 
policy environm ent contributed to  w eakening th e  s ta te ’s  ability to
34Chang, Park and Yoo, Interpreting the Korean crisis, pp.738-9.
35Robert Wade, ‘International Institutions and the US Role in the Long Asian Crisis of 1990-2000’, paper 
presented at the conference, New Institutional Economics, Institutional Reform and Poverty Reduction, 
Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 7-8 September 
2000.
13
supervise th e  financial and corporate sec to r. In sum, th e  d ism an tling ’ of 
w h at w ere regarded a s  th e  pillars of th e  system  of socia lisation  of private 
risk -  industrial policy and s tric t financial regulation -  a re  indicated a s  
m ajor c au se s  contributing to  the  crisis  th a t hit Korea in 1997.
However, the  role played by ex ternal p ressu res, in particu lar from 
th e  U.S., on Korea’s  policy choices is not sufficient to  explain th e  policy 
reform s th a t ultim ately caused  th e  crisis. As Wade acknow ledges, th is  
argum ent d o e s  not pin down the  im portance of th is  ex ternal p ressu re  
relative to  th e  w ishes of segm en ts  of th e  Korean policy-making elite; nor 
does it say  w here th e  Korean governm ent g e ts  its  policy ’p references’ 
from.’36Furtherm ore, p references m atte r little if th e  policy e lites  cannot 
carry  out th e  policies they  c h o o se .37 Policy e lites need to  have th e  
capacity  to  im plem ent policies, not only through an effective 
adm inistrative appara tus th a t can reso rt to  taxation  or coercion, but also 
by mobilising or retaining support in th e  socie ty .3*Thus, exp lanations of 
th e  ca u se s  th a t led to  th e  transform ation of the  capacity  of th e  Korean 
s ta te  since  th e  early 1990s calls for an understanding of th e  perceptions, 
p references and s tra teg ie s  of th e  Korean political leaders th a t led them  
to  pursue institutional change. Additionally, it is also  n ecessary  to  
com prehend th e  political dynam ics involved in th is p rocess, in particular 
the  building of a supporting coalition and its degree of political su c c e ss  
and econom ic costs .
36Wade, ‘International Institutions and the US Role in the Long Asian Crisis of 1990-2000’, p. 17.
37Barbara Geddes, Politician‘s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1996), p. 14. Policy elites can be defined as “those who have official positions in government 
and whose responsibilities include making or participating in making and implementing authoritative decisions 
for society”. See Merilee Grindle and John W. Thomas, Public Choices and Policy Change: The Political 
Economy o f Reform in Developing Countries (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp.59-67. 
The composition of the policy elites (heads of state, bureaucracy, legislators, etc) will vary depending on the 
particular policy under consideration.
8Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1986), p.238.
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1.3 Investigating “Socialisation of Private Risk” In Korea: An Alternative 
In terpretation
1.3.1 Beneath th e  V eneer of the  S ta te : Historical Institutionalism  and the 
Politics of Policy P rocess
S tudies of th e  Korean developm ental s ta te  often build a  s ta tic  
model of th e  s ta te  em phasising th e  role of the  bureaucracy, and its 
s treng th  vis-d-vis a 'w eak’ socie ty  (in particu lar th e  business sector). Yet, 
by continuing to  b ase  their analysis of th e  nature  of th e  Korean s ta te  on 
th e se  term s, th e  s tu d ies  fail to  grasp  th e  manifold and dynamic 
in teractions within th e  s ta te  s tra ta  and betw een  th is  com plex s ta te  and 
society, in particular the  role played by Korean P residen ts vis-a-vis o ther 
concerned ac to rs, during th e  p ro cesses  of policy cho ices. Analysts 
operating within historical institutionalism  have sought to  go beyond the  
dichotom y of s ta te-socie ty , which form s th e  basis  of th e  developm ental 
s ta te  literature, to  focus instead  on th e  dynam ic in teractions betw een 
political and econom ic ac to rs  in th e  policy p ro cess .39As P eter Hall, one of 
th e  main exponents of th is  school, em phasises, historical institutionalism  
looks a t 'th e  institutional relationships, both formal and conventional 
binding th e  com ponents of s ta te  to g e th e r and [which] s tru c tu re  its 
relations with society. While th o se  relationships are  sub jec t to 
increm ental change, and m ore radical change a t  critical conjunctures, 
they provide th e  con tex t in which normal politics is conducted .’40
Institutions, in particu lar interm ediate institu tions, m atter. Not only 
do institu tions determ ine th e  capacity  of governm ents to  en a c t laws and 
im plem ent policies, they also  mould th e  perceptions, p references and 
actions of individuals or groups, and s tru c tu re  pow er relations betw een
39Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’ in Kathleen Thelen, 
Sven Steinmo, and Frank Longstreth, eds, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. I-32, p.7. For a similar approach to the historical 
institutionalist school, see Ha-Joon Chang, ‘Breaking the mould: an institutionalist political economy alternative 
to the neo-liberal theory of the market and the state’; Cambridge Journal o f  Economics, 26 (2002), 539-559.
40Peter Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics o f State Intervention in Britain and France (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1986), p. 19.
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contending individuals or groups in society . Institutions are  here  defined 
a s  the  ‘formal rules and informal procedures, routines, norm s and 
conventions em bedded in the  organisational s truc tu re  of th e  polity or 
political econom y.’ 41 Historical institu tionalists consider exam ples of 
in term ediate institutions to  be: constitu tional rules, bu reaucratic
s tan d a rd s  operations, property rights laws, industrial organisation, 
conventions th a t govern trade  unions or business associa tion  activ ities, 
a s  well a s  bank-firm ties. Most of th e se  rules tend  to  be explicit, well- 
defined, usually w ritten and are  deliberately crea ted  and estab lished  by 
th e  s ta te  to  apply, a t leas t in principle, to  all political ac to rs. O thers, 
however, a re  not w ritten, but ra ther developed a s  codes of behaviour.
Historical institu tionalists, in general, do not regard individuals or 
groups a s  all utility m axim isers when they  pursue their p references, but 
instead  m ore a s  rule-following ‘sa tisfice rs’. 42 This approach s e e s  the  
perceptions, preferences and actions a s  defined and confined by the  
institutional reality in which individuals or groups in terac t with each  other. 
The question of how individuals or groups forge their perceptions, 
p references and actions is regarded a s  problem atic, s ince  they  are  
influenced by th e  institutional context. H istorical institu tionalists also  
tend  to  look a t the  institutional environm ent a s  shaping th e  pow er 
relations betw een the  contending individuals or groups in socie ty  a s  it 
favours a c c e s s  to  the  p rocess  of policymaking to  som e but not o thers. 
T hese analytical foundations em phasise  th e  role played by institu tions in 
structuring  politics. H istorical institu tionalists tend  to  concep tualise  
institu tions a s  path-dependent, i.e., ‘decisions a t one point in tim e can  
restric t future possibilities by sending policy off onto particular track s,
41 Peter Hall and Rosemary C.R Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’; Political 
Studies, 24 (1996), p.938. The concept of institutions here employed is usually associated with historical 
institutionalism. For an overview of other institutionalisms, new institutionalism economics (NIE), rational 
choice and sociological institutionalism, see Douglas C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), and ‘The New Institutional Economics and Third 
World Development’, in John Harriss, Janet Hunter and Colin Lewis, eds, The New Institutional Economics and 
Third World Development (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 17-26, Thomas Koelbe, ‘The New Institutionalism in 
Political Science and Sociology’; Comparative Politics, 27 (January 1995), 231-243, and Junko Kato, ‘Review 
Article: Institutions and Rationality in Politics -  Three Varieties of Neo-Institutionalists’; British Journal o f 
Political Science, 4 (1996), 553-582.
42Thelen and Steinmo, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, p.8.
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along which ideas and in te re s ts  develop and institu tions and s tra teg ies  
adap t.,43lnstitu tions a re  thus seen  a s  relatively enduring fea tu res  which 
have played a  crucial role in driving historical developm ent along a 
particular s e t  of paths.
By focusing analysis on how th e  institutional se tting  influences 
s ta te -so c ie ty  in teractions, i.e., the  politics of the  policy process, 
historical institutionalism  em erges a s  th e  m ost adequate  and useful 
theoretica l platform to  look carefully beneath  th e  veneer of the  Korean 
developm ental s ta te  and advance our know ledge of the  logic behind the  
policy process, in particular th e  w orkings of the  system  of socialisation of 
private risk.
Three main them es within historical institutionalism  distinguish it 
from o ther institutionalism s (as illustrated  in Table One) to  offer a  more 
adequate  and com prehensive analysis of th e  political econom y of growth 
and developm ent in Korea:
1) Recognising the  lim itations of human rationality, historical 
institutionalism  does not n ecessarily  s e e  th e  preferences, goals and 
ac tions of individuals and groups a s  oriented tow ards utility 
m axim isation a s  in rational cho ice institutionalism . Instead, 
preferences, goals and ac tio n s are  th e  product of particular historical 
developm ents, and are  developed and susta ined  by a  particular s e t  of 
norms, rules, s tru c tu res  and ideas;
2) For historical institu tionalists, p ro cesses  of politics and policymaking 
within a  specified institutional se tting  can  be b es t understood if w e 
develop a contextual perspective  to  tra ce  w hat political ac to rs  are 
trying to  achieve and why they  em phasise  certa in  p references and 
actions over o thers. For historical institutionalism , unlike new
43Margaret Weir, ‘Ideas and the politics of bounded innovation’, in Thelen, Steinmo, and Longstreth, eds, 
Structuring Politics, pp. 188-216, p. 192.
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institutional econom ics and rational choice institutionalism , causality  
is regarded a s  being contextual, i.e., it s e e s  particular policy decisions 
a s  being a  product of highly com plex constellation of fac to rs a t  a 
certa in  point in tim e. This school has re jected  th e  view  th a t th e  sam e 
operative forces will lead to  th e  sam e political ou tcom es everyw here. 
Instead, th e  effects  of such forces will be m ediated by th e  con tex t of a 
specific situation, often a legacy from th e  p ast.44
3) Finally, historical institu tionalists focus on th e  ‘contingencies of 
history’, i.e., they highlight the  irregularities ra ther than the  
regularities of history to  dem onstra te  the  lim itations of universal 
causal m odels. Ultimately, th is allow s the  analysis of multiple and 
diverse types of developm ent experiences beyond w hat have been th e  
common ob jects  of study within th is approach: industrialised W estern 
nations.45 As Ellen Immergut puts it:
Our understanding of particular even ts  and developm ents is 
constrained  by the  large role played by chance. Quirks of fa te  are  
responsible for acciden tal com binations of fac to rs  th a t nevertheless 
have lasting effects . In addition, self-conscious political ac to rs, 
reflecting on their p a s ts  and fu tures can  divert th e  supposedly 
ineluctable m arch of progress onto unexpected  paths. Such contingent 
developm ents stand  beyond logic and can  only be grasped  through 
historical analysis.46
44While institutions play a crucial role in shaping the behaviour of political actors, historical institutionalists, 
nonetheless, agree that it is the interplay between institutions and other contextual factors such as class, public 
philosophies, historical circumstances, elite and public preferences that fabricate peculiar policy outcomes which 
in urn, will become areas of future political and institutional strife. See Thelen and Steinmo, ‘Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, p.27. See also Hall and Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms’, p.941.
45Ellen Immergut, ‘The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism’; Politics & Society, 26 (1998), 5-34.
^Immergut, ‘The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism’, p. 19.
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Table One - Types of Institutionalisms: Similarities and Differences
Dimensions New Institutional 
Economics
Rational Choice 
Institutionalism
Historical
Institutionalism
Institutions Set of humanly devised 
rules th a t constrain 
human interaction in 
society  (ex: property 
rights, formal rules and 
regulations)
Set of incentives 
and constrain ts th a t 
mould the  rational 
behaviour of self- 
in terested  
individuals (ex.: 
constitutions, 
legislatures, 
executives, courts or 
elections)
Set of formal and 
informal rules and 
conventions tha t 
structu re  and 
shape individuals, 
(ex.: constitutional 
rules, bureaucratic 
standard  
operations, 
industrial 
organisation, or 
conventions 
governing bank- 
firm ties)
A ctor's
preferences
and
behaviour
Individuals’ preferences 
are  constrained by their 
m ental models which are  
partly culturally derived 
and partly acquired by 
experience. Individual 
action is based on 
incom plete information 
and limited m ental 
capacity.
Individuals’ 
preferences are 
given, fixed and they 
m anoeuvre and a c t 
strategically  to 
atta in  and maximise 
their personal 
utilities. Individual 
action is regarded as  
an optimal 
adaptation to the 
institutional 
environment.
Individuals’ 
preferences are 
self-reflective, 
defined and 
confined by history, 
norms, rules, 
s tructu res and 
ideas within a 
particular context. 
Individual action is 
determ ined by the 
institutional reality 
and context a t the 
point in time.
Political
P rocess
Institutions determ ine 
the  perform ance of the 
economy by their 
constraining effect on 
exchange p rocesses in 
term s of transaction  and 
production costs .
Institutions are  the 
s tra teg ic  arena, i.e., 
the  rules of the gam e 
th a t do not allow 
every conceivable 
political choice to  be 
considered and 
within which the 
preferences of self- 
in terested  
individuals are  
pursued.
Institutions offer 
an ordered and 
structured 
environm ent in 
which som e 
actions might be 
appropriate but 
o thers not. 
Institutions 
m anipulate and 
constrain 
perceptions, 
expectations, the 
calculation of 
in terests  and 
formation of goals.
Power
Relations
Institutions reflect 
in terest group politics 
and are  influenced by 
the  transaction  co s ts  of 
bargaining, 
m easurem ent and
Individuals have the 
ability to  a c t 
unilaterally and 
institutions are  not 
analysed in term s of 
w hether or not they
Institutions are  not 
neutral.
Institutions bias 
policymaking 
toward som e types 
of in terests  and
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enforcem ent. privilege particular 
in terests.
aw ay from others 
because  they 
channel 
participation in 
particular 
directions.
Institutional
Change
Institutional change is 
an ongoing, increm ental 
process. Change is a 
consequence of 
exogenous p ressures or 
learning by individuals or 
organisations th a t 
choose to modify the 
term s of the  exchanges 
because  they believe 
th a t they could be b e tte r 
off.
Institutional change 
is usually 
evolutionary and a 
product of 
exogenous 
pressures. Change is 
a  conscious process 
and occurs when the 
existing institution 
has failed to m eet 
the  requirem ents for 
which it w as formed.
Institutional 
change is 
essentially  an 
outcom e of the 
pressure by 
exogenous 
elem ents a s  they 
"punctuate” w hat 
w as regarded a s  a 
durable 
institutional 
setting.
1.3.2 Individuals, Institutions and Historical Institutionalism : Debating
Ontological and Epistem ological Issues
Historical institutionalism  show s a  way forward to  exam ine how 
institu tions s tru c tu re  political in teractions in th e  policy p rocess  over time, 
but it is less  obvious how and why th e se  institu tions change. This is not 
to  say  th a t historical institutionalism  does not deal w ith institutional 
change: ‘institutions are  charac terised  by long periods of stability, 
periodically ‘punctuated’ by ‘critical junc tu res’, i.e., w hen substan tia l 
institutional change occurs thereby creating  a ‘branching point’ from 
which historical developm ent m oves onto a  new  path .’ 47 Change is 
essen tia lly  an outcom e of th e  p ressure  by exogenous elem en ts such a s  
econom ic crisis or military conflict (‘critical ju n c tu re s’), a s  they 
‘punctua te’ w hat w as regarded a s  a  durable institutional setting . While
47Hall and Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, p.942, and Thelen and Steinmo, 
‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, pp.16-7. ‘Critical junctures’ are defined as ‘points of 
departure from established patterns’. See Thelen and Steinmo, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Politics’, p.27. A concept that is widely accepted within the historical institutionalist school is of ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ first introduced by Stephen Krasner, and borrowed from evolutionary biology, and which he 
described as ‘an imagery that expects short bursts of rapid institutional change followed by long period of stasis.’ 
In this model, institutional crises usually arise from external pressures. These crises lead to the breakdown of the 
old institutions to generate political conflict over the configuration of the new institutional framework. See 
Stephen Krasner, ‘Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics’; Comparative 
Politics, 16 (1984), 223-246.
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th is  ‘punctuation’ can  be a  sufficient explanation afte r th e  occurrence of 
th e  fac t, th is  can also  com e close  to  being tautological. How are  w e to  
know th a t th is  fac t w as sufficient to  a lte r th e  institutional equilibrium? 
There seem s to  be no a  priori criteria to  learn when th ere  may be enough 
political or contextual force to  produce change .48In general, historical 
institu tionalists do not seem  to  have elaborated  a c lea r response to  
explain w hat triggers ‘critical jun c tu res’ th a t ultim ately a lte r the  
institutional equilibrium and inertia.49
This resides in the  fac t th a t historical institutionalism  am biguously 
a d d resses  a recurren t ontological d iscussion in social sc ience , i.e., the  
nature of th e  exchange betw een institu tions and individuals. 90 For 
h istorical institu tionalists, political behaviour tak es  p lace within a stab le  
institutional fram ework th a t offers an ordered and struc tu red  environment 
and which might be appropriate for certa in  actions but not o thers. 
Institu tions are  seen  a s  essen tia lly  m anipulating and constraining 
p references and actions. Historical institu tionalists are  ec lec tic  in the  
se n se  th a t they  use  e ither a ‘calcu lus approach’ or a ‘cultural approach’ to  
explain how institutions affect th e  behaviour of individuals or groups.61The 
‘calcu lus approach’ assu m es th a t institu tions influence th e  behaviour by 
providing ‘g rea te r or le sse r degrees of certa in ty  about th e  p resen t and 
future behaviour of o ther ac to rs .’ They affect individual behaviour by 
changing th e  expecta tions an ac to r has about th e  conduct th a t o ther 
a c to rs  are  likely to  tak e  in reaction  to  or a t the sam e tim e with his own 
action. The “cultural approach” presum es th a t individuals or groups 
derive moral and cognitive guidelines for in terpretation  of reality and 
behaviour from th e  institutional se tting  they  are  em bedded in. Here, th e  
cou rse  of action decided by individuals will depend on th e  way they  
in terpret th e  con tex t ra ther than  on m erely instrum ental calculation.
48Guy Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science (London: Pinter, 1999), pp.68-9.
49Even historical institutionalists such as Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor acknowledge this limitation of the 
approach. See Hall and Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, p.942.
50Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science, pp.71-2.
51Hall and Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, pp.939.-940.
21
N evertheless, historical institu tionalists recognise th a t institutions 
are  th em se lv es  also  the  outcom e (conscious or unintended) of deliberate 
political s tra teg ies , of political conflicts, and of choice.’s2ln th is sense , 
political ac to rs  can be a s  K athleen Thelen and Sven Steinm o em phasise  
‘su b jec ts  and ag en ts  of historical change.’ 83 Despite th e  em pirical 
evidence showing th a t political ac to rs  should be taken  seriously in the  
analysis of p ro cesses  of institutional change, analysing how ac to rs  
becom e ag en ts  or a rch itec ts  of institutional change rem ains a vague 
project within historical institutionalism .54 Colin Hay and Daniel W incott’s 
in terpretation of how the dynamic in teraction betw een political ac to rs  
and institu tions may yield institutional change is here seen  a s  a  potential 
approach to  a tten d  to  th is ontological issu e .8ST hese au thors claim th a t 
historical institutionalism  is prone to  fall into a ‘la ten t structuralism ’ by 
postulating, th a t w hether through th e  ‘calculus approach’ or ‘cultural 
approach’, political behaviour is essen tia lly  circum scribed by institutions.
For historical institutionalism  to  overcom e th is  lim itation, Hay and 
W incott contend th a t it needs to  be founded on a d istinctive social 
ontology. Such social ontology would then  affirm a  s tronger conception of 
the  s tra teg ic  role played by political agency in political outcom es and 
acknow ledge the  ‘mutually constitu tive’ nature of th e  relationship 
betw een institutions and ag en ts  and how they  affect institutional 
fabrication, dynam ics and transform ation. For Hay and Wincott, 
institu tions do not only im pose constra in ts, they  also  offer opportunities
52Thelen and Steinmo, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, p. 10.
53Thelen and Steinmo, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, p. 10.
54For studies on the role played in particular by political leaders, in nurturing institutional change and policy 
reform, see Joan N. Nelson, ed, Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics o f Economic Adjustment in the 
Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), Grindle and ThomaSyPublic Choices and Policy 
Change, John Williamson, ed, The Political Economy o f Policy Reform (Washington: Institute for International 
Economics, 1994), Merilee Grindle, ‘New Rules of the Game: Theory, Practice and Poverty’, paper presented at 
the conference New Institutional Economics, Institutional Reform and Poverty Reduction, Development Studies 
Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 7-8 September 2000, Merilee Grindle, 
‘Designing Reform: Problems, Solutions, and Politics’; KSG Faculty Research Working Papers Series RWP01- 
020 (Cambrige: Harvard University, 2000), and Merilee Grindle, Audacious Reforms: Institutional Invention 
and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2000).
55Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, ‘Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism’; Political Studies, 46 
(1998), 951-7. For a debate on structure and agency, see Colin Hay, ‘Structure and Agency’, in David Marsh and 
Gerry Stoker, eds, Theory and Methods in Political Science (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1995), pp. 189-206. 
For a reply to Hay and Wincott, see Peter Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, ‘The Potential of Historical 
Institutionalism: A Response to Hay and Wincott’; Political Studies, 46 (1998), 958-962.
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for political behaviour. The prem ises for th e se  s tra teg ie s  m ust rely upon 
judgem ents of the  institutional fram ew ork which are  a t  b es t partial and 
which may turn out to  be erroneous a fte r carrying out the  s tra teg ic  
p lan .88Within th is formulation, s tra teg y  plays an im portant role in the  
analysis of change, which is expected  to  com prise of, th e  exam ination of 
th e  calcu lations of th e  ac to rs, the  actions based  on such  calcu lations, the  
institutional con tex t within which th e  actions occur and th e  scu lp ture of 
th e  perceptions of th e  institutional con tex t in which th e  s tra teg y  is 
devised. Ultimately, Hay and W incott argue th a t s tra teg ic  action  produces 
tw o outcom es, w hether intended or unintended:
(1) d irect e ffects  upon th e  institutional and institu tionalised  co n tex ts  
within which it ta k e s  p lace and which future action occu rs  -  producing a 
partial transform ation of th a t institutional environm ent (though not 
necessarily  a s  anticipated) and altering th e  course  of its  tem poral 
unfolding (however marginally); (2) s tra teg ic  learning on th e  part of th e  
a c to rs  involved -  a s  they revise their perceptions of w hat is feasible, 
possible and indeed desirable in th e  light of their a s se s sm e n ts  of their 
own ability to  realise  prior goals (and th a t of others), a s  they  assim ilate  
‘new  information’ (from w hatever external source), and a s  they  reorient 
future s tra teg ie s  in the  light of such  ‘em pirical’ and m ediated knowledge 
of th e  co n tex t a s  a s tructu red  terrain  of opportunity and constra in t.87
Finally, within th is formulation, ideas tend  also  to  perform an 
im portant role as  ‘cognitive filters’. The perceptions, p references and 
s tra teg ic  actions of political ac to rs  are  moulded not only by th e  
institutional environm ent in which they are  s itu a ted  but also  by 
id e a s .88 Ideas are then ‘m ental construc ts , view s or political beliefs
56Hay and Wincott, ‘Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism’, p.954.
57Hay and Wincott, ‘Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism’, p.956.
58Hay and Wincott, ‘Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism’, pp.956-7. Ideas, however, have not been 
absent from the historical institutionalist analysis. Ideas, in fact, tend to be regarded as a significant variable in 
the historical institutionalists’ examinations of processes of policy-making. See Thelen and Steinmo, ‘Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, pp.22-6. Yet, ideas themselves rarely emerge as the unique forces 
determining political outcomes, and there is a tendency to treat them instrumentally and functionally. Ideas are 
seen more as, in the words of Mark Blyth, ‘catch-all concepts to explain variance’, and no efforts are made to 
analyse ideas per se, or their independent impact on the institutional setting. See Mark Blyth, ‘Any More Bright
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political ac to rs  have about som e a sp e c t of th e  world around them ’ and 
they  m atte r in th e  se n se  th a t a s  they  rem ain significant over tim e, they  
becom e institu tionalised to  form w hat is known as  culture, i.e., a  ‘s e t  of 
ideas or beliefs th a t are  institutionalized, persis t over tim e and are  
asso c ia ted  with a  particular com munity.’ ”  The analysis of ideas and 
cu ltu res are  particularly im portant b ecau se  they  might acco u n t not only 
for continuity but also  change, i.e., how individuals, groups, so c ie ties  
su cceed  in sw apping or m erge old beliefs and cultural p a tte rn s  with new  
ones.
In th e  face  of th is  need to  se ek  a  stronger conception of th e  role 
played by agency in political outcom es, acknow ledgem ent th a t ag en ts  
and institu tions are  mutually constitu tive, and explanation on how th is 
m utual constitu tion  em erges and how it p roduces institutional change, 
th e  research  s tra teg y  employed by historical institu tionalists needs to  be 
rearranged epistem ologically. The work of Merilee Grindle and John  W. 
Thom as is significant by offering th e  em pirical guidelines and a  priori 
criteria  th a t can  be used  to  tra c e  how political ac to rs, in particu lar e lites, 
a c t stra teg ically  to  initiate and im plem ent reform .60 According to  th e  
fram ew ork designed by Grindle and Thom as, th e  confluence of th ree  key 
fac to rs  a re  crucial to  understand reform p ro cesses: (1) th e  environm ental 
background influencing the  perceptions, p references and actions of the 
policy elites; (2) the  specific political conditions affecting policy cho ices 
and; (3) th e  political dynam ics th a t em erge during th e  im plem entation 
p rocess.
Ideas? The Ideational Turn of Comparative Political Economy’; Comparative Politics, 29 (1997), 229-250, 
p.231. Peter Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, seem to have taken this criticism seriously, stressing that historical 
institutionalism has the potential to offer a more sophisticated understanding of the relationship between, 
structures and agents by postulating that exposure to new ideas ‘can alter the basic, as well as the strategic 
preferences of actors’ to the point that ideas could be seen more as building blocks of actions than ‘cognitive 
filters’, as presented by Hay and Wincott. See Hall and Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms’, pp.961-2.
59See Sheri Berman, ‘Ideas and Culture in Political Analysis’, paper presented at workshop Ideas, Culture and 
Political Analysis Workshop, Princeton University, 15-16 May 1998, p.l.
60Grindle and Thomas, Public Choices and Policy Change.
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Within th is framework, th ere  are  four main Menses’, or a  priori 
'decisional criteria’, through which policy e lites  may filter their policy 
options:61(1) technical recom m endations; (2) the  effects  of their choices 
on bureaucra tic  exchanges; (3) th e  im plications in te rm s of political 
s tab ility  and political support and *2 ;(4) the  im pact on tie s  with 
international ac to rs. These four crite ria  are  seen  a s  aiding th e  policy 
e lites  to  evaluate  th e  risks and gains th a t can  derive from th e  several 
options under analysis. The consideration of th e se  criteria , however, will 
necessarily  reflect th e  orientation of policy e lites  -  values, ideas, 
expertise , experiences, power and loyalties - and th e  historical 
c ircum stances, international conditions, dom estic political and econom ic 
con tex ts, and institutional environm ents within which they seek  to 
accom plish their goals. The im portance of the  criteria  will vary over tim e 
and depend on th e  different s e t  of con tex tual conditions.'3
The p rocess of decision-m aking is relevant to  discern: who g e ts  
involved in th e  p rocess of policymaking; w hat may be th e  issues and 
problem s under consideration and; when and how reform may begin. 
However, it is the  im plem entation phase  th a t often s e ttle s  th e  nature and 
su c c e ss  of the  initiative. Im plem entation is regarded a s  an Mnteractive’ 
and 'ongoing’ p rocess of policy making in th e  sen se  th a t policy e lites need 
to  ta k e  into consideration the  viability of th e  cho ices in te rm s of: coalition 
support and opposition to  change; w hat s ta k e s  they have in the  pursuit of 
reform and; th e  political and bureaucratic  resou rces they  hold to  m aintain 
such  reform initiatives. 64 There are, however, th ree  im portant 
considerations to  m ake concerning th is  framework.
6lGrindle and Thomas, Public Choices and Policy Change, pp.96-104. Unlike the model of politics designed by 
Warren Ilchman and Norman Uphoff in which the main concern of statesmen in developing countries is to gain 
and maintain power when making policy choices, the model offered by Grindle and Thomas goes beyond the 
‘power-as-overriding motive’ assumption and in this way provides a more comprehensive and approximate view 
of the reality in relation to what may actually be the motivations and preferences of decision makers. See Warren 
F. Ilchman and Norman Thomas Uphoff, The Political Economy o f Change (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1969).
62 This, with the understanding that social actors hold in different degrees a set of political and economic 
resources from votes, political allegiance and support, to economic goods and services, information or money.
63Grindle and Thomas, Public Choices and Policy Change, p.96.
^Grindle and Thomas, Public Choices and Policy Change, p. 125. Political resources are assessed in terms of 
their significance for regime legitimacy, political stability, governmental autonomy, nature of the reforms and
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First, Grindle and Thom as point out th a t, techn ical 
recom m endations are  often imbued by an ideological co n ten t on how the  
path of developm ent ought to be. However, th is  in terpretation  
intertwining technical advice and ideas m akes it difficult to  understand 
why and how ideas per se becom e politically significant to  inspire 
political leaders to  seek  reforms.**As put by Mark Blyth, ideas can , not 
only redefine existing preferences and th e  creation  of new  ones, but also  
a s s is t  the  occurrence of radical policy change and are  a  prerequisite  for 
it.**
Secondly, th e  im plem entation p ro cess  not only ten d s  to  s e t  the 
nature and su c c e ss  of the  reform initiative, but a lso  has political 
outcom es th a t ultim ately may break th e  institutional equilibrium and 
g en era te  change. Institutions mould policies and politics, but policies and 
politics ultim ately may g enera te  institutional change. This is w hat Paul 
Pierson calls ‘policy feedback’.*7As s ta te d  by Sven Steinm o, ‘political 
institutions are  not neutral. They bias policy making tow ard som e types of 
in te re sts  and aw ay from o thers b ecau se  they  channel participation in 
particular d irections.’**For exam ple, public policies usually d irect ‘spoils’ 
to  certain  groups but not o thers and in doing so  they  offer a  strong 
incentive for the  beneficiaries to  m obilise to  keep th e  ‘spoils’ or even 
expand them . Public policies and th e  allocation of s ta te  reso u rces  are  
then  turned into no more than ‘ob jects of perpetual conflic ts’.**Adam 
Przeworski identifies th ree  types of conflict: (1) betw een  s ta te  ac to rs; (2) 
betw een s ta te  ac to rs  and the  in te re sts  negatively affected  by th e  public 
policies; and (3) betw een s ta te  ac to rs, exclusively, or betw een  them  and 
o ther non-state ac to rs  in the  definition of th e  goals underpinning public
elite consensus. Bureaucratic resources, on the other hand, take three forms: financial strength, management 
skills and technical capacity.
65Grindle and Thomas, Public Choices and Policy Change,p. 97.
66Blyth, ‘Any More Bright Ideas?’, p.246.
67Paul Pierson, ‘When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change’; World Politics, 45 (l 993), 
pp.595-628. See also Liddle, ‘The Politics of Development Policy’, pp.793-807.
68Sven Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American Approaches to Financing the Modem 
State (New Haven: Yale University Press 1993), p.7.
69Adam Przeworski, The State and the Economy under Capitalism (Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1990), 
pp. 50-1.
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policies. The natu re  of th e  conflicts is then a  significant fac to r to  
understand  how they may change th e  configuration of th e  institutional 
environm ent.70
Finally, th is fram ew ork regards politics a s  a m eans through which 
‘window s of opportunities’ a re  recognised and taken  on by policy e lites  to 
produce reform. However, insights on th e  configuration of th e  political 
dynam ics em bedded in a  specific institutional environm ent need to  tak e  
into accoun t th a t in teractions, especially  betw een a  com plex s ta te  and 
society , are  not alw ays formal, visible and tra c e a b le .71 In fact, th e se  
in teractions may be informal. Thus, th is th esis  will refer to  politics a s  
‘who g e ts  w hat, w hen, how, and a t w hose ex p en se’, in th e  se n se  th a t 
politics is about ‘the  distribution not only of th e  benefits derived from the  
u se  or consum ption of goods and serv ices, but also  th e  c o s ts  required for 
their production and supply.’72This in terpretation of politics allow s for the  
inclusion of both formal and informal p ro cesses  of politics. Formal politics 
re la tes  to  the  type of politics governed by explicit, well-defined and 
w ritten  rules th a t usually em anate  from th e  s ta te . Informal politics 
involves th e  custom s, informal norms and codes of behaviour guiding 
relationships betw een  individuals and groups in any given socie ty  which 
are  not deliberately c rea ted  by an estab lished  authority .73Unlike formal 
politics, th a t can  be described  a s  operating within th e  realm  of th e  rule of 
law to  achieve legitim ate public ends, informal politics are  conducted  
through th e  use  of m eans th a t owe their legitim acy essen tia lly  to  th e
70Peter Hall, for example, emphasises the role played by ideas and power for the policy paradigm shift that took 
place in Britain as the country abandoned a Keynesian mode of policymaking to one based on monetarist 
economic theory in the late 1970s. See Peter A. Hall, ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The 
Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain’; Comparative Politics, 25 (1993), 275-296. Jonas Pontusson, on the 
other hand, focuses, for example, on the role played by changing interests of economic actors caused by 
transformations in the characteristics of the marketplace and how this led to institutional realignments. See Jonas 
Pontusson, ‘From Comparative Public Policy to Political Economy: Putting Institutions in Their Place and 
Taking Interest Seriously’; Comparative Political Studies, 28 (1995), 117-147.
71Merilee Grindle and John W.Thomas recognise that in developing countries due to the close nature of the state 
and the elite-centred politics, it was not uncommon to see informal and non-public channels trying to influence 
the process of policymaking, but they fail to show how formal and informal politics interact in the policy 
process. See Grindle and Thomas, Public Choices and Policy Change, p.63.
2Haruhiro Fukui, ‘Introduction: On the Significance of Informal Politics’, in Lowell Dittmer, Haruhiro Fukui, 
Peter N.S. Lee, eds, Informal Politics in East Asia (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.l- 
19, pp. 1-3.
73Robert Scalapino, ‘Informal Politics in East Asia: Introduction’; Asian Survey, 36 (1996), 227-9, p.227.
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individuals involved in the  policy p rocess . The relationship betw een  
formal and informal politics is one of functional in terdependence. As 
Lowell Dittmer s ta te s :
Formal politics se rv es  tw o functions for informal politics: spiritual and 
m undane. On the  one hand, the  formal hierarchy supplies th e  offices, 
s ta tu s , and perquisites of power th a t political ac to rs  seek . But informal 
groupings do not m erely plunder th e  hierarchy for th e se  ends, but also  use  
it to  confer legitim acy on th e  policies th a t they en ac t, not only for 
them selves but on behalf of m ass constituencies, perhaps even (if 
coincidentally) th e  ‘public’ a t large. Thus formal politics is both a ‘feeding 
trough’ and a  ‘tem ple’ for the  p ractice  of informal politics.74
The main problem of informal politics, however, re s ts  precisely  on 
the  possibility th a t individuals may s to p  legitimising the ir occurrence. For 
exam ple, while informal politics will usually operate  within a secre tive , 
private and businesslike approach (here a  good exam ple would be 
s ituations of ‘pork barrel politics’, i.e., resource tran sfe rs  to  one’s  
constituency), it can develop into “crisis  politics” when it is sub jec ted  to  
public enquiry (such a s  m ajor financial scan d a ls  or corruption ties) and by 
doing so  it may lead to  institutional change and policy reform s.75
Korea is a  good c a se  to  analyse to  w hat degree ideas, political 
conflicts generated  by policy feedback, and informal netw orks in te rac t to 
influence the  cho ices of political leaders. During th e  1960s and 1970s, 
under th e  leadership of Park Chung Hee, who w as deeply com m itted to  a 
‘grow th-first’ ideological paradigm , Korea estab lished  and consolidated  a 
system  of socialisation of private risk. The s ta te  nurtured th e
74Lowell Dittmer, ‘Conclusion: East Asian Informal Politics in Comparative Perspective’, in Dittmer, Fukui, 
Lee, eds, Informal Politics in East Asia, pp.290-308, p.295. See also Patricio Abinales, Making Mindanao: 
Cotabato and Davao in the Formation o f the Philippine Nation-State (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University 
Press, 2000), p. 11. Focusing on the debate strong society versus a weak state, Abinales argues that this division 
between state and society fails to notice that a significant characteristic of postcolonial weak states is a 
‘considerable blurring of what is official and what is not and how the lack of a clear divide weakens state 
capabilities’. He adds that ‘in reality it is difficult to distinguish between citizen and bureaucrat, party official 
and local warlord, police officer and local smuggling kingpin’.
75Dittmer, ‘Conclusion’, p.303.
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developm ent of dom estic business groups through a s e t  of resou rces, 
including capital, technology and industrial policies.7'The assassin a tio n  of 
Park Chung Hee in 1979, and the  em ergence of a  new  authoritarian 
regime under Chun Doo Hwan (1980-1987), led, however, to  a  re­
a ssessm en t of th e  system  of socialisation of private risk which ultim ately 
led to  changes in th e  equilibrium sustain ing th is  system , in particular th e  
cooperative tie s  betw een the  s ta te  and th e  private sector."C ooperative 
tie s  in Korea would not only occur through th e  participation of th e  private 
sec to r  in government-led deliberation councils or o ther official 
arrangem ents, but also  in a less visible and informal m anner. As in many 
o ther political settings, the legitim acy of political leaders and their 
ac tions w ere far from being secured  due to  th e  w eak  tradition of the  rule 
of law and the  tendency to  d isresp ect adm inistrative regulations in Korea. 
In a p rocess th a t becam e progressively en trenched  during Park Chung 
H ee’s  reign in the  1960s, policy deliberations becam e an ideal terrain  to  
build supporting groups, usually based  on school, family or/and regional 
ties, a s  a  way to tack le  the  likely vulnerability of th e  regim e. Thus, 
natives of the  south-eastern  region of Kyongsang and g rad u ates  from 
Seoul National University have dom inated th e  country’s  political and 
econom ic elites for the  p ast 50 years.78 N evertheless, th is may not be a 
guaran tee  for continuing exchange of political and econom ic trade-offs. 
S ince th e  1980s, and desp ite  th e  school or regional ties, th e  p references 
of th e  new  leadership and econom ic ac to rs  began to  diverge. Furtherm ore, 
th e  tendency to  privilege th e se  ties, in particular th e  regional, cam e under 
strong social condem nation with th e  dem ocratisation  of Korean socie ty .
The new  econom ic policies undertaken by President Chun Doo 
Hwan, and la te r continued by Roh Tae Woo (1988-1992) and Kim Young 
Sam (1993-1997), involved not only changes in th e  ’spoils’ system  c rea ted  
by Park Chung Hee, but also  a re-evaluation of th e  policy ou tcom es of th e
76See Chapters Three and Four for the “growth-first” ideological paradigm.
77Chung-in Moon, ‘Changing Patterns of Business-Govemment Relations in South Korea’, in Andrew McIntyre, 
ed, Business and Government in Industrializing Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 142-166.
78See Chapter Two for more details.
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previous developm ent s tra teg y  th a t culm inated in an ideological paradigm  
shift from ‘growth-first’ to  ‘fairness of w ealth  distribution’, which implied 
mainly th e  reduction of th e  chaeboPs econom ic concentration .79Yet, by 
th is tim e, th e  legacy of th e  past, i.e., th e  system  of socialisation of private 
risk th a t had consolidated the  econom ic pow er of big business groups 
m ade th e  project of institutional change m ore difficult to  achieve. With 
the  chaebol increasingly under control of their own financial resou rces 
and know-how, the private s e c to r  not only s ta rted  to  challenge the  
capacity  of th e  s ta te  to  perform certa in  serv ices, but also  resis ted  the  
ending of th e  ‘spoils’. This is w hat Eun Mee Kim calls  th e  contradictions 
of institution and autonom y of th e  developm ental s ta te . Such 
contradictions ultim ately contribute to  th e  w eakening of th e  s ta te ’s  
power and influence in th e  workings of th e  economy: ‘the  contradictions 
are  paradoxical, s ince it is su c c e ss  in attain ing th e  goal (econom ic 
developm ent) th a t becom es th e  ca ta ly s t for th e  s ta te ’s  decline and 
transform ation.’90
In sum , a modified version of historical institutionalism  th a t 
seriously considers th e  s tra teg ic  role played by political agency  in 
promoting institutional change and how th e  blending of ideas, political 
conflicts generated  by policy feedback  and informal netw orks drive policy 
s tra teg ies  is p resen ted  here  a s  an a lternative  in terpretative fram ew ork to  
investigate th e  system  of socialisation  of private risk in Korea.
1.4 Polished Historical institutionalism and Institutional Change In Korea
This th esis  in troduces a  polished version of historical 
institutionalism  as  a useful theoretica l platform to  improve our know ledge 
of th e  logic of decision-m aking in th e  Korean developm ental s ta te , in 
particular through an investigation of th e  im pact of political dynam ics on 
the changing configuration of th e  system  of socialisation  of private risk
79See Chapters Five and Six for the “fairness of wealth distribution” ideological paradigm.
80Eun Mee Kim, Big Business, Strong State: Collusion and Conflict in South Korean Development, 1960-1990 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), p.43.
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since  th e  1980s. The research  re s ts  on five propositions to  understand  
institutional change in Korea: (1) institu tions m atte r not only b ecau se  
they im pose constra in ts  but also  b ecau se  they open opportunities for 
political behaviour; (2) political ac to rs  a re  both su b jec ts  and ag en ts  of 
historical change, in the  sen se  th a t they can  a c t stra teg ically  to  define, 
pursue and achieve institutional change; (3) political s tra teg y  is shaped  
by th e  institutional se tting  in which ac to rs  are  em bedded, a s  well a s  by 
ideas and th e  specific historical con tex t within which th e  action  tak e s  
place; (4) policies a re  so u rces of political make-up th a t ultim ately may 
g en era te  institutional change; (5) and th e  in teraction of formal and 
informal politics is relevant to  the  understanding not only of ‘who g e ts  
w hat, w hen, how, a t  w hose expense’, bu t also  how th e se  p a tte rn s  of 
political behaviour influence th e  p a tte rn s  of institutional change. In 
com parison with previous s tud ies  on th e  Korean developm ental s ta te , 
historical institutionalism  has th e  potential to  offer a th icker analytical 
narrative of p ro cesses  of institutional change in Korea.
As in any o ther country, policy cho ices in th e  Korean s ta te  are 
ham m ered out by political leaders. In Korea, the  P resident and his s ta ff a t 
the  Blue House have reigned over th e  p ro cess  of decision-m aking. For the  
p as t forty years, th e  single m ost enduring featu re  of Korean politics has 
been th e  concentration  of pow er in th e  presidency. Institutional ch eck s 
and ba lances based  on th e  principle of separation  of pow ers do ex ist, on 
paper. However, they a re  rarely enforced. *1 Korean p residen ts  are  
expected  to  be active players in th e  p ro cess  of decision-m aking through 
their involvement in th e  design, negotiation, im plem entation and 
screening  of public policies, ye t their role in inducing institutional change 
continues to  be understudied.82Furtherm ore, while th e  Korean presidency 
is usually regarded a s  an ‘imperial presidency’, Korean leaders a re  far
81 Sung Chul Yang, The North and South Korean Political Systems: A Comparative System (Seoul: Seoul Press, 
1994), p.463.
82A few exceptions are Sung Deuk Hahm and L. Christopher Plein, After Development: The Transformation o f 
the Korean Presidency and Bureaucracy (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1997) and Yeon-ho Lee, 
The State, Society and Big Business in South Korea (London: Routledge, 1997). However, they both fall into the 
same pattern of analysing the Korean presidency from a perspective of an autonomous and capable actor vis-a- 
vis a weak society.
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from autonom ous.83They do not live in an  institutional, political, econom ic, 
social, ideological or historical vacuum  a s  their policy cho ices are 
unequivocally influenced by a myriad of intertw ined fac to rs . For any 
chosen  policy to  ta k e  effect, political leaders need to  m obilise or retain  
support in the  socie ty . This research , by attem pting to  fill in th e  gaps in 
th e  existing literature through th e  exam ination of th e  intervening role of 
Korean political leadership  in advancing institutional change, aim s to  
contribute to  a  b e tte r  understanding of th e  Korean developm ental s ta te  
and th e  country’s  econom ic perform ance.
1.4.1 Methodology
In an analysis of econom ic ad justm ent policies during th e  1980s, 
Jo an  Nelson points ou t th a t th e  com bination of ded icated  leadership  and 
a  high degree of cen tra lised  control and authority a re  im portant to  explain 
th e  reso lu te  and effective im plem entation of stab ilisation  and s tructu ral 
change program s. This type of control and authority resu lts  e ith er from 
military rule, or from political institu tions th a t grant th e  ch ief execu tive 
dom inant power, a s  well a s  from m ore tem porary c ircu m stan ces  such  a s  
successfu l popular election  and /or m om entarily suspended  or w eak 
opposition.*4In the  sam e vein, one of the  conclusions of a num ber of 
s tud ies  of econom ic reform program s around th e  world organised by the  
W ashington-based Institu te  for International Econom ics in th e  1990s 
reveals th a t m ost of th e  c a s e s  of successfu l reform involved leadership  
from execu tives strongly com m itted to  institutional change.**
Despite th e  fac t th a t E ast Asia, in particu lar th e  c a s e s  of Korea and 
Taiwan, formed (and continue to  m aintain to  a certain  ex ten t even afte r 
the  dem ocratic  overture in th e  la te  1980s) political regim es in which 
control and authority are  concen tra ted  in the  hands of th e  executive,
83The term ‘imperial presidency’ is taken from Chung-in Moon and Jongryn Mo, Economic Crisis and Structural 
Reforms in South Korea (Washington: The Economic Strategy Institute, 2000), p.23.
84Nelson, ‘Introduction: the politics of Economic Adjustment in Developing Nations’ and ‘Conclusion’ in 
Economic Crisis and Policy Choice, pp.3-32, p.25 and pp.321-361, p.341, respectively.
85John Williamson and Stephan Haggard, ‘The Political Conditions for Economic Reform’, in Williamson, ed, 
The Political Economy of Policy Reform, pp.525-596.
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litera tu re  on the  developm ental s ta te  h as  instead  preferred to  analyse th e  
role of th e  bureaucracy a s  th e  leading ac to r behind th e  developm ent 
p rocess . But in choosing such a  fram ew ork it overlooks the  ‘nitty-gritty’ of 
th e  policy process, and hence its  failure to  clearly understand  the  nature  
and organisation of th e  s ta te  and th e  involvement of political leaders in 
th e  policy p rocess  and how th is changed over tim e. In th is  sen se , th is 
th e s is  a ttem p ts  to  open th e  ‘black box’ of th e  East Asian developm ental 
s ta te  through an analysis of Korea a s  a  c a se  study by exploring and 
investigating how Korean P residents filter the ir policy options in term s of 
th e  com plex interaction of institutional constra in ts  and opportunities, 
history, context, ideas, and coalition politics.
1.4.2 R esearch  S trategy
This th esis  aim s to  provide an understanding of th e  role played by 
Korean leaders in th e  policy p rocess  and their efforts to  bring about 
institutional change. In th is sen se , th e  research  exam ines how th e  
perceptions, incentives, m otivations and p references of Korean leaders 
moulded by a particular institutional, historical, con tex tual and political 
environm ent help define policy cho ices. The research  looks a t tw o m ajor 
periods a s  critical points w here Korean P residen ts are  considered in 
te rm s of their role in ‘punctuating’ the  institutional equilibrium to  pursue 
and im plem ent institutional change. 86 The first period covers the  
presidency of Park Chung Hee (1961-1979) and the  second  encom passes 
the  presidency of Kim Young Sam (1993-1997). The tw o periods here 
se lec ted  com prise w hat I regard to  be key m om ents of institutional 
change with a  major im pact on Korea’s  econom ic growth and 
developm ent. The analytical narrative undertaken to  exam ine th e se  two 
periods intends to clearly illustrate  th e  s tra teg ic  actions and policy 
decisions pursued by Korean p residen ts in the  p ro cess  leading to  the  
creation, m aintenance and transform ation of th e  system  of socialisation 
of private risk. The actions and policy decisions taken  up by Park Chung
86See footnote 46.
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Hee and Kim Young Sam are exam ined in further detail in tw o ca se  
s tud ies  on policy reform s, the heavy and chem ical industrialisation in the 
1970s and th e  real nam e financial transaction  system  in 1993.
In assessin g  th e  usefu lness of th e  five propositions mentioned 
above to  explain institutional change in Korea, th is  th esis  first 
investigates why and how President Park Chung Hee built and 
consolidated a  system  of socialisation of private risk in th e  1960s and 
1970s. The identification of th is period a s  a crucial instance of 
institutional change is explained by th e  fac t th a t it is during Park’s 
leadership th a t Korea experienced a successfu l turnaround in the  
country’s  econom ic record. The d iscussion of th e  pre-1980s period is also  
im portant to  underline th e  significant institutional path dependencies 
inherited from Park’s  regime and how their ex is ten ce  moulded the  
cho ices of th e  succeeding  Korean leadership.
In th e  afterm ath  of the  country’s  m ajor financial crisis in 1997, it 
becam e apparen t th a t policy cho ices undertaken during th e  presidency of 
Kim Young Sam had played a significant role in th e  country’s  econom ic 
m eltdown by changing im portant ru les underpinning the  system  of 
socialisation  of private risk. While previous governm ents led by Chun Doo 
Hwan (1980-1987) and Roh Tae Woo (1988-1992) had already a ttem pted  to  
a lte r  th e  rules of th e  gam e, it w as only with Kim Young Sam th a t the 
dism antling of the  tw o pillars of th e  sy stem - industrial policy and s tr ic t 
financial regulation -  becam e a reality. These policy cho ices a re  indicated 
a s  m ajor c a u se s  contributing to  th e  collapse of Korean corporate and 
financial se c to rs  in 1997. Subsequently, and having identified th is period 
a s  ano ther m om ent of critical institutional change in Korea’s  political 
econom y, th is  th esis  investigates why and how President Kim Young Sam 
afte r 1993 chose  to  radically transform  th e  rules of th e  gam e originally 
em bodied in th e  system  of socialisation of private risk and with w hat 
degree of su ccess .
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C ase s tud ies a re  powerful tools to  analyse th e  political dynam ics 
involved in p ro cesses  of institutional change.87The use  of th e  process- 
tracing technique in c a se  stud ies allows us to  look closely  a t th e  w ay a 
decision w as designed, negotiated  and im plem ented. As Andrew B ennett 
and A lexander L. George point out, ‘p ro cess  tracing is an a ttem p t to  tra ce  
em pirically th e  tem poral and possibly causal seq u en ces  of ev en ts  within 
a  c a se  th a t intervene betw een independent variables and observed 
outcom es.’ 88 In th is way, c a se  s tud ies  provide th e  an sw ers  for the  
following questions: how and when did issues of institutional change 
surface? Who w ere the  main ac to rs  involved in the  p rocess  of institutional 
change? What reasons accoun t for why th e se  ac to rs  defended or d isputed 
institutional change? How did th e se  ac to rs  seek  to  define th e  tra jecto ry  
of th e  p ro cess  of institutional change? How w ere th e  proposals adopted 
and legitim ised? How did th e  ac to rs  reac t in face  of new  rules of the  
gam e?89
1.4.3 Data Collection
Since th is research  aim s a t exploring th e  logic behind th e  Korean 
s ta te ’s  decision-m aking process, th e  th es is  is particularly in te rested  in 
analysing how policy cho ices undertaken by Korean leaders a re  shaped  by 
the  in teraction of institutions, history, con tex t, ideas and coalition politics. 
Memoirs, sp eech es, new spaper artic les, publications of Korean think tanks, 
unpublished PhD d isserta tions and o ther secondary  da ta , supplem ented  by 
a num ber of first-person interview s are  th e  main research  instrum ents 
employed to  understand Korean leaders’ p references, perceptions, 
m otivations, incentives, evaluation of a lternatives, a s  well a s  th e  
information they  hold, the  expecta tions they develop, th e  s tra te g ie s  they
87Pierson, ‘When Effect Becomes Cause’, p.596.
88Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, ‘Case Studies and Process Tracing in History and Political Science: 
Similar Strokes for Different Foci’, in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds, Bridges and Boundaries: 
Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study o f International Relations (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 
pp.137-166, p.144.
89Berman, ‘Ideas and Culture in Political Analysis’, p.l 1 and Grindle, Audacious Reforms, p.l 1.
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adopt, and th e  constra in ts  and opportunities th a t define th e  p aram eters  of 
the ir actions.
Field research  in Korea w as undertaken in tw o different periods 
totalling around 13 m onths (January-June 2000 and January-July 2001). 
During th e  field research , I carried out ex tensive  research  in new spaper 
archives in th e  library of th e  National Assembly and Yonsei University, a 
com prehensive search  for papers from Korean journals, and publications 
from Korean think tanks (in particular th e  Korean Development Institu te  
and Korea Institu te  of Finance) and conducted  fourteen interview s. Several 
problem s w ere encountered  in the  research  p rocess.
I originally planned to  follow Merilee Grindle and John W. Thom as with 
regard to  establishing an interview schedule of relevant policy elites: heads 
of s ta te , bu reaucra ts , legislators, socie ta l in te rests , business in te rests , 
religious e lites, military, organised labour and m edia.90However, a  detailed  
exam ination of how a  decision w as designed, negotia ted  and im plem ented 
in Korea poses significant challenges due to  the  relatively closed, informal 
and secre tive  elite-centred decision-m aking p rocess .” 91 Hence, the  
identification of whom to interview  becam e an issue  from th e  beginning. In 
order to  identify who should be interviewed, I engaged in an ex tensive 
c ro ss  reading of new spaper archives, o ther secondary  d a ta  (academ ic 
papers, a rtic les  in Korean journals and reports by think tan k s  and leading 
Korean policym akers) which described  or even briefly m entioned th e  tw o 
particu lar c a se  stud ies  under exam ination, and reso rted  to  informal 
conversations with Korean academ ics and bu reaucra ts . Through th is  
m ethod, I traced  th e  sequence in which ev en ts  em erged and developed, 
identifying, when possible, those  involved in th e  policy process. The review  
covered th e  1970s for the first c a se  study and 1982 to  1993 for th e  second  
c a se  study.
90Grindle and Thomas, Public Choices and Policy Change, p.63.
91Tu-jen Cheng and Brantly Womack, ‘General Reflections on Informal Politics in East Asia’; Asian Survey, 34 
(1996), 320-337, p.327. See also Grindle and Thomas, Public Choices and Policy Change, p. 63.
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A second problem th a t em erged w as th e  a c c e s s  to  th e  country’s  
policy e lites  a s  well a s  their availability for interview s. In Korea, w here 
hum an relations are  strongly based on school, regional or family ties, 
personal co n tac ts  are  usually an im portant m eans to gain a c c e s s  for 
interview s. While I su cceed ed  in obtaining som e interview s through local 
connections, m ost of them  had to be pursued personally a s  my co n tac ts  
w ere  not alw ays available to  help me. The final list of c ited  interview s 
includes a  senior journalist a t  one of th e  leading business m agazines in 
Asia, bu reaucra ts  in th e  Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) and Bank 
of Korea (BOK), form er m em bers of th e  governm ent, academ ics, 
re sea rch ers  a t the  country’s  main business lobby group, th e  Federation for 
Korean Industries (FKI) and m em bers of tw o of the  country’s  m ost 
prestig ious non-governm ental organisations, th e  Citizen’s  Coalition for 
Economic Ju s tic e  (CCEJ) and People’s  Solidarity for Participatory 
D em ocracy (PSDP).
Elite interviewing is usually aim ed not a t  th e  com pilation of pre­
determ ined da ta  but a t th e  collection of information to  a s s is t  the  
interview er in his/her efforts to  reconstruc t som e ep isodes or distinguish a 
p attern  of specific behaviours.92 This m ethodological approach can  be 
regarded a s  a g reat opportunity to  learn from th e  responden ts’ experiences 
and to  obtain unexpected  and valuable information th a t o therw ise would 
not be accessib le  in w ritten docum ents or repo rts  and th a t can  actually  
offer new  w ays to  d isentangle the  particu larities of th e  ob ject of study. 
Thus, in th is  thesis , interview s w ere essen tia lly  unstructured  though 
underpinning them  all w as a  common line, i.e., th e  search  for answ ers 
regarding th e  role played by Korean leaders in th e  country’s  policy p rocess  
and to  understand policy cho ices leading to  reform in general and 
specifically during tw o historical periods under exam ination, 1961-1979 and 
1993-1997. As Paul Thompson points out, ’in th e  b roadest sen se , all 
testim onies normally carry within them  a triple potential: to  explore and
92Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich, Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science 
(New York: Longman Publishers, 1995), p. 162.
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develop new  in terpretations, to  estab lish  or confirm an in terpretation  of 
p a s t p a tte rn s  of change, and to  ex p ress  w hat it felt like.*93The interview s 
w ere recorded and la ter fully transcribed  and cita tions m ade a s  faithfully 
a s  possible to  ensure both the  c h a rac te r  and th e  m eaning of the  original.
Elite interviewing, nonetheless, en ta ils  som e risky scientific  issues. 
By employing a s  so u rces  those  who w ere  or are  deeply engaged in th e  
policy process, elite interviewing can  mould th e  re sea rch er’s  view  of the  
p ro cess itself. According to  Jaro l Manheim and Richard Rich, th e re  a re  four 
main risks in term s of reliability involved in elite interviewing, a s  th e  
responden ts may: (1) have a limited view of the  even ts under analysis 
which leads them  not to  recognize which a sp e c ts  are  im portant to  explain 
th e  events; (2) have im precise information on th e  even ts  (either b ecau se  of 
m isperception of the  ep isodes or b ecau se  they  have forgotten im portant 
details); (3) have convinced them selves th a t their perception of th ings w as 
th e  ‘valid one’ when in fac t it w as not; (4) have deliberately  lie in order to  
p ro tec t them selves or o thers.94As with any o ther source, th e  tran scrip ts  of 
th e  interview  needed to  be te s ted  to  sea rch  for internal consistency , c ro ss ­
checked  to  com pare details  with o ther sou rces, and evaluated  by placing 
th e  evidence in a w ider con tex t.95
Interviews for th is th es is  lasted  betw een  one to  tw o hours each  and 
served  to  provide relevant information, regarded not a s  factual d a ta  but 
simply a s  data , on the  workings of th e  policy p ro cess  pertaining to  th e  two 
c a se  s tu d ies  under exam ination. Data gathered  during th e  interview s w as 
cross-checked  by com paring it with o ther sou rces, including m aterials 
co llec ted  during th e  archival research . Most of th e  interview s w ere 
conducted  in English, with th e  exception of th e  ones involving m em bers of 
non-governm ental organisations. Though I undertook a six-month language 
course  in Korea, I found my language skills insufficient to  conduct th e se  
interview s on my own and therefore had th e  a s s is ta n c e  of an in terpreter, a
93Paul Thompson, The Voice o f the Past: Oral History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.265.
94Manheim and Rich, Empirical Political Analysis, pp. 162-3.
95Thompson, The Voice o f the Past, p. 153.
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m aste r s tu d en t a t  Yonsei University in Seoul and with previous experience 
a s  an in terpreter. Additionally, the  in terpreter also  a ss is te d  me in th e  
research  and transla tion  of som e Korean-language new spaper a rtic les, 
re la ted  to  th e  tw o c a s e  s tu d ies  under exam ination.
The developm ental s ta te  literature tends to  analyse Korean econom ic 
grow th and developm ent by looking a t a  s ta tic , excessively  a b s tra c t and 
too  often agg regated  s ta te  under th e  rule of bureaucra ts , instead  of th o se  
who cfe facto  control and d irect th e  activ ities of s ta te  agencies , i.e., th e  
political leadership. Furtherm ore, research  on the  Korean developm ental 
s ta te  does not tell us much about how public policy problem s first becom e 
defined and so lutions developed by th e  country’s  political leadership within 
th e  national policy agenda. In th is  sen se , th is th esis  se e k s  to  exam ine how 
th e  perceptions, m otivations, incentives and p references of Korean leaders 
in teracting with particu lar institutional co n stra in ts  and opportunities, 
history, con tex t, ideas, and coalition politics led to  th e  creation, 
sustainability  and transform ation of th e  system  of “socialisation  of private 
risk.”
Drawing from a polished version of historical institutionalism  its  
theo re tica l underpinnings and supporting its  argum ents through an 
em pirical exam ination of tw o c a s e  s tud ies  based  on primary and secondary  
d a ta , th is  th es is  offers a re-interpretation of the  Korean developm ental 
s ta te  th a t em phasises  th e  crucial role of Korean leadership  in th e  policy 
process . Additionally, and, in com parison with previous s tu d ies  on Korean 
developm ent, th e  th es is  offers a  ’thicker* analytical narrative of p ro cesses  
of institu tional change in Korea. Finally, and concerning th e  tex t, I have 
decided not to  p resen t tabu lar d a ta  s ince  th e  d a ta  I employ in my argum ent 
is easily  available in published form. Instead I refer to  th is  d a ta  in th e  te x t 
and c ite  th e  sou rces.
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1.4.4 O rganisation
The th es is  is com posed of seven  chap ters. This ch ap ter has s e t  out 
th e  th e sis  project, th e  research  focus, th e  general background, and th e  
theoretica l and m ethodological considerations. C hapter Two analyses the 
lim itations of th e  ex is ten t literature on th e  developm ental s ta te  by 
reassess in g  w hat is a t  the  core of th e  Korean developm ental s ta te , the  
system  of socialisation of private risk and its political and econom ic 
foundations: strong s ta te , industrial policy and financial control. I re­
evaluate  the  three-level causation  the  developm ental s ta te  literature 
claim s to  be behind Korea’s  econom ic perform ance. The developm ental 
s ta te  literature aim s to  explain successfu l econom ic perform ance. In 
doing so, th is  literature ten d s  to  reify th e  role played by a  strong and 
efficient bureaucratic  s ta te  in producing th is  outcom e. I propose, however, 
th a t any a ttem p t to  understand econom ic perform ance in Korea needs 
n ecessarily  to  go beyond a rigid conceptualisation  of a  strong and 
efficient bureaucratic  s ta te  and instead  s ta r t  accounting for the  multiple 
and in teractive levels within th e  s ta te  and betw een th is  com plex s ta te  
and socie ty  and how their exchanges influence policy cho ices and 
im plem entation. This fac ilita tes  opening th e  Korean developm ental s ta te  
“black box” and revealing th e  logic behind th e  s ta te ’s  decision-m aking 
p rocess. I su g g est th a t th e  s treng th  of the  Korean s ta te  to  choose, 
im plem ent, and enforce public policy should not be seen  a s  s ta tica lly  
persisting over tim e and sp ace . Instead the  streng th  of th e  s ta te  is 
sub jec ted  to  variation and th is depends essen tia lly  on th e  role played by 
Korean Presiden ts and how they filtered their policy options in te rm s of 
institutions, history, context, ideas and coalition politics.
C hapters Three and Four investigate th e  formation and consolidation 
of th e  system  of socialisation of private risk during th e  presidency of Park 
Chung Hee (1961-1979). Chapter Three analyses the  role of President Park 
in se lecting  and favouring th is  system  and how his choices w ere 
m ediated by historical c ircum stances, institutional legacies, th e  dom estic
40
political situation, th e  country’s  econom ic conditions, international 
p ressu res, and ideologies. C hapter Four exam ines in detail a  particular 
in stance of policy reform, the heavy and chem ical industrialisation in the  
1970s, a s  a w ay to  explain why and how President Park behaved 
stra teg ically  to  p ro tec t the  system  and with w hat political and econom ic 
consequences.
C hapters Five and Six explore the  efforts to  transform  th e  rules of 
the  gam e em bodied in the  system  of socialisation of private risk th a t have 
been undertaken since  th e  early 1990s. Chapter Five analyses the  role of 
President Kim Young Sam (1993-1997) and his governm ent in their 
a ttem p ts  to  change th e  workings of th e  system  right before th e  IMF crisis. 
In doing so, I investigate why and how such  cho ices w ere  pursued and 
im plem ented, and under w hat particular institutional, international and 
dom estic environm ent. C hapter Six investigates in-depth a  specific policy 
reform, th e  real nam e financial transac tion  system  in 1993, to  understand 
why and how President Kim stra teg ically  ac ted  to  a lte r an im portant 
fea tu re  of th e  system  of socialisation of private risk and with w hat 
political and econom ic outcom es.
C hapter Seven first m akes a  com parative a sse ssm en t of 
presidential policy cho ices during th e  tw o periods, 1961-1979 and 1993- 
1997, and then, drawing from the  different policy ou tcom es derived from 
the  c a s e  s tud ies  p resen ts  conclusions on th e  politics of policy choices in 
Korea. I end with suggestions for further research .
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2. CHAPTER TWO - Beyond th e  L im itations of th e  D evelopm ental 
S ta te  L itera tu re: T he K orean C ase
2.1 Introduction
The literatu re  on Korean developm ent p a tte rn s  offers compelling 
evidence of th e  in terventionist role played by th e  s ta te  in fostering rapid 
and econom ic growth since  th e  1960s. Behind th is  econom ic su c c e ss , it 
argues, re s ts  a strong developm ental s ta te , usually equated  with 
bureaucracy, which defines and pursues efficient econom ic policies 
reflecting national in te rests . Yet, the  p rocess  of decision-m aking within 
th e  Korean developm ental s ta te  has largely rem ained a “black box”. While 
th e  literatu re  co n cen tra te s  on how th e  s ta te  h as  intervened in th e  
organisation of th e  m arket, and how the  country’s  successfu l econom ic 
perform ance is co rre la ted  with th is  s ta te  intervention, it does not say  
much about th e  political dynam ics affecting th e  decision-m aking process, 
i.e., how policies a re  d iscussed , agreed, im plem ented, a s se s se d  and 
enforced. This ch ap te r first sum m arises the  econom ic and political 
foundations of th e  system  of “socialisation  of private risk”: strong s ta te , 
industrial policy and financial control. This system  is usually regarded to  
be a t th e  core of th e  E ast Asian developm ental s ta te . I then  re a s s e s s  the  
three-level causation  th e  developm ental s ta te  literatu re  claim s to  be 
behind th e  Korea’s  econom ic perform ance. Predominantly, developm ental 
s ta te  literature concerned  with finding explanations for successfu l 
econom ic perform ance, ten d s  to  reify the  role played by w hat it considers 
to  be a strong and efficient bu reaucra tic  s ta te .
I propose th a t any a ttem p t to  m ore clearly com prehend econom ic 
perform ance in Korea has to  tem per th is  tendency  to  em phasise  the  
im age of a strong and efficient s ta te . Instead, it needs to  acknow ledge 
the  ex is ten ce  of dynamic exchanges betw een multiple and in teractive 
levels within th e  s ta te  and betw een  th is com plex s ta te  and th e  society . 
Additionally, it should recognise how th e se  exchanges have an effect on
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policy cho ices, policy im plem entation and econom ic perform ance. I then  
su g g est an alternative interpretation of th e  Korean developm ental s ta te  
in which th e  streng th  of the  s ta te  to  choose, implem ent, and enforce 
public policy should not be seen  a s  sta tica lly  persisting over tim e and 
sp ace . Conversely, it is sub jected  to  variation. This variation depends 
essen tia lly  on th e  role played by Korean P residen ts and how they  filtered 
the ir policy options in term s of institu tions, history, con tex t, ideas and 
coalition politics.
2.2 Explaining th e  E ast Asian Developm ental S ta te  and Economic S u ccess
2.2.1 Industrial Policy and Financial Control
In th e  p as t forty years, the  fa s t growing econom ies of East Asia 
have led to  a  rethink of th e  genesis  of developm ent. In a  tim e when 
developm ent theory and policy w ere dom inated by th e  idea of a  ‘minimal 
s ta te ’ a s  th e  b es t solution for econom ic growth, th e  E ast Asian high 
econom ic perform ance offered new  insights into th e  role played by the  
s ta te  in th e  p rocess of national developm ent. Several scho lars sought to 
explain th e  successfu l econom ic perform ance of E ast Asia by looking a t 
th e  interventionist and leading role played by th e  s ta te .96Analysing the  
Ja p a n e se  case , Chalmers Johnson  introduced th e  concep t of th e  
‘developm ental cap ita list s ta te ’ a s  one which se e k s  econom ic 
developm ent through high ra te s  of grow th, productivity and 
com petitiveness. Six main policy fea tu res  a re  regarded a s  crucial to  
explain th e  perform ance of th e  E ast Asian developm ental s ta te s : (1) 
redistributive land reform; (2) sta te-contro lled  financial system ; (3) 
m acroeconom ic stability to  nurture long-term investm ent; (4) industrial 
policy th a t favoured sim ultaneously import substitu tion  and export 
production; (5) protection and investm ent in th e  agricultural s e c to r  a s  
well a s  im provem ent of rural livelihoods; (6) and incom e policies th a t
96See for example, Chalmers Johnson, M/77 and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth o f  Industrial Policy, 1925- 
1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), Amsden, Asia Next Giant, Wade, Governing the Market, Onis, 
‘The Logic of the Developmental State’, and Woo, Race to the Swift.
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produced a more equitable incom e distribution and higher living 
s tan d a rd s .97
As a whole, all th e se  policies a re  co rrelated  with th e  East Asian 
su ccessfu l econom ic perform ance. However, industrial policy and 
financial control, in particular, s tand  a t  th e  core of th e  E ast Asian 
developm ental s ta te s ’ peculiar way of organising th e  m arket. According 
to  developm ental s ta te  literature, the  econom ic perform ance of E ast Asia 
is strongly asso c ia ted  with a se ries  of key m echanism s devised by the  
in terventionist s ta te  to  organise th e  financial system  and define th e  
blueprint for industrial developm ent.98T hese  key fea tu res  m ake up w hat is 
known a s  the  system  of socialisation of private risk:
(1) In a  closely regulated bank-based system  a s  in Korea or 
Taiwan, en terp rises w ere  inclined to  m ake b e tte r  
investm ent decisions, b ecau se  they  w ere  offered the  
opportunity to  develop long-term s tra teg ies . As th is 
relationship streng thened  over tim e, and a s  long a s  firm s’ 
investm ents followed long-term plans, loans w ere rolled 
over even if the  re tu rns w ere not a s  im m ediate a s  
thought;
(2) The bank-based system  allowed for a fa s te r  allocation of 
capital to  s tra teg ic  industrial se c to rs  and granted the  
s ta te  the  capacity  to  control th e  financial flows;
(3) Close relations betw een  banks and firms improved 
collection and th e  processing  of information, allowed the  
monitoring of m anagem ent perform ance, and eased  
restructuring of firms undergoing difficulties; and
97Putzel, ‘Developmental States and Crony Capitalists’, pp. 163-8.
98Wade, Governing the Market, pp.364-8.
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(4) Control over the  financial system  offered the  s ta te  the
political leverage to  build up th e  coalitions necessary  to  
im plem ent the  industrial and developm ent s tra teg ies . In 
th is sen se , th e  public-private co-operation usually 
p resen t in East Asia w as far from being an outcom e of 
voluntary com pliance by the  business groups a s  they 
w ere discouraged from opposing th e  s ta te  under th rea t of 
possible loss of a c c e s s  to  c red it."
Additionally, th is  literature claim s th a t th is  cooperative system  
betw een  s ta te , banks and firms su cceed ed  b ecau se  it obeyed certain  
‘im peratives’:
(1) The s ta te  susta ined  th e  risks involved in th e  investm ents.
This socialised  risk took th e  form of: deposit insurance, 
lender-of-last-resort, subsid ies to  banks dangerously 
exposed to  loan lo sses  and firms in financial difficulties, 
banks’ shareholding in firms, or state-ow ned banks;
(2) The creditor w as involved in th e  firm m anagem ent, and
did not pull out w hen th e  com pany w as under d istress  
showing instead  com m itm ent with th e  restructuring of 
its  m anagem ent;
(3) The s ta te  and th e  banks w ere able to  distinguish
betw een ‘responsible’ and ‘irresponsible’ borrowings, and 
disciplined th e  la tter. This capacity  allow ed the  s ta te  to  
avoid bailing out firms and moral hazard. Sim ultaneously, 
the  governm ent w as also  careful to  monitor th e  
activ ities of th e  financial interm ediaries to  impede them , 
for exam ple, from hiding non-performing loans (NPLs);
"Wade, Governing the Market, pp.364-5.
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(4) The ex isten ce  of a ‘cen tral guiding agency’ w as crucial 
to  com plem ent m arket signals with its  own signals a s  to  
which sec to rs  will be m ost profitable;
(5) Finally, th e  s ta te  regulated  international capital flows 
which granted it th e  capacity  to  control money supply 
and the  co s t of capital to  dom estic  firms a s  well a s  to  
s e t  and m anage th e  developm ent of s tra teg ic  industrial 
sec to rs .100
2.2.2 The Strong B ureaucratic S ta te  and the  System  of Socialisation of 
Private Risk
U nderneath the  East Asian system  of socialisation  of private risk 
are  chard s ta te s ’, i.e., s ta te s  th a t a re  ’able not only to  re s is t private 
dem ands but actively to  shape th e  econom y and socie ty .’101A com peten t 
bureaucracy  usually led by a pilot agency in charge of form ulating and 
implementing econom ic policies is th e  leading ac to r in th e  p rocess  of 
econom ic change and developm ent. It is th is  bureaucracy  th a t in fac t 
’guided’ th e  m arket, and im plem ented th e  consis ten t, coheren t, and 
rational system  of socialisation of private risk. As Robert Wade puts it, ’in 
th is kind of political regime, th e  bureaucracy  can  m ore easily  
dem onstra te  com petence and rem ain ’c lean ’, b ecau se  it is neither caught 
betw een and penetra ted  by struggling in terest groups nor subverted  from 
above by th e  politics of rulers’ survival.’102
In tandem , ongoing organisational and institutional linkages 
betw een th e  governm ent and the  private se c to r  eased  th e  s tream  of 
information exchange, facilitated  co-operation, policy coordination, 
im plem entation and goal co n sen su s .103Thus, th e  developm ental s ta te  is
l00Wade, Governing the Market, pp.366-8.
l0lWade, Governing the Market, p.337.
l02Wade, Governing the Market, p.339.
l03Daniel Okimoto, Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1989), p.226. For another example of relationships between state and the private
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basically one w here th e  autonom y of th e  bureaucracy  is com plem ented by 
an unusual degree of private-public co-operation. 104 The difference 
betw een East Asia and o ther la te  industrialising econom ies did not re s t in 
the  invention of industrial policy and financial control m echanism s a s  
‘many o ther nations have a t one tim e or ano ther tried m ost of th e  policy 
tools used in East Asia.’105For Alice Amsden, w hat distinguished E ast Asia 
w as th e  w illingness of th e se  bureaucratic  s ta te s  to  behave a s  
‘disciplinarian agen ts, imposing perform ance s tan d ard s  while allocating 
subsid ies for industrial developm ent.’106
2.3 Three-Level Causation and The Korean Economic Perform ance
According to  developm ental s ta te  literature, th e  Korean su ccessfu l 
econom ic perform ance during m ore than  th ree  d ecad es  s ta rting  in th e  
1960s is essen tia lly  the  product of a  three-level causation  p ro cess .107At 
the  first level of causation , econom ic perform ance w as th e  outcom e of 
high levels of productive investm ent, s tra teg ic  allocation of financial 
resou rces in key industries, and se lective  exposure of dom estic industries 
to  international com petition.
At a  second level of causation , th e se  proxim ate ca u se s , a s  put by 
Robert Wade, w ere them selves the  policy ou tcom es of a system  of 
socialisation  of private risk combining industrial policy and financial 
control th a t em powered th e  s ta te  w ith the  capacity  to  stim ulate , guide 
and control industrial production and investm ent, a s  well to  discipline th e  
private se c to r  w henever it failed to  comply with perform ance s tandards.
sector as an ongoing negotiation or strategic co-operation, see Richard Samuels, The Business o f the Japanese 
State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
,04For an overview of the developmental state, see Onis, ‘The Logic of the Developmentalist State’. For Robert 
Wade, however, while Taiwan fits the developmental state’s image of bureaucratic autonomy, the same cannot 
be said in terms of public-private cooperation. See Wade, Governing the Market, p.256. For a comparative 
analysis of the bureaucracy and the relations between government and business in Taiwan and Korea, see Tu-jen 
Cheng, Stephan Haggard and David Kang, Institutions, Economic Policy and Growth in the Republic o f Korea 
and Taiwan Province o f China (Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1996).
l05Wade, Governing the Market,p.343.
106Alice Amsden, ‘A Theory of Government Intervention in Late Industrialization’, in Louis Putterman and 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds, State and Market in Development: Synergy or Rivalry? (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1992), pp.53-84, p.61.
107Wade, Governing the Market, pp.26-9.
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H ence, the  Korean s ta te  actively intervened in th e  m arket to  pick th e  
s tra teg ic  industries to  be developed, guided th e  use of investm ent 
resou rces, and regulated investm ent ra te s  through its control of th e  
country’s  financial resources. Additionally, th e  s ta te  selectively  
distributed business licences (i.e., determ ining who could en te r  certa in  
se c to rs  of th e  economy) and regulated  m onopolistic and unfair trad e  
p rac tices . It also  controlled prices and w ages (which involved th e  
repression  of labour unions), supported private business w ith ta x  benefits, 
financial incentives and m arket information, and su sta in ed  an efficient 
taxa tion .108
Finally, a t the  third level of causation , the  system  w as m aintained 
and enforced by a ‘hard’ bureaucratic  s ta te . The Korean s ta te  has been 
regarded a s  an ‘essentially’ W eberian s ta te , i.e., a s ta te  with th e  
autonom y and capacity  to  form ulate and im plem ent econom ic cho ices 
free  from the  influence of private in te re sts . Two crucial fea tu res  are  th e  
basis  of th e  East Asian developm ental s ta te s : bureaucra tic  autonom y and 
public-private co-operation. It is ‘the  coex is ten ce  of th e se  tw o conditions 
th a t allow s th e  s ta te  and the  bureaucra tic  e lites  to  develop independent 
national goals and, in the  subsequen t s ta te , to  tra n s la te  th e se  broad 
national goals into effective policy action. The co ex is ten ce  of th e se  tw o 
conditions is critical.’109
The s ta te  in Korea is usually equated  with a strong and 
autonom ous bureaucracy seen  a s  a product of Confucian heritage and 
Ja p a n e se  colonialism .110The recruitm ent of b u reaucra ts  developed along a 
m eritocratic  line, and the highly com petitive en tran ce  exam ination tended  
to  a ttra c t the  best national s tud en ts . Among bu reau cra ts  th ere  w as a
l08Jung Ku-Hyun, ‘Business-Govemment Relations in the Growth of Korean Business Groups’; Korean Social 
Science Journal, 14 (1988), 67-82, pp.68-9. See Amsden, Asia Next Giant, pp.16-8.
109Onis, ‘The Logic of the Developmentalist State’, p. 114.
I10Meredith Woo-Cumings, ‘The Korean Bureaucratic State; Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspectives’, 
in James Cotton, ed, Politics and Policy in the New Korean State: From Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam 
(Melbourne: Longman Australia Pty Ltd, 1995), pp.141-169. See also Atul Kohli, ‘Where Do High Growth 
Political Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of Korea’s Developmental State’; World Development, 
22 (1994), 1269-1293.
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tendency  to  g enera te  a  sen se  of unity and common identity offering the  
im age of a corporate  ac to r th a t delivered coherent, co n sis ten t and 
rational policies aim ed a t achieving long-term national developm ent goals. 
This, however, w as only possible a s  long a s  th e  bureaucracy  w as 
insulated  from p ressu res  by any in terest groups or distributional 
co a litio n s .111 Consequently, the Korean developm ental s ta te  has been 
described  a s  a s ta te  w here ‘bureaucra ts  rule while politicians reign’.112The 
o ther m ajor fea tu re  of the  Korean developm ental s ta te  lies in the  type of 
relationship built betw een the  s ta te  and business sec to r. S ta te  and 
b u sin esses  have developed cooperative tie s  bounded by th e  system  of 
socia lisation  of private risk.
Two co ncep ts  w ere introduced to  describe th e  nature of s ta te - 
business  relations in Korea within th is  system : th e  ‘quasi-intem al 
organisation’ and ‘em bedded autonom y’. Chung-Hee Lee proposes th a t the  
governm ent and large private en terp rises  in South Korea should be 
considered  a s  a ‘quasi-intem al organisation’.113Under th e  control of th e  
Korean s ta te , the  country’s  financial system  functioned a s  an internal 
cap ita l m arket by providing cred it to  se le c ted  business groups. In Korea, 
w here th e  governm ent w as com m itted to  fa s t econom ic developm ent via 
export growth, export ta rg e ts  becam e closely  tied to  th e  allocation of 
subsid ised  credit. Lee argues th a t th e  ‘quasi-internal organisation’ 
contributed to  econom ic developm ent in South Korea b ecau se  it helped 
solve m arket im perfections through ‘ex tended  bounded rationality, 
reduced opportunism  and uncertainty, reduced small-number 
indeterm inacies, b e tte r information and a  group-oriented atm osphere.’ 
P e te r Evans, on th e  o ther hand, su g g ests  the  co n cep t of ‘em bedded
1 "Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy. States & Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1995), p.30.
" 2Onis, ‘The Logic of the Developmentalist State’, p. 115. This interpretation of the relationship between 
bureaucracts and politicians in the developmental state first emerged in die work carried by Chalmers Johnson 
on Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in 1982 and later extended to the cases of Korea 
and Taiwan. For the latter cases, see Chalmers Johnson, ‘Political institutions and economic performance: the 
govemment-business relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan’, in Frederic C. Deyo, ed, The Political 
Economy o f  the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 136-164.
113 Chung-Hee Lee, ‘The Government, Financial System, and Large Private Enterprises in the Economic 
Development of South Korea’; World Development, 20 (1992), 187-197.
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autonom y’ to  describe relations betw een  governm ent officials and 
business ac to rs, and to  explain th e  high econom ic perform ance in 
K orea.114 For Evans, s ta te  officials in Korea w ere well organised in a 
coheren t s truc tu re  a s  they aim ed a t  pursuing collective goals, with the  
s ta te  playing the  role of ’midwife’.115 By th is  he m eans th a t the  s ta te , 
connected  with th e  business community, helped th e  growth of 
entrepreneurial groups and induced existing ones to  ta k e  on new and 
challenging industrial ventures by reducing the  risk and uncertainty  of 
such  endeavours. For co nnectedness to  tak e  th e  path of growth-oriented 
pro jects, however, s ta te  officials should remain autonom ous in the  
p ro cess of policy formulation.
Interestingly, in the  afterm ath of th e  Korean financial crisis in 1997, 
th e  synergetic  and closed ties  betw een th e  s ta te  and business groups 
th a t w ere  once regarded a s  an im portant fea tu re  accounting for th e  
successfu l econom ic perform ance of Korea, soon w ere identified a s  
’crony capitalism ’ and accused  to  be th e  cau se  of th e  crisis. Yet, a s  
M ushtaq Khan points out, rent-seeking h as  not only been a pervasive 
fea tu re  of th e  Korean political economy, but it has also  been asso c ia ted  
with productive investm ents and high econom ic grow th.11* Khan claim s 
th a t rent-seeking g en era tes  not only value-reducing ren ts  but also  value- 
enhancing ren ts. In his analysis, patron-client netw orks and the  
distribution of power within them  are  th e  crucial independent variable 
determ ining w hether or not rent-seeking g en era te  value-enhancing ren ts. 
Khan argues th a t in the  c a se  of Korea, it w as th e  p resen ce  of a strong 
s ta te  vis-a-vis a  w eak socie ty  th a t bolstered  th e  creation and 
m ain tenance of value-enhancing ren ts. A careful exam ination of th is 
strong s ta te  perspective, however, reveals som e significant draw backs in 
its  in terpretation of the  ca u se s  behind th e  successfu l Korean econom ic 
perform ance.
ll4Evans, ‘State Structures, Govemment-Business Relations, and Economic Transformation’, p.78.
115Evans, Embedded Autonomy, pp.78-81.
116Khan, ‘Rents, Efficiency and Growth, and Rent-Seeking as Process’.
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2.4 R eassessing  th e  Korean Economic Perform ance: A Critique of th e  
Three-Level Causation
2.4.1 Challenging the  First-Level Causation
At the  first-level causation , high levels of productive investm ent, 
allocation of resou rces to  s tra teg ic  industries and exposure of dom estic 
industries to  international com petition seem ed  to  have played an 
im portant role in the  country’s  industrialisation. However, it is difficult to  
say  to  w hat degree calcu lated  governm ent intervention is sufficient to  
explain Korean econom ic perform ance in isolation from, or w ithout 
relating it, to  a  particular con tex t a t th e  tim e. Contingent even ts, which 
are  beyond th e  control of th e  s ta te , such  a s  unanticipated  international 
political and econom ic c ircum stances and which might have a  significant 
im pact over a country’s  pattern  of econom ic perform ance need to  be 
taken  seriously.117The econom ic im pact of th e  Vietnam War in th e  1960s 
and th e  Middle East oil boom in th e  1970s are  tw o significant c a s e s  of 
how unexpected  ’contingencies of history’ should be taken  into 
consideration for a b e tte r  understanding of th e  Korean econom ic 
perform ance during the  leadership of Park Chung Hee (1961-1979).
From 1965 to  March 1973, over 300,000 South Korean so ld iers 
fought in Vietnam, to  m ake it th e  la rgest U.S. allied military contingent 
afte r th e  South V ietnam ese.118South Korea’s  involvement in the  Vietnam 
War w as seen  a s  a move by P residen t Park Chung Hee not only to  
g uaran tee  th e  m aintenance of th e  US military p resen ce  in the  Korean 
peninsula in face  of the continuing th re a t by North Korea, but also  to  keep 
US support for his regime and to  win financial support and econom ic
ll7Moon and Prasadh, ‘Beyond the Developmental State’, p.370.
ll8On the impact of the Vietnam War on Korea, see Seiji Naya, ‘The Vietnam War and Some Aspects of Its 
Economic Impact on Asian Countries’; The Developing Economies, 9 (1971), 31-57, Sungjoo Han, ‘South 
Korea’s Participation in The Vietnam Conflict: An Analysis of the U.S.-Korean Alliance’; Orbis, 21 (1978), 
893-912, Woo, Race to the Swift, pp.93-7, and John Lie, Han Unbound: The Political Economy o f South Korea 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp.62-7.
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b e n e f its .119 Park Chung Hee, a s  well a s  o ther Korean officials and 
businessm en, seem ed  to  have been conscious of th e  im pact th e  Korean 
War had had on th e  revival of th e  Ja p a n e se  econom y in th e  early 1950s. 
This consc iousness seem s to  have led the  Korean elite  to  draw  a  parallel 
conclusion th a t th e  Vietnam War would be an opportunity for the  Korean 
econom y. The incom e generated  by Korea from w hat w as known a s  the  
Vietnam War boom to talled  over one billion US dollars betw een  1965 and 
1972.120As Sungjoo Han argues, ‘the  Vietnam earnings becam e available 
during a  critical s ta g e  in Korea’s  econom ic developm ent, when large 
am ounts of international liquidity w ere needed for th e  rapid expansion of 
export industries.’121
South Korean business groups working in Vietnam generated  a 
to ta l incom e estim ated  a t 233 million US dollars from 1966 to  1972.122The 
conflict rep resen ted  the  first opportunity for an international venture for 
som e of th e  country’s  m ajor business g roups.123 Hyundai won its first 
international co n trac ts  from th e  US governm ent for p ro jects  in S outheast 
Asia, and Hanjin, th a t a  few  years la te r would purchase the  country’s  
m ajor airline KAL, signed a 7.9 million US dollars co n trac t to  supply 
transportation  to  th e  U.S. Air Force. The w ar-related incom e w as 
particularly im portant in term s of rem ittances from K oreans, both military 
and civilian w orkers, sta tioned  in V ietnam .124But the  im pact of the  w ar
ll9For the opinions emerging in Korea concerning the potential political and economic benefits related to an 
involvement in the Vietnam War, see Lie, Han Unbound, p.63. See also Han, ‘South Korea's Participation in the 
Vietnam Conflict’, p.894. He argues that Korea became first involved in the conflict to prevent the withdrawal or 
weakening of the U.S. security commitments with the country.
l20Lie, Han Unbound, p.64.
l2lHan, ‘South Korea’s Participation in the Vietnam Conflict’, p.898.
l22Lie, Han Unbound, p.64.
l23Woo, Race to the Swift, pp.96-7. See Seok Ki Kim, Business Concentration and Government Policy: A Study 
o f the Phenomenon o f Business Groups in Korea, 1945-1985, Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1987, 
p. 131.
124 David Cole and Princeton N. Lyman, Korean Development: The Interplay o f Politics and Economics 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p.135. See also Lie, Han Unbound, p.64. As he puts it: 
‘Remittances of South Korean soldiers, technicians, and workers not only benefited individuals but the 
government as well. The revenue generated during the Vietnam War in large part financed the construction of 
the main South Korean artery, the Kyongbu Highway connecting Seoul and Pusan, which was built between 
1968 and 1970.’ The importance of these revenues for the building of this major highway should not be 
underestimated. For Chung-yum Kim, Chief of Staff of President Park during the 1970s, the construction of the 
expressways was crucial for Korean economic development. It increased the incomes of farmers by allowing the 
cultivation of vegetables and fruits in greenhouses along the expressways that could easily reach major cities in 
one day year round. At the same time, it helped the emergence of industrial parks that benefited from lower 
production costs as a result of lower wages in the countryside and reduced transportation time and costs. For the
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w ent further, a s  it corresponded to  a  turning point in te rm s of industrial 
p a tte rn s  a s  Korea began to  ship to  Vietnam new  industrial products such  
a s  s tee l, transportation  equipm ent and non-electric equipm ent.12sAs Jung- 
en Woo points out:
The Vietnam War w as not only a  cornucopia of huge invisible earnings and 
im m ense U.S ass is tan c e , but an incubator of new  industries before 
testing  th e  fires of international com petition. The phenom enon w hereby a 
foreign m arket is turned into a laboratory for infant industries is, in o ther 
w ords, often political and, therefore, foreign to  th e  assum ptions 
underlying neoclassical trade  theories. N onetheless, it is one of th e  w ays 
in which a m ercantilist s ta te  engineers a  m ovem ent upward in th e  
industrial product cycle.12'
The Middle East oil boom in th e  1970s is ano ther relevant 
'contingency of history’ th a t tends to  be overlooked in te rm s of its  im pact 
on th e  perform ance of the  Korean econom y.127Benefiting from increasing 
oil revenues in the  afterm ath  of th e  first oil crisis in 1973, from 1974 
Middle E ast countries pursued m ajor construction  pro jects  a s  part of their 
developm ent plans. Pushed by President Pak Chung Hee who seem ed  to  
be w orried with th e  rapidly growing accoun t deficits derived from th e  high 
c o s t of oil imports, Korean construction  com panies began to  look for new  
business opportunities in th e  Middle E ast w ith th e  help of th e  
governm ent.122 As it had earlier happened with th e  Vietnam War, the
process leading to the construction of the country’s network of expressways, see Chung-yum Kim, Policymaking 
on the Front Lines: Memoirs o f a Korean Practitioner, 1945-1979, EDI Retrospectives in Policymaking 
(Washington: The World Bank, 1994), pp.103-114.
125Naya,’The Vietnam War and Some Aspects of Its Economic Impact on Asian Countries’, p.47. As Naya puts 
it: ‘The Vietnam conflict has provided Taiwan and Korea a greater learning effect in producing and exporting 
new industrial products than would have occurred under normal conditions.’
126Woo, Race to the Swift, p.97.
,27For economic relations between South Korea and the Middle East during the 1970s, see Nigel Disney, ‘Korea 
and the Middle East’, in Gavan McCormack and Mark Selden, eds, Korea North and South: The Deepening 
Crisis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), pp. 199- 206, and Jae Kyu Park, ‘Korea and the Third World’, 
in Youngnok Koo and Sung-joo Han, eds, The Foreign Policy o f the Republic o f Korea (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1985), pp.219-261. For government policies to support construction firms in the Middle East, 
see Chung Hoon Lee, ‘Promotion Measures for Construction Service Exports to the Middle East (1975)’, in Lee- 
Jay Cho and Yoon Hyung Kim, eds, Economic Development in the Republic o f Korea: A Policy Perspective 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), pp.527-549.
128Lee, ‘Promotion Measures for Construction Service Exports to the Middle East (1975)’, p.539. The South 
Korean government played an active role in promoting business expansion into the Middle East. For example,
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im pact on th e  Korean econom y w as particularly significant. As Nam Duck 
Woo, Deputy Prime M inister and M inister of Economic Planning a t th e  tim e, 
puts it:
The construction  activ ities in the  Middle E ast had far reaching e ffec ts  on 
th e  Korean econom y. In addition to  improving Korea’s  balance of 
paym ents with the  region, they  provided opportunities for Korean 
engineers and w orkers to  learn new  skills and gain ex p ertise  in large 
project m anagem ent in a foreign environm ent. Through th is  experience 
Koreans acquired new  com parative advan tage in developm ent p ro jects  in 
the  Third World.129
The im portance of th e  construction  activ ities in th e  Middle East for 
the Korean econom y in the  1970s can  be seen  by looking a t the ir share  
and value in the  country’s  to tal m erchandise exports.130Betw een 1965 and 
1973, th e  value of m erchandise exports  w as  approxim ately 8.6 billion US 
dollars with th e  construction  serv ice exports  to  th e  Middle East reaching 
a m ere 24 million US dollars, or 0.3 percen t of th e  to ta l value of 
m erchandise exports. But over th e  nex t eight-year period, from 1974 to  
1981, th e  value of construction  serv ice exports to  th e  Middle E ast 
becam e one of the  m ajor com ponents of Korea’s  ex ternal trade, a s  it grew  
to  rep resen t 44 p ercen t of th e  value of m erchandise exports, or 41 billion 
US dollars of a to tal of 94 billion US dollars. At the  sam e tim e, from 1977 
to  1979, approxim ately 292,000 Korean w orkers w en t to  th e  Middle East, 
or around 27 p ercen t of th e  country’s  m ale m anufacturing work 
force.131The rem ittance of their w ages a s  well a s  of business profits, in 
conjunction with exports of m achinery, equipm ent, and m ateria ls re la ted
the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation set in 1962 to help promoting the country's exports, had opened eight 
centres in the Middle East during the 1970s, and in 1975, President Park Chung Hee founded the Korea 
Foundation for Middle East Studies (KFMES) aimed at advising firms on trade opportunities in the Middle East. 
See Disney, ‘Korea and the Middle East’, p.202.
,29Nam Duck Woo, Korea’s Economic Growth in a Changing World (Seoul: Samsung Economic Research 
Institute, 1997), p. 106.
130Lee, ‘Promotion Measures for Construction Service Exports to the Middle East (1975)’, pp.527-58.
131 Amsden, Asia Next Giant, p. 100.
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to  the  construction activ ities provided th e  country with much needed 
foreign exchange earnings.132
What th e se  tw o ‘contingencies of history’ tell us is th a t they  had a 
significant im pact on the  perform ance of the  Korean econom y in th e  
1960s and 1970s and had they not occurred th e  country’s  pattern  of 
developm ent might have had a  different outcom e. These tw o events, 
however, should not be seen  a s  sufficient to  explain th e  perform ance 
pattern  of th e  Korean economy, a s  th e  econom ic and political benefits 
related  to  them  cannot be d issocia ted  from the  governm ent initiative to  
intervene and tak e  advantage of the  international econom ic con tex t. In 
both c a se s , th e  leadership of Park Chung Hee played th e  n ecessa ry  role 
of managing th e  system  of socialisation of private risk to  swiftly intervene 
and m axim ise th e  opportunities and th e  potential w indfalls p resen ted  by 
th e se  tw o events. This w as done by offering financial incentives, 
adm inistrative guidance and risk insurance to  Korean firms willing to  g e t 
involved in business pro jects related to  th e  Vietnam War and th e  Middle 
East construction  boom.
2.4.2 Challenging the  Second-Level Causation
At th e  second-level causation , th e  developm ental s ta te  literatu re  
argues th a t high levels of productive investm ent, s tra teg ic  allocation of 
financial resou rces in key industries, and se lec tive  exposure of dom estic 
industries to  international com petition are  the  policy ou tcom es of a 
system  of socialisation of private risk. This system  em pow ers th e  s ta te  
vis-&-vis th e  private sec to r with th e  capacity  to  guide levels of industrial 
production and investm ent through its  control of financial flows. Policy 
cho ices a re  expected  to  obey principles of econom ic rationality, including 
disciplinarian m easures against th o se  in th e  private se c to r  th a t fail to 
achieve th e  ta rg e ts  s e t  by the  sta te-designed  developm ent plans. An
l32Lee,‘Promotion Measures for Construction Service Exports to the Middle East (l 975)’, p.527 and Lie, Han 
Unbound, p.88. See also Disney, ‘Korea and the Middle East’, p.201.The increase in foreign exchange earnings 
in turn increased the domestic money supply, which, along with the increase in national income had important 
consequences for the economy that will be discussed in Chapter Five. See Amsden, Asia Next Giant, pp. 100-1.
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a ssessm en t of the system  of socialisation  of private risk, how ever, show s 
a  more com plex picture.
First, the  strong s ta te  literature claim s th a t th e  system  of 
socialisation of private risk has been pro tected  from th e  influence of 
in terest p ressu res. This literature posits th a t it w as th e  depoliticisation of 
th is system  and its resp ec t for principles of econom ic rationality, even 
within a scenario  of custom ary rent-seeking th a t strongly contributed to  
Korean econom ic perform ance.133Yet, policies are  rarely undertaken  only 
to  realise  an econom ic rationale a s  they are  usually a ttem p ts  to  
‘politicise’ the  m arket. As Chung-in Moon and Rashemi Prasadh point out, 
‘regard less of regime type, econom ic policies are  destined  to  be 
politicised. Depoliticisation of th e  econom y is equivalent to  the  
neoclassical assum ption of perfect m arket.’134For instance , th e  Korean’s  
governm ent decision to  pursue heavy and chem ical industrialisation in 
th e  1970s w as expected  not only to  move th e  country’s  industrial 
production to  high-valued products (econom ic rationale), but also  to  
ad d ress  th e  country’s  growing security  concerns by building an 
indigenous defence industry (security rationale) and n ecessa ry  to  bestow  
legitim acy on the  new  Yushin regime and guaran tee  th e  political survival 
of P resident Park Chung Hee (political rationale).13SEconomic concerns 
seem  to  have been only one of th e  several variables influencing th e  policy 
process.
The sam e politicised policymaking p attern  surfaced  in th e  1980s 
during th e  military and authoritarian regime of Chun Doo Hwan (1980- 
1987) w ith th e  im plem entation of th e  Industrial Rationalisation 
Program .13'This program w as formally aimed a t  building a  m ore efficient 
allocation of state-controlled  credit. It involved th e  re-organisation of six
l33Khan, ‘Rent-Seeking as Process’, p. 128. As Khan puts it: ‘The less important economic rationality is for state 
officials, the less likely it is that value-maximizing rights and rents will be created by autonomously acting 
states.’
134Moon and Prasad, ‘Beyond the Developmental State’, p.368.
135See Chapter Four.
136Moon, ‘Changing Patters of Business-Govemment Relations in South Korea’, pp. 147-8.
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problem atic industries, especially  pow er-generating equipm ent and 
autom obiles, with serious surplus capac ity  stem m ing from ex cessiv e  
investm ent and poor planning and co-ordination. The policy favoured 
m ergers betw een whole business lines, th e  delegation of particular 
p roducts to  specific firms and th e  a ttrac tion  of foreign investm ent.137Here, 
th e  governm ent faced  a dilemma. The rescu e  of ailing industries and 
insolvent firms could imply not only very high c o s ts , but a lso  the  
surrender of the  governm ent’s  recen t adoption of m arket values, but 
forsaking them  could on the  o ther hand gen era te  econom ic ch ao s and. 
subsequently  political d istress . The solution found w as to  persuade 
health ier firms to  tak e  over th e  troubled firms by offering them  highly 
generous financial benefits, such  a s  concessional loans a t low in te rest 
ra te s  and payable over 5-30 years, or money to  offset th e  estim ated  loss 
from th e  acquisition of the  insolvent firms.
Between 1985 and 1988, som e 78 firms w ere restruc tu red  under 
th is  program.138Paradoxically, and given th e  fac t th a t th e  reform w as to  
move tow ards a m ore m arket-oriented approach, th e  governm ent sought 
th e  restructuring through discretionary industry-specific and firm-specific 
s ta te  intervention. In fact, there  w ere no guidelines concerning the  
identification of industries eligible for governm ent-initiated 
restructuring .139Politics again seem ed  to  have dom inated the  econom ic 
agenda of the Korean governm ent. As Ja m e s  Schopf argues, the  
executive led by Chun Doo Hwan ‘did not u se  th e  effective econom ic 
bureaucracy available to  him simply to  im plem ent plan-rational industrial 
policy. Instead, Chun se lec ted  firms to  receive ren ts  and used  the  
bureaucracy to  advise th e se  politically m otivated decisions, thus 
foregoing maximization of efficiency and basing his decisions not on 
firms’ econom ic perform ance so  much a s  on th e  ow ners’ political
137The Daewoo Heavy Industries of the Daewoo Business Group, for example, was expected to merge its Okpo 
Integrated Machinery Plants with the Changwon and Goonpo factories of Hyundai International in the power 
generating equipment and heavy construction equipment sectors. See Jong-Chang Rhee,77ze State and Industry 
in South Korea: The limits o f the authoritarian state (London: Routledge,1994), p. 161.
138Moon, ‘Changing Patters of Business-Govemment Relations in South Korea’, p.149.
139 Sang-Woo Nam, ‘Korea’s Financial Reform Since The Early 1980s’; KDI Working Paper No.9027 (Seoul: 
Korea Development Institute, 1992), p.34.
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contributions and family tie s .’140The co llapse of the  Kukje conglom erate in 
1985 (at th e  tim e th e  seventh-largest chaebol, or business conglom erate) 
is usually p resen ted  a s  a good c a se  revealing the  w illingness of the s ta te  
to  punish a  poorly m anaged business group.141
The president of th e  conglom erate, Yang Chong-mo, however, 
claim ed th a t b ecau se  of its  support of th e  opposition, and his refusal to  
contribute to  a  private foundation c rea ted  by Chun Doo Hwan, the 
governm ent decided to  cu t th e  financial su p p o rt.142 The p rocess  th a t 
followed to  dissolve and resell the  group’s  23 subsid iaries proved to  be 
influenced by political considerations a s  the  se lec ted  firms to  acquire 
Kukje’s  a s s e ts  all had c lose tie s  with th e  country’s  leadership. The main 
beneficiaries of the  whole p rocess w ere  Dongkook S teel Group, Hanil 
Synthetic Fiber Group and th e  Kukdong Construction Group, a  group of 
firms th a t had built strong informal tie s  with the  leadership of the  Fifth 
Republic through political contributions and family connections. Hanil, 
Kukdong and Dongkook contributed respectively  eight, five, and four 
tim es m ore per a s se t  than Hyundai, th e  la rgest chaebol, and th e  favours 
received from Chun Doo Hwan corresponded to  their order and sca le  of 
contribution.
Additionally, the  second  and fourth sons of th e  ow ner of Hanil, Kim 
Han-Soo, m arried the  daughters of Choi Nam-sun and Kim Bok-dong, two 
Korean Military Academy (KMA) presiden ts from th e  co re  supporting 
group of Chun Doo Hwan, the  KMA’s  11th graduating c lass . Furtherm ore, 
Choi Nam-sun’s  son-in-law, Lee Jae-w oo, w as a  m em ber of parliam ent for 
Chun’s  D em ocratic Ju s tic e  Party (DJP), while Kim’s  son-in-law w as Roh
l40James C. Schopf, ‘An Explanation For the End of Political Bank Robbery In the Republic of Korea’; Asian 
Survey, 41 (2001), 693-715, p.694.Under Korea’s new Freedom of Information Act, Schopf had access to 
previously sealed documents that detailed the exchange of kickbacks under the Fifth Republic led by Chun Doo 
Hwan.
141 Amsden, Asia Next Giant, p. 15.
1420n the collapse of Kukje Corporation, see Kim, Big Business, Strong State, pp.200-3. See also Mark Clifford, 
Troubled Tiger: Businessmen, Bureaucrats, and Generals in South Korea (New York: M.E.Sharpe Inc.,1998), 
p.222. In an interview with Mark Clifford, Kim Mahn Je, president of the Korean Development Institute during 
the regime of Park Chung Hee, and Minister of Finance during Chun Doo Hwan, admitted that politics were 
involved in bringing down Kukje.
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Tae Woo’s  (close a sso c ia te  of Chun and la ter Korean president from 1988 
to  1992) right hand-m an.143 The tw o c a s e s  presen ted  here show  clearly 
th a t policy cho ices have not been depoliticised in Korea. Instead , policies 
have been se lec ted  to  satisfy  th e  political in te re sts  of th e  regim e. The 
la tte r c a se  show s clearly th a t th e  disciplinarian p ro cess  has not been 
immune to  political considerations cultivated through formal and informal 
tie s  betw een  politicians, businessm en and th e  military leadership.
Furtherm ore, strong s ta tis t  analyses tend  to  s tre s s  how th e  system  
of socialisation of private risk provided th e  Korean s ta te  with the  
capacity  to  push th e  private se c to r  to  follow s tra teg ic  industrial 
s tra teg ie s  and policies. Consequently, the  private se c to r  is regarded a s  a 
passive and assen ting  ac to r th a t does not do m ore than  follow s ta te  
cho ices. An exam ple, however, of th e  entrepreneurial initiative 
dem onstrated  by private firms and its  im pact on th e  industrial 
transform ation of Korea can  be traced  to  the  early drive in th e  1960s to  
develop export-oriented m anufacturing in d u stries.144 Empirical evidence 
has illustrated  well the crucial role played by the  Korean s ta te  in the 
promotion of exports through financial reforms, incentive sch em es and 
se tting  an adm inistrative support sy stem .148Yet, th e  initial su c c e ss  of 
Korea’s  export-oriented industrialisation seem s to  be le ss  related  with th e  
first s ta te-designed  developm ent plans and m ore w ith th e  ingenuity 
revealed by the  Korean private se c to r  in allying them selves with 
Ja p a n e se  com panies to  seize international business opportunities.
Korea’s  first-five year developm ent plan (1962-1966) gave sc an t 
a tten tion  to  exports, in particular to  m anufactured exports. Youngil Lim
l43Schopf, ‘An Explanation For the End of Political Bank Robbery In the Republic of Korea’ ,pp.707-8.
l44For a study on the entrepreneurial role of Korean business groups as an important factor determining the 
country’s economic performance, see In-Young Kim, The Political Economy o f a Chaebol’s Capital 
Accumulation in South Korea: The Case o f Samsung, 1938-1987, Doctoral dissertation, University of Hawaii,
1996.
145Choong Yong Ahn and Joo-Hoon Kim, ‘The Outward-Looking Trade Policy and the Industrial Development
of South Korea’, in Cha Dong-se et al, eds, The Korean Economy 1945-1995: Performance and Vision for the
21st Century (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1997), pp.339-382, pp.344-350, and Young Sae Lee and
Woojin Youn, ‘Export Promotion in Asia: The Korean Experience’; KIET Occasional Paper No.29 (Seoul: 
Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade, 1999).
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points out th a t the  plan unveiled by th e  governm ent ‘did not clearly  
envisage adopting export-led growth based  on th e  unskilled labour- 
intensive m anufactures,’ th a t would la te r becom e the  country’s  m ajor 
export item s.146ln fact, one of the  sec tio n s  of the  developm ent plan th a t 
exam ined how to  expand exports w as initially deleted  by m em bers of th e  
military jun ta  a t th e  tim e for ‘they saw  little hope for grow th’.147The plan 
put into effect in January  1962 focused  primarily on export of primary 
goods, such a s  pigs, rice, seaw eed , fresh fish, frozen m arine products, 
dried cuttlefish, silk yam , iron ore, graphite , or skins and hides. For th e  
industrial secto r, the  plan em phasised  im port-substitution industries like 
cem ent, fertilizer, industrial m achinery, oil refinem ent, m achine and heavy 
chem ical industries. Such industrial policy w as to  be financed with the  
foreign exchange gained through th e  exports  of primary goods.14*However, 
by th e  end of th e  first year of im plem entation, the  plan had failed to  reach  
its goals and underw ent m ajor revision which included changing th e  
ta rg e t for average annual growth ra te  from 7.1 percen t to  5 percen t. The 
initial ta rg e ts  w ere abandoned and a  new  plan w as devised with more 
m odest goals.149
By the  end of the  (revised) first five-year developm ent plan, 1966, 
the  com position of ac tual exports w as surprisingly different from w hat 
had been planned originally by th e  governm ent. Textiles, clothing, 
plywood, w igs, footw ear, and electron ic  com ponents em erged a s  th e  
m ajor foreign exchange earners. 150 While the  governm ent expected  
m anufactured goods to  rep resen t only 33.2 percen t of th e  to ta l exports in 
the  first five-year developm ent plan, th e  ac tual figure w as 61.8 percen t. 
Furtherm ore, a s  a resu lt of the  higher percen tage  of exports of 
m anufacturing goods, the  value of ac tua l exports greatly  su rp assed  th e
l46Youngil Lim, Government Policy and Private Enterprise: Korean Experience in Industrialization (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1981), p. 16.
147Clifford, Troubled Tiger, p.54. From 1961 to 1963, Korea was under a military junta until the election of Park 
Chung Hee as the country’s President in late 1963.
148Lim, Government Policy and Private Enterprise, p. 16.
I49For an insider’s description of Korea’s first five-year development plan, see Nam, Korea’s Economic Growth 
in a Changing World, pp.21-38.
150Lim, Government Policy and Private Enterprise, p. 17.
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projections or ta rg e ts , from an ex pected  137.5 million US dollars to  an 
actual 250.3 million US dollars in 1966. The trend continued in the  
following five-year developm ent plans (1967-1971 and 1972-1976) with 
m anufactured products turning into th e  country’s  main export item and 
value of to ta l exports reaching num bers well above th o se  projected by the  
governm ent: 1.06 billion US dollars in 1971 (against th e  ta rg e ted  550 
million US dollars) and 7.71 billion US dollars in 1976 (against th e  planned 
3.58 billion US dollars).
The econom ic outcom e reveals th e  capacity  dem onstrated  by 
private firms to  tak e  full advantage of th e  system  of socialisation  of 
private risk to  explore th e  country’s  po ten tia lities in building an export- 
oriented m anufacturing sec to r. During th e  1960s, th e  system  offered non- 
discrim inatory incentive schem es and financial support to  any export- 
oriented industry, a s  well a s  a com prehensive insurance m echanism  to  
reduce potential m arket risks and u n ce rta in tie s .1,1 But, if governm ent 
p lanners failed to  perceive the  capacity  of th e  country’s  business sec to r 
to  export m anufacturing goods, w hat then  m ade th e  Korean private se c to r  
gam ble on th e  future of th e  sec to r?  At th e  core of th e  explanation seem s 
to  be an alliance developed betw een  Korean and Ja p a n e se  
b u sinessm en .1*2 According to  Vivek Chibber, th e  ultim ate goal of th is 
alliance w as to  use Korea a s  ‘launching pad for exports into advanced 
cap ita list m arket’, in particular th e  United S ta tes: ‘th e  Ja p a n e se  brought 
in technology, m arketing netw orks, and finance, while the  Koreans 
supplied cheap  labour, a  m arket for J a p a n e se  cap ita l goods, and a m eans 
of bypassing U.S trade  restric tions against Jap an .’1*3
l5,Ahn and Kim, 'The Outward-Looking Trade Policy and the Industrial Development of South Korea’, p.347. 
As these authors stress: ‘Unlike most developing countries, access to basic incentives in Korea in the 1960s was 
automatic for all production and commercial transactions related to exports.’ See also Lim, Government Policy 
and Private Enterprise, pp. 18-25. This non-discriminatory system would change in the 1970s when a shift in the 
government’s development strategy involved the allocation of credit primarily to the development of heavy and 
chemical industries. See Chapter Four.
152For works on the importance of Japan, in particular of Japanese businessmen, as an independent variable 
influencing the performance of the Korean economy, see Vivek Chibber, ‘Building a Developmental State: The 
Korean Case Reconsidered’; Politics and Society, 27 (1999), 309-346. See also Robert Castley, Korea’s 
Economic Miracle: The Crucial Role o f Japan (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997), and Kim, Big Business, 
Strong State, pp. 84-9.
153Chibber, ‘Building a Developmental State’, p.335.
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The first s te p s  to  gain governm ent support for th is alliance 
em erged in th e  early 1960s, when Y asuhei Yukawa, th e  d irector of the  
Japan-K orea Trade Association, and a  former instructor of Park Chung 
Hee a t th e  Ja p a n e se  Military Academy m et the Korean President. But it 
w as th e  lack of normalised ties  betw een  Seoul and Tokyo th a t im peded 
further strengthening of the  ties. This w as an im portant and sensitive 
political issue a s  the  Korean governm ent feared it could trigger civil 
un rest due to  th e  national anim osity tow ards Jap an  following its colonial 
rule over th e  Korean peninsula during 1905-1945.
This political environment, however, did not s top  th e  Federation of 
Korean Industries (FKI), gathering th e  country’s  m ajor industrialists, to  be 
am ong th e  first dom estic forces to  p ress for th e  estab lishm ent of 
diplom atic tie s  betw een the  tw o nations.1s4ln Jap an , th e  advocacy w as 
done by w hat w as known as  the  ’Korea lobby’ m ade up of m em bers of th e  
country’s  fifteen top firms a s  well a s  im portant politicians. The s tra teg y  
involved also  th e  provision of financial backing to  th e  P resident’s political 
party, th e  ruling Dem ocratic Republican Party (DRP), from both Korean 
and J a p a n e se  businessm en. A CIA report from 1966 found th a t from 1961 
to  1965 (the years betw een th e  coup d’e ta t  led by Park Chung Hee and the  
norm alisation of diplom atic tie s  w ith Japan), J a p a n e se  firms provided 
tw o-thirds of the  DRP’s  budget. Six J a p a n e se  firms w ere said  to  have paid 
a  to ta l of 66 million US dollars, w ith individual hand-outs estim ated  to  
have ranged betw een one million US dollars to  20 million US dollars.1S8The 
ratification of the  trea ty  in mid-1965, supported by P resident Park but 
opposed by th e  majority of the  population, opened th e  doors to  full 
estab lishm ent of Korea a s  a base  for Ja p a n e se  firms engaged in exporting 
to  th e  U.S.1S6With the  structu ra l foundations already s e t  by Korean and 
Ja p a n e se  businessm en in the  years before 1965, th e  norm alisation of ties  
put an end to  the  last barrier to  export-led m anufacturing industrialisation.
l54Chibber, ‘Building a Developmental State’, p.333.
155Woo, Race to the Swift, p.86.
l56For the negotiating process leading to the settlement of the treaty, see Bae Ho Hahn, ‘Policy Toward Japan’, in 
Koo and Han, The Foreign Policy o f the Republic ofKorea, pp. 167-197, pp. 171 -5.
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The norm alisation of tie s  not only opened th e  opportunity for 
Korean and Ja p an e se  firms to  work together, but also  gave th e  country 
much needed foreign exchange through th e  paym ent of reparations for 
th e  colonisation of th e  country by Jap an . The final reparation figures 
reached  a to tal of US$800 million a t th e  tim e (US$300 million in grants, 
US$200 million in governm ent loans, and th e  remaining in com m ercial 
credit). It w as an im pressive figure for a country th a t had exported a to ta l 
of US$200 million in 1964.187By the  end of 1974, Jap a n e se  firms w ere 
responsible for 55 percen t of exports by foreign firms in te rm s of to tal 
value. Their influence in promoting Korean exports w as im m ense. 
Ja p a n e se  firms dom inated several im portant export-oriented se c to rs  such 
a s  chem icals, clay, m etals, m achinery and e lectron ics. For exam ple, by 
th e  end of 1974, foreign firms (led by Ja p a n e se  investors) w ere 
responsible for 77 percen t of exports of m achinery and p arts  th a t totalled 
77 million US dollars, 84 p ercen t of to ta l m etal products exports  of 120 
million US dollars, and 89 p ercen t of to ta l e lec tron ic  m achinery exports of 
474 million US dollars. 188 Additionally, Ja p a n e se  firms had a more 
ex tensive system  of joint-ventures than non-Japanese  foreign com panies 
th a t facilitated  the  transfer of technological know-how, m arketing and 
m anagem ent skills. 189 Another elem ent th a t w as im portant in th is 
relationship w as played by Ja p a n e se  trading com panies in th e  form of 
m arketing and finance. They offered Korean com panies m arketing and 
sa le s  netw orks in the  lucrative US m arket, and guaran teed  easy  and 
continuous a c c e ss  to  credit from Ja p a n e se  ban k s.160In sum, the  early 
s u c c e ss  of Korean m anufacturing exports and the ir contribution to  the  
country’s  econom ic perform ance ow es much to  th e  en terprise  
dem onstrated  by local business groups, in alliance with Ja p a n e se  firms, 
in identifying m arket opportunities and tak ing  risks in th e  international 
export m arkets.
157Woo, Race to the Swift, p.87.
158Castley, Korea’s Economic Miracle, p .l4l (see table 3.34).
l59Castley, Korea's Economic Miracle, p. 141.
160Chibber, ‘Building a Developmental State’, p.334.
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However, the  entrepreneurial spirit of the  Korean firms in joint 
collaboration with their Ja p a n e se  coun terparts  to  explore the  
international m arket is not sufficient to  explain th e  country’s  perform ance. 
The Korean private se c to r  continued to  be technologically poor, badly 
informed about th e  international m arkets and, m ore im portantly, to  lack 
capital. The resolution of th is lim itation rested  ultim ately on the  
supporting and guiding hand offered by th e  Korean s ta te . Under Park 
Chung Hee, th e  Korean governm ent sought not only to  g u aran tee  cred its  
and risk insurance to  the  private sec to r  through th e  system  of 
socialisation  of private risk, but also  to  certify th a t th e  te rm s of the  
alliance would not be unfavourable to  th e  Korean firms in natural 
d isadvantage vis-d-vis the  more powerful J a p a n e se  com panies, and to  
offer technological and investm ent a ss is ta n c e .1'1 In sum , policy cho ices 
w ere not necessarily  technically  rational and free from political bias. 
Additionally, th e  application of disciplinarian m easures depended le ss  on 
th e  s treng th  of th e  s ta te  and more on th e  nature of th e  relationship 
betw een  th e  executive and th e  private sec to r. Private firms w ere not only 
followers of s ta te  policy cho ices but also  took the  initiative to  e n te r  new  
industries and succeeded  in obtaining th e  support of th e  Presidency in 
their business ventures.
The tendency  to  highlight th e  s treng th  of th e  Korean s ta te  re s ts  on 
th e  belief th a t th e  power of th e  s ta te  depends on its  control of financial 
flows. There is no doubt th a t s ta te  control over finance significantly 
in creases  the  pow er of th e  s ta te  over th e  private sec to r. Yet, it is not 
c lea r how th is pow er could be sufficient to  give th e  s ta te  th e  autonom y 
and capacity  to  be unconcerned about th e  private se c to r’s  response to  
policy changes. The analysis offered by th e  strong s ta te  litera tu re  seem s 
to  m isin terpret th e  term s of th e  relationship betw een  s ta te  and business 
groups. The c a se s  above show  th a t th e  informal nature of th e  tie s  binding 
th e  s ta te  and the  private sec to r, contrary to  th e  in terpretation  offered by 
the  strong s ta te  literature, led to  a m ore dynamic relationship betw een
l6lChibber, ‘Building a Developmental State’, p.336.
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th e  tw o to  su rp ass  th e  idea of strong s ta te  versus w eak  business groups. 
S ince th e  legitim acy of the  regim e becam e strongly dependen t on its 
ability to  deliver rapid econom ic growth and developm ent, all involved 
ac to rs  w ere aw are th a t any move to  hurt the  private se c to r  needed to  be 
well a s se s se d  a s  it could cau se  sev ere  disruptions to  th e  en tire  national 
economy. As Timothy Lim puts it:
The s ta te  and big business, then, w ere locked in a  tight, in terdependent 
(if not co-dependent) power-relationship. On th e  one hand, th e  s ta te  
occupied a  position of legitim ate pow er (i.e., authority) and “controlled” 
a c c e s s  to  many of th e  physical and/or financial resou rces needed by 
business. Big business, on the  o ther hand, perform ed many of th e  
activ ities th a t su sta ined  the  economy, and, by extension , th e  s ta te ’s  
position of legitim ated power. This c rea ted  an in teresting  and com plex 
dynamic betw een th e  s ta te  and th e  chaebol.1'2
2.4.3 Challenging the  Third-Level causation
Strong s ta te  perspectives usually eq u a te  th e  Korean s ta te  w ith an 
autonom ous and capable bureaucracy th a t through th e  system  of 
socialisation  of private risk s e ts  cooperative t ie s  w ith th e  private sec to r. 
However, th e se  perspectives provide an incom plete im age of th e  
organisation and workings of the  Korean s ta te  and its relations w ith th e  
private sec to r. They do not only fail to  recognise  th a t th e  Korean s ta te  is 
m ade of several constitu tive layers with th e  P residency a t  th e  top of th e  
decision-m aking process but also  to  acknow ledge the  capacity  of th e  
private se c to r  to  influence policy choices.
The strong s ta te  literature on Korean developm ent ten d s  to  reify 
the  role of th e  bureaucracy a s  th e  main a c to r  behind th e  country’s  
policymaking process. The bureaucracy  is usually introduced a s  a 
m eritocracy united and coheren t in its  se lec tion  and im plem entation of
1 “ Timothy Lim, ‘Power, Capitalism, and the Authoritarian State in South Korea’; Journal o f Contemporary 
Asia, 28 (1998), 457-483, p.472.
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developm ent p o lic ie s .163 The Korean bureaucracy is indeed se lec ted  
according to  a highly com petitive en tran ce  exam ination th a t has usually 
a ttra c ted  th e  country’s  best s tud en ts . During the  presidency of Park 
Chung Hee there  w as a concern not only to  increase  th e  size of th e  
bureaucracy, but also  to  improve its  professional com petence and to  
boost its  capacity  to  m anage th e  growing com plexity of th e  country’s  
econom y.164The strong s ta te  literature’s  in terpretation fails, however, to  
understand  th e  political fea tu res  shaping th e  organisation and th e  
workings of th e  bureaucratic  m achine. One of such  fea tu res  is th e  
organisation of the  bureaucracy along regional lines. Despite th e  
tendency  to  portray Korea a s  a hom ogenous country the  political 
considerations of P residents have led them  to  u se  regional affiliations a s  
an im portant fac to r defining the  organisation of th e  bureaucracy. In fact, 
regionalism  in civil service has continued to  ra ise  g rea t d eb a te s  in 
Korea.168Since the  1970s, and through th e  la st presidency of Cholla-native 
Kim Dae Jung (1998-2002), the home region of th e  la s t four p residen ts  
(Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo Hwan, Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam), 
Kyongsang, has been over-represented in th e  bureaucracy. Hwang Jong- 
Sung argues th a t, ’b ecause  P resident Park Chung Hee’s  legitim acy w as 
w eak  due to  his beginning in a military regim e and his pow er w as 
constan tly  challenged, he im plem ented th e  m ethod of regional 
relationships to  overcom e potential uncertain ty  and danger.’166
Afterwards, the p resence of natives from Kyongsang continued to  
increase  in the  adm inistrative elite, and a s  they grew  in number, they  
becam e an independent power struc tu re . While it is difficult to  identify 
th e  cau sa l relationship, th is political b ias in th e  organisation of the  
bureaucracy  developed alongside an uneven econom ic regional
l63Evans, Embedded Autonomy, and Woo-Cumings, ‘The Korean Bureaucratic State; Historical Legacies and 
Comparative Perspectives’.
l64See Chapter Three for the measures undertaken by Park Chung Hee to reform the country’s bureaucracy.
,65Heo Nam-chin, ‘What Happened to Promised Reforms?’, Joongang Ilbo, 13 March 2001, p.3, Cho Ki-suk, 
‘Regionalism Trivializes Korean Politics’, Joongang Ilbo, 21 March 2001, p.3, Hwang Sung-dong, ‘Incomplete 
Study of Bias in Civil Service’, Joongang Ilbo, 22 March 2001, p.3, and Hong Soon-il, ‘Cronyism’, The Korea 
Times, 7 June 2001, p.4 (hereafter KT).
166Hwang Jong-Sung, ‘Analysis of the Structure of the Korean Political Elite’; Korea Journal, 37 (1997), 98- 
117, pp.l 13-4. See also Kim Byong-kuk, ‘Apartheid, Korean Version’, KT, 27 April 1993.
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developm ent in Korea.1t7ln 1949, th e  provinces off Kyongsang (north and 
south) and Cholla (north and south) w ere  th e  m ost populous a re a s  in th e  
country, with approxim ately 25 percen t and 28 percen t respectively  off th e  
to ta l population. However, by the  early  1990s, while th e  population in 
Kyongsang increased  to  30 percen t of th e  to ta l population, Cholla saw  its 
inhabitan ts decreasing  to  approxim ately 12 p ercen t off th e  to ta l 
population, a s  people m igrated out off th e  region in search  off em ploym ent. 
Betw een 1958 and 1983, Cholla’s  sh a re  of m anufacturing em ploym ent 
diminished from 13.1 percen t to  5.4 percen t, while th a t off Kyongsang 
increased  from 28.6 percen t to  41 p ercen t.1"
In a country w here the  s ta te  granted busin esses  a  large num ber off 
financial benefits and tax  incentives, geographical affiliation, school 
connections and kinship netw orks seem ed  to  have played an im portant 
role in th e  selection  of those  to  be rew arded. The em ergence off big 
business groups such a s  LG and Sam sung from Kyongsang and th e  
relative decline of th e  Cholla-based Sam yangsa Group and Kyongsung 
Textile Company since  the  1960s show  how regional affiliations seem  to  
have been im portant for succeeding  in business. 169 While, regional 
affiliations probably brought certa in ty  and stability  within th e  
adm inistration since the  1960s, regional econom ic inequality is a legacy 
th a t has nurtured regional hostilities and divisions to  negatively affect th e  
consolidation of Korean dem ocracy.170 As pointed out by P e te r Gourevitch, 
even strong s ta te s  rely on the  support of social ac to rs  to  prevail:
l67For a more detailed analysis on the political and economic disparities between regions, see Soohyun Chon, 
‘Political Economy of Regional Development in Korea’, in Richard Appelbaum and Jeffrey Henderson, eds, 
States and Development in the Asia Pacific Rim (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1992), pp.150-175. See also 
Dong Ok Lee and Stanley D.Brunn, ‘Politics and Regions: an analysis of the recent presidential election’; 
Political Geography, 15 (1996), 99-119, and Dae Hwan Kim, ‘Economic Concentration and Disparities: The 
Political Economy of Class, Region and the Chaebol’, in Dae Hwan Kim and Tat Yan Kong, eds, The Korean 
Peninsula in Transition (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997), pp.36-62, pp.43-9.
168Chon, ‘Political Economy of Regional Development in Korea’, p. 154.
169Chon, ‘Political Economy of Regional Development in Korea’, p. 170. See also Young-Iob Chung, ‘Chaebol 
Entrepreneurs In the Early Stage of Korean Economic Development’; The Journal o f Modern Korean Studies, 2 
(1985), 15-29, pp.23-5.
I70For a study on the impact of regional economic inequality in regional voting in Korea since the democratic 
opening in 1987, see Kisuk Cho, ‘Regional Voting in New Democracies: The Case of South Korea’, paper 
prepared for the 17th International Congress of the International Political Science Association, Seoul, 18 August,
1997. See also, Kyoung-Ryung Seong, ‘Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: Great 
Achievements and Remaining Problems’, in Larry Diamond and Byung-Kook Kim, eds, Consolidating 
Democracy in South Korea (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2000), pp.87-109, pp.98-102.
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The autonom y of th e  s ta te  has a  social base: for s ta te  autonom y to  ex ist 
for specific purposes, the s ta te  m ust be  able to  obtain th e  support, of 
differing kinds, from socie ta l ac to rs. The strong s ta te  is one with th e  
political support to  be strong, a  s ta te  with th e  com pliance and
enthusiasm  of a t leas t som e socie ta l a c to rs  th a t support th e  ac tio n s of 
s treng th . When the  support d isappears, so  does s ta te  s tren g th .171
Another political fea tu re  moulding the  organisation of th e
bureaucracy  and w as the creation  of a  ‘bifurcated bureaucracy’ during th e  
1960s. 172 Dom estic-oriented m inistries such a s  Transportation,
Construction and Home Affairs w ere filled with patronage appointm ents, 
while econom ic m inistries such  a s  EPB, Finance or Trade and Industry 
kep t their professionalism  by being left immune from such  political 
considerations. Patronage appoin tm ents involved especially  m em bers of 
th e  military in th e  early years of th e  Park’s  presidency a s  an  instrum ent to  
conso lidate  support within th e  military h ierarchies and keep  control of th e  
bureaucracy .173
Additionally, the workings of th e  Korean bureaucracy  have been far 
from following the  pa tte rns of a united body th a t applies efficient
econom ic policies. Law rence W estphal and Irma Adelman point out in 
their analysis of the  Korean planning p rocess  th a t ‘th e  spirit of 
com petition appears to  dom inate th e  inter-agency dealings to  the  
detrim ent of cooperation in planning th e  achievem ent of common 
goals.’174The bureaucratic  s ta te -cen tred  perspective  is nonethe less  right 
in em phasising the role played by th e  Economic Planning Board (EPB) a s  a 
cen tral agency giving co h eren ce  to  th e  governm ent’s  econom ic 
po!icies.175The achievem ent of th is  coherence involved th e  resolution of
l7lGourevitch, Politics in Hard Times, p.238.
172 David Kang, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp.85-90.
173See Chapter Three.
174Sung-Hwan Jo and Seong-Young Park, Basic Documents and Selected Areas o f Korea's Third Five-Year 
Development Plan (1972-1976) (Seoul: Sogang University Press, 1972) p. 19.
175For a study on the role of the EPB in Korea, see Byung-sun Choi, Institutionalizing A Liberal Economic Order 
in Korea: The Strategic Management o f Economic Change, Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1987.
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conflicts betw een different m inistries through several EPB-led 
consultation forums such a s  the  Economic Minister’s  Consultation 
Meeting (EMCM) and th e  Industrial Policy Deliberation Council (IPDC). Yet, 
the  technocra tic  bias of the strong s ta te  perspective fails to  acknow ledge 
th a t th e  decisional power of th e  EPB ultim ately rested  on th e  political 
authority and support given by th e  P resident.
Hence, during the  1970s, Park Chung Hee moved by econom ics, 
politics, national security  and ideology decided to  co n cen tra te  the  
country’s  resources in th e  developm ent of heavy and chem ical 
industrialisation (HCI). In doing so, Park bypassed  th e  advice of th e  EPB 
which proposed a  gradual promotion of heavy and chem ical 
industries.17SUnder the  patronage of Park Chung Hee, an a s s is ta n t vice 
m inister a t  th e  Ministry of Com m erce and Industry (MCI), Oh Won Choi, 
la ter appointed a s  a Second Economic S ecre tary  to  th e  President, would 
be in charge of th e  new  industrial policy through his leading role in th e  
Heavy and Chemical Industries Planning Com m ittee (HCIPC) c rea ted  in 
1973.177During th e  1970s the  Planning Council, under th e  d irect control of 
the President, em erged a s  th e  cen tre  for econom ic decision-m aking for 
HCI.17SPrivate com panies, in terested  m inistries (in m ost c a se s , th e  MCI), 
and th e  Planning Council would jointly initiate new  developm ent plans and 
investm ent projects. The President would m ake th e  final decision 
following th e  opinion of the  Planning Council, w ith th e  Second Economic 
Secretary  taking over the original coordinating role of th e  EPB during th e  
whole policy process.
The EPB seem ed, in fac t, to  have had little pow er to  check  th e  
a c c e ss  of private businessm en to  th e  Second Economic S ecretary  or their 
direct a c c e s s  to  the  President. Consequently, th e  EPB saw  its capacity  to  
coordinate econom ic policies w eakened  by th e  new  political environm ent. 
The EPB still sought to have th e  new  plans and p ro jects  sub jec ted  to
l76See Chapter Four.
l77Kim, Policymaking on the Front Lines, pp. 83-5.
l78Choi, Institutionalizing A Liberal Economic Order in Korea, p. 105.
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rigorous feasibility s tud ies, but its  efforts w ere in vain, a s  th e  President 
personally endorsed major investm ent plans and se lec ted  private 
businesspersons to  undertake such projects.
The strong s ta te  literature further em phasised  th a t in th e  Korean 
developm ental s ta te , the  s ta te  and th e  private sec to r  build cooperative 
ties, though th e  form er s e ts  the  rules of th e  gam e through th e  system  of 
socialisation  of private risk. Probably th e  m ost cited  exam ple revealing to  
w hat ex ten t th e  Korean s ta te  could a s se r t  its  pow er over th e  private 
s e c to r  a rises  from th e  initiative taken  during th e  early days of the  military 
regim e led by Park Chung Hee to  expropriate th e  w ealth  of th e  country’s  
m ajor businessm en.179After enacting th e  ’Illicit Wealth Accumulation Law*, 
Park a rres ted  thirty leading business leaders and ordered them  to  return 
all th e  profits gained though rent-seeking s ince  the signing of the  Korean 
War tru ce  in 1953.1B0They w ere asked  to  pay the  fines in cash  or by turning 
over the ir a s s e ts  to  the  governm ent. This is clearly regarded a s  the  
initiative th a t resolutely estab lished  th e  Korean s ta te  in a  superior 
position and guaran teed  th a t th e  private sec to r would comply with its 
developm ental plans. However, a c lo ser exam ination of the  whole 
incident helps build a  different represen tation  of the  s ta te -b u sin ess  power 
relations in Korea since th e  1960s.
It is a  represen tation  th a t m oves aw ay from the  s ta tic  reading in 
which a  dom inant agen t ex e rts  pow er over a subordinate agen t, to  a  more 
dynamic and com plex understanding of their exchanges. Even if the  new 
leadership  show ed th a t it could discipline business groups, its  legitim acy 
rested  on its  su c ce ss  in achieving econom ic growth through th e  
im plem entation of developm ent plans. Paradoxically, the  only viable 
econom ic force a t  the  tim e th a t could help the  realisation of th e  program
l79Karl Fields, Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp.52-3.
l80The law defined as illicit wealth: (l) tax evasion; (2) illegal contribution to political parties; (3) illicit 
acquisition of national vested properties; (4) extraordinarily preferential monopoly of contracts for construction 
and supply activities; (5) unusually large and monopolistic allocation of foreign capital; (6) misallocated foreign 
funds; (7) other capital illegally flown out of the country. See Kyong-Dong Kim, ‘Political Factors in the 
Formation of the Entrepreneurial Elite in South Korea’; Asian Survey, 26 (l 976),465-477, p.471.
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w as th e  group of businessm en ta rg e ted  by the  initiative w ith ‘their 
singular advantage of organization, personnel, facilities, and capital 
reso u rces.’ 181 Though th e  governm ent had seized th e  control of the  
country’s  banks thus gaining th e  control of an im portant policy instrum ent, 
ultim ately it had to  find a com prom ise with the  business s e c to r .182 In 
August 1961 th e  final decision of th e  investigation com m ittee reduced  by 
90 percen t th e  original fines to  be paid by the  thirty en trepreneurs, and 
then  in January  1962, th a t am ount w as again cu t in half.183
The private sec to r w as far from being an obedient and passive 
actor. Kyong-Dong Kim claim s th a t th e  reduction of fines w as a  resu lt of 
the  in tense  lobbying done by the  accu sed  businessm en who took 
advantage of th e  growing internal factionalism  within th e  new  regime 
over many policy issues, including th e  im plem entation of th e  illicit w ealth  
law .184The businessm en moved to  ‘buy o ff several political leaders  in 
exchange for bribes. The kickbacks w ere  expected  to  be used  a s  political 
funds to  feed th e  politicians’ factions within a newly launched political 
organisation supported by th e  military regime, the  D em ocratic Republican 
Party (DRP). With all political parties officially banned afte r th e  coup 
d '6 ta t in 1961, under the  leadership of Kim Jong-pil, a  c lo se  a s so c ia te  of 
P resident Park, the  military leaders sought the  estab lishm ent of th e  DRP 
a s  an effective political party  to  pursue their in te re sts  in an ticipation of 
th e  country’s  return to  civilian rule a fte r e lections in 1963.188Finally, som e 
of th e  indicted businessm en su cceed ed  in persuading th e  new  regim e to  
actually  help them  build new  industrial p lan ts under th e  five-year 
developm ent plans. When th e  p lan ts w ere com pleted, th e  businessm en 
w ere ex pected  to  pay the  im posed fines by turning over a  m ajority of the  
sh a re s  to  th e  governm ent. Instead, m ost of them  decided to  pay th e  fines
l8lKim, ‘Political Factors in the Formation of the Entrepreneurial Elite in South Korea’, p.470.
l82See Chapter Three for the seizure of the country’s banks by the new regime.
l83Fields, Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan, p.52.
l84Kim,‘Political Factors in the Formation of the Entrepreneurial Elite in South Korea’, pp.470-l.
l85Kelley Kum-mi Hwang, The State and Society in Korean Development: Domestic Coalitions and Informal
Politics, Doctoral dissertation, University of Califomia-Santa Barbara, 1994, p. 131.
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in cash  and keep th e  control of th e  sam e firms th a t th e  military regime 
had hoped to  nationalise.186As Chung-in Moon s ta te s :
Business might well choose a  s tra teg y  of com pliance and co­
operation with the  s ta te  if more benefits can  be expected  by doing it. It 
can  also  a ttem p t to  modify s ta te  behaviour through lobbying, p ro tests , 
blackm ail, and networking. In th e  w orst case , business can  pull itself out 
of (inter) dependence with th e  s ta te  and seek  its  own survival and 
expansion through such autonom ous ac tions a s  diversifying political ties  
and even creating  its  own political shield (e.g., political parties).187
In sum, th e  activ ities of th e  Korean bureaucracy  have been 
sub jec ted  to  the  political in te re s ts  of the  country’s  leaders. In th is  sen se , 
Korean bureaucracy  w as far from being the  main a c to r  se tting  the  
configuration of th e  policy process. Additionally, th e  spirit w ithin the  
adm inistrative apparatus seem s to  have been m ore one of com petition 
ra ther than  one of cooperation and unity in purpose. Finally, cooperative 
tie s  betw een  th e  executive and th e  private se c to r  should be seen  a s  more 
com plex than  th e  usual dichotom y strong versus w eak. There is sp a ce  for 
variation and th a t depends on th e  capac ity  for negotiation of both s ides 
over policy choices.
2.5 An A lternative In terpretation of th e  Korean Developm ental S ta te : 
Leadership, Political S tra teg ies  and Policy Choices
The curren t developm ental s ta te  literatu re  on Korea com m its the  
fallacy of causally  relating a strong, cohesive and plan-rational 
bureaucratic  s ta te  with successfu l econom ic perform ance. The above 
m entioned episodes, however, portray a  m ore com plex im age of the  
Korean developm ental s ta te  in which th e  system  of socia lisation  of 
private risk is far from being depoliticised. Instead, th e  system  is
l86Kim,‘Political Factors in the Formation of the Entrepreneurial Elite in South Korea’, p.471.
I87Moon, ‘Changing Patterns of Business-Govemment Relations in South Korea’, p. 145. See also Jae Jean Suh, 
‘The Social and Political Networks Of the Korean Capitalist Class’; Asian Perspective, 13 (1989), 111-139.
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sub jec ted  to  th e  politics of negotiation betw een  an array of ac to rs  with 
different in te rests , w hether they are  m em bers of th e  executive, 
bureaucracy, National Assembly or th e  private sec to r. The s treng th  of the  
Korean s ta te  to  im plem ent and enforce th e  system  of socialisation  of 
private risk should not be seen  statically , but a s  varying over tim e and 
sp ace  and th is depends essen tia lly  on capacity  of th e  Korean P residents 
to  m obilise or retain  political support. As in any o ther country, policy 
cho ices in th e  Korean s ta te  are  forged by political leaders.
In Korea, the  P resident and his s ta ff a t  the  Blue House have 
reigned over the  p rocess of decision-m aking. Korean P residen ts are  de 
facto  in control and com m and of th e  policy p rocess. Chung Duck-Koo, 
who sp en t 20 years of his life a s  an official a t  th e  Ministry of Finance and 
who would becom e Vice Minister of Finance during th e  presidency of Kim 
Dae-Jung (1998-2002) leaves no margin for doubts w hen he describes th e  
Korean political system : ‘It is [a] presidential system , not a  cab inet 
system . The president has the  la s t word.’ 1Bt Policy cho ices and 
im plem entation re s t on s tra teg ie s  designed by Korean P residen ts to  boost 
their political legitimacy, to  build up their power, and to  secu re  regime 
survival. Their policy s tra teg ies , however, a re  far from being 
autonom ously taken  a s  they  a re  filtered by th e  com plex in teraction of 
institutions, history, con tex t, ideas, and coalition politics. It is th is  failure 
to  understand  th e  political dynam ics em bedded in th e  system  of 
socialisation  of private risk and their policy and political ou tcom es since 
the  1960s th a t accoun ts  for th e  inability of th e  strong s ta te  literatu re  to  
offer a  m ore com prehensive explanation for th e  financial c risis  in 1997.
The following ch ap te rs  seek  to  illustrate w ith more detail th e  role 
played by Korean P residents in the  form ation, consolidation and 
transform ation of the system  of socialisation of private risk and how their 
policy cho ices w ere m ediated by historical c ircum stances, institutional 
legacies, dom estic political and econom ic con tex t, international
l88Interview with Chung Duck-Koo in Seoul, 14 June 2001.
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environm ent and ideologies. C hapters Three and Four a ttem p t to  analyse 
the  origins and consolidation of th e  politics behind th e  system  of 
socialisation  of private risk during th e  1960s and 1970s. The policy and 
political outcom es generated  during th is period will serve  a s  th e  ‘path- 
dependen t’ background. This political and policy legacy fac ilita tes  th e  
investigation in C hapters Five and Six of th e  s te p s  tak en  in particular 
from th e  early 1990s to  radically transform  th e  ru les of th e  system  of 
socialisation of private risk and with w hat political, econom ic and social 
consequences.
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3. CHAPTER THREE - Unravelling th e  Origins of th e  K orean 
D evelopm ental S ta te : The Park  Chung H ee Regim e (1961 -  1979)
3.1 Introduction
The system  of socialisation of private risk is a c lear testim ony of 
th e  degree of intervention played by th e  Korean developm ental s ta te  in 
th e  organisation of the  m arket. Yet, how th e  Korean developm ental s ta te  
em erged, and by extension the system  of socialisation of private risk, 
rem ains a much debated  issue, with tw o major view s -  continuity and 
discontinuity - exposing different explanations on th e  genesis  of the 
phenom enon. The continuity perspective em phasises th e  legacy of the  
Ja p a n e se  colonial period a s  the  harbinger of th e  ‘strong’ Korean 
developm ental s ta te  th a t em erged in the  1960s. The alternative 
perspective, the  discontinuity school, claim s instead  th a t th e  roots of 
such  a s ta te  developed only in the  afterm ath  of the  military coup d '6 ta t in 
1961. 189 The two perspectives, however, are  not w ithout their own 
shortcom ings th a t s tem  from their tendency  to  be historically selective  
and biased.
The continuity perspective argues th a t th e  J a p a n e se  colonial 
period s e t  th e  institutional foundations of th e  Korean developm ental s ta te  
th a t surfaced  in the  1960s. Yet, it fails to  seriously consider th e  political, 
econom ic and social im pact of a troubled 15-year period following the 
liberalisation of the country in 1945. Conversely, th e  discontinuity th esis  
em phasises  th e  role of an authoritarian and military leadership  in building 
th e  Korean developm ental s ta te  during th e  1960s. In its  a ttem p ts  to  reify
l89For the continuity thesis, see Bruce Cumings, ‘The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political 
Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles and Political Consequences’, in Deyo, ed, The Political Economy 
o f the New Asian Industrialism, pp.44-83, Dennis L. McNamara, The Colonial Origins o f Korean Enterprises, 
1910-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Carter J. Eckert, Offsprings o f Empire: The 
Koch ’ang Kims and the Colonial Origins o f Korean Capitalism, 1876-1945 (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1991), Woo, Race to the Swift,and in particular Kohli, ‘Where Do High Growth Political Economies 
Come From?’. For the discontinuity view, see Stephan Haggard, David Kang, and Chung-in Moon, ‘Japanese 
Colonialism and Korean Development: A Critique’; World Development, 25 (1997), 867-881,and Chibber, 
‘Building a Developmental State’.
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th is  leadership, however, th is  th esis  falls short by ignoring tw o major 
fac ts . First, the  new  rulers’ policy cho ices w ere influenced by plans and 
p ro jects devised during th e  previous civilian governm ent. Second, the  
new  rulers’ initial and failed efforts to  reform the  econom ic system  by 
adm inistrative fiat served well a s  s tra teg ic  learning in te rm s of feasibility 
of future policies.
This ch ap te r begins by critically analysing the  tw o contending views 
on th e  origins of th e  system  of socialisation  of private risk. Then, and 
moving beyond th e se  tw o perspectives, I argue th a t Park Chung Hee’s  
choice to  c re a te  a system  of socialisation of private risk w as m ediated by 
th e  legacies of Syngman Rhee and Chang Myon; US p ressu res  for econom ic 
reform s and; th e  belief th a t econom ic growth and developm ent could only 
be achieved through a sta te-led  econom ic nationalism . Additionally, I will 
argue th a t th e  im plem entation of th e  system , a t th e  core  of th e  Korean 
developm ental s ta te , w as ultim ately shaped  by Park Chung Hee’s  
dem onstrab le capacity  to  build a supporting coalition w ith bureaucra ts , 
farm ers and business firms. During th e  presidency of Park Chung Hee, the  
system  of socialisation  of private risk worked to  s treng then  the  autonom y 
and capacity  of th e  presidential office and th e  bureaucracy, in particu lar of 
th e  Economic Planning Board (EPB), to  s e t  the  country’s  p attern  of 
developm ent. Yet, th e  institutionalisation of th e  system  depended on the  
role and capacity  of Park Chung Hee to  m aintain it through a  credible 
com m itm ent to  an alliance with bureaucra ts , farm ers and th e  chaebol. This 
credible com m itm ent w as com prised of positive incentives, but also  of 
penalties th a t would be applied if bu reaucra ts  or chaebol failed to  atta in , 
or comply with, certa in  planned ta rg e ts  or guidelines. Furtherm ore, Park 
built a  repressive security  and policing m achine through law s and agencies 
such  a s  Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), National Defence 
Security Command (NDSC) a s  well a s  the  police to  keep under control 
political opposition and civil society. Despite the  increasing pow er of the  
presidency, th e  legitim acy of Park Chung Hee’s  leadership  w as a lso  highly 
based  on th e  electoral support from the  rural majority, bu reau cra ts  and
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b u s in e s s  g roups. The first group provided th e  v o te s  during e lec to ra l  
periods  th a t  w e re  regarded  m ore  a s  o rc h e s t r a te d  e v e n ts  to  m e a su re  th e  
popularity  of th e  leadersh ip  ra th e r  th a n  an  opportun ity  to  v o te  for political 
c h an g e .  And m ore im portantly, P ark ’s  leg itim acy re s te d  on th e  coun try ’s 
rapid eco n o m ic  grow th, w hich s trong ly  d ep en d e d  on th e  p e rfo rm a n ce  of 
th e  b u s in e s s  g roups  supported  by good m a n a g e m e n t  and  by a co m m itted  
b u re a u c ra c y  (see  Figure One).
Park Chung Hee
j k.
Labour
Chaebol
ONTAEPB NDSCKCIA
S ecre ta ria t
Police
Farm ers
U.S.Aid
Pressure
Hist. Legacies State-Led Economic
Nationalism
Line Ministries
Figure One: Presidential Leadership and Policy Process, Park Chung Hee (1961-1979)
3.2 From Continuity to Discontinuity: Debating the Rise of the Korean 
Developmental S tate
The continuity  th e s i s  re c o g n ise s  th e  exp lo ita t ive  n a tu re  of th e  
J a p a n e s e  occu p a tio n  of Korea from 1905 to  1945, bu t it a lso  c la im s  th a t  
th e  40-year old J a p a n e s e  colonial rule over th e  pen in su la  led to  c rucia l 
ins ti tu tional tran s fo rm a tio n s  th a t  m oulded th e  configura tion  of th e  
pos tco lon ia l Korean deve lopm en ta l s ta te .  Atul Kohli a rg u e s  th a t  th e
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Ja p a n e se  colonial rule over Korea left th ree  m ajor leg ac ies .190First, in 
p lace of w hat had becom e a  w eak  and d istrusted  Korean m onarchic 
system , th e  colonial regime estab lished  an authoritarian and centralized 
s ta te  supported by a com petent and disciplined bureaucracy  a s  well a s  by 
a  strong and powerful police with th e  capacity  to  infiltrate and dom inate 
th e  society .
Second, th e  Korean s ta te  w as transform ed into an efficient 
econom ic actor, concerned with building infrastructure, increasing ta x  
collection and agrarian and industrial production. Under th e  Jap an ese , 
th e  Korean s ta te  co-opted th e  propertied c la s se s  by offering such  
rew ards a s  legal property rights securing th e  control of the  land in 
perpetuity  or jobs in local authorities. This s tra teg y  aim ed not only a t 
accom plishing the  colonial au thorities’ econom ic goals but also  to  keep 
th e  country’s  villages under control. Sim ultaneously, m echanism s such a s  
th e  promotion of technology and control over cred it w ere employed to  
push Korean and Jap an ese  landlords and businessm en to  observe th e  
colonial agrarian and industrial policies. This alliance betw een  th e  s ta te  
and businessm en is regarded a s  th e  force behind Korea’s  su c c e ss  in 
exporting goods during the  colonial period.
Finally, to  ensure th e  su c c e ss  of the  production-oriented agenda, 
th e  low er c la sse s  com posed of p easan ts  and th e  working c la ss  w ere 
oppressed  and exploited by the  colonial s ta te  in collusion with th e  local 
bourgeoisie. By imposing order through force in th e  Korean society , the  
colonial s ta te  could concen tra te  on its narrow  policy-orientation, i.e., 
m axim isation of agricultural and industrial production. Sim ultaneously, 
incom es and w ages w ere in general lower than  productivity gains. This 
resu lted  in higher profits, savings and investm ent. In sum, for the  
continuity thesis , the  main fea tu res  of th e  Korean developm ental s ta te
l90Kohli, ‘Where Do High Growth Political Economies Come From?’, p. 1270.
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th a t first em erged in the  1960s are  no m ore than  a  legacy of th e  colonial 
period and they *were simply never a lte red  in any fundam ental w ay.’191
While th e  institutional inheritance of Jap a n e se  colonialism  may 
have helped in moulding the  fea tu res  th a t would la te r ch a rac te rise  th e  
Korean developm ental s ta te , a s  Vivek Chibber points out, it cdoes not by 
any m eans follow th a t they w ere sufficient for it.’192 In fact, by anchoring 
their analytical cu es  exclusively on th e  legacy of th e  J a p a n e se  colonial 
period, th e  continuity in terpretation of th e  origins of th e  Korean 
developm ental s ta te  com m its th e  error of ignoring the  im portant political, 
econom ic and social im pact of a 15-year interm ission betw een  th e  end of 
Ja p a n e se  rule in 1945 and the  beginning of th e  Park Chung Hee’s  regime 
in 1961. During th is time, Korea w ent through an American occupation, a 
civil war, th e  division of the  country into com m unist North Korea and anti­
com m unist South Korea, and the  troubled governm ents of Syngman Rhee 
(1948-1960) and Chang Myon (1960-1961).
The discontinuity school, on th e  o th er side, seriously consider th is 
15-year interlude. Thus pointing out th e  difficulty dem onstrated  by the  
continuity th esis  in explaining why th e  J a p a n e se  legacy w as not 
m itigated by la te r events. The discontinuity  school m ake four main 
argum ents.193First, in term s of econom ic record, they  claim  th a t th e re  are  
‘stronger reasons to doubt th a t any Ja p a n e se  contribution w as an 
enduring one.’194They argue th a t the  end of J a p a n e se  rule w as followed by 
15 years  of political and social an tagonism s, national war, policy 
inconsistencies and erratic  econom ic developm ent. Only after policy 
changes in the  early 1960s, w as th ere  a  turnaround in th e  country’s  
econom ic record. It is only with th e  leadership  of Park Chung Hee th a t a 
m ore coheren t econom ic policy fram ew ork m aterialised  following 
institutional changes th a t s treng thened  th e  pow er of th e  executive in the
l9lKohli, ‘Where Do High Growth Political Economies Come From?’, p. 1285.
192Chibber, ‘Building a Developmental State’, p.314.
193Haggard, Kang, and Moon, ‘Japanese Colonialism and Korean Development’, p.868.
194Haggard, Kang, and Moon, ‘Japanese Colonialism and Korean Development’, p.868.
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policy p rocess  and reformed the  organisation and natu re  of the  
bureaucracy.
Second, the  tendency to  em phasise  the  Ja p a n e se  legacy re s ts  on a 
tech n o cra tic  bias. While the  colonial bureaucracy served a s  an im portant 
tool in th e  hands of the  Ja p a n e se  em pire to  deliver their production- 
o riented econom ic goals, th e  sam e bureaucracy inherited by Syngman 
Rhee and his allies w as used  to  nurture unproductive rent-seeking 
activ ities. However, in the  early  1960s, under th e  leadership  of Park 
Chung Hee, the  Korean s ta te  w en t through an organisation reshuffle th a t 
converted it into an agent for industrial change, econom ic growth and 
developm ent.
Third, th e  claim th a t Korean post-w ar business conglom erates 
found the ir genesis  in the  J a p a n e se  colonial period is also  disputable. It 
w as a basic  s tan c e  a t the  tim e to  discrim inate ag ain st Korean firms. In 
addition, em pirical da ta  show s th a t, for exam ple, in the  early 1980s, only 
one of th e  top ten  business groups in Korea, and six  out of th e  top 50, w as 
c rea ted  during the Ja p a n e se  period, 31 of th e se  business groups w ere 
formed betw een 1945 and 1960, during the  regim e of Syngman Rhee, 
before th e  country’s  econom ic take-off. 198 While the  acquisition of 
J a p a n e se  a s se ts  contributed to  the  grow th of som e business groups in 
th e  1950s, much of th a t Japanese-financed  cap ital s to ck  w as destroyed 
or lost value during 1945-1953 and had to  be built anew .
Finally, the  discontinuity school argues th a t with th e  exception  of 
labour repression, im portant socia l preconditions for th e  post-w ar Korean 
developm ent such a s  land reform and growing public investm ent in 
education  w ere not legacies of th e  colonial period, but w ere only possible
l95Kim, Big Business, Strong State, p. 126. For an analysis of the growth of business groups during the 1950s, see 
Young-Iob Chung, ‘Capital Accumulation of Chaebol In Korea During The Early Stages of Economic 
Development’; The Journal o f Modern Korean Studies, 3 (1987), 11-41.
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with th e  country’s  independence from Ja p a n ese  ru le .196 In sum , the 
discontinuity perspective, unlike th e  continuity th esis , regards the  
Ja p a n e se  colonial period a s  having le ss  im pact on th e  form ation of the  
Korean developm ental s ta te . Instead, it claim s th a t it w as only with the  
leadership of Park Chung Hee starting  in 1961 th a t Korea en tered  a  period 
of high econom ic growth.
The discontinuity perspective is not w ithout its  own faults. The 
tendency to  reify th e  reform ist role played by the  military regim e under 
Park Chung Hee in bringing about successfu l econom ic perform ance since  
1961 leads it to  com m it two im portant oversights. First, it fails to  
acknow ledge th a t som e im portant policy changes introduced during the  
military rule w ere originally designed during th e  form er civilian 
governm ent led by Chang Myon. Second, it overlooks the  fac t tha t, 
betw een 1961 and 1963, the  country’s  econom y under th e  new  military 
leadership w as far from being a  su c c e ss . In fact, m ajor econom ic reform s 
introduced by adm inistrative fiat by th e  military had a  negative im pact in 
term s of econom ic perform ance. The policy and political ou tcom es 
eventually offered th e  new  leadership im portant policy lessons, or w hat 
Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott would call ‘s tra teg ic  learning’, on how to 
approach future policy choices.
In April 1960, right a fte r controversial presidential and vice- 
presidential e lections th a t had taken  p lace a month earlier, th e  newly re­
e lected  governm ent led by Syngman Rhee collapsed in th e  afterm ath  of 
large s tu d en t dem onstrations in th e  capital Seoul protesting against
l96Lee Hahn Been, Korea: Time, Change and Administration (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1968), p.67. 
Lee Hahn Been, a well known Korean civil servant, who served during the regimes of Syngman Rhee, Chang 
Myon and Park Chung Hee, describes the end of the Japanese colonialism in these terms:
The Liberation of 1945 brought about a dominant ideology -  the ideology of equal opportunity. This potent 
ideology gave birth to two important policies with far-reaching consequences, i.e., education and land reform. 
These two policies, which were carried by the government with support of the society at large, were the 
cornerstones in the ensuing process of levelling the traditional structure, increasing social mobility, and ushering 
in the twin processes of urbanization and literacy.
See also James Putzel, ‘Land Reforms In Asia: Lessons From The Past For the 21st Century’; DESTIN Working 
Paper Series No.00-04 (London: LSE Development Studies Institute, 2000).
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police v io lence .197 An Interim Government installed by Rhee afte r his 
resignation, arranged for a constitu tional reform th a t introduced a 
parliam entary system  and prepared th e  country for general e lec tions in 
Ju ly  th e  sam e year. The elections w ere won by th e  D em ocratic Party (DP) 
and culm inated with th e  selection  of Chang Myon a s  the  country’s  Prime 
M inister.19SD espite th e  tendency to  overlook th e  short tenure  of th e  Chang 
Myon’s  regime, overthrown in 1961 by a  military coup d 'e ta t, th e  new  
governm ent initiated significant policy ch anges.199
The new  governm ent introduced th e  ‘National Construction Service’ 
(NCS), a  com prehensive, multi-purpose and multi-year public w orks 
pro ject aim ed a t building th e  country’s  infrastructure and fighting 
unem ploym ent.200 Meanwhile, under th e  leadership  of th e  new  Finance 
M inister Kim Young-Sun, a  team  had already began working on a  five-year 
developm ent plan, in efforts to  join o ther Asian countries w here planning 
had becom e an estab lished  feature  of th e  policy p rocess .201Sim ultaneously, 
a  group of bu reaucra ts  formed a ‘Governm ent R eorganisation Study 
Group’ to  reform th e  country’s  econom ic adm inistration. The plan involved 
th e  creation  of a  ‘super-m inistry’ th a t would be nam ed Economic Planning 
Board (EPB), bringing together the  Budget Bureau from th e  Ministry of 
F inance (MOF), th e  S ta tis tic s  Bureau from th e  Ministry of Home Affairs, 
and th e  Overall Planning Bureau and th e  R esources and Mobilisation 
Bureau from th e  Ministry of Economic Developm ent.202The launching of the
197For an account of this period, see Kim Joung Won, Divided Korea: The Politics o f Development, 1945-1972 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 162-5, and George Henderson, Korea: The Politics o f Vortex 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 174-176.
198For a more detailed view on the workings of the Interim Government, see Lee, Korea: Time, Change and 
Administration, pp. 109-122. On the Democratic Party, see also Lee, Korea: Time, Change and Administration, 
pp.123-130. The Democratic Party (DP) was created in 1956 bringing together former members of the then 
ruling Liberal Party (LP) and the Democratic Nationalist Party (DNP), the major opposition party during the 
regime of Syngman Rhee.
199For a detailed analysis of the policy changes undertaken during the government of Chang Myon, see David 
Satterwhite, The Politics o f Economic Development: Coup, State and the Republic o f Korea's First Five-Year 
Economic Development Plan (1962-1965), Doctoral dissertation, University of Washington, 1994.
200On the NCS, see Lee, Korea: Time, Change and Administration, pp. 130-1.
201 Satterwhite, The Politics o f Economic Development, p.332. See also Timothy Lim, Competition, Market, and 
the Politics o f  Development in South Korea, 1945-1979, Doctoral dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1996,
pp.218-222.
202Stephan Haggard and Chung-in Moon, ‘The State, Politics, and Economic Development in Postwar South 
Korea’, in Hagen Koo, ed, State and Society in Contemporary Korea (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1993), pp.51-93, p.64.
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five-year developm ent plan and th e  EPB, however, failed to  m aterialise in 
consequence  of th e  military coup d '6 ta t.
However, th e  new military regim e led by Park Chung Hee seized 
both pro jects and launched them  officially a s  a  product of their own 
work.203There w ere also a se ries  of o ther policy changes th a t th e  military 
regim e claim ed a s  their own but, which had in fac t been announced or 
planned by th e  Chang adm inistration. Among them  w ere m easures to  
reform th e  tax  system , to  prosecu te  corrupt officials and th o se  who had 
illegally am assed  w ealth  during Rhee’s  era, and th e  expansion of foreign 
relations with o ther nations such  a s  then  W est Germany, to  reduce the  
dependency on th e  U.S both in term s of investm ent and 
a ss is ta n c e .204Furthermore, the  discontinuity school overlooks the  military 
regim e’s  unsuccessfu l econom ic policies launched betw een  1961 and 
1963 and how the policy and political outcom es had im portant 
im plications in term s of s tra teg ic  learning.208
Soon after the  coup cf'dfaf, th ree  m ajor econom ic policies w ere 
pursued by th e  new  leadership: the  Counter-Usury Program on May 25, 
1961; th e  im plem entation of th e  country’s First Five-Year Development 
Plan on July 22, 1961 and; a Currency Reform on Ju n e  9, 1962. With the  
announcem ent of a moratorium for w hat w as thought to  be a  sizable 
am ount of usurious deb ts acquired by farm ers (and fisherm en), the 
Counter-Usury Program aim ed a t promoting and improving the rural 
econom y. Usurious loans had been regarded a s  one of th e  main facto rs 
behind th e  persis ten t poverty of th e  rural a re a s .206 In a  country w here 
agriculture w as still the  m ajor econom ic activity, th e  m easure w as seen  
a s  a w ay to  augm ent the  authority and legitim acy of th e  new regime
203Satterwhite, The Politics o f Economic Development, p.377.
204Satterwhite, The Politics o f Economic Development, p.3 81.
205For an analysis of the economic policies undertaken during this period by the military regime, see Paul Ho- 
Yeol Yoo, A New Political Economy o f Economic Policy Change in South Korea, 1961-1963: Crisis, 
Uncertainty and Contradiction, Doctoral dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1990.
206Y o o ,  A New Political Economy o f Economic Policy Change in South Korea, 1961-1963, p.94.
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am ong th e  population by presenting them selves a s  ‘saviors of the  poor 
farm ers and fisherm en.’207
However, th e  program failed to  produce the  expected  resu lts  in 
particu lar th e  reduction of th e  farm ers’ dependency on unregulated 
financial institutions a s  well a s  th e  ta tte r’s  im portance in the  Korean 
financial system . Since th e  m oratorium cau sed  a  tem porary paralysis of 
th e  financial system  in th e  rural com m unities, the  governm ent m ade 
efforts to  increase  agricultural cred it a t  low in te rest ra te s . This new easy- 
money policy resulted  in a  42.5 percen t in crease  in money supply in 1961 
from a  year earlier, leading to  growing inflationary p ressu res  th a t forced 
th e  governm ent to  limit its  support for agricultural credit. Consequently, 
private m oneylenders soon resum ed the ir ac tiv ities to  becom e m ajor 
p layers in th e  Korean financial system , and th e  ratio of private deb t to 
to ta l farm household debt increased  from 58 p ercen t in 1960 to  70 
percen t in 1964.20*
The First Five-Year Development Plan, originally designed by the  
previous civilian governm ent but revised in its  num erical co n ten ts  to 
reflect th e  econom ic goals of th e  new  military regim e, aim ed a t building a 
self-sustaining econom y and s e t  th e  foundations for th e  country’s  
industrialisation.209^  effect from January  1962, th e  plan, however, w as 
critic ised  from the  o n se t for its  ‘lack of realism  and for 
overam bitiousness.’210 By th e  end of th e  first year, th e  criticism s seem ed  
to  have been valid. The ac tu a l growth ra te  for 1962 reached  only 2.8 
percen t against the  planned 5.7 percen t, and th e  ac tual figures for 
dom estic  savings and foreign exchange w ere far from th e  planned 
o n es .211 Consequently, the  military regim e w as com pelled to  revise the  
plan and ad just its planned ta rg e ts , in particu lar th e  average annual 
growth ra te  from the  original 7.1 percen t to  5 percen t. Nam Duck Woo, a
207Yoo, A New Political Economy o f Economic Policy Change in South Korea, 1961-1963, pp. 111-2.
208Cole and Lyman, Korean Development,p.l48.
209Nam, Korea’s Economic Growth in a Changing World, pp.21-38.
210Nam, Korea’s Economic Growth in a Changing World, p.23.
211Yoo, A New Political Economy o f Economic Policy Change in South Korea, 1961-1963, pp.261-2.
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form er M inister of Finance (1969-1974) and Deputy Prime M inister and 
M inister of Economic Planning (1974-1978), describes Korea’s  First Five- 
Year Development Plan in th e se  term s: ‘The Korean planning experience 
illu stra tes th e  common m istakes often found in underdeveloped countries 
in th a t th e  governm ent em barked on an overam bitious developm ent plan 
w ithout ad equate  preparation and soon ran into foreign exchange 
difficulties and inflation.’212
The Currency Reform in 1962 em erged a s  a response to  potential 
inflationary p ressu res  caused  by a  substan tia l increase  of alm ost 50 
percen t in th e  money supply in th e  previous year. It w as also  a response  
to  a  belief within th e  new  regime th a t money w as being hoarded by large 
sp ecu la to rs  who the  country’s  leadership feared  could th rea ten  the  
stability  of th e  econom y.213The reform involved th e  change of th e  currency 
denom ination, turning 10 old hwan into one new  won, a  limited conversion 
to  500 new  won to  m eet existing living ex p en ses, th e  reg istration  of all 
cash , checks, and money orders, and the  a ttem p t to  allocate  all ‘surplus’ 
funds into a new  ‘Industrial Development Corporation’ th a t w as expected  
to  finance new  industrial activ ities. The im m ediate outcom e, however, 
w as to  ‘bring th e  econom ic activity nearly to  a  standstill b ecau se  of lack 
of funds.’214Within five w eeks, and w ithout signs th a t large am ounts of 
money had in fac t been am assed , th e  m onetary au thorities brought th e  
reform to  an end. As the  Bank of Korea clearly  puts it, ‘th e  currency 
reform ended a s  a failure which did not a tta in  its  original objectives and 
only c rea ted  socioeconom ic problem s.’219
Generally, the policies undertaken during th is  period aim ed a t 
mending som e past injustices. The policies, m ostly populist in nature, 
w ere ta rg e ted  a t certain  groups th a t had been relatively ignored in
2l2Nam, Korea’s Economic Growth in a Changing World, p.32.
2l3David C. Cole and Yung Chul Park, Financial Development in Korea 1945-1978 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1983), pp.58-9.
214Cole and Park, Financial Development in Korea 1945-1978, p.58.
215Bank of Korea, The Bank o f Korea: A History o f Fifty Years (Seoul: The Bank of Korea, 2000), p.157.
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particu lar during R hee's regim e such  a s  farm ers.216The failure of th e se  
th ree  m ajor econom ic policies had im portant policy and political 
ou tcom es for th e  country’s  new  leadership  in term s of s tra teg ic  learning. 
In its  first years of governm ent, th e  military regim e led by Park Chung Hee, 
seem ed  to  believe th a t it could reorder th e  country’s  econom ic 
a rch itec tu re  by adm inistrative fiat. The First Five-Year Development Plan, 
for exam ple, w as initiated w ithout any concern for th e  opinion of th e  
country’s  m ajor econom ic ac to rs, i.e., business groups. Yet, following th e  
initial failure, they w ere allowed to  partic ipate  in th e  design and 
im plem entation of the  developm ent p la n s .217 The growing im portance 
placed  on th e  business sec to r by th e  military regime becam e apparen t 
following th e  first s tep s  to  pardon and reduce the  fines im posed on th o se  
it had earlier accused  of ’illicit w ealth  accum ulation’.218
Kim Jong Pil w as, one of th e  leading figures behind th e  coup d '6 ta t , 
head of th e  KCIA, and a nephew  of Park Chung Hee. In an interview  with a 
Korean monthly magazine, Kim m ade c lea r th e  changing and som etim es 
conflicting view s within the  military regim e on the  business secto r:
Pardoning th e  illicit w ealth  accum ulators w as an obvious violation of th e  
revolution’s  pledge to  elim inate corruption and evil p rac tices. But it w as 
necessary ...If w e punished businessm en under corruption charges, it w as 
evident th a t our economy would be paralyzed. Of course, m em bers of the  
revolutionary council insisted  on prosecuting them , but I opposed it. It 
w as essen tia l to co-opt them  in order to  carry  out revolutionary ta sk s .219
Likewise, the  currency reform w as  devised in sec recy  and 
im plem ented w ithout any consideration for th e  view s of the  country’s
2l<sStephan Haggard, Richard N. Cooper and Chung-in Moon, ‘ Policy Reform in Korea’, in Robert Bates and 
Anne 0 . Krueger, eds, Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1993), pp.294-332, p.312.
217Yoo, A New Political Economy o f Economic Policy Change in South Korea, 1961-1963, p.265.
218See Chapter Two.
2,9Stephan Haggard, Byung-Kook Kim and Chung-in Moon, ‘The Transition to Export-Led Growth in South 
Korea: 1954-1966’; The Journal o f Asian Studies, 50 (1991), 850-873, p.859. The quotation is taken from the 
interview given by Kim Jong Pil to the Korean magazine Monthly Chosun.
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major econom ic organisations such a s  th e  EPB or the  Bank of Korea 
(BOK).220The reform for which Chung-yum Kim, Chief of Staff of President 
Park during th e  1970s, claim s responsibility w as only known to  a  few, 
including Park Chung Hee, and practically  w ithout any involvement of 
ca ree r econom ic b u reau cra ts .221 After its  im plem entation, th e  negative 
im pact on th e  country’s  econom y, the  rising opposition from th e  BOK and 
concerned econom ic m inistries, a s  well a s  the  p ressu res  by th e  U.S, led 
to  the  d ism issal of th e  currency reform’s  a rch itec ts  and an end to  the  
reform a lto g e th er.222 Ultimately, th e se  failed econom ic reform s show ed 
Park Chung Hee th a t any efforts to  pursue institutional change by 
arbitrary execu tive order, even within an authoritarian political 
environm ent a s  in Korea, would fail w ithout s trateg ically  seeking  the 
support of a  coalition.
The next section  p resen ts  first th e  major institutional reform s 
introduced by th e  regim e of Park Chung Hee (1961-1979) which a re  a t the  
basis of the  system  of socialisation of private risk. This is followed by an 
analysis of w hat I regard a s  th e  historical, international and ideological 
fac to rs th a t shaped  Park’s  m otivations to  favour th is  system . Yet, 
m otivations and p references m atte r little if Park could not im plem ent the  
system  he chose. The failure of th e  econom ic reform s a ttem pted  by 
adm inistrative fiat in the  first years of th e  military regim e show ed th a t 
policy im plem entation would not succeed  w ithout m obilisation or support 
within society . In th is sen se , th e se  policy ep isodes rep resen ted  a 
significant s tra teg ic  learning, i.e., the  realisation of w hat is feasible, 
possible and desirable in te rm s of policy cho ices within th e  Korean 
con tex t a t  th e  tim e.223l argue th a t ultim ately the  s treng th  of the  system  of 
socialisation of private risk and how it w as used to  fo ste r econom ic 
growth and developm ent re s ted  on th e  capacity  dem onstrated  by Park in
220Yoo, A New Political Economy o f Economic Policy Change in South Korea, 1961-1963, p.265.
221For an account of the process leading to the implementation of the currency reform in 1962, see the memoirs 
of Chung-yum Kim, Policymaking on the Front Lines, pp.21-7.
222For the U.S. pressures to cancel the reform, see Kim, Policymaking on the Front Lines, pp.24-7.
223See Chapter One, p.24.
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nurturing a  supporting coalition m ade of bureaucrats, farm ers and 
business  groups.
3.3 Building th e  System  of Socialisation of Private Risk: Park Chung Hee 
(1961-1979)
The concentration  of power in th e  executive, th e  re-organisation of 
th e  bureaucra tic  apparatus, and th e  introduction of policy changes, in 
particu lar in th e  financial system , may be regarded a s  th e  th ree  major 
institutional and policy transform ations during the  Park era  th a t m arked a 
turning point in the  country’s  econom ic developm ent history.
3.3.1 Strengthening the  Executive Power
In te rm s of th e  role of th e  executive in th e  policy process, 
P resident Park developed several execu tive m echanism s through which 
he com m anded, coordinated and monitored the  bureaucracy  and its 
perform ance in implementing th e  country’s  developm ent s tra teg y .224First, 
Park enlarged, em pow ered and extensively used th e  presidential 
s e c re ta r ia t m ade up of a ch ief secre ta ry  and six to  seven o ther senior 
se c re ta r ie s  who w ere usually among th e  country’s  b e s t econom ic 
b u reau cra ts  and a ss is te d  th e  President in th e  coordination and 
m anagem ent of th e  bureaucracy. As th e  country launched its econom ic 
developm ent plans, the  s ta ff w as expected  to  counsel th e  President 
particularly on econom ic issues. From a to ta l num ber of 15 in 1961, the  
presidential s ta ff rapidly grew  to  over 100 in 1967 and above 200 in 
1 9 6 8 .228 Consequently, the  P resident and his se c re ta r ia t becam e th e  
dom inant cen tre  of policymaking and policy im plem entation.
At th e  sam e tim e, Park built a coercive and repressive appara tus 
through not only a  se ries  of legal m echanism s such  a s  th e  National
224Young-Whan Hahn, ‘Administrative Capability for Economic Development: The Korean Experience’; Korean 
Review o f Public Administration, l (l 996), 177-208, pp. 186-190. See also Chung-Kil Chung, ‘Presidential 
Decisionmaking and Bureaucratic Expertise in Korea’; Governance: An International Journal o f Policy and 
Administration, 2 (1989), 267-292.
225Choi, Institutionalizing A Liberal Economic Order in Korea, p.33.
Security  Law, th e  Anti-Communist Law and th e  Law concerning Collective 
D em onstrations, but also  the  creation  of security  and intelligence 
agencies  such  a s  th e  KCIA.22> C reated in 1961 with an initial 3,000 
em ployees, th e  KCIA would grow in th e  following th ree  years  to  an 
estim ated  370,000 em ployees (a notable figure for a country a t th e  tim e 
with 20 million people). But unlike its  U.S. counterpart, th e  KCIA w as 
explicitly fram ed to  spy on its own citizens, to  carry out both dom estic 
and foreign o perations.227 Together with th e  National Defence Security 
Command (NDSC) and the  police, th e  KCIA served well th e  regime 
in te re sts  to  control and keep in check  political opposition and th e  civil 
society .
Second, Park relied on a  group of so-called “bulldozer” type 
adm inistrators th a t helped him achieve th e  expected  econom ic outcom es 
in th e  early s ta g e s  of the  push for rapid econom ic growth. Hence, during 
th e  1960s, th e  m ost rep resen ta tive  w ere Chang Kee Young, Deputy Prime 
M inister of th e  EPB (1964 -67), Kim Hyun Ok, first Mayor of Pusan (1962- 
65) and la te r of Seoul (1966-70), and Lee Nak Sun, d irector of Office for 
National Tax Administration-ONTA (1962-66).228
Third, in his a ttem p ts  to  scru tin ise  bureaucra tic  perform ance, the  
P resident initiated w hat w as known a s  the ‘New Year Briefing S essions’, 
or v isits  to  the  offices of each  m inistry during th e  m onths of January  and
226Chung-in Moon and Yong-Cheol Kim, ‘A Circle of Paradox: Development, Politics and Democracy in South 
Korea’, in Adrian Leftwich, ed, Democracy and Development: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1996), pp.139-167, p.144.
227Clifford, Troubled Tiger, p. 80.
228Hahn, ‘Administrative Capability for Economic Development’, pp. 188-189. Hahn Young Whan describes 
them in this way:
They were Park’s ‘alter ego’, an incarnation of President’s other self, so deeply committed to the realization of 
rapid growth. These bulldozers worked extremely hard. Their nickname ‘bulldozers’ came from their work style 
that did not pay much attention to difficulties or constraints of any nature. They just pushed the program through 
until the target could be realized. The President provided them with every possible means of support and 
defended them from all possible attacks. They reciprocated with achievements far better than the President had 
expected.
Lee Nak Sun, for example, was seen as the man responsible for a 66 percent increase in tax revenues within one 
year of his appointment. For the Park regime’s strong commitment to tax administration reform in Korea in the 
1960s, see Chong Kee Park, ‘The 1966 Tax Administration Reform, Tax Law Reforms, and Government 
Saving’, in Cho and Kim, eds, Economic Development in the Republic o f Korea, pp.247-272.
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February to  obtain briefings on plans and s tra te g ie s  for th e  coming year 
and perform ance achieved during th e  previous year. The se ss io n s  w ere 
also a ttended  by all the m inisters, presidential sec re ta rie s , governors, 
leaders of th e  ruling party and National Assembly, a s  well a s  m ost of the 
bureau chiefs and section  chiefs. This new  presidential m ode of operation 
w as a c lea r dem onstration th a t Park Chung Hee had a  g rea t concern  for 
results, and only th o se  who su cceed ed  in fully achieving or exceeding  the  
planned ta rg e ts  could survive or be prom oted, with th o se  failing to  comply 
with the  goals over a certain  num ber of evaluation periods facing possible 
sacking.
Finally, the  President himself personally becam e involved in the  
im plem entation of certain  pro jects he deem ed crucial for th e  country’s 
developm ent. For exam ples, th e  c a s e s  of th e  Seoul-Pusan Highway, the  
Ulsan Industrial Complex, th e  Korean Institu te  of Science and Technology 
(KIST), or th e  POSCO stee l mill. For Nam Duck Woo, one of th e  country’s  
top decision-m akers during the  1960s and 1970s, the  leadership  of Park 
Chung Hee w as crucial for the  country’s  econom ic developm ent:
He (Park) alw ays think about in his head and mind, all th e  tim e, all the  
econom ic pictures, w hat is going on, and so  on. Once he know s the  
problem he tries  to  solve it, one w ay or another, right or wrong. He 
defines th e  program and tries  to  work out th e  system  to  solve the  problem. 
And then tries  to  maxim ise the  efficiency of th e  organisation, and the  
system . He constantly  sum m ons the  m inisters, th e  sec re ta rie s . Once in a 
month, he a tten d s  th e se  briefings a t  the  EPS about th e  econom ic 
situation. He also  heads the  Export Promotion M eetings. Also every 
quarter, a tten d s  a conference to  evaluate  th e  program s. He is really 
com m itted himself.229
With the  executive showing a growing w illingness to  lead, m anage 
and regu late  econom ic policymaking to  achieve grow th and developm ent,
229Interview with Nam Duck Woo in Seoul, 31 May 2001.
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the  transform ation of the  bureaucracy  into a  m ore effective appara tus 
w as seen  a s  n ecessary  to reach  the  P residen t’s  econom ic goals.
3.3.2 Reforming th e  Bureaucracy
A se rie s  of reforms w ere introduced in th e  organisation of the  
Korean bureaucracy  during th e  1960s. These led to  th e  creation  of new 
agencies and, the  redefinition of com petencies and conventions in order 
to  a tta in  b e tte r  perform ance in th e  country’s  econom ic m anagem ent. 
Among th e  m ajor bureaucratic  reform s w as th e  official estab lishm ent of 
the EPB, and new  procedures for recruitm ent, training and promotion 
within th e  bureaucracy to improve professional com petence .230The EPB 
began its  official activ ities in July 1961 and soon becam e the  main 
econom ic governm ental body in charge of com prehensive planning and 
effective execution of the  country’s  Five-Year developm ent plans, th e  first 
of th e se  launched in 1962. Additionally, reaffirming th e  regim e’s  pledge to 
econom ic planning and developm ent, th e  head of th e  EPB w as 
sim ultaneously given the  position of Deputy Prime M inister (DPM) from 
Decem ber 1963.231The im portance assigned  to  econom ic m inistries and 
technocracy  by Park Chung Hee w as evident a s  he actively sought to 
insulate th e  EPB from political p ressu res, and to  appoint mainly econom ic 
experts  to  th e se  m inistries. Hence, from 1964 to  1979, only seven (14.7 
percent) of 47 econom ic m inisters w ere formerly military, in com parison 
with th e  46 (38.3 percent) of th e  120 non-econom ic m inistries.232
Although less  m entioned, the  creation  of th e  Office for National Tax 
Administration (ONTA) in 1966 w as probably a s  im portant a s  the  EPB for 
the institutionalisation of th e  system  of “socia lisation  of private risk”. 
Since its  establishm ent, the  ONTA has usually been regarded a s  the  
governm ent’s  m ost powerful coercive policy instrum ent to  guarantee: (1) 
th a t cap ita l allocated to  th e  private se c to r  would go into officially
230Hahn, ‘Administrative Capability for Economic Development’, pp. 191-3.
23lChoi, Institutionalizing A Liberal Economic Order in Korea, p.5.
232Hahn, ‘Administrative Capability for Economic Development’, p. 195.
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approved business a rea s  and; (2) to  punish th e  businessm en who had 
violated national econom ic guidelines. This would usually tak e  th e  form of 
tax  evasion investigations th a t sub jec ted  th e  firms judged guilty not only 
to  the paym ent of additional tax es  and penalties, but a lso  to  criminal 
prosecution. Furtherm ore, tax  investigation could resu lt in a  d e c rea se  of 
indirect financing funds from financial institu tions.233
Another m ajor reform during th e  1960s, involved th e  consolidation 
of a  m eritocratic  system  in th e  p ro cess  of recruitm ent, training and 
promotion of th e  adm inistrative m achine.234The governm ent re-introduced 
a  highly com petitive and open exam  system  for th e  higher and lower 
echelons of th e  civil serv ice in 1963 th a t a ttra c te d  th e  b es t Korean 
s tu d en ts  from th e  country’s  top universities due to  th e  socia l prestige 
usually a sso c ia ted  with adm inistrative positions.23SThe changes pushed by 
Park Chung Hee re insta ted  an old m eritocratic  p rac tice  inherited from 
early  Korean dynasties and lost during th e  previous regim es, which 
seem ed  to  have been m ore concerned  w ith the  politicisation of civil 
serv ice appointm ents.236Entrance to  th e  Korean civil serv ice  could follow 
th ree  patterns: th e  civil serv ice exam ination; special promotion and; 
special appointm ent. The first one aim ed essen tia lly  a t employing mid­
m anagers to  build a capable  m anagerial body, th e  second  g ran ted  som e 
lower m anagers th e  opportunity to  join the  adm inistrative appara tus, and 
th e  third guaran teed  presidential control over m inistries and ea se d  the  
en tran ce  of professionals into th e  bureaucracy .237
The changes w ere particularly significant in th e  num ber of mid­
m anagers recruited  through the  civil serv ice exam ination. The num bers 
th a t had averaged 25.8 recru its under Syngman Rhee and Chang Myon
233 On the role of the ONTA, see Carter Eckert, ‘The South Korean Bourgeoisie: A Class in Search of 
Hegemony’, in Hagen Koo, ed, State and Society in Contemporary Korea, pp.95-130 ,pp.l02-3.
234For an overview of the Korean bureaucracy, see Woo-Cumings, ‘The Korean Bureaucratic State; Historical 
Legacies and Comparative Perspectives’.
235For a detailed study on the 1960s reforms on the Korean bureaucracy, see Byung-Kook Kim, ‘State Capacity 
for Reform: The State in Korea and Mexico’; The Korean Journal o f Policy Studies, 3 (1988), 69-91.
236For an analysis of the characteristics of the bureaucracy in the 1950s, see Lee, Korea: Time, Change and 
Administration, pp. 101-8.
237Kim, ‘State Capacity for Reform’, pp.81-3.
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grew  strongly to  44.6 by 1970 and 174.8 by 1980. Park saw  them  as  
im portant to  increasingly m anage com plex econom ic issu es  a s  th e  
country’s  move to  focus on export-oriented industrialisation. The 
m eritocratic  legitim acy w as reinforced by their education in elite 
universities and/or high schools. Not only 96.6 p ercen t had enrolled in a 
college, but 24.7 percen t of them  had a tta ined  a  higher degree. To secu re  
th e  support and gain th e  loyalty of th e  growing num ber of m id-m anagers 
in the adm inistration, Park Chung Hee pursued a  strong policy of internal 
promotion, reducing th e  share  of special appo in tees.23BFurtherm ore, new  
training program m es for all th e  higher-ranking civil serv ice w ere 
estab lished  in 1961 in th e  Central Officials Training Institu te  and som e 
m inistries launched their own think tanks. Among th e  m ost im portant 
ones w ere th e  Korean Institu te of S cience and Technology (KIST) in 1967 
supported by President Park, and th e  Korean Development Institu te  (KDI) 
under th e  ausp ices of the  EPB.23*ln sum , Park pursed a  reform s tra teg y  for 
th e  bureaucracy  th a t increased  its  size, improved professional 
com petence and streng thened  its capac ity  to  deal w ith increasingly 
com plex econom ic issues a s  the  country focused on export-oriented 
industrialisation.
3.3.3 Changing th e  Economic A rchitecture
The reform of th e  political and bureaucra tic  institu tions w as 
accom panied by significant changes in th e  country’s  econom ic 
arch itectu re . The new  governm ent s e t  tw o main goals: (1) m obilisation 
and allocation of financial resources to s tra teg ic  se c to rs  (exports) a s  
defined by industrial policies s e t  in th e  country’s  developm ent plans; and 
(2) the  estab lishm ent of th e  foundations for full governm ental control of 
the  financial secto r. 240This involved: the  im plem entation of a five-year 
developm ent plan (FYDP) setting  econom ic ta rg e ts  (namely in te rm s of 
gross dom estic product, investm ent, dom estic  savings, foreign savings,
238Kim, ‘State Capacity for Reform’, p.82.
239Hahn, ‘Administrative Capability for Economic Development’, pp. 192-3.
240Pyung Joo Kim,‘Financial System and Policy (1961-79): An Assessment of Park’s Legacy’; KIF Paper 95-02 
(Seoul: Korea Institute of Finance, 1995) p. 19.
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exports and im ports growth ra tes) under the  supervision of the  EPB, 
followed by th e  allocation of reso u rces  to  th e  industrial sec to rs  
considered  a  priority for national developm ent. As Ha-joon Chang points 
out:
The designated  industries had priority in acquiring rationed (and often 
subsidised) cred its  and foreign exchange, s ta te  investm ent funds, 
preferential tax  trea tm en ts  (for exam ple tax  holidays, acce lera ted  
depreciation allow ances) and o ther supportive m easures, including import 
pro tection  and entry restric tions. In return for th is support, they becam e 
su b jec t to  s ta te  contro ls on technology (for exam ple production m ethods, 
products), entry, capacity  expansion and p rices.241
Chang argues th a t th e  control played by th e  governm ent aimed 
specifically  a t fighting ’excessive  com petition’ and ’social w as te ’, with 
violators sub jec ted  to  penalties such  a s  revocation of licences, fines, and 
even, prison se n te n c es .242Additionally, the  governm ent developed a s tr ic t 
system  to  m onitor th e  perform ance of th e  private se c to r  and guaran tee  
th e  com pliance with th e  ta rg e ts . The m ost fam ous exam ple being the  
’Monthly Export Promotion M eetings’ chaired by th e  P resident and 
gathering se lec ted  m inisters and top bu reaucra ts  responsible for trade  
and th e  economy; th e  chief execu tives of export associa tions and; 
p residen ts of several business groups or chaebol.243The m eeting would 
s ta r t  w ith a briefing on th e  progress of th e  country’s  exports  in m eeting 
the  ta rg e ts  s e t  in th e  developm ent plan, followed by a  d iscussion on the  
possible problem s affecting som e s tra teg ic  industries. Ultimately, the 
m eeting ’perm itted th e  P resident to  a c t  directly on problem s th a t 
individual industries w ere facing, often by simply issuing directives on the  
spo t.’244
24lHa-joon Chang, The Political Economy o f Industrial Policy (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd, 1994), p.l 13.
242Chang, The Political Economy o f Industrial Policy, p.l 14.
243On the Monthly Export Promotion Meeting, see Cheng, Haggard and Kang, Institutions, Economic Policy and 
Growth in the Republic o f Korea and Taiwan Province o f China, pp.41-3.
244Cheng, Haggard and Kang, Institutions, Economic Policy and Growth in the Republic o f Korea and Taiwan 
Province o f China, p.42.
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In th e  early 1960s capital w as s c a rc e  due to  th e  low dom estic  
savings ra te , underdeveloped financial and cap ital m arkets, a s  well a s  
declining foreign aid. This led the  governm ent to  initiate a  se rie s  of 
financial reform s to  provide it with th e  control of cred it allocation in order 
to  carry  on with th e  industrial policies included in th e  developm ent 
p lans.^D uring th is period, major changes included: th e  am endm ent of th e  
Bank of Korea Act (making th e  cen tral bank subordinate to  th e  Ministry of 
Finance); th e  nationalisation of com m ercial banks and; th e  creation  of 
new  specia lised  and local banks. Foreign banks w ere also  allow ed to 
e n te r  th e  Korean m arket, but not w ithout restric tions on their 
activ ities. 246 As the  governm ent actively sought th e  m obilisation of 
financial resou rces to  support export-led growth, th ree  m ajor reform s 
took place: (1) currency devaluation; (2) in te re st ra te  reform s to  s tim ulate  
savings and; (3) increase  of foreign capital inflows.
Currency devaluation w as seen  a s  an im portant com ponent to  
s tim ulate  export perform ance. Consequently, from an average ra te  of 130 
won to  th e  dollar in 1963, the  local currency w as devalued to  255 won to  
th e  dollar in 1964.247ln 1965 th e  governm ent decided to  change its  in te re st 
ra te  policies to  a ttra c t savings from th e  informal financial m arket to  the  
banking sec to r. The nominal in terest ra te  on (one-year) tim e deposits  w as 
raised  from 15 percen t to 30 p ercen t annually, and th e  general loan ra te  
increased  from 16 to  26 percen t.24Sln th e  first th ree  m onths, bank d eposits  
grew  by 40 percent, and approxim ately doubled in each  of th e  nex t th ree  
succeed ing  years. 249 The reform w as only partial s in ce  many loan 
ca teg o ries  continued to  be heavily subsid ised  by th e  governm ent 
including th o se  related  to  export and agricultural investm ent
245Lee-Jay Cho and Yoon Hyung Kim, ‘Major Economic Policies of the Park Administration’, in Cho and Kim, 
eds, Economic Development in the Republic o f Korea, pp. 15-40, p. 16.
246Cole and Park, Financial Development in Korea 1945-1978, pp.66-7.
247Haggard, Cooper and Moon, ‘Policy Reform in Korea’, pp.315-6.
248For a detailed analysis of the monetary reform of 1965, see Cole and Park, Financial Development in Korea 
1945-1978, pp. 198-211.
249Cole and Park, Financial Development in Korea 1945-1978, p.203.
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loans.250Finally, in face  of continuous sho rtage of dom estic capital, th e  
governm ent sought th e  inflow of foreign capital. This w as  first sought 
through th e  norm alisation of relations with Jap an  in 1965, followed by th e  
Foreign Capital Inducem ent Act in 1966, which allowed sta te-contro lled  
banks to  guaran tee  private sec to r  foreign borrowing.2s1Dimitri V ittas and 
Yoon J e  Cho claim  th a t if investm ent in Korea had relied uniquely on 
dom estic savings during 1962-1982, th e  average growth of th e  econom y 
would have been only 4.9 percent, in com parison with th e  ac tua l average 
growth of 8.2 percen t.252
In 1962, an am endm ent to  th e  Bank of Korea Act reduced the  
autonom y of th e  cen tra l bank (BOK) and brought th e  institution under th e  
influence of th e  Ministry of Finance (MOF).253M onetary policy authority  and 
control over foreign exchange moved to  the  MOF. The ch an g es also  
provided th e  MOF with th e  pow er to  oversee BOK’s  operations, to  m anage 
its  budget, th e  right to  req u est reconsideration of resolutions approved by 
th e  M onetary Board (the BOK policymaking body), and th e  prerogative to  
recom m end th e  appointm ent of th e  BOK governor to  th e  President. 
Another im portant reform raised  th e  profile of th e  D epartm ent of Bank 
Supervision in the  cen tra l bank to  Office of Bank Supervision and 
Examination (OBSE) ou tside th e  BOK executive. While th is  change w as 
n ecessa ry  due to  th e  growing num ber of banking institu tions th a t need to  
be inspected , it also  becam e a  recurren t issue affecting the  relations 
betw een  th e  MOF and th e  BOK. The office w as eventually m ade into an 
in d ep en d en t’ body under th e  ministry. Eventually, th e  am ended Bank of 
Korea Act by reducing th e  role of th e  BOK bestow ed, on th e  governm ent, 
th e  ‘final say  on all m onetary and financial policies.’254
250Yoon Je Cho and Joon-Hyung Kim, ‘Credit Policies and the Industrialization of Korea’; World Bank 
Discussion Papers 286 (Washington: The World Bank, 1995), p.33.
25lCho and Kim, ‘Credit Policies and the Industrialization of Korea’, p.34.
252Dimitri Vittas and Yoon Je Cho, ‘Credit policies: Lessons from Japan and Korea’; The World Bank Research 
Observer 11:2 (August 1996), p.9.
253For the amendment of the Bank of Korea Act, see Kim, ‘Financial System and Policy (1961-79)’, pp.19-20.
254Bank of Korea, The Bank o f Korea, p. 154.
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In th e  early 1960s, the Korean financial m arket em bodied a dual 
s truc tu re : th e  state-run Korea Development Bank (KDB), th e  Korea 
Agricultural Bank (KAB), and the  privately-owned com m ercial banks, m ost 
of which had been privatised in 1957.28Sln 1960, the  KDB and th e  KAB 
accoun ted  for 71 percen t of th e  to ta l lending, w ith the  private com m ercial 
banks taking a  29 percen t share .288Following th e  military coup d 'e ta t in 
1961 th e  new  regime, led by Park Chung Hee, moved to  tak e  full control of 
th e  financial system  by nationalising th e  com m ercial banks, claiming th a t 
they  had been ‘illegally hoarded’ by a  sm all group of large stockholders 
who had bought the  sh ares  in 1957.287
In te rm s of special banks, each  of them  targeting  a  predefined area  
of activity, the  governm ent a ltered  th e  Korea Development Bank Charter 
in D ecem ber 1961 to  bolster th e  bank’s  role in th e  country’s  industrial 
developm ent.2S8The am endm ent increased  its  cap ita l, allowed it to  borrow 
funds from abroad and the BOK, to  guaran tee  foreign loans obtained by 
private firms, to  supply working capital loans, and to  g ran t long-term 
loans to  governm ent and KDB-owned en terp rises. Throughout th e  1960s, 
o ther specia l banks w ere also  s e t  to  handle policy loans. The Medium 
Industry Bank (MIB) w as c rea ted  in 1961 to  provide loans to  medium and 
sm all firms, followed the  next year by th e  Citizen’s  National Bank (CNB), 
th e  National Federation of Fisheries C ooperatives (NFFC), and the  
National Agricultural Co-operatives Federation (NACF). The Korea 
Exchange Bank (KEB) appeared  in 1967 to  support foreign exchange 
tran sac tio n s  by firms. Local banks w ere estab lished  betw een  1967 and
255Cole and Yung Chul Park, Financial Development in Korea 1945-1978, pp.53-4. See also Bank of Korea, The 
Bank o f Korea, p. 148.The Korea Development Bank (initially called Korea Reconstruction Bank) was created in 
1954 and its main objective was to grant medium- and long-term loans to industry. The Korea Agriculture Bank 
was officially launched in 1958 with capital subscribed by farmers, agricultural co-operatives and organisations.
256Park, ‘The Development of Financial Institutions and the Role of Government in Credit Allocation’, in Cho 
and Kim, Economic Development in the Republic o f Korea , p.45.
257Cole and Park, Financial Development in Korea 1945-1978, p.53. For example, Lee Byung-chul, the founder 
and chairman of Samsung, was the main buyer of almost half of the shares on offer. He purchased 85 percent of 
the Hanil Bank, nearly 50 percent of the Cho Hung Bank, and 30 percent of the Commercial Bank of Korea. See 
Leroy P. Jones and II Sakong, Government, Business and Entrepreneurship in Economic Development: The 
Korean Case (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), p.415, fin. 12. For ties between the Rhee’s 
regime and Samsung, see Ingyu Oh, Mafioso, Big Business and the Financial Crisis: The state-business 
relations in South Korea and Japan (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), pp.93-7.
258Cho and Kim, ‘Credit Policies and the Industrialization of Korea’, p.31.
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1971, one for each  of the ten  provinces, with th e  branch netw ork allowed 
only within th e  province w here th e  head offices would be located . Foreign 
banks w ere allowed to  operate  in th e  country in 1967, on th e  expectation  
th a t they  would a ttra c t the  needed foreign cap ita l inflows, and ‘to  render 
[the] dom estic bankers’ playground com petitive so  th a t they  may be 
induced to  improve their banking p rac tices  and m anagerial skills.’2*9
At the  core of the new  financial institutional fram ew ork w as the  
policy loan, i.e., the  major financial tool linking th e  governm ent, banks 
and business groups in K orea.260 It w as th e  policy loan th a t gave the  
governm ent th e  capability to  actively intervene in the  country’s  p a tte rn s 
of industrialisation. Under the  regim e of Park Chung Hee, th e re  w ere  four 
types of system s delivering policy loans designed to  support export-led 
growth and th e  Five-Year Development Plans: (1) via specia lised  banks (in 
particu lar th e  Korea Development Bank); (2) via com m ercial banks; (3) via 
National Investm ent Fund or NIF (created  in 1973 to  finance long-term 
investm ent in heavy and chem ical industry p lan ts and equipm ent); and (4) 
via rationing foreign credit.261Policy loans could be allocated  in tw o ways. 
First, through designated credit program m es such  a s  th o se  for exports, 
agriculture, fisheries or sm all-and-m edium -enterprises (SMEs). Loan 
eligibility w as based  on the  specific program and borrow ers received 
loans a t preferential ra tes.
Second, policy loans could be allocated  through governm ent 
d irectives, adm inistrative guidance, and ad hoc interventions. Loans did 
not have preferential ra tes, a s  th e  designated  cred it program m es above, 
and fell into the  sam e category  a s  th e  general bank loans. T hese loans 
w ere usually m ade according to  governm ent a sse ssm e n t of th e  progress 
of specific  key pro jects and the  constra in ts  facing specific firms or 
industries. Decisions w ere usually m ade in consultation  betw een  th e  
governm ent and business sec to rs , a fte r c lo se  monitoring of progress by
259Kim, ‘Financial System and Policy (1961-79)’, pp.21-.5, and pp.30-1.
260Kim, ‘Financial System and Policy (1961-79)’, p.49.
261Kim, ‘Financial System and Policy (1961-79)’, pp.50-2.
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th e  governm ent. The governm ent, if n ecessary , w as known to reso rt to 
both formal and informal req u ests  to  g e t the  banks to  support particular 
ex p o rters .262According to  Yoon J e  Cho and Joon-Kyung Kim, while the  ad  
hoc  nature  of th e se  loans m akes it difficult to  es tim a te  their am ount, they 
seem  to  have been substan tial and probably m ore than th e  ones allocated  
to  earm arked program m es.263
Ultimately, th e se  changes in th e  country’s  financial arch itec tu re  
gave the  s ta te  the  key control over cap ital allocation and led to  the 
creation  of a system  of socialisation of private risk. Within th is system , 
and through different form ats, w hether deposit insurance, lender-of-last- 
resort, s ta te  guaran tees, or subsid ies to  banks facing difficulties due to  
non-performing loans, the s ta te  supported  the  potential risks a sso c ia ted  
with private investm ents in th e  designated  s tra teg ic  industries for 
national developm ent. Conversely, th is  control of th e  financial system  
allow ed th e  s ta te  to  im pose perform ance ta rg e ts  and to  discipline those  
firms th a t failed to  a tta in  such ta rg e ts  by blocking their a c c e s s  to  credit. 
In sum , th e  new  regime led by Park Chung Hee pursued a se rie s  of 
reform s forming the  basis of th e  country’s  system  of socialisation  of 
private risk. The puzzle rem ains, however, on th e  m otivations th a t led 
Park Chung Hee to  favour and reinforce th is  system  in pursuit of national 
growth and developm ent. I argue th a t Park’s  s tra teg ic  ac tions to build the  
system  of socialisation of private risk w ere m ediated  by a com bination of 
historical, international and ideological fac to rs. But, it w as Park’s  ability 
to  assem ble  and mobilise a  coalition during alm ost tw o d ecad es  of 
leadership  th a t ultim ately guaran teed  th e  streng th  of th e  system , a t the  
core of th e  Korean developm ental s ta te .
262Cho and Kim, ‘Credit Policies and the Industrialization of Korea’, p.32.
263Cho and Kim, ‘Credit Policies and the Industrialization of Korea’, p.40.
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3.4. Shaping th e  System  of Socialisation of Private Risk: History, Institutional 
Legacies, C ontext and Ideas
3.4.1 The Legacies of Syngman Rhee, Chang Myon and U.S. Aid (1948-1961)
The First Republic under P resident Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) and 
the  Second Republic headed by Prime M inister Chang Myon (Aug.1960- 
May 1961) left im portant legacies th a t serve  a s  crucial indicators for the 
institutional transform ation Park Chung Hee engineered to  scu lp t the 
system  of socialisation of private risk. As Yung-Chul Park points out, ‘the 
econom ic and financial policies of every country a re  strongly shaped  by 
certa in  fundam ental assum ptions and objectives, a t  tim es not fully 
articu lated , th a t determ ine th e  mind s e t  of policym akers and th e  public 
alike. Usually, th e se  com e from historical experiences th a t have, in one 
way or another, been dram atic.’264
During the leadership of both Rhee and Chang, party politics 
hijacked th e  decision-making p rocess, turning th e  econom ic bureaucracy  
into a  hostage of th e  in te re sts  of th e  executive, ruling party and private 
firms.265During Rhee’s  era, th e  Korean s ta te , under the  control of th e  ruling 
Liberal Party, becam e easily  exposed to  patron-client tie s  which nurtured 
the  growth of unproductive investm ents, mainly th e  m anufacturing of 
im port-substitution consum er goods. 266 Furtherm ore, there  w as no 
consis ten t and system atic  a ttem p t to  im plem ent long-term developm ent
264Yung-Chul Park, ‘Concepts and Issues’, in Hugh T. Patrick and Yung Chul Park, eds, The Financial 
Development o f Japan, Korea, and Taiwan: Growth, Repression, and Liberalization (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), pp.3-26, p.4.
265Chung-in Moon and Sang-young Rhyu, “ Overdeveloped’ State and the Political Economy of Development in 
the 1950s: A Reinterpretation’; Asian Perspective, 23 (1999), 179-203.
266For a general description of the patron-client ties during Rhee’s regime, see Joongi Kim, ‘Corruption, 
Clientelism and Economic Development in Korea’, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University 
(mimeo), (not dated) pp.6-9. See also Moon and Rhyu, ‘’Overdeveloped’ State and the Political Economy of 
Development in the 1950s’, p. 194 and pp. 197-8. Moon and Rhyu describe 1950s Korea in these terms: 
‘President Rhee reigned, the Liberal Party ruled, and bureaucrats served during the First Republic. Strong 
political society and weak state characterized the political landscape of the 1950s.’ See also Kim,‘Political 
Factors in the Formation of the Entrepreneurial Elite in South Korea’, pp.468-9 and Woo, Race to the Swift, 
pp.65-9. In terms of industrial production, in 1960-1961, just before the military coup d'etat, food, beverage, 
tobacco, textiles, clothing, and footwear represented almost 70 percent of the total manufacturing production. 
See Edward Mason et al, The Economic and Social Modernization o f the Republic o f Korea (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1980), p.250.
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p lans.267The Second Republic under Chang Myon em erged afte r a se rie s  of 
popular dem onstrations against the  Rhee governm ent th a t eventually led 
to  his resignation in 1960. The new  adm inistration headed by Chang Myon, 
though publicly com m itted to s ta te  reform, econom ic developm ent, and 
th e  fight against corruption, faced a  difficult political environm ent. Short­
term  econom ic policies, such a s  th e  devaluation of th e  currency and price 
in c reases  for governm ent-subsidised serv ices, genera ted  inflationary 
c o s ts  th a t w ere politically ill-timed w hen public opinion w as not ready to  
b ear them .268Sim ultaneously, a s  in Rhee’s  period, m em bers of the  ruling 
party  saw  in their new  pow er an opportunity to  exploit th e  patronage 
benefits  of office.269Founded on a  fragile coalition, th e  governm ent led by 
Chang Myon lacked autonom y and political support. Consequently, Chang 
Myon w as incapable of settling th e  conflicting dem ands placed on it by 
different social groups.270
Furtherm ore, from 1957, W ashington not only decided to  change its 
aid policies from provision of g ran ts to  loans, but ultim ately to  c e a se  aid 
a lto g e th er during the  1960s.271 Since 1945, and in particu lar afte r the  
Korean War, th e  U.S. played an im portant role in th e  country’s  
reconstruction  through m assive aid a llo ca tio n s.272 With th e  end of the  
conflict in 1953, Korea becam e increasingly dependent on U.S. aid th a t 
financed nearly 70 percen t of to ta l im ports betw een 1953 and 1961 and 
75 p ercen t of th e  to ta l fixed capital form ation.273ln th e  la te  1950s, U.S aid 
accoun ted  for over 10 percen t of Korea’s  GDP.274ln 1957, U.S. aid reached
267Lee, Korea: Time, Change and Administration, pp. 100-1.
268Henderson, Korea, p. 181.
269Kim, Divided Korea, p.214.
270For the growing disenchantment in the Korean society with the government led by Chang Myon, and in 
particular with the ruling Democratic Party, see Kim, Divided Korea, pp.221-222, Cole and Lyman, Korean 
Development, pp.32-3, and Henderson, Korea, pp. 179-181.
271Tu-jen Cheng, ‘Political Regimes and Development Strategies: South Korea and Taiwan’, in Gary Gereffi and 
Donald L. Wyman, eds, Manufacturing Miracles: Paths o f Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp.139-178, p.154. For the changing US aid policies, see 
Woo, Race to the Swift, pp.69-72.
272Woo, Race to the Swift, p.45. From 1946 to 1976, Washington provided 12.6 billion U.S. dollars of economic 
and military aid from a total of 15 billion U.S. dollars. Japan contributed with one billion U.S. dollars, and 
international financial institutions with the remaining two billion U.S dollars.
273Haggard and Moon, ‘The State, Politics, and Economic Development in Postwar South Korea’, p.61.
274Lie, Han Unbound, p. 29.
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382 million U.S. dollars, and from then  it began to  drop, to  321 million US 
dollars in 1958 and 222 million US dollars in 1959.
Thus, a s  ‘policy feedback’, the  First and Second Republics show ed 
how party politics underm ined the  decision-m aking process, w eakened 
the  econom ic bureaucracy, and politicised policy cho ices to  ultim ately 
jeopard ise th e  country’s  econom ic growth and developm ent. 
Sim ultaneously, W ashington’s  decision to  reduce aid only contributed to  
underlining th e  need for th e  country to  rapidly find solutions for its 
econom ic problems.
3.4.2 Economic C ontext and U.S. P ressu res
After th e  military coup d 'e ta t in 1961, the  new  leadership  launched 
a se ries  of new  econom ic program m es.27SThe new  econom ic program m es 
aimed a t  invigorating th e  econom y. Instead, they  not only led to  a 
resurgence of high inflation ra tes , but also  to  substan tia l public deficits 
starting  in 1961. 276 Sim ultaneously, foreign reserves began to  rapidly 
dwindle following th e  im plem entation of the  country’s  first five-year 
developm ent plan. With th e  new  leadership engaged in building a self- 
sufficient economy, th e  plan led to  a rapid increase  in th e  import of raw  
m ateria ls and industrial m achinery to  stim ulate  industrial activ ities, in 
particular th e  construction  of large-scale p ro jects  such  a s  an in tegrated 
iron and s te e l mill. S ince th e  mobilisation of foreign exchange resources 
through exports, inter-governm ental and private loans failed to reach  the  
planned value, the  governm ent w as com pelled to  use  th e  country’s  
foreign reserves. By th e  end of 1963, Korea’s  foreign reserves had 
decreased  to  no m ore than  90 million US dollars. 277 To w orsen the  
econom ic scenario  serious crop failures in 1962 and 1963 not only
275See above for the three major economic policies implemented by the new military regime during 1961 and 
1963.
276Cole and Park, Financial Development in Korea 1945-1978, p.226. See also Haggard, Cooper and Moon, 
‘Policy Reform in Korea’, p.312. According to Haggard, Cooper and Moon, the Counter-Usury Program, 
together with the ambitious investment targets set in the development plan, and a pay rise offered to public 
servants contributed largely for a fourfold increase in total bank credit to the public sector in 1961, and a 64 
percent rise in 1962.
277Cho and Kim, ‘Major Economic Policies of the Park Administration’, p.20.
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dem anded a  tem porary rise in U.S. g ran t aid levels during th e  period but 
a lso  strongly contributed to  push inflation upw ards.27* Inflation ra te s  
increased  from around 10 percen t in 1960 to  alm ost 35 percen t in 1964.279
Faced with food shortages, rising inflation, decreasing  foreign 
reserves, and under th e  th rea t of possible loss of much needed  aid, the  
military governm ent becam e politically vulnerable and seem ed  to  have 
been  left with no o ther choice but to  comply with the  U.S. p ressu re  to 
pursue econom ic reform s.2B0The U.S. effect on Korean policies w as m ade 
quite c lear by Park Chung Hee in his writings: ‘As far a s  Korea is 
concerned , sh e  m ust frankly adm it th a t sh e  is, realistically  speaking, 
under th e  influence of th e  United S ta te s  -  w hether sh e  likes it or 
not!’281S tephan Haggard, Byung-Kook Kim and Chung-in Moon claim  th a t 
th e  inflationary consequences of th e  military’s  econom ic policies led the  
local d irector of th e  U.S. aid mission (USAID) to  decide to  withhold som e 
p arts  of U.S. aid, including food a ss is tan c e , a s  a w ay to  force th e  new  
regim e to  adopt a  stabilisation plan.2t2The rapid d ecrease , for exam ple, of 
th e  food a ss is ta n c e  aid program, Public Law 480, had a  particu lar im pact 
in 1971 due to  the  serious food sho rtages. In 1971, food aid reached  33.7 
million US dollars, against 61.7 million US dollars in 1970 and 74.8 million 
US dollars in 1969. In consequence, th e  governm ent w as forced to  buy 
som e 297.3 million US dollars in food grains from th e  U.S.283Betw een 1964 
and 1966, the  military regime pursued w hat w as seen  a s  U.S.-influenced 
econom ic reforms, namely currency devaluation, tax  and in te rest ra te  
reform s, foreign capital opening and export-prom otion policies.284
In summary, and in face  of a difficult econom ic environm ent, and 
under p ressu re  from W ashington to  adopt econom ic reform s, th e  new  
military leadership eventually had to  filter their econom ic policy options
278Cole and Lyman, Korean Development, p. 172.
279Cole and Park, Financial Development in Korea 1945-1978, p.225.
280On U.S. pressure, see Lim, ‘The Origins and Evolution of the Korean Economic System’, pp.22-3.
28IPark Chung Hee, The Country, The Revolution and I  (Seoul: Hollym Corporation Publishers, 1970), p. 153.
282Haggard, Kim and Moon, ‘The Transition to Export-Led Growth in South Korea’, p.863.
283Kim, Divided Korea, p.280.
284Haggard, Cooper and Moon, ‘Policy Reform in Korea’, pp.315-324.
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in term s of their im pact on the  relationship with the  U.S., a t  the  tim e the  
country’s  main aid donor.
3.4.3 S tate-led Economic Nationalism and ‘Growth-First’ Developmental 
Paradigm
The country’s  econom ic con tex t, and dependence on US aid, 
imposed constra in ts  on th e  behaviour of th e  new  military regim e, but it 
also  opened opportunities in term s of policy cho ices th a t w ere em braced 
by the  new  leadership. As Wonhyuk Lim points out, ‘Park would go far 
beyond th e  orthodox econom ic policies prescribed by th e  A m ericans, and 
adopt d rastic  m easu res to  prom ote exports and increase  econom ic 
independence.’288Economic nationalism  w as particularly re sp ec ted  by the 
new  leadership, and th is  w as  visible in th e  Korean governm ent preference 
for foreign loans vis-&-vis foreign d irect investm ent.288Since th e  dom estic 
firms a t th e  tim e, lacked the  financial credibility to  ra ise  cap ita l in 
international m arkets, th e  governm ent allowed state-ow ned  banks to  
guaran tee foreign borrowing.
Economic nationalism  w as a c lea r ideological s ta n c e  driving the  
econom ic policy cho ices s e t  by the  new  military regime. The population 
w as asked  to  contribute to  th e  country’s  rapid econom ic developm ent 
through such  slogans a s  ‘L et's  try  to  live well’ and ‘We too can  do it’.287The 
actions, sp eech es  and policy cho ices of Park Chung Hee revealed a 
leader who w as in terested  in strengthening  th e  nation through econom ic 
developm ent.288As he put it in his book The Country, the Revolution and  f, 
‘creation of a self-supporting econom y and accom plishm ent of an
285Lim, ‘The Origins and Evolution of the Korean Economic System’, p.24.
286Lim, ‘The Origins and Evolution of the Korean Economic System’, p.25. See Dae-Hwan Kim, ‘The Idea of 
National Economic Integration and the Experience of Korean Development’, in John Borrego, Alejandro 
Alvarez Bejar and Jomo K.S., eds, Capital, the State, and Late Industrialisation: Comparative Perspectives on 
the Pacific Rim (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp.81-96, pp.85-7.
287Kim, ‘The Idea of National Economic Integration and the Experience of Korean Development’, p.86. 
Furthermore, the implementation of the leadership’s nationalist policy choices were facilitated by the 
cooperation of a population that, in face of the colonial experience under the Japanese, was itself strongly 
nationalist.
288For a discussion of the impact of economic development as an ideology in the policy process, see Chung-kil 
Chung, ‘The Ideology of Economic Development And Its Impact on Policy Process’; The Korean Journal o f  
Policy Sciences, 1 (1986), 28-46.
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industrial revolution is a  key to  national renaissance  and prosperity .’299ln 
his nationalist s tan ce , Park w as not different from Syngman Rhee.290What 
distinguished Rhee and Chang’s  ‘free-m arket’ approach from th a t of Park’s 
w as th a t Park believed the  s ta te  had a role to  m odernise and build a 
strong nation through rapid econom ic growth and developm ent.291 Park 
m ade th is c lear in his Our Nation’s Path:
There w as once a  tim e when th e  la issez faire policy w as th e  only w ay to  
guaran tee th e  maximum freedom  of people’s  econom ic activ ities, but it 
w as  realized subsequently  th a t such  a  policy w as ap t to  widen th e  gap 
betw een th e  haves and have-nots and c rea te  m assive unem ploym ent. 
Hence, it w as felt n ecessary  to  com bine laissez faire with planning and 
for the  S ta te  to  directly and positively partic ipate  in econom ic activ ities 
so  a s  to guaran tee  the  econom ic w elfare of th e  individual. Inasm uch a s  
th e  principal objective of achieving national prosperity is to  guaran tee  th e  
econom ic w elfare of individuals, th e  Governm ent is called upon to  
strongly enforce its adm inistrative prerogatives.292
’Growth-first’ soon becam e th e  m otto a t th e  h eart of th e  new  
leadership’s  developm ental goals. In an interview, Nam Duck Woo, Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Planning during th e  presidency 
of Park Chung Hee, clarifies th e  view  of the new  leadership: ‘(...)at th e  
tim e, nobody, including th e  President and the  bureaucracy  believed in the  
so-called private function of th e  financial m arket. P resident Park had a 
strong belief th a t if governm ent did tak e  th e  hands of th e  bank system , 
then  the  banks would favour cred it to  som e “unproductive se c to rs” like 
restau ran ts .’ 293 Park Tae Gyu, a professor a t  th e  country’s  leading 
educational institution Seoul National University (SNU), points out th a t 
a fte r the  coup d 'etat, th e  new  military regim e em ployed a group of
289Park, The Country, The Revolution and I, p. 171.
290Cole and Lyman, Korean Development, p.95.
291 Interview with Park Tae Gyu, Professor at Seoul National University, Seoul, 12 March 2001.
292Park Chung Hee, Our Nation’s Path: Ideology o f Social Reconstruction (Seoul: Hollym Corporation 
Publishers, 1970), pp.37-8.
293Interview with Nam Duck Woo in Seoul, 30 May 2001.
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econom ists which he nam ed th e  ‘s ta te-led  group’.2*4 These econom ists 
em phasised th e  interventionist role of th e  s ta te  in the  econom y and 
adopted a s  the ir m odels Third World nationalism  from countries such  a s  
India, Egypt and Turkey. Im portant in Park’s  ideological view s seem  to  
have been th e  influence of Park Hee-Bum, one of the  m em bers of th is 
‘sta te-led  group’ and a  professor of econom ics a t  SNU. He w as first 
formally appointed a s  a  special econom ic advisor to  th e  President, but 
la ter and under strong p ressu res  from th e  US, he w as forced to  leav e .298 
N evertheless, Park Tae Gyu argues tha t, until his assassin a tio n  in 1979, 
Park Chung Hee kept a c lo se  relationship w ith Park Hee-Bum.298
South Korea’s  particular historical legacies of Syngman Rhee and 
Chang Myon, th e  U.S.’s  reduction of aid and p ressure  for econom ic 
reforms, and the  new  leadership’s  belief in sta te-led  econom ic 
nationalism  em erged then  a s  im portant variables shaping the  incentives 
th a t led Park Chung Hee to  estab lish  a  system  of socialisation  of private 
risk. The im plem entation of th is  system , nevertheless, would not have 
succeeded  if Park Chung Hee had not s tra teg ically  ac ted  to  control a 
m eritocratic bureaucracy with th e  capacity  to  hold and m aintain such 
reform initiatives, build a  supporting coalition with th e  country’s  farm ers 
and business firms, and rep ress  labour.
3.5 Negotiating th e  System  of Socialisation of Private Risk: Co-Opting 
B ureaucrats, Farm ers and Businessm en
Reform of the  bureaucracy  perm itted Park Chung Hee full control 
over the  adm inistrative apparatus, and to  guaran tee  th a t it would becom e 
increasingly m eritocratic and insulated from soc ie ta l in terests . The 
initiative w as not only a response  to  the  politically-charged and w eak  
econom ic bureaucracy of th e  previous regim es. By taking m easures
294Interview with Park Tae Gyu in Seoul, 12 March 2001.
295Interview with Park Tae Gyu in Seoul, 12 March 2001. According to Park Tae Gyu added the “state-led 
group” was forced to leave the bureaucratic machine under pressure of the U.S. which as shown above clearly - 
disagreed with the earlier economic policies undertaken by the Park’s regime.
296Interview with Park Tae Gyu in Seoul, 12 March 2001.
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aim ed a t increasing the  size of th e  bureaucracy, improving its 
com p eten ces  through selective  recru itm ent p ro cesses, training program s 
and job incentives, Park sought s tra teg ically  not only to  legitim ate his 
pow er seized  by w ay of a military coup d 'e ta t, through econom ic 
developm ent but a s  well a s  to  accom m odate political allies. He c rea ted  a 
‘bifurcated bureaucracy’ feeding dom estic-oriented m inistries such a s  
T ransportation, Construction and Home Affairs w ith patronage 
appoin tm ents, while guaranteeing th e  professionalism  of th e  econom ic 
m inistries such  a s  EPB, Finance or Trade and Industry.297
Sim ultaneously, Park Chung Hee s e t  in 1961 a  Ministry of 
Governm ent Affairs in charge of supervising and reorganising the  
bureaucracy , to  im pede th e  influence of th e  National Assembly on 
personnel policy, a  w idespread p rac tice  during th e  previous regim es. 
Under Park Chung Hee, bu reaucra ts  w ere also  given th e  a ssu ran ce  th a t if 
they  achieved the  perform ance goals s e t  a t  the  top, they  could be 
prom oted to  a  m ore prestigious position ‘all the  w ay up to  th a t of 
m inister.’29*Appointments of military officers w ere particularly im portant in 
th e  early  years  of th e  regime, b ecau se  Park Chung Hee needed not only to 
keep  military support in all sec to rs  of th e  bureaucracy  a s  a m eans of 
consolidating and keeping control, but a lso  to  include in th e  new  
adm inistration individuals with m anagem ent skills a s  th e  Korean military 
had becom e m odernised more than  any o ther national organisation.299
P ark 's  regim e also  sought the  involvement of th e  country’s  farm ers 
in th is  grow th-oriented alliance. Following th e  end of th e  Korean War in 
1953, P resident Rhee, who had lost support within th e  population, 
finalised a  m ajor land reform to  gain the  confidence of th e  rural majority
297Kang, Crony Capitalism, pp.85-90.
298Hahn, ‘Administration Capability for Economic Development’, p. 196.
299Wan Ki Paik, ‘The Formation of the Governing Elites in Korean Society’, in Gerald E. Caiden and Bun 
Woong Kim, eds, A Dragon’s Progress: Development Administration in Korea (West Hartford, Connecticut: 
Kumarian Press, 1991), pp.43-57, p.53. See also Lee, Korea: Time, Change and Administration, pp.88-9. Lee 
mentions, for example, the creation of the National Defense College and the ROK (Republic of Korea) Army 
Logistics in 1956. The ROK Army Logistics was, according to Lee, the first institution in Korea with an 
advanced management course using the “case-study method”.
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and secu re  his rule over th e  territory recaptured  by th e  US-UN forces. 
Land reform w as seen  a s  an im portant tool contributing to  th e  legitim acy 
of Rhee’s  governm ent. In exchange for land, ten an ts  had to  pay 30 
p ercen t of the ir harvest to  the  governm ent.300 This m eant th a t th e  reform 
allow ed th e  regim e to  have a c c e s s  to  much needed grain to  feed the  
country’s  troops. In a  sim ilar vein, Park Chung Hee also  sought to  
estab lish  th e  legitim acy of his regim e by a ttrac ting  the  support of the 
rural m ajority in a country w here th e  main econom ic activ ity  w as still 
agriculture.
In Korea, even for au thoritarian  regim es, political legitim acy has 
re s ted  on w hether or not th e  ruler has th e  ’m andate of heaven’ to  govern, 
drawn from th e  support of th e  people.301 D espite th e  continuing allegations 
of illegal p rac tices, the  election p ro cess  has been regarded  a s  a 
m echanism  capable to  m easure  th e  degree of popular support for 
cand ida tes . A majority of th e  vo tes would confer th e  highly symbolic 
’m andate  of heaven’.302Although th e  Counter-Usury Program in 1961 failed 
to  ach ieve its  goals, o ther agricultural policies pursued by th e  regim e had 
a positive im pact in the  developm ent of th e  rural econom y. For exam ple, 
th e  military regim e reorganised th e  agricultural and m arketing institu tions 
by bringing to g e th er the  agricultural cooperatives and th e  Agriculture 
Bank into one institution nam ed National Agricultural Cooperatives 
Federation (NACF). This institution w as to  becom e responsib le for 
allocating cred it to  farm ers, provide them  with agricultural inputs such  as  
fertilizers and pestic ides, and m arketing farm crops. The creation  of an
300For an analysis on the factors leading to land reform in Korea during the regime of President Syngman Rhee, 
see James Putzel, A Captive Land: The Politics o f agrarian reform in the Philippines (London: Catholic Institute 
for International Relations, 1992), pp. 103-5.
30lSoohyun Chon, ‘The Election Process and Informal Politics in South Korea’, in Dittmer, Fukui, and Lee, 
Informal Politics in East Asia, pp.66-8l, p.68. For studies on the Korean political tradition and its relation to 
Confucianism, see Hahm Pyong-Choon, Korean Jurisprudence, Politics and Culture (Seoul: Yonsei University 
Press, 1986) and The Korean Political Tradition and Law: Essays in Korean Law and Legal History (Seoul: 
Royal Asiatic Society, 1987).
302The adoption of ‘western’ political institutions (such as the Constitution and other laws) and practices (such as 
elections) following the liberation from Japan represented the first step by the Korean elites to move away from 
the old Confucianist political heritage of the past. Consequently, for the Korean elites, legality -  or at least the 
apparent conformity with laws -  became the principal foundation of their legitimacy: ‘When he is elected or 
appointed in conformity with the constitution and laws, he enjoys a solid legitimacy.’ See Hahm, Korean 
Jurisprudence, Politics and Culture, p. 196.
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Office for Rural Development (ORD) w as a lso  im portant for th e  distribution 
of improved seed , and information on new crops and cultivation 
techn iques.303
Finally, th e se  institutional and policy reform s by strengthening  the  
autonom y and capacity  of th e  s ta te , in particular of th e  executive, 
provided it w ith the  power to  transform  th e  nature of s ta te -b u sin ess  ties. 
Park’s  regim e w as still dependent on business to  im plem ent industrial 
policies and deliver econom ic growth. However, it also  controlled th e  
country’s  financial system  which streng thened  its  capacity  to  negotiate  
th e  rules of th e  gam e. One of the  main reasons for th e  new  regim e’s 
nationalisation of the  country’s  com m ercial banks w as th e  claim  th a t the  
s tockholders of th e  banks w ere businessm en who had bought th e  
institu tions w ith profits th a t w ere ‘illegally’ gained during th e  previous 
regime. Another reason rested  on Park Chung Hee’s  fears  th a t, s ince  the  
main s tockholders of the  com m ercial banks w ere also  the  main ow ners of 
th e  country’s  business firms, the  banks would a llocate  c red it to  affiliated 
com panies.
While th e  new  regim e initially p rosecu ted  th e  ow ners of th e  major 
chaebol such  a s  Sam sung, Samho, Gaipoong, Tai Han and Lucky-Gold Star, 
Park Chung Hee and c lose a sso c ia te s  soon becam e aw are th a t th is  move 
could only hurt th e  governm ent’s  developm ent plans. 304 Instead of 
prosecution, a s  illustrated in section  2.4.3 of C hapter Two, businessm en 
w ere  re leased  and ‘invited’ to  join a  national grow th-oriented alliance led 
by Park Chung Hee. Rather than  a relationship dom inated by the  s ta te , it 
w as built on in terdependent ties. The relationship betw een  th e  tw o ac to rs  
w as further enhanced  by Korean s ta te  w illingness to  prevent the  
form ation of labour m ovem ents th a t could challenge th e  governm ent’s  
econom ic agenda. As Byung-Kook Kim and Hyun-Chin Lin point out: ‘What 
Park desired  w as a labour force resigned to  shouldering a
303For a more detailed analysis of the causes of agricultural growth, see Cole and Lyman, Korean Development, 
pp.142-153.
304Haggard, Kim and Moon, ‘The Transition to Export-led Growth in South Korea’, p.859.
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disproportionate share  of the  burden of heavy investm ent in th e  early 
s ta g e s  of industrial developm ent while cap ital received d iverse privileges 
for its  role a s  engine of growth.’308
3.6 Conclusion
The em ergence of th e  Korean developm ental s ta te  rem ains a much 
debated  issue with tw o m ajor view s -  continuity and discontinuity  -  
arguing different justifications for th e  origins of th e  phenom enon. The 
continuity school tends to  underline th e  legacy of th e  Ja p a n e se  colonial 
period a s  se tting  the  institutional foundations for the  Korean 
developm ental s ta te . The discontinuity school claim s instead  th a t the  
origins of such  a  s ta te  a re  in the  policies undertaken s ince  1961 by 
President Park Chung Hee. The tw o perspectives are , nonetheless, 
w ithout their own shortcom ings a s  a  consequence of their propensity  to  
be historically se lective  and bias.
While th e  continuity school fails to  tak e  into consideration the  
political, econom ic and social im pact of a problem atic 15-year period 
following th e  liberalisation of th e  country in 1945, th e  discontinuity school 
by reifying th e  developm ental role of th e  post-1960s military leadership  
ignores tw o m ajor fac ts . First, th e  new  military leaders’ policy cho ices 
w ere significantly influenced by plans, p ro jects  and program s earlier 
designed by th e  civilian governm ent led by Chang Myon. Second, th e  new  
military leaders’ initial and failed a ttem p ts  to  reform th e  econom y by 
adm inistrative fiat provided im portant policy and political s tra teg ic  
lessons for fu ture policy cho ices.
An analysis based on historical institutionalism  provides the  
in terpretative and analytical too ls to  understand  th e  relationship betw een  
leadership, socia l in te rests  and policy ou tcom es within a particu lar
305Byung-Kook Kim and Hyun-Chin Lim, ‘Labour Against Itself: Structural Dilemmas of State Monism’, in
Larry Diamond and Byung-Kook Kim, eds, Consolidating Democracy in South Korea (Boulder, Co: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2000), pp.111-137, p.l 15.
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co n tex t and historical momentum. This theoretica l fram ew ork s e ts  a s  its 
focal point th e  institutional arrangem ent th a t s truc tu re  political relations, 
w hether or not co-operative, and actions to  determ ine th e  policy process. 
In th e  c a se  of Korea, the  em pirical findings show  th a t th e  system  of 
socialisation  of private risk strateg ically  c rea ted  and consolidated  by Park 
Chung Hee worked well to  support co-operative behaviour betw een 
leadership  and social in terests, in particu lar bu reaucra ts  and business 
groups. P ark 's s tra teg y  w as essen tially  based  in four main featu res: (1) th e  
concentration  of pow er in the executive; (2) th e  developm ent of effective 
c lu ste rs  com prised of professional econom ic bureaucrats; (3) s ta te  control 
of th e  financial system  and; (4) an alliance with bureaucra ts , farm ers and 
th e  chaebol.
This institutional fram ework m aterialized a s  the  rules of the  gam e 
shaping th e  political, econom ical, and informal relationships betw een 
Korean leadership, bureaucrats, business groups and farm ers, and thus 
influencing th e  pattern  of policy outcom es. The system  em erged a s  a 
response  to  historical legacies, U.S. p ressu res  for econom ic reform, and 
an ideological standing held by th e  country’s  leadership  (state-led 
econom ic nationalism) by opening opportunities for co-operation and 
placing restra in s  bn self-in terested behaviour through rew ards and 
penalties. The su c c e ss  of the  system  rested  on th e  capacity  of Park 
Chung Hee to  sustain  the system  through a  credible com m itm ent to  an 
alliance with bureaucrats, chaebol and farm ers. The credible com m itm ent 
com prised precisely not only of incentives but also  penalties. For exam ple, 
b u reaucra ts  w ere offered promotions in return  for s u c c e ss  in achieving 
perform ance ta rg e ts , but bureaucra ts  could a lso  be sack ed  if they failed 
to  achieve those  planned ta rg e ts . Conversely, th e  chaebol traded  
econom ic perform ance and political funds for financial incentives, tax  
savings and tariff protection. Yet, if the chaebol fell short of fulfilling 
econom ic guidelines s e t  by th e  governm ent, they could be blocked from 
a c c e s s  to  cred it or exposed to  tax  investigations. In th is  sen se , the
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system  of “socialisation of private risk” w as based  on pow er equilibrium 
betw een  th e  involved parts, especially  betw een  the  s ta te  and th e  chaebol.
In th e  p rocess, it helped minimise a  collective-action dilemma, i.e., the  
belief th a t groups will a c t only to  guaran tee  a disproportionate share  of 
soc ie ta l incom e for them selves ra th er than  advance collective w elfare. 
The rules of th e  gam e underpinning th e  system  of socialisation  of private 
risk ultim ately influenced p references and provided ex p ecta tio n s both 
about potential rew ards/sanctions and about how to  s tra teg ically  a c t in 
face  of possible behaviour by o ther players.
The following ch ap ter a s s e s se s  a particular c a se  of policy reform, 
th e  heavy and chem ical industrialisation in th e  1970s. It ana lyses why 
and how President Park ac ted  stra teg ically  to  consolidate  th e  system  and 
with w hat policy and political outcom es for future policy choices.
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4. CHAPTER FOUR - C onsolidating  th e  S ystem  of S o c ia lisa tio n  of 
P riva te  Risk: T he H eavy and  C hem ical Industria lisa tion  o f th e  
1970s
4.1 Introduction
In th e  January  1973 New Year’s  address, P resident Park Chung Hee 
announced th a t th e  governm ent would im plem ent a heavy and chem ical 
industrialisation (HCI) plan. With th is move, Park vowed th a t Korea would 
soon becom e one of the  leading developing countries, with a per cap ita  
GNP of US$1,000 and exports of US$10 billion.306The governm ent en ac ted  
a Heavy and Chemical Industries Promotion Act to  support six  major 
industries: s tee l, non-ferrous m etals, m achinery (including autom obiles), 
shipbuilding, e lec tron ics and chem icals. The a c t provided tax  and credit 
benefits a s  well a s  th e  exem ption of young engineers and skilled w orkers 
from th e  country’s  com pulsory military serv ice.307Key industrial p ro jects  in 
the  plan w ere to  be undertaken by private firms. Exceptions to  th is  w ere 
the  production expansion of iron and s tee l and th e  construction  of 
chem ical fertilizer plants. This would be left to  public 
com panies.308Furtherm ore, th e  plan expected  th a t m ost of the  se le c ted  
industries would becom e th e  country’s  leading exporters by 1980.309For 
Suk-Chae Lee, an official in th e  EPB from 1970 through 1984, th e  HCI plan 
m arked a significant change in th e  governm ental approach to  industrial 
policy in several w ays.310
306Kim, Policymaking on the Front Lines, p. 85
307Suk-Chae Lee, ‘The Heavy and Chemical Industries Promotion Plan (1973-79)’, in Cho and Kim, eds, 
Economic Development in the Republic o f Korea, pp.431-471, p.432. For a detailed work on the role played by 
the Korean state in pushing for the heavy and chemical industrialisation of the country, see Choue Inwon, The 
Politics o f  Industrial Restructuring: South Korea's Turn Toward Export-Led Heavy and Chemical 
Industrialization, Doctoral dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1988. Choue, however, assumes the same 
position as the strong state literature. He emphasises the autonomy of the Korean state in successfully leading 
and pushing for the restructuring of the country’s industrial panorama from light manufacturing to heavy and 
chemical industries. But Inwon fails to recognise that this strategy only succeeded because the state not only 
coerced but also motivated, offered incentives and co-opted the chaebol to actively participate in the industrial 
transformation. The chaebol were, in fact, initially reluctant to invest in an industrial sector where they did not 
have much experience. See below for the chaebol's earlier view on HCI.
308Lee, ‘The Heavy and Chemical Industries Promotion Plan (1973-79)’, p.434.
309Lee, ‘The Heavy and Chemical Industries Promotion Plan (1973-79)’, p.434.
310Lee, ‘The Heavy and Chemical Industries Promotion Plan (1973-79)’, pp.436-7.
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First, unlike p as t five-year developm ent plans (FYDPs) promoting 
exports a s  a whole w ithout singling out any particular industry, th e  ten- 
y ear HCI plan ta rg e ted  a specific industrial s e c to r  with a detailed, 
com prehensive investm ent to  be carried  out within a certa in  tim etable. 
Second, th e  HCI plan w as an im pera tive  plan’, i.e., it w as ex pected  to  be 
’execu ted  m eticulously’. While the  FYDPs had an im portant im pact in 
te rm s of resource m obilisation and p a tte rn s  of resource allocation, they 
w ere  not regarded a s  im perative plans. Finally, due to  the  size of th e  key 
pro jects included in th e  HCI plan, only th e  country’s  large firms w ere  fit to  
ta k e  part in the  new  developm ent stra tegy . In fac t, a s  II Sakong points out, 
i n  implementing HCI promotion policies, th e  governm ent actively 
encouraged large business groups with proven tra ck  records and financial 
capability to  partic ipate  in m ajor p ro jects in designated  industries.’311
By early 1980s, th e  Korean econom ic s tru c tu re  had been radically 
transform ed. In 1970, in te rm s of the  country’s  to ta l m anufacturing value 
added and exports, light industry rep resen ted  64 percen t and 81 percent, 
respectively, against 36 percen t and 18.2 p ercen t for HCI. But in 1983, the  
situation had reversed, with HCI accounting for 53.9 percen t of th e  
m anufacturing value added and 56.5 percen t of th e  exports, 
correspondingly the  share  of th e  country’s  light industry had d ecreased  to
46.1 percent and 43.5 percen t.313 This outcom e seem ed  to  have vindicated 
th e  governm ent’s s tra teg y  to  push for HCI and to  co-opt big business to  
actively partic ipate in th e  country’s  radical industrial transform ation. The 
leadership’s  decision to  invest in th e  developm ent of heavy and chem ical 
industries w as, nonetheless, seen  a s  a  bold and risky move a t a  tim e 
w hen th e  country’s  econom y faced  growing internal and external 
adversities.
As a case-study, th is  ch ap te r see k s  first to  understand th e  active 
role of Park Chung Hee in pushing for the  HCI plan, and how his choice
31 'Sakong, Korea and the World Economy, p.57.
312Lee, ‘The Heavy and Chemical Industries Promotion Plan (1973-1979)’, p.452 (Table 17.12).
114
w as moulded by th e  in terface betw een th e  system  of socialisation  of 
private risk, the  dom estic econom ic and political conditions, changing 
international security  environm ent and ideological m otivations. Next, it 
exam ines ‘who g e ts  w hat, when, how, a t w hose expense’ within the  HCI 
im plem entation p rocess  and how th e se  p a tte rn s  of political behaviour 
influenced th e  configuration of th e  new  industrial policy and with w hat 
political and policy outcom es. I show  th a t th e  successfu l im plem entation 
of the  HCI plan depended on Park’s  s tra teg ic  behaviour, not only to  build a 
co nsensus within th e  econom ic bureaucracy  over th e  new  industrial 
policy, but also  to  p ro tect and secu re  th e  s ta te ’s  alliance with the  
chaebol. In th e  la tte r case , Park ac ted  not only to  re scu e  th e  corporate  
sec to r in a  tim e of econom ic difficulties, but also  to  co e rce  and induce 
them  through a  se ries  of incentives to  undertake key HCI projects. 
Ultimately, th is consolidated system  of socialisation  of private risk 
inherited from th e  1970s produced significant political and policy 
outcom es th a t, by placing th e  country into a  certa in  path-dependent 
developm ent tra jectory , constrained  future policy choices.
4.2 O rchestrating a  New Industrial S trategy
In th is  section , several fac to rs  a re  exam ined to  understand  to  w hat 
degree they  played an im portant role in shaping the  policy cho ices of Park 
Chung Hee in th e  early 1970s a s  he moved to  support HCI. It s ta r ts  by 
looking a t th e  internal and ex ternal econom ic conditions a t th e  tim e, 
followed by an analysis of th e  ideologies m otivating th e  leadership to  
pursue such  policy and a  consideration of th e  country’s  security  and 
dom estic environment.
4.2.1 Booming Economy, Increasing Trade Deficits and Rising International 
Protectionism  and Competition
During th e  1960s, th e  Korean econom y grew  rapidly, a t  7.8 p ercen t 
per annum  during the (revised) first five-year developm ent plan (1962- 
1966), rising to  9.7 percent, m aintained every year during th e  second  plan
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(1967-1971 ).313The industrial s truc tu re  began to  experience a  m ajor shift 
in its  com position a s  th e  m anufacturing sec to r, essen tia lly  light industries, 
becam e one of th e  country’s  leading econom ic perform ers. While th e  
agricultural se c to r  sh a re  in te rm s of to ta l GDP declined from 40.4 p ercen t 
in 1953-1961 to  27.8 percen t in 1967-1971, the  m anufacturing sec to r  
increased  its  sh a re  from 12.7 percen t to  20.5 p ercen t during th e  sam e 
period. Along with th e se  changes, unem ploym ent ra te s  d ec reased  from
8.2 p ercen t in 1963 to  4.5 percen t in 1971.314Meanwhile, th e  num ber of 
agricultural w orkers declined from around 70 percen t to  50 p ercen t of th e  
w orkforce, a s  th e  num bers of th o se  employed by the  m anufacturing 
se c to r  grew  from a m ere 1.5 percen t in 1960 to  13.1 percen t in 1970.315The 
expansion of th e  m anufacturing sec to r  w as basically an outcom e of the  
export dem and originating from Jap an  and the  US, the  country’s  tw o 
m ajor foreign m arkets. In 1960, Jap an  w as Korea’s  m ost im portant export 
m arket taking 61.5 percen t of th e  country’s  to ta l exports. By 1971, th e  US 
overtook Jap an  to  becom e Korea’s  main trade  partner with alm ost 50 
percen t of th e  country’s  to ta l exports (from a  m ere 11 p ercen t in I960).31*
One of th e  m ost relevant econom ic fac to rs  during th e  1960s w as 
th e  country’s  increasing integration in th e  world econom y. From 1962 to  
1971, exports  increased  from 55 million US dollars to  1.132 billion US 
dollars, while im ports grew  from 390 million US dollars in 1962 to  2.178 
billion US dollars in 1971.317Export dependency jum ped from less  than  one 
p ercen t to  9.3 percen t of th e  gross dom estic product (GDP) during the  
1960s, while import dependency increased  from around 9 p ercen t to  22 
p ercen t for th e  sam e period. Exports of m anufactured goods w ere 
predom inantly com posed of clothing, footw ear, travel goods, tex tiles, and 
lea ther goods.318lm ports included mainly cap ita l goods and raw  m ateria ls
313 Cho Soon, The Dynamics o f Korean Economic Development (Washington: Institute for International 
Economics, 1994), p. 17.
314 For unemployment figures and manufacturing sector share in GDP, see Cho, The Dynamics o f  Korean 
Economic Development, pp. 19 and p.22, respectively.
315Jung-ho Yoo, ‘The Industrial Policy of the 1970s and the Evolution of the Manufacturing Sector in Korea’; 
KDI Working Paper 9017 (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, October 1990), p.5.
316Yoo, ‘The Industrial Policy of the 1970s and die Evolution of the Manufacturing Sector in Korea’, p. 13.
317Cho, The Dynamics o f Korean Economic Development, pp.21-5.
318Yoo, ‘The Industrial Policy of the 1970s and the Evolution of the Manufacturing Sector in Korea’, pp.8-12.
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needed  for th e  export sec to r a s  well a s  for th e  im port-substitution 
industries nurtured by th e  governm ent.319Such w as the  su c c e ss  of th e  
export s e c to r  th a t th e  governm ent claim ed th a t th is  econom ic outcom e 
would soon lead to  th e  ‘estab lishm ent of th e  nation on th e  basis  of 
exports’ (suchul ipkuk).320
However, d esp ite  th e  continuing and rapid growth of exports, 
im ports grew  even faste r, leading in consequence to  w orsening trad e  
deficits  during the  1960s. At th e  end of th e  Second FYDP in 1971, th e  
trad e  deficit had jum ped to  alm ost 1.05 billion US dollars, from 429.5 
million US dollars in 1966, th e  last year of the  First FYDP.321 If one 
com pares th e  ac tua l figures for 1971 with th e  344 million US dollars 
originally ta rg e ted  by th e  Second FYDP, then  th e  unexpected  size of th e  
tra d e  deficit w as increasingly seen  a s  a  national liability. The significance 
of th e  issue  gained growing public and governm ental a tten tion  in th e  la te  
1960s. An ‘Evaluation Com m ittee of P rofessors’, com posed of well-known 
college and university professors which gathered  annually to  review  th e  
progress of the  five-year developm ent plans, raised  the  alarm  over th e  
growing and p e rsis ten t trade  deficits. 322 Among th e  prescrip tions 
su g g ested  to  the  governm ent w ere: restric tions on w hat w as called 
‘u n necessary  im ports’, in particular consum er goods, and promotion of 
HCI.
Meanwhile, th e  grow th of th e  m anufacturing se c to r  w as largely 
financed by deb t (through a c c e s s  in particular to  policy loans) ra ther than  
internal savings or new  equity. 323 The successfu l perform ance of th e
3l9Cho, The Dynamics o f Korean Economic Development, p.25.
320Inwon, The Politics o f Industrial Restructuring, p. 199. See also Castley, Korea's Economic Miracle, pp. 170- 
1.
321Cho, The Dynamics o f Korean Economic Development, p.29 and p.35 for targets and performance of the first 
and second five-year development plans, respectively.
322Y o o ,  ‘The Industrial Policy of the 1970s and the Evolution of the Manufacturing Sector in Korea’,pp.22-3.
323Chung, ‘Capital Accumulation of Chaebol in Korea During the Early Stages of Economic Development’, 
pp.20-4. During the 1960s, since the country lacked a large pool of domestic savings, policy loans provided by 
the government were regarded as the main sources to finance business investments. The advantage of these loans 
rested not only on the lower interest rates charged (there were times that the official interest rates paid by the 
borrowers would be negative in real terms, as the inflation rates surpassed the nominal interest rates), but also on 
the longer maturity terms. Additionally, the government’s taxation policy favoured borrowing. If companies 
produced profits, the government would impose a corporate tax rate of about 40 percent, against a tax of only
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Korean econom y during th e  1960s, gave rise to  an expecta tion  th a t the  
expansion would p e rs is t for the  near future. This optimism led th e  private 
se c to r  to  e sca la te  its  investm ents. In 1968 and 1969, investm ent 
increased  a t  an average  ra te  of nearly 50 p ercen t per annum and 
dom estic  cred it expanded a t over 60 percen t.324The in terest ra te  reform in 
1965 and th e  new  system  guaranteeing th e  repaym ent of foreign loans 
greatly  helped the  private se c to rs ’ investm ent expansion. Among its o ther 
efforts to  induce foreign capital, th e  Korean governm ent signed a  one- 
y ear Stand-by Credit A greem ent for 9.3 million US dollars with the  
International M onetary Fund (IMF) in March 1965.328Time afte r tim e, the  
governm ent not only ex tended  th e  loan period but also  increased  the  
am ount it owed to  th e  IMF. Betw een 1965 and 1969, the  to ta l dom estic 
indeb tedness of th e  m anufacturing se c to r  to  financial institutions 
increased  from 2.6 to  9.2 p ercen t of GNP.326Consequently, foreign deb t 
th a t w as a t  a  relatively low am ount of 157 million US dollars (4.06 percen t 
of th e  GNP) in 1961 reached  2.922 billion US dollars (30.06 percen t of the  
GNP) in 1971.327
Real w age ra te s  increased  rapidly and th is began to  w eaken the  
country’s  international com petitiveness, and slow  the  ra te  of export 
growth, from a high of 42 p ercen t in 1968 to  34 and 28 p ercen t in 1969 
and 1970, respectively. 328 As Kim Wan-Soon s ta te s , ’corporate 
indeb tedness w as s tre tch ed  to  such  an ex ten t th a t a  m oderate slowdown 
in dem and could ca u se  a num ber of firms to  experience serious financial 
difficulties.’329The first s igns of increasing financial agony in the  private 
s e c to r  su rfaced  in 1969 w hen a  num ber of firms failed to  m eet their 
foreign deb t obligations. In May 1969, th e  system  of socialisation  of
around 10 percent for interest income on bank deposits. However, the same system regarded interest on loans as 
managerial costs, and in doing this it promoted debt-building by the corporate sector. See Cole and Park, 
Financial Development in Korea 1945-1978, p. 162.
324Lim, ‘The Origins and Evolution of the Korean Economic System’, p.31. See also Cho and Kim, ‘Credit 
Policies and the Industrialization of Korea’, p.63 (Table B).
325Bank of Korea, The Bank o f Korea, p. 165.
326Wan-Soon Kim, ‘The President’s Emergency Decree for Economic Stability and Growth (1972)’, in Cho and 
Kim, Economic Development in the Republic o f Korea, pp. 163-181, p. 163.
327Woo, Race to the Swift, p. 105 (Table 4.8).
328Inwon, The Politics o f Industrial Restructuring, p.232.
329Kim, ‘The President's Emergency Decree for Economic Stability and Growth (1972)’, pp.163-5.
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private risk w as put to  work. The governm ent, worried with th e  possible 
negative im pact off the  corporate bankruptcies in th e  country’s  
international cred it ratings, intervened to  tak e  over th e  m anagerial 
control off thirty  ffirms, struggling to  serv ice their foreign loans. The 
governm ent controlled, auctioned, or refinanced th e se  ffirms, while 
financially rescuing sta te-ow ned banks th a t had issued  th e  repaym ent 
g u aran tees. Another ninety firms w ere also  reported to  be on th e  verge off 
bankruptcy. 330 While guaranteeing th e  repaym ent off the ir foreign 
borrowings, th e  governm ent took a  ‘principled s ta n c e ’ against the  
insolvent ffirms and s ta te d  th a t it would keep the  m anagem ent off th ese  
firms accoun tab le  for their prior business deals. Despite governm ental 
intervention, th e  num ber of firms which had taken  foreign loans and gone 
into bankruptcy continued to  grow. By 1971, th e  to ta l w as m ore than  two 
hundred.331
With th e  aggravation of th e  econom ic scenario , th e  IMF approached 
Korea to  call for th e  im plem entation off a  stab ilisation  p ack ag e .332The 
governm ent acqu iesced  with th e  IMF proposal in 1971, afte r th e  US linked 
consideration  of further developm ental loans to  th e  ac cep tan ce  off the  
prog ram .333 The IMF program advocated  tightening off m onetary control, 
which restric ted  cred it ac tiv ities of th e  dom estic com m ercial banks, and 
consequently  th e  la tte r could not offer much relief to  heavily-indebted 
firms. D om estic cred it expansion slow ed from 66.3 percen t and 59.8 
p ercen t in 1968 and 1969 to  32.3 p ercen t and 28.2 p ercen t in 1970 and 
1971.334At th e  IMF’s  insistence , th e  governm ent w as forced to  can ce l 61 
loans already approved for 1971, totalling 250 million US dollars. 
Following th e  announcem ent off th e  ceiling on loans, even th o se  who had 
governm ent approval found foreign banks unwilling to  serve further credit.
330Lim, ‘The Origins and Evolution of the Korean Economic System’,pp.3l-2. See also Woo, Race to the Swift, 
p. 109, and Kim, Divided Korea, pp.277-8.
33lInwon, The Politics o f Industrial Restructuring, p.233.
332Cho and Kim, ‘Credit Policies and the Industrialization of Korea’, p.63, and Lim, ‘The Origins and Evolution 
of the Korean Economic System’, pp.32-3.
333Woo, Race to the Swift, p. 110.
334Cho and Kim, ‘Credit Policies and the Industrialization of Korea’, p.63 (Table B).
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The IMF had s e t  th e  ceiling a t 468 million US dollars in com m ercial loans, 
but only 345 million US dollars w ere in fa c t received in 1971.338
In an effort to  stim ulate  exports  and help struggling export-led 
m anufacturing firms, the  Economic Planning Board announced a  currency 
devaluation of 18 p ercen t in 1971, and an additional seven  percen t in the  
following y e a r .338 Yet, a s  Woo Jung-en pointed out, ‘th is  w as bitterly 
resen ted  by businessm en, including exporters , who considered th e  sharp  
rise in th e  won co s t of debt-financing ill-timed, adding insult to  
injury.’ 337 The m easures had a  negative im pact particularly in the 
m anufacturing sec to r. The deb t to  equity ratio  th a t w as a t 92.2 percen t in 
1963, rapidly increased  to  270 p ercen t in 1969, 328.4 percen t in 1970 and
394.2 percen t in 1971, with profits falling sharply from 9.1 p ercen t in 1963 
to  3.3 p ercen t in 1970 and 1.2 percen t in 1971.338The ra te  of delayed 
paym ents a s  well a s  dishonoured ch eck s  and bills rose, a s  business 
p ro sp ec ts  deteriorated .
The country’s  econom ic situation  becam e even m ore s tra ined  a s  
th e  US, and o ther industrial countries, began to  adopt p ro tection ist 
m easures, especially  against labour-intensive m anufactured goods from 
developing nations. This trad e  policy affected  th e  Korean tex tile  industry, 
in particular, in its  relations with the  US. In O ctober 1971, th e  US im posed 
a quota on Korean tex tile  exports  to  affec t a  se c to r  th a t a  year earlier 
acco u n ted  for 40 percen t of th e  country’s  to ta l ex p o rts .339 In th e  final 
q u arter of 1971, exports to  th e  US fell 15 percen t, and governm ent 
officials estim ated  th a t th e  quota would c o s t Korea 840 million US dollars 
of export incom e during th e  Third FYDP (1972-1976).340At th e  sam e tim e, 
th e  growing participation of S ou theast Asian countries, a s  well a s  of the
335Kim, Divided Korea, p.278.
336Lim, The Origins and Evolution o f the Korean Economic System, p.33.
337Woo, Race to the Swift, p. 110.
338Cho and Kim, ‘Credit Policies and the Industrialization of Korea’, p.64 (Table C).
339Y o o ,  ‘The Industrial Policy of the 1970s and the Evolution of the Manufacturing Sector in Korea’, pp.20-1, 
and Lee, ‘The Heavy and Chemical Industries Promotion Plan (1973-79)’, p.438.
340For the Korea-U.S. Textile Agreement, see Yonhap News Agency, Korea Annual 1972 (Seoul: Yonhap News 
Agency, 1972). See also Kim, Divided Korea, pp.280-281, and Woo, Race to the Swift, pp. 125-6.
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People 's Republic of China, in the  international export m arket for labour- 
intensive and light-industry products w as a sign th a t Korea’s  com parative 
advantage w as  under th re a t and could soon vanish.
Ultimately, the  country’s  continuing trad e  pattern  began to  be 
regarded a s  a  structu ra l built-in tendency, i.e., the  trad e  deficit would 
continue to  grow  as  long a s  th e  country failed to  develop its own heavy 
and chem ical industries to  rep lace im ports. Sim ultaneously, the  Korean 
m anufacturing industry began to  suffer from th e  pro tectionist m easures 
undertaken by developed countries and from th e  com petition challenge 
pushed by new com ers into th e  international export m arket. Consequently, 
the  Korean governm ent began to  increasingly se e  th e  upgrade of th e  
country’s  industrial s tru c tu re  a s  th e  solution for th e  country’s  econom ic 
problems.
4.2.2 Changing Security Environment and Building a ’Rich Nation, Strong 
Army’
The decision to  push for HCI cam e also  in a  period of security  
uncertainty and the  policy w as seen  a s  an opportunity to  build an 
indigenous defence industrial se c to r  through forward and backw ard 
linkages. Furtherm ore, Park’s  HCI drive seem s to  have been rooted in an 
old Jap a n e se  nationalist view  -  ’rich nation, strong army’- th a t em erged a s  
the  dom inant ideological paradigm  shaping th e  country’s  new  econom ic 
direction.341As Nam Duck Woo, a t  th e  tim e M inister of Finance, puts it out:
To my knowledge, he (Park Chung Hee) w as m otivated by the  belief th a t 
the  real econom ic streng th  of a  country derives from th e  streng th  of its  
heavy industry, a s  w as well illustrated  by th e  Ja p a n e se  experience before
34,Chung-in Moon, ‘Democratization and Globalization as Ideological and Political Foundations of Economic 
Policy’, in Jongryn Mo and Chung-in Moon, eds, Democracy and the Korean Economy (Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1999), pp. 1-33, p.5. Park Chung Hee, however, in a speech on April 28, 1969, commemorating 
the 424th anniversary of the birth of Admiral Yi Sun-sin, seemed to have associated this view to the country’s 
most famous military strategist: “Thus, he (Admiral Yi Sun-sin) stressed the urgent need for building strong 
armed forces for making the country strong and rich. Only such a great statesman as he, who possessed far- 
reaching wisdom and discretion, could confidently make such a prophecy for the sole purpose of saving a nation 
from an imminent crisis.” See Shim Bum Shik, Major Speeches by Korea’s Park Chung Hee (Seoul: Hollym 
Corporation Publishers, 1970), p.242.
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and after th e  Second World War. His belief w as la te r b u ttressed  by the  
need he felt to  develop th e  defence industry in the  w ake of changing US 
policy tow ard South Korea following th e  fall of Vietnam, signalled by th e  
w ithdrawal of the  US Seventh Division from Korea in 1971. He thought it 
w as im perative for him to  c rea te  a self-reliant defence posture on th e  
b asis  of enhanced  industrial capability.342
The occurrence of new  hostilities w ith North Korea, and a  possible 
end of W ashington’s  security  com m itm ents in th e  region following a 
surprising announcem ent th a t it would s ta r t  w ithdrawing troops from th e  
country, led Seoul to  seek  th e  developm ent of the  country’s  own defence 
industries.343 On January  21, 1968, Pyongyang se n t a 31-member North 
Korean com m ando to  raid th e  Blue House. Although th e  mission w as 
aborted, th e  team  w as deterred  only a  few  m iles aw ay from th e  
presidential building. Two days later, North Korea seized th e  US ship USS 
Pueblo and its  eighty-two crew  m em bers, off th e  North Korean co ast. In 
1969, North Korea sho t down a  U.S. E-121 reconnaissance  plane with 
thirty-one crew  m em bers. As North Korean military provocations seem ed  
to  be on the  rise, P resident Park Chung Hee exhorted the  US, a t th e  tim e 
in charge of controlling th e  operations of th e  South Korean army, to  
intervene and strike against North Korean bases. However, with deep 
involvement in th e  Vietnam War, th e  U.S. response  w as m uted.
In July 1969, W ashington declared  th e  Nixon Doctrine asserting  
th a t ‘Asian hands m ust sh ap e  the  Asian Future’, followed with the  
announcem ent by the  end of th e  year th a t it would w ithdraw  an entire 
com bat division from South Korea. W ashington notified Seoul th a t it 
planned to  w ithdraw  20,000 out of the  63,000 troops s ta tioned  in
342Nam, Korea s Economic Growth in a Changing World, p.88. As a latecomer, Japan’s success in developing its 
own heavy and chemical industries during the 1960s and early 1970s by relying on foreign technology and 
equipment served well as a model for the Korean regime. See Lee, ‘The Heavy and Chemical Industries 
Promotion Plan (1973-79)’, p.439.
343For the security issues in Korea in the later 1960s and early 1970s, see Haggard and Moon, ‘The State, Politics 
and Economic Development in Postwar South Korea’, pp.74-5.
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Korea.344The unexpected  announcem ent w as m et with strong opposition 
from th e  Korean governm ent calling it fentirely prem ature’ due to  th e  
continuing provocation by North Korea and the  still w eak  South Korean 
army. Presenting th e  1970’s  National Budget to  th e  National Assem bly in 
November 1969, Park Chung Hee m ade c lea r the  governm ent’s  policies for 
coming Third FYDP (1972-1976):
The governm ent will reinforce its  diplom acy for defence first of all. In 
order to  promptly and successfu lly  re ac t to  any situation  th a t might be 
brought about by th e  aggression  of th e  North Korean Com m unists, the  
governm ent will s treng then  its diplom atic efforts for national defence on 
th e  basis of th e  Korea-United S ta te s  Mutual Defence Treaty. As th e  new  
Asian policy of the  US governm ent calls for self-support and self-defence 
of each  nation, a s  th e  cu rren t situation  dem ands th a t K oreans should 
ta k e  up their own burden of national defence, th e  governm ent will 
consolidate th e  foundation for self-defence and develop defence industry 
by cooperation with th e  US.34*
By Ju n e  1971, Am erican troops had been reduced to  43,000 in the  
peninsula. The move rep resen ted  a significant den t in w hat w as 
estim ated  to  be a 250 million US dollars annual contribution to  th e  Korean 
econom y by th e  American military p resence . In addition, Seoul w as forced 
to  re-evaluate th e  US com m itm ent to  Korean defence.346U ncertainty over 
th e  country’s  security  w as ex acerb a ted  afte r Ju ly  1971, w hen Henry 
Kissinger landed secre tly  in Beijing to  begin th e  historic Sino-American 
rapprochement. This even t w as la te r followed by P resident Nixon’s  
official visit to  China. In Seoul, P resident Park Chung Hee in terpreted  the  
US initiative a s  implying th e  ‘US ac cep tan ce  of a  hostile, powerful, and 
revolutionary country in South Korea’s  im m ediate neighbourhood, tied by 
a  military alliance to  North Korea’, and posed th e  question of tru s t
344Don Oberdofer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (London: Warner Books, 1997), pp. 13-4. Don 
Oberdofer was the Washington Post’s Northeast Asia correspondent from 1972-1975, and continued to cover 
issues related to Korea in the seventeen years thereafter as the newspaper’s diplomatic correspondent.
345Shim, Major Speeches by Korea’s Park Chung Hee, p.373.
346Yoo, ‘The Industrial Policy of the 1970s and the Evolution of the Manufacturing Sector in Korea’, p. 19.
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betw een Seoul and W ashington.347 North Korean provocations began to  
d ec rease  a fte r 1970, and the  U.S. stopped  withdrawing troops and 
reconfirm ed its military support aga inst North Korean military aggression. 
However, Seoul’s  leadership rem ained uncertain  about U.S. com m itm ent 
tow ards th e  country’s  security . In face  of th is security  scenario , the 
regim e believed th a t the  developm ent of heavy and chem ical industries 
could becom e th e  basis  for an indigenous industrial defence sec to r.
4.2.3 Politics of D issent and th e  Yushin Constitution
At th e  sam e tim e, with th e  econom y facing difficulties, the 
country’s  security  under challenge, dom estic concerns began to  arise  as  
well. Domestically, growing political opposition began to  th rea ten  the  
stability  of Park’s  regim e.34*With presidential e lec tions s e t  for 1971, and 
President Park Chung Hee constitu tionally  barred from a  third term , the 
choice of a su ccesso r rapidly turned th e  ruling D em ocratic Republican 
Party (DRP) into a  factional battlefield .349By 1969, it w as obvious th a t the 
ruling party would not reach  an agreem ent on who would su cceed  Park 
Chung Hee. This raised the  fear th a t in c a s e  of tw o cand ida tes  from the  
DRP bidding for the  presidency, th e  opposition cand idate  could win the  
elections. The solution, although not unanim ous in th e  party  and 
co n tested  by the  opposition, w as to  am end th e  Constitution to  allow a 
third term  for President Park Chung Hee. A national referendum  in 
O ctober 1969 passed  the am endm ent w ith 65.1 percen t of th e  voting 
e lec to ra te  approving the  change. Not, however, it seem s w ithout the  
apparen t vote buying by th e  ruling party:
It w as reported th a t local governm ent party  officials openly passed  out 
money and bread to villagers In rural a reas, and it w as estim ated  th a t th e  
governm ent expended about $15 million in support of th e  am endm ent, a s
3470berdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 13.
348For an analysis on the growing political conflicts affecting the country in the last years of the 1960s and early 
1970s, see Kim, Divided Korea, pp.272-286.
349For the country’s party system and the factionalism within the DRP during the late 1960s, see Cole and 
Lyman, Korean Development, pp.241-6.
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opposed to  about $1.5 million sp en t by the  opposition. It w as also 
reported  th a t th e  DRP sp en t $600,000 for aw ards to  8,471 local party 
officials following th e  referendum , the  am ount of each  official varying by 
th e  p ercen tag e  of pro-govem m ent vo tes received in his d istric t.380
This am endm ent, while guaranteeing a possible third m andate  for 
Park Chung Hee, underm ined his political legitimacy. Consequently, his 
legitim acy depended further, therefore on econom ic perform ance. During 
th e  nex t tw o years, 1970 and 1971, a s  shown above, th e  country’s  
econom y rapidly deterio ra ted  thus endangering w hat rem ained the 
execu tive’s  main source of political legitimacy. Moreover, th e  s u c c e ss  of 
th e  1960s export-led industrialisation had nurtured the  em ergence of a 
new  socia l force: industrial w orkers. As their opposition to  th e  econom ic 
orientation of th e  governm ent grew  over tim e, they  began to  dem and the  
inclusion of econom ic ju s tice  and w ealth  redistribution on th e  national 
political agenda. Hitherto, th is  agenda had been dom inated by the  
d iscourse  of fa s t and high econom ic growth.
The econom y had grown rapidly during th e  1960s, but by th e  end of 
th e  d ecad e  th ere  w ere still no signs of im provem ent in th e  working 
conditions of th e  labour fo rces.351The governm ent rep ressed  any a ttem p t 
to  o rganise labour unions, th e  institution of a minimum w age had still to 
m aterialise, and w age levels lagged behind gains in productivity. 
F rustrated  industrial w orkers, particularly in export industries, s tag ed  
unorganised and spon taneous p ro te sts  aga inst w hat they  saw  a s  poor 
working conditions. These dem onstrations had little im pact on the  
developm ent of a  labour m ovem ent until November 1970, w hen a young 
w orker Chun Tai II im m olated him self in a  d esp era te  a ttem p t to  m ake 
public th e  intolerable conditions in garm ent factories. His death  becam e a
350Kim, Divided Korea, p.276.
351 For an analysis on the growth of the working class and labour movements, see Hagen Koo, ‘The State, 
Minjung, and the Working Class in Korea’, in Hagen Koo, State and Society in Contemporary Korea, pp. 131- 
162. See also Inwon, The Politics o f  Industrial Restructuring, pp.241-5.
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symbol for th e  working c la ss  m ovem ent, and had an im portant e ffect on 
in tellectuals, s tu d en ts  and church leaders. As Hagen Koo s ta te s :
It aw akened  them  and m ade them  realize w here socie ty ’s  m ost serious 
problem s lay and how stra teg ic  th e  labour m ovem ent could be for their 
dem ocratization struggle. S tudent-labour linkages began to  develop 
during th is  period, a s  did th e  labour involvement of ac tiv ist church groups. 
Thus econom ics and politics becam e closely  entw ined to  sh ap e  th e  
c h a ra c te r  of th e  w orking-class activism  to  com e.3*2
Labour s trik es  rapidly increased  from 70 in 1969, to  101 in 1971. 
More significant w ere labour-m anagem ent d ispu tes th a t jum ped from 130 
in 1969 to  1,656 in 1971. 353 C oncentrated in th e  cities, th is urban 
’distributional coalition’, formerly ineffective and divided, began to  find a 
com m on s tan d  against th e  alliance betw een  th e  governm ent and the  
chaebol. Jou rnalists  began to  expose th e  conditions in work p laces and 
in te llec tuals  w rote p ieces challenging th e  ’ideological’ basis  of the  
governm ent’s  econom ic policy. It w as a policy, they  argued, too  much 
focused  on growth perform ance, disregarding distributional issues. In May 
1970, even th e  Ministry of Health and Social Affairs re leased  a  report 
claim ing th a t unequal distribution of incom e w as seriously contributing to 
social un rest.394
Under th is  dom estic political scenario , and with th e  approach of 
th e  April 1971 elections, Park’s  regim e becam e m ore defensive. 
Meanwhile, th e  opposition party  and its  candidate, Kim Dae Jung, cen tred  
the ir cam paign on challenging th e  governm ent’s  su ccessfu l econom ic 
developm ent record by claiming th a t it had produced am ple im balances 
betw een  c ities  and rural a reas , rich and poor, and big business and small- 
and medium-sized firms.3S9Kim Dae Jung’s  popularity seem ed  to  show  no 
signs of abating. A rally in Seoul a ttended  by nearly half a  million
352Koo, ‘The State, Minjung, and the Working Class in Korea’, p. 139.
353Inwon, The Politics o f  Industrial Restructuring, p.242.
354Kim, Divided Korea, pp.279-280 and Inwon, The Politics o f Industrial Restructuring, pp.246-7.
355Inwon, The Politics o f Industrial Restructuring, p.248.
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supporters  of th e  opposition leader indicated th a t he could becom e th e  
nex t Korean President. Against th is background, on th e  eve of the  
election’s  day, Park Chung Hee announced th a t he would not bid again for 
th e  presidential office. ” • However, w hen the  vo tes w ere  counted, 
surprisingly, Park had won with a  reported 51.2 percen t of th e  to ta l votes, 
aga inst Kim Dae-Jung’s  reported 43.6 percent. 357 R esults show ed th a t 
while th e  rural e lec to ra te  had been crucial for Park’s  victory by giving him 
58.0 percen t of th e  to ta l rural vote, th e  opposition cand ida te  took the  
urban a reas, in particular the  capital, Seoul, with 51.5 p ercen t of th e  
votes.
The opposition, however, received th e  resu lts  with scep tic ism , and 
soon declared th e  election invalid, claiming th a t it had been sta ined  by 
irregularities, in particular in rural a rea s  w here vo ters w ere said  to  have 
been intim idated to  vote for th e  ruling party’s  candidate . The victory of 
Park Chung Hee in rural a reas, in fact, seem ed  to  have been anom alous a s  
th e se  a reas  had been facing econom ic decline for th e  p as t tw o y ears.3** 
With growing popular resen tm en t over reported electoral irregularities in 
th e  countryside, and the  successfu l resu lt of th e  opposition cand idate  in 
th e  urban areas, Park Chung Hee and his governm ent lacked  a  c lear 
’m andate of heaven’ to  govern th e  country.
After the  1971 election, p ro tests  by th e  urban poor, industrial 
w orkers and s tu d en ts  continued, and th e  governm ent’s  response  w as to  
suppress  their ac tiv ities .363 In August 1971, around 30,000 urban poor 
gathered  in a  southern  suburb of Seoul to  s ta g e  a violent p ro test 
attack ing  police s ta tio n s  and governm ent buildings. The riot w as the  first 
violent episode involving th e  urban poor, and it highlighted th e  dark side 
of th e  export-led industrialisation: rapid and uncontrolled urban migration,
356Yonhap News Agency, Korea Annual 1972, p.26.
357For an account of this election, see Kim, Divided Korea, pp.282-4.
358Kim, Divided Korea, p.283. He points out that government’s statistics showed that 1.5 million people, or ten 
percent of the total rural population, had left their farms during 1968 and 1970, and it was believed that the 
migration was essentially due to poor rural conditions.
359Haggard and Moon,‘The State, Politics and Economic Development in Postwar South Korea’, p.74.
127
poor housing and working conditions. Moreover, a s  labour union 
m em bership grew  from 23,000 in O ctober 1963 to  493,000 by August 1971, 
industrial w orkers began to  dem and higher w ages and rep resen ta tion  in 
th e  National Assembly. The year of 1971 w as also  a  very tum ultuous 
period in co lleges and universities throughout Korea. S tuden ts rallied in 
p ro te s t aga inst governm ent plans to  intensify military training in schools 
and growing political corruption in th e  country. Additionally, in D ecem ber 
1971, Korean military forces th a t had been stationed  in Vietnam began to  
return hom e in a  tim e of political, econom ic and social crisis. There w ere 
fears  th a t w ar v eterans could ‘sh are  g rievances’ and turn them  against 
th e  governm ent.360
As political d issen t continued, on 6 D ecem ber 1971, Park Chung 
Hee declared  a  S ta te  of National Emergency. A year la te r claiming 
reaso n s of national security , he im posed m artial law and announced his 
intention to  am end th e  Constitution. This move opened th e  w ay for th e  
institution of the  authoritarian Yushin Constitution (literally m eaning 
revitalisation), which led to  th e  consolidation of presidential power, 
neutralisation  of opposition forces, and insulation of econom ic 
policymaking from social forces. The Yushin Constitution introduced 
im portant changes in the  country’s  political institutional fram ework.
First, th e  president would be indirectly e lec ted  by th e  m em bers of 
th e  National Conference for Unification. The creation  of th e  conference 
perm itted  th e  president to  be re-elected  w ithout any difficulties. 
Consequently, in Decem ber 1972, and July 1978, P resident Park w as re­
e lec ted  unanimously w ithout any com petition. In sum , th e  presidential 
c o n te s t w as elim inated from party politics. Second, th e  presidential term  
w as ex tended  from four to  six  years, and th e  third term  restric tion  w as 
rem oved from the  Constitution. Third, only tw o-thirds of th e  m em bers of 
th e  National Assembly w ere to  be e lec ted  directly by th e  people, w ith th e  
rem aining one-third to  be appointed by th e  President. This helped the
360Kim, Divided Korea, pp.284-5.
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ruling party keep control over the  National Assembly a s  it could easily 
obtain two-thirds. It a lso  m ade th e  National Assembly a  m arginal ac to r in 
th e  policy p rocess, a s  th e  Blue House sec re ta r ia t and bu reau cra ts  gained 
unparalleled power. Finally, any constitu tional am endm ent w as possible 
w ithout parliam entary consen t.361President Park’s  control over th e  socie ty  
increased  with the  institution of legal instrum ents such  a s  th e  National 
Security Law, th e  Anti-Communist Law, and the  Social Safety Law.362ln his 
New Year’s  ad d ress  in January  1973, Park Chung Hee announced his new 
vision and th e  econom ic basis  for th e  Yushin regime: th e  promotion of the 
heavy and chem ical industries. As a promising new  developm ent policy, 
th e  HCI em erged a s  th e  regim e’s  policy choice to  boost Park’s  political 
legitimacy, to  s treng then  his pow er and to  guaran tee  his regim e survival.
In conclusion, pressing econom ic needs in face  of th e  country’s  
trad e  im balances and international protectionism  and com petition, 
asp irations to  build a  national defence industrial se c to r  driven by 
ideological beliefs a s  well a s  by security  concerns, and growing dom estic 
political d issen t th reaten ing  th e  stability  of the  regime, all contributed to 
shape  Park’s  choice to  push for the  developm ent of heavy and chem ical 
industrialisation. Yet, the  im plem entation of HCI rested  in Park’s  s tra teg ic  
behaviour in building and mobilising a  supporting coalition not only within 
a divided econom ic bureaucracy  over th e  value of th e  new  developm ent 
s tra tegy  a s  well a s  within an initially re luctan t business sec to r.
4.3 Implementing Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation: B ureaucratic 
Mobilisation and B usiness Incentives
4.3.1 Rallying th e  Economic Bureaucracy
During th e  1960s, the  EPB had clearly  played th e  dom inant role in 
the  coordination of th e  econom ic policy process. However, the  EPB's
36lByong Man Ahn, ‘The Process of Political Changes in Korea- An Analysis of Crucial Elections and Party 
Politics’; Korea and World Affairs, 9 (1985), 625-646, p.635.
362Moon and Kim, ‘A Circle of Paradox: Development, Politics and Democracy in South Korea’, p. 144.
129
stra teg y  to  deal with the  country’s  econom ic im passe in th e  early 1970s 
failed to satisfy  President Park Chung Hee. 363The EPB envisaged the  
reduction of the  role of th e  s ta te  in support of w hat it called a  ’civilian- 
initiated mode’ and the  gradual promotion of heavy and chem ical 
industries.3S4This would involve: the  promotion of import substitu tion  in 
som e sec to rs  in face  of th e  continuing trad e  deficits and; the  exports of 
heavy and chem ical products in which Korea could show  a  com parative 
advantage. The econom ic rationale behind th e  thinking of th e  EPB w as 
not only the  fac t th a t HCI, by nature, required large am ounts of cap ital but 
also  th a t th e  promotion of th e se  industries would require tim e due to  the  
country’s  businesses lack of experience in operating in th e  sec to r.
However, th e  long-term stra teg y  devised by th e  EPB failed to 
add ress  th e  pressing security  needs of th e  country’s  leadership. 
Ultimately, President Park Chung Hee decided  to  support a  different 
strategy . Put together by th e  Blue House Chief of Staff Kim Chung-yum 
and vice-m inister a t  th e  MCI, Oh Won-chul, th e  s tra teg y  involved a  fast- 
track  plan linking th e  developm ent of HCI with an indigenous defence 
sec to r.36SKim, writing in his memoirs, clearly  s ta te s  th e  rationale behind 
the  HCI plan:
Private arm am ent fac to ries are  econom ically infeasible becau se  
expensive, specialized m achines m ust s tay  idle when th e  dem and is low. 
All w eapons can be dissem bled into parts. W ell-designed parts  could be 
m anufactured in different fac to ries and eventually assem bled  to  m ake 
precise  w eapons. Modern w eapons required th e  sam e m anufacturing 
s tandards a s  sophisticated  heavy and chem ical industries. For th e  Korean 
economy, the  promotion of th e  heavy and chem ical industries w as 
essen tia l, not only for econom ic necessity , but also  for national security  
reasons. The promotion of th e  Korean defence industry should be pursued
363Kang, Crony Capitalism, pp.92-3.
364Inwon, The Politics o f Industrial Restructuring, pp.267-8.
365For an insider’s account of the policy process leading to the adoption of the HCI plan, see Kim, Policymaking 
on the Front Lines, pp.83-7.
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in line w ith th e  build up of th e  heavy and chem ical industries. Each 
factory  could specialize in a  particular w eapon part to  minimise econom ic 
loss. Although th e  construction  of w eapons and production facilities w as 
th e  fundam ental issue, securing and training engineers and skilled 
w orkers w as ju s t a s  im portant.366
Kim s ta te s  th a t Park Chung Hee resolved to  lead the  
im plem entation of th e  plan. In th e  p rocess, he concen tra ted  m ore policy 
pow ers within th e  presidential office. Park’s  determ ination had th e  effect 
of w eakening th e  role of th e  EPB in th e  policy p rocess  and th is  ta tte r’s  
intentional goal to  reduce th e  role of th e  s ta te  in the  econom y. Nam Duck 
Woo w as a t th e  tim e Minister of Finance. He w as initially re luc tan t to 
support th e  plan, but la te r changed his view afte r being persuaded by 
Park.367Nam points out th a t th e  P resident’s  in te rest in acce lera ting  th e  
heavy and chem ical industrialisation of th e  country w as such  th a t those  
in charge of th e  new  s tra teg y  failed to  prepare a  financial planning 
a sse ssm e n t. Fearing the  co llapse of th e  banking system , Nam found out 
th a t th e  only w ay to  provide som e form of order and fram ework, in term s 
of m oney flows for th e  new  pro jects, w as to  launch the  National 
Investm ent Fund (NIF) in Jan u ary  1974. The NIF w as a  financing schem e 
to  support th e  im plem entation of th e  new  policy.366
Meanwhile, Park decided to  a sk  Oh to  join th e  Blue House a s  his 
Second Economic Secretary , a  newly c rea ted  position. 369 Oh w as an 
eng ineer who had served in th e  MCI for a  decad e  before joining th e  Blue
366Kim, Policymaking on the Front Lines, p. 84. On the other side, the development of a defence industry seemed 
to have had an impact in the growth of other industries. According to Shim Jae Hoon, Senior Bureau Chief for 
the Far Eastern Economic Review, the growth of the telecommunications industry and of the textile industry is 
related with defence-oriented signal communication equipment and the need to develop synthetic fibers for 
military use, respectively. He added also that the electric oven (one of the country’s most successful exports) was
also a “spin-off’ of the defence industry. Interview in Seoul, 8 March 2001.
367Interview with Nam Duck Woo in Seoul, 30 May 30 2001.
368Interview with Nam Duck Woo in Seoul, 30 May 2001. For a more detailed explanation of the NIF, see Nam, 
Korea's Economic Growth in a Changing World, pp.92-3. The NIF was set to finance in particular long-term 
investment in plants and equipment for the selected industries. It aimed at bringing together several public funds 
such as the civil servants’ pension funds into a special account through the sale of National Investment Bonds to 
these funds with the option to convert the bonds to equity in later years. Additionally, the country’s banks and 
insurance companies were also asked to contribute with deposits to die NIF.
369Kim, Policymaking on the Front Line, p.85. For the role played by Oh in the HCI policy process, see Inwon,
The Politics o f Industrial Restructuring, pp.296-300.
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House. Through his position a s  chair in th e  Heavy and Chemical Industries 
Planning Com m ittee (HCIPC) c rea ted  in 1973, Oh becam e the  main 
coordinator behind th e  im plem entation of the  HCI plan.370From then  on, 
th e  HCIPC, under th e  d irect control of th e  President, em erged a s  the  
cen tre  for th e  country’s  econom ic decision-m aking.371 During the  1960s, 
Park’s  lack  of a  ’soph isticated ’ understanding of econom ic issues m ade 
him highly dependent on the expertise  provided by his advisors in th e  Blue 
House. Conversely, during the  im plem entation of th e  HCI plan in th e  
1970s, Park actively intervened in th e  policy p rocess. 372 This becam e 
evident a s  Park personally endorsed m ajor investm ent plans and se lec ted  
private businesspersons to  undertake key projects. Business groups, 
participating m inistries (in m ost c a se s , th e  MCI), and th e  HCIPC would 
jointly in itiate new  developm ent plans and investm ent projects.
D espite th e  growing role of th e  HCIPC in the  country’s  policy 
process , Park Chung Hee stra teg ically  sought th e  support of the  EPB and 
MOF illustrating his effort to  build a  co nsensus within th e  econom ic 
bureaucracy  over th e  new  developm ent stra tegy . Reaching out to  th e  EPB 
and MOF involved in particular th e  offer of organisational privileges th a t 
aim ed a t th e  expansion of the ir pow er and prestige by adding new  
bureaus and increasing th e  num ber of higher-ranking officials.373As Byung- 
Kook Kim puts it: ’They (EPB and MOF) controlled s tra teg ic  policy 
netw orks, com m anded critical econom ic resources, and m ost importantly, 
p o ssessed  Korea’s  b es t bureaucrats. Simply silencing th e  EPB’s  voice of 
caution  and ordering MOF’s  unswerving obedience to  his HCI d irectives 
hardly solved Park’s  political problem of bureaucratic  
m obilization.’374Furthermore, Park would play promotion sch em es through 
w hich he could show  th a t th o se  who decided to  contribute  to  th e  HCI 
drive would be rew arded with pow er and honour.
370Choi, Institutionalizing A Liberal Economic Order in Korea, pp. 102-4.
37lChoi, Institutionalizing A Liberal Economic Order in Korea, p.105.
372Chung, ‘Presidential Decisionmaking and Bureaucratic Expertise in Korea’, p.279.
373Byung-Kook Kim, ‘The Leviathan: Economic Bureaucracy under Park Chung Hee’, paper prepared for the 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston 29 August -  l September 2002, p.23.
374Kim, ‘The Leviathan’, p.24.
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4.3.2 Saving and Luring th e  B usiness S ecto r
The new  developm ent s tra tegy  implied necessarily  the  involvem ent 
of th e  private sec to r, which w as expected  to  undertake key p ro jects  (the 
exception being th e  expansion p ro jects in iron and s te e l and construction  
of new  chem ical fertilizer p lan ts to  be carried out by public 
com panies).37SHowever, w hen th e  plan w as first devised in th e  early  1970s, 
hundreds of firms, a s  shown above, w ere undergoing difficulties a s  they  
failed to  m eet their debt obligations, which led to  a  growing fear th a t th e  
heavily indebted corporate sec to r  could soon co llapse and potentially 
g enerate  political and social unrest. The im plem entation of th e  IMF 
program m e in 1971 w orsened th e  business conditions a s  th e  governm ent 
adopted a s tr ic te r  m onetary policy which restric ted  cred it allocation. 
Faced with th is  situation, financially d is tressed  firms turned to  th e  last 
available m echanism  to  underw rite their ac tiv ities and pay back  their 
debts: the  unregulated money m arket or curb m arket, w ith its  heavy 
in terest ra te s  and short-term  m aturity.37*
Curb m arket in te re st ra te s  reached  51.36 percen t in 1970 and 
46.44 percen t in 1971, in com parison with th e  nominal in te re st on general 
bank loans of around 24 percen t in 1970 and 23 percen t in 1971.377As 
Jung-en Woo points out: ‘The curb had long been part of th e  dualistic 
financial system  in Korea, and had proved flexible, pervasive, and 
resilient. While outside th e  rule of law, it w as to lera ted , if not implicitly 
encouraged by financial au thorities in Korea, b ecau se  th e  curb w as the  
only source from which households, a s  well a s  som e busin esses, could 
obtain loans.’37*Despite the  governm ent’s  a ttem p ts  to  control and rein in 
the  informal financial m arket, according to  surveys during th e  1960s, 
th e se  illegal loans w ere very popular am ong th e  majority of large and
375Lee, ‘The Heavy and Chemical Industries Promotion Plan (1973-79)’, p.434.
376For a detailed analysis of the workings of the informal financial market in Korea, including the curb market, 
and its interactions with the regulated financial market, see Cole and Park, Financial Development in Korea 
1945-1978, pp.l 10-133.
377Cho and Kim, ‘Credit Policies and the Industrialization of Korea’, p.63 (Table B).
378Woo, Race to the Swift, p. 113.
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small and medium-sized businesses. 37a The deals  would usually be 
surrounded by secrecy . Borrowers rarely revealed th e  iden tities of their 
lenders or brokers. D isclosure could, in fact, rep resen t th e  end of their 
a c c e s s  to  th e  curb m arket, and to  w hat w as th e  only available m echanism  
to  obtain sw ift short-term  credit. Borrowers usually signed an agreem ent 
in which they  accep ted  never to  reso rt to  courts  to  d ispute th e ir  c a s e s  if 
they could not repay the ir deb ts.3*0
The low -interest-rate policy seem s to  have been th e  single m ost 
im portant c au se  for th e  expansion of th e  unregulated financial m arket in 
Korea and th e  p e rsis ten ce  of financial dualism  during th e  1960s and 
1970s. The low -interest ra te  policy led to  a  voracious dem and for bank 
cred it by th e  co rpo rate  secto r. Official in terest ra te s  w ere ad justed  for 
inflation and kept far below th e  m arket level. Therefore, sav ers  w ere 
encouraged to  en te r  th e  curb m arket a ttra c te d  by higher ra te s  of re tu rns 
even if more risky. Due to  the  country’s  chronic cap ital shortage, and the  
authorities’ policy of selectively  allocating th e  available cap ita l to  
s tra teg ic  sec to rs , th e  curb m arket becam e the  safe ty  valve for firms th a t 
failed to  obtain cred it in the  regulated financial sy stem .3*1
M embers of th e  Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), representing 
the  in te re sts  of th e  chaebol, w ere  concerned  with th e  possible instability 
in the  curb m arket due to  th e  cu rren t econom ic situation. 3S2They feared 
th a t a s  soon a s  rum ours in th e  m arket identified a  particu lar firm with a 
cash  flow problem, curb  m arket loans could be w ithdraw n a t short notice. 
The FKI therefore began to  p ress  th e  governm ent to  tak e  on extraordinary 
m easures to  tack le  th e  situation  and help th e  corporate  sec to r. During 
two m eetings held w ith P resident Park in Ju n e  1971, th e  chairm an of the  
FKI proposed th e  intervention of th e  governm ent to  confront th e  dom estic
379Kim, Big Business, Strong State, p.147. According to a 1963-64 survey by the Bank of Korea (BOK), 75 
percent of businesses questioned said that they resorted to curb market loans.
80Cole and Park, Financial Development in Korea 1945-1978, p.l 19.
381Cole and Park, Financial Development in Korea 1945-1978, pp. 137-8.
382Seok-Jin Lew, Bringing Capital Back In:A Case Study o f the South Korean Automobile Industrialization, 
Doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1992, pp. 160-2.
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sou rces troubling th e  corporate  sec to r. This intervention would include: 
first, the  conversion of very expensive curb-m arket loans into cheaper 
bank loans; second , corporate  ta x  cu ts; and third, lower in te re st ra te s  and 
le ss  restric ted  m onetary  policy.
The governm ent sought to  ad d ress  the  problem s facing the 
corporate sec to r by announcing a  10-billion won Industry Support Fund. 
This w as seen  a s  a  significant am ount taking into consideration the  fac t 
th a t money supply had only increased  3.5 billion won by Ju ly  1971. The 
fund w as la te r followed by an in te rest ra te  cu t in January  1972.3B3Yet, 
business leaders saw  th e  m easu res a s  insufficient and inadequate to  halt 
their difficulties. According to  Kim Chung-yum, for business  leaders the  
solution involved an a ttem p t to  regulate th e  curb m arket:
One day, the  federation’s  chairm an called  on th e  p residen t and asked  for 
a solution. He explained th a t all com panies w ere working very hard, but 
th a t high in te rest loans from th e  informal money m arket w ere absorbing 
all their profits, and th a t they  w ere all apprehensive b ecau se  of the  th re a t 
of m oneylenders calling in the ir loans sim ultaneously. He said  th a t th e  
em ergency loans from th e  banks w ere  insufficient and th a t many 
en terp rises would go bankrupt if an em ergency adm inistrative m easure 
concerning the  informal money m arket loans w ere not introduced.384
Upon a req u est from Park Chung Hee, Kim Chung-yum studied the  
situation and proposed th a t th e  solution had to  involve the  s ta te - 
controlled banking system . Banks would have to  lend th e  firms enough 
money to  pay off their private loans. However, th e  financial authorities 
w ere only able to  g a th er 10 billion Won to  support th e  private secto r, out 
of the  estim ated  100 billion Won (by the  Ministry of Finance), or 180 billion 
won (by the  Federation of Korean Industries) borrowed by Korean firms a t 
th e  curb m arket. 388 Therefore, ’th e  only w ay to  d e c rea se  th e  ra te  of
383Yonhap News Agency, Korea Annual 1972, p. 137.
384Kim, Policymaking on the Front Lines, p.67.
385Kim, Policymaking on the Front Lines, p.68.
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busin ess  failures, prevent a  banking crisis, and avoid a  chain reaction  of 
bankruptcy and m ass unem ploym ent w as to  freeze th e  informal money 
m arket for a  certa in  period of tim e.’388Having won th e  agreem ent of the  
P resident, th e  preparation and con ten t of the  policy to  deal w ith the  
unregulated  money m arket w as kept se c re t. This w as for fear th a t making 
it public would lead private lenders to  w ithdraw  their loans, and 
potentially  cau se  a  sudden collapse of th e  econom y. Among th o se  
involved in th e  p ro cess  w ere th e  President, Kim Chung-yum, Nam Duck 
Woo (M inister of Finance), and bu reaucra ts  in the  MOF, MCI and several 
banks.3*7
Support over th e  d ec ree ’s  efficacy, however, w as far from being 
unanim ous am ong the  top decision-m akers. Nam Duck Woo said  th a t he 
decided to  go along with th e  decree , but not w ithout reservations: *1 w as 
not very en th u sias tic  about th e  original proposal to  freeze th e  curb 
m arket. Apart from its short-run effects, it would not put an end to  the  
operation of th e  curb m arket, which is deeply rooted in Korea’s  econom ic 
culture, un less th e  financial sec to r  w ere fully liberalized to  th e  degree 
th a t th e  curb m arket is absorbed into a single open m arket in which a 
uniform ra te  of in terest will prevail.’3*8Ultimately, th e  final decision to  
re scu e  th e  corporate  se c to r  cam e not from the  country’s  cen tral agency 
EPB, but from th e  Blue House.388
In a  surprising but s tra teg ic  move on 3 August 1972, th e  Korean 
P residen t Park Chung Hee, under Article 73 of th e  country’s  Constitution, 
issued  th e  Presidential Emergency Order on Economic Stabilization and  
Growth  aim ed a t  bailing out th e  debt-ridden corporate  sec to r. 390 In a 
p repared  s ta te m en t on th e  d ecree , President Park Chung Hee said  th a t it
386Kim, Policymaking on the Front Lines, p.69.
387Inwon, The Politics o f Industrial Restructuring, p.256. See also ‘Man of the News: Minister Nam Architect of 
Painstaking ‘Order” , The Korea Herald, 4 August 1972, p.l (hereafter KH).
388Nam, Korea's Economic Growth in a Changing World, p.91.
389Lew, Bringing Capital Back In, pp. 162-3.
390On the contents of the decree, see ‘President Freezes All Private Loans, Orders Rationalization of Business: 
Banks to issue W200 Bil. Bonds for Enterprises’, KH 3 August 1972, p.l, ‘Text of Emergency Economic 
Measures’, KH 4 August 1972, p.3, ‘To Fight Economic Recession: Park Freezes Private Loans, Sets Up Funds’, 
KT 3 August 1972, p. 1 and Cho and Kim, ‘Credit Policies and the Industrialization of Korea’, p.64.
136
aim ed a t promoting private investm ent for continuing econom ic growth, 
and to  guaran tee  national stability. In the  s ta tem en t, he identified two 
main problems plaguing th e  Korean econom y, and in particu lar the  private 
sector: (1) th e  ‘vicious cycle of inflation and s tead y  in crease  of 
commodity prices, public utility ra te s  and foreign exchange ra te s ’ th a t 
‘resulted  in bringing instability to  th e  lives of c itizens’; and (2) the  
‘ram pant circulation of high-interest private loans’ th a t had becom e 
‘another m alady in our econom y’ by w eakening and burdening the  
corporate se c to r’s  financial s tru c tu re .391The decree  called for all firms to 
report to  th e  governm ent the  curb loans they  owed a s  of 2 of August.
The main co n ten ts  of th e  d ecree  included a  m oratorium on the  
paym ent of all corporate  debt to  curb lenders and broad rescheduling of 
bank loans a t  a  reduced in te rest ra te . All curb loans w ere to  be 
transferred to  bank loans a t a  monthly in te rest ra te  of 1.35 percen t or
16.2 percen t annually (at a  tim e when th e  curb m arket in te re st ra te  w as 
a t more than 40 percent), with th e  m oratorium  to  la s t th ree  years, a fter 
which they  had to  be repaid over five years. Banks w ere to  issue  special 
bonds worth 200 billion Won, with th e  funds gathered  to  becom e available 
a s  long-term loans to firms a t an annual in terest ra te  of eight p ercen t with 
a  three-year g race  period, followed by a  repaym ent over five years. Bank 
in terest ra te s  on up to  one-year loans w ere s e t  a t 15.5 percen t from 19 
percent.
The decree  arranged also  for th e  estab lishm ent of a  1 billion-Won 
Trust G uarantee Fund to  support the  sm all and medium industry, and a 
sim ilar one for th e  agriculture and fisheries sec to rs . Moreover, the  
governm ent would s e t  an Industrial Rationalization Fund with an initial 50 
billion Won to offer long-term loans a t low in te re s t ra tes , a s  well a s  
taxation  benefits, to  firms th a t m et the  rules stem m ing from the  
Com m ittee on Industrial Rationalization. Finally, th e  d ec ree  stipu lated  the  
stabilization of th e  won-dollar exchange ra te s  a t  400 won to  one US dollar,
391‘Text of Emergency Economic Measures’, KH, 4 August 1972, p.3.
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a s  well a s  an in c rease  of no more than  th re e  percen t per y ea r for public 
utility ra te s  and com m odity prices. The im pact of th e  decree  w as widely 
felt in th e  Korean economy. The volum e of informal loans reported 
surprised  th e  Korean society , with cred ito rs reporting 357.1 billion won 
and deb to rs 345.6 billion won. Even if tak ing  th e  lower figure, th is  w as to  
rep resen t approxim ately 88 percen t of money supply a t th e  tim e.392The 
figures w ere  th ree  tim es bigger than  ex p ec ted  by tax  officials who had 
m ade th e ir  predictions based  on th e  am ount of ta x e s  paid on borrowed 
m oney by b u s in esses.393
The decree  saved  th e  highly debt-ridden corporate  sec to r, a t  the  
ex p en se  of th e  curb lenders and deposito rs.394The financial s ta tu s  of th e  
business  firms improved rapidly, a s  the ir in te re st burden w as significantly 
reduced with th e  im plem entation of th e  decree . For exam ple, in the 
m anufacturing sec to r, the  ratio  of in te re st exp en ses  to  sa le s  volume fell 
from 9.9 percen t in 1971 to  7.1 p ercen t in 1972 and m ore sharply to  4.6 
p ercen t in 1973. Furtherm ore, deb t to  equity  ratio  d ecreased  from 394.2 
p ercen t in 1971, to  313.4 In 1972 and 272.7 in 1973. Sim ultaneously, 
profits ro se  from 1.2 percen t in 1971 to  3.9 percen t in 1972, and 7.5 
p ercen t in 1973.39SThis em ergency d ec ree  w hilst aiming a t th e  financially 
d is tre ssed  business se c to r  turned out to  benefit th e  chaebol, in particular. 
Conversely, the  small- and medium-sized en terp rises  (SME) w ere not 
significantly aided, and even had to  shoulder th e  disruptions caused  by 
th e  d ec ree  in th e  w orkings of th e  informal money m arket. 396 As the  
im plem entation of th e  decree  proceeded, th ree  ep isodes illustrated  well 
th e  benefits  gained by the  country’s  m ajor corporations.
392Kim, ‘Financial System and Policy (1961-79)’, p.35.
393‘Staggering Figure: Full Picture Drawn of Private Loan Mart’, KT 11 August 1972, p.l.
394‘Private Loans Massive: Economic Decree Seen Big Favor to Business’, KT, 6 August 1972, p.4.
395Cho and Kim, ‘Credit Policies and the Industrialization of Korea’, p.64 (Table C).
3960n the reactions to the decree by the business sector, see ‘Business Circles Hail Movement to Defer Private 
Loan Payments’, KH, 4 August 1972, p.6 and ‘Freeze May Bring Shortage of Funds’, KT 4 August 1972, p.l. 
On the impact on the small- and medium-sized firms, see ‘Private Loan Freeze: Small Firms Suffer From Fund 
Squeeze’, KT 17 August 1972, p.4 and ‘Small Businesses Feel Squeeze Since Freeze’, KH, 17 August 1972, p.6.
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First, according to  a  report by th e  Bank of Korea, thirty  undisclosed 
firms had borrowed more than  100 million won each  in th e  informal money 
m arket.397But m ore im portant w as th e  fac t th a t while th ere  w ere only 547 
c a s e s  (1.3 percen t of th e  40,677 reg istered  c a s e s  of curb m arket loans) 
accounting  for loans over 100 million won, th e  to ta l am ount of th e se  loans 
reached  182.98 billion won, or 52.9 percen t of th e  to ta l am ount of 
reg istered  curb m arket loans. 399Two unnam ed com panies w ere said  to  
have co n trac ted  curb m arket loans totalling 4.9 billion won and 4 billion 
won each .399
The second  episode, involved th e  running of th e  50-billion won 
Industrial Rationalization Fund s e t  by th e  governm ent to  offer low -interest 
and long-term loans to  m odernise equipm ent. The fund pushed for 
b usiness  m ergers, im provem ent of th e  cap ita l s tru c tu re  of th e  
m anufacturing sec to r  a s  well a s  of th e  productivity and international 
com petitiveness of Korean firms. The Industrial Rationalization Council 
under th e  Office of th e  Prime Minister, w as put in charge of adm inistering 
th e  fund and selecting  firms th a t would ge t hold of financial benefits. The 
council, chaired by th e  head of th e  EPB, included am ong its  m em bers 
o ther econom ic m inisters, governors of th e  specia l banks, and private 
m em bers appointed by the  President. N onetheless, th e  final approval of 
th e  recip ien ts rested  w ith th e  President. 400 The fund w as apparently  
designed to  support SMEs.401 However, betw een  1972 and 1975, 73 percen t 
of th e  to ta l fund, or 48.1 billion won, w as re leased  to  support chaebol-
397Cole and Park, Financial Development in Korea 1945-1978, pp. 164-5 (Table 33). The Bank of Korea's Report 
of the Results of the August 3, 1972 Presidential Emergency Decree (August 1973), is cited by the authors in 
their analysis on the outcome of the decree. The survey considered 6 different loan sizes, from the lowest below 
3 million won, to the highest over 100 million won, as reported by borrowers. The two highest loan sizes (50 to 
100 million won, and over 100 million) accounted for 222.02 billion won, or 64.2 percent of the total amount of 
curb market loans, although they represented only 2.7 percent of the cases.
398Cole and Park, Financial Development in Korea 1945-1978, pp. 164-5. For an example of a major firm that 
highly benefited from the decree, see the case of Hyundai Motors Corporation in Lew, Bringing Capital Back In, 
pp. 165-6.
"‘The Periphery of the 8.13 Decree’, The Shindong-a Ilbo, October 1972, pp.136-149.
400Kim, ‘The President's Emergency Decree for Economic Stability and Growth (1972)’, pp.176-178. According 
to Wan-Soon Kim, to be eligible to the fund, companies had to meet the following criteria: “(1) industries 
producing goods or services indispensable to the nation; (2) industries promoting related industries; (3) machine 
and raw material manufacturing industries; (4) export industries, tourism, and other foreign-exchange earning 
industries; (5) farmers' subsidiary businesses or agricultural/fisheries processing industries that would 
significantly increase the incomes of farmers and fishermen.
401Kim, ‘The President’s Emergency Decree for Economic Stability and Growth’, p. 177.
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dom inated industries, such a s  iron and stee l, nonferrous m etal, 
shipbuilding, e lec tron ics, electrical m achinery, and coal.^K im  Wan-Soon 
highlights th a t th e  council, and ultim ately th e  president, had virtually 
com plete d iscretion  over the  allocation of th e  fund: ‘B ecause alm ost any 
en terp rise  could co n stru c t an argum ent for privileges under som e 
provision of th e  decree , and given th e  e x c e ss  dem and for preferential 
cred it a t low ra te  (8 percen t per annum), discretion w as thus inevitable.’403
The third episode involved th e  reduction of in terest ra te s  on bank 
loans from 19 to  15.5 percent. The dem and for credit greatly  exceeded  its  
availability. Therefore, the  allocation of funds conform ed to  a 
discretionary p ro cess  th a t naturally tended  to  benefit m ajor corporations, 
s ince  sm aller firms lacked collateral and cred it s ta tu s . 404 After the  
im plem entation of th e  decree, th e  opposition New D em ocratic Party (NDP) 
claim ed in th e  National Assembly th a t th e  m easures favoured m ajor firms. 
Additionally, th e  NDP also  claim ed th a t th e  m easu res provided 
preferential trea tm en t to  those  th a t w ere already recip ien ts of various 
financial privileges. A m em ber of th e  parliam ent for th e  NDP insisted  th a t 
all of the  big busin esses  th a t had reported  d eb ts  above 100 million Won 
w ere foreign-loan recipients, w here cred it tended  to  be allocated  
according to  connections in th e  ruling party  or in th e  b u reau cracy .400 
These th ree  ep isodes, size of curb m arket loans, industrial rationalisation 
fund, and reduction of in terest ra tes , illustrate  well th e  benefits of th e se  
initiatives for Korea’s  chaebol.
Under th e  dire econom ic situation  affecting th e  corporate  sec to r, 
th e  d ecree  reaffirm ed Park’s  com m itm ent to  a  ‘growth-first’ developm ent 
program m e within th e  system  of ‘socialisation  of private risk’, i.e., the  
s ta te  guaran teed  th e  risks a sso c ia ted  with private investm ents. If the 
governm ent had failed to intervene through th e  decree , many businesses
402Kim, Big Business, Strong State, p. 149.
403 Kim, ‘The President’s Emergency Decree for Economic Stability and Growth’, p. 177.
404 Kim,‘The President’s Emergency Decree for Economic Stability and Growth’, p.173.
405‘House Deliberation: NDP Claims Decree Favors Major Firms’, KT,19 August 1972, p.l.
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would have gone bankrupt; the  ow ner-m anagers of failed firms would have 
lost their ow nership and control s tak e s ; banks and curb lenders would 
have had to  bear g rea t financial lo sses  and; ultim ately unem ploym ent 
would have rapidly increased  and th rea ten ed  social and political stability. 
Furtherm ore, an increasing num ber of bankruptcies could potentially 
underm ine Korea’s  international cred it standing and hinder th e  much 
needed  flow of foreign loans Into th e  country to  feed th e  high growth 
policy supported  by the  governm ent. Meanwhile, the  d ecree  also  offered 
th e  opportunity to  consolidate th e  regim e’s alliance with th e  private 
sec to r, Park Chung Hee saw  the private s e c to r 's  involvement a s  e ssen tia l 
for th e  successfu l im plem entation of heavy and chem ical industrialisation.
After th e  decree , Korea’s  big business groups, however, w ere 
unen thusiastic  abou t participating in th e  heavy and chem ical 
industrialisation.406 Jong-Chan Rhee argues th a t, ‘businessm en h esita ted  
to  invest in th e  HCIs because  the ir already highly indebted firms w ere 
short of internal savings and b ecau se  they  w ere faced  with a  long period 
of return on their heavy and chem ical investm ent and opaque p ro sp ec ts  
for th e  m arkets.,407Consequently, th e  governm ent decided to  s e le c t private 
investors and through a s tra teg y  of ‘ca rro ts  and s tick s’ to  induce and 
co erce  them  to  undertake th e  key HCI pro jects.408 Among th e  incentives to  
a t tra c t  th e  private se c to r  w ere: the  creation  of th e  National Investm ent 
Fund (NIF); tax  exem ptions and reductions; trad e  policy changes imposing 
import restric tions on certa in  products to  encourage the ir pu rchase  from 
dom estic  HCI firms; robust investm ents in th e  expansion of sc ien ce  and 
technological education and in R & D and; construction  of industrial 
com plexes to  reduce c o s ts  for exam ple in infrastructure to  achieve 
operational efficiencies by concentrating  in one single a rea  rela ted  
industries.409
406Lee, ‘The Heavy and Chemical Industries Promotion Plan (1973-79)’, p.436.
407Rhee, The State and Industry in South Korea, p.69.
408Dai-Seok Choi, ‘The Limits of State Strength in South Korea: The Case of the Heavy and Chemical 
Industrialization Plan’; Korea Observer, 26 (1995), 63-95, pp.73-5.
409For a more detailed description of the incentive system offered by the Korean government, see Lee, ‘The 
Heavy and Chemical Industries Promotion Plan (1973-79)’, pp.441-9.
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However, th e  s ta te  would not only becom e a  m ajor dom estic 
cu sto m er for many pro jects, but also  allowed e ither monopoly or oligopoly 
in th e  HCI. The s ta te  considered it a ‘more desirab le’ industrial s tra tegy  
than  a  com petitive structu re , due to  th e  country’s  sm all dom estic m arket 
size, im portance of econom ies of sca le  and huge capital 
requirem ents.410On th e  o ther hand, business groups th a t failed to  comply 
w ith th e  governm ent orientation w ere expected  to  cope with econom ic 
p enalties  usually by suspending, or strongly reducing, their a c c e s s  to  
cap ita l.411 In the  end, th e  s ta te ’s  s tra teg y  of ’carro ts  and s tick s’ led th e  
chaebol to  ’believe th a t a s  long a s  they  helped fulfil th e  leadership’s  
vision of developm ent, they  could reasonably  ex p ect th a t th e  s ta te  would 
a s s is t  them  with any m eans.’412Under th e se  conditions, Sam sung w as, for 
exam ple, se lec ted  to  develop aircraft engine assem bling (in agreem ent 
w ith Boeing), Daewoo to  focus on assem bling fuselage and air wings, and 
Hyundai to  produce frigates.413
In summary, with the  HCI stra tegy , Park Chung Hee aim ed a t 
solving th ree  major issues. First, the  HCI allowed him to  ad d ress  th e  
growing security  concerns and build an indigenous defence industry. This, 
how ever, required th e  involvement of th e  private sec to r, and a s  long a s  
th e  la tte r  w as undergoing financial d is tress , it could not be of much help 
for th e  governm ent’s  developm ent plans. The decree  by alleviating their 
financial problems, a lso  contributed to  consolidating th e  governm ental 
nexus with the country’s  m ajor firms. Second, th e  deterioration of th e  
in ternational trade environm ent with the  rising protectionism  in 
developed nations, and growing com petition in particular from S ou theast 
Asian countries, provided the  governm ent with th e  econom ic rationale to  
a llo ca te  a  g rea ter sh are  of th e  financial resou rces to  th e  developm ent of 
heavy and chem ical industries and more value-added products. Finally, 
dom estic  politics provided th e  th ru st for th e  HCI drive a s  it would
4l0Choi, ‘The Limits of State Strength in South Korea’, p.74.
4llRhee, The State and Industry in South Korea, p.71.
4l2Choi, ‘The Limits of State Strength in South Korea’, p.74.
4l3Interview with Shim Jae Hoon, Seoul, 8 March 2001.
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leg itim ate th e  Yushin system  and guaran tee  th e  political survival of Park 
Chung Hee. Although th e  new  Yushin Constitution granted  ex tensive 
pow ers to  th e  P resident and w as approved with 92 p ercen t of th e  popular 
vo te  in a  referendum , it took p lace under m artial law, which: banned 
political activ ities of all so rts; tem porarily closed th e  universities; and 
im posed p ress  censorship.
Under th e se  conditions, th e  legitim acy of the  new  system  w as far 
from guaran teed . By announcing th a t the  new  industrial developm ent 
plan would further enrich th e  nation and increase  per cap ita  incom e to
1,000 US dollars by the  early  1980s, Park sought to  legitim ise his 
leadersh ip  through econom ic perform ance. The fac t th a t th e  issue  of th e  
d ec ree  (3 August 1972), m artial law and the  am endm ent of th e  
Constitution (17 O ctober 1972), and the  announcem ent of th e  new  
econom ic s tra teg y  (12 January  1973) took p lace in su ccessio n  with two 
month in tervals betw een them  seem ed  to  indicate th a t th e re  w as a 
co n certed  and conscious effort on the  part of th e  governm ent to  
transform  th e  country’s  developm ental path.
4.4. Conclusion
This case-study  illu stra tes well how th e  HCI w as essen tia lly  a 
pro ject led by th e  P resident and his sec re ta r ia t in th e  Blue House in 
resp o n se  to  dom estic econom ic difficulties, international trad e  changes, 
growing security  concerns, ideological m otivations and political needs. 
This ch ap te r also  show s why and how Park Chung Hee s tra teg ically  ac ted  
to  p ro tec t th e  system  of socialisation  of private risk and with w hat 
political and econom ic im plications and co n sequences. Despite the  
different view s on HCI, Park Chung Hee actively rallied th e  econom ic 
bureaucracy  in support of th e  new  industrial stra tegy . Sim ultaneously, 
Park also  sought to  secu re  th e  alliance with th e  country’s  la rgest firms by 
issuing th e  em ergency order to  bailout the  debt-ridden corporate  sec to r,
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a s  well a s  by offering a  se ries  of incentives to  induce their participation in 
th e  s tra te g ic  HCI.
But by adopting th is new industrial stra tegy , th e  Korean s ta te  
p laced  th e  country on a  path-dependent developm ent s tra teg y  with 
significant political and econom ic co n seq u en ces th a t would la ter 
constrain  a ttem p ts  a t  institutional change. First, during th e  1970s, th e  
system  of socialisation  of private risk concen tra ted  th e  country’s  
financial reso u rces  in th e  growth and developm ent of th e  heavy and 
chem ical industries. By clearly se lecting  the  chaebol a s  th e  main 
recip ien ts  of th e  available resources, and turning them  into th e  country’s  
main econom ic ac to rs, th e  system  under the  m anagem ent of the  Korean 
s ta te  actually  m ade the  country’s  econom y hostage  to  th e  chaeboPs 
m arket behaviour and accom plishm ents.414
It w as during th e  1970s, th a t th e  chaebol cam e not only to  tak e  
control of th e  m anufacturing sec to r, in particular heavy and chem ical 
industries, but also  to  hold a near monopoly or oligopoly in many capital- 
and technology-intensive sec to rs . Chaebol provided not only jobs to  a 
large percen tag e  of the  country’s  w orkers, but also  produced a  wide 
range of consum er products and serv ices.416Additionally, while th e  s ta te  
continued to  guaran tee  th e  risks assum ed by private investm ents, in its  
e ag e rn ess  to  radically transform  th e  country’s  industrial structu re , it 
failed to  play its  disciplinarian role a s  expected  within th e  system  of 
socia lisation  of private risk. After the  issuance  of th e  presidential d ecree  
in 1972, business profits grew  rapidly, and their deb t s ta tu s  improved 
considerably. However, th is condition did not la st long. Within a year, th e  
soundness of the  corporate sec to r’s  financial s tru c tu re  began to  
d e te rio ra te  and soon it dropped back  to  levels preceding th e  issuance of 
th e  decree , a s  businesses resorted  again to  debt for new  HCI
4l4For works on the growth of the chaebol, see Kim, Big Business, Strong State, and Myung Hun Kang, The 
Korean Business Conglomerate: Chaebol Then and Now (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 
Fields, Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan, and Kim, Business Concentration and Government 
Policy.
4l5Kim, Big Business, Strong State, p.52.
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investm ents.41<The governm ent sought to  co rrec t corporate  governance 
and th e  financial s tru c tu re  of th e  m ajor business groups.
Among th e  m ost im portant w as th e  *29 May M easure’ in 1974 th a t 
com prised five m ajor directives: (1) to  tak e  corporations public; (2) to 
estab lish  a monitoring system  over th e  cred it and tax-paying s ta tu s  of 
closed en terp rises  and their m ajor stockholders; (3) to  s treng then  cred it 
control over large en terp rises to  reduce the ir reliance on bank credit; (4) 
to  drive the  heavily-leveraged en terp rises  to  sell part of th e ir  curren t 
business, in c a se  of the  entry into a new  business; and finally (5) to  fortify 
tax  enforcem ent and reinforce an outside auditing system  on en terp rises  
and their m ajor stockholders.417By dem anding firms to  be listed  in the  
s to ck  m arket, th e  governm ent sought to  d isperse  ow nership, professional 
m anagem ent, and ultim ately lead firms to  issue equity to  finance long­
term  investm ent and reduce th e  firms continuous dependence on debt. 
However, until 1972, only 66 firms had decided  to  go public. By th e  end of 
1979, 300 com panies w ere already listed in th e  s to ck  m arket.411
Yet, the  m easures failed to  produce th e  sought a fte r ou tcom es, as  
the  chaebol rem ained m ostly under family control and continued to  rely 
on debt to  build up their businesses. Nam Duck Woo say s  th a t he 
designed th e  *29 May M easure’ while he w as still th e  M inister of Finance, 
and th a t they aim ed a t reforming corporate  governance by requiring, for 
exam ple, reliable and tran sp aren t financial s ta te m en ts  or lim itations of 
loans to  unsound businesses. However, once he left th e  m inistry in 1974 
to  tak e  his position a s  Deputy Prime M inister (DPM) and M inister of 
Economic Planning, his su cc e sso rs  a t th e  MOF failed to  ’s tick  to  th a t 
system ’ due to  opposition of th e  chaebol.*™
4l6Cole and Park, Financial Development in Korea 1945-1978, p. 167.
417Kim, ‘Financial System and Policy (1961-79)’, p.37.
418Lim, ‘The Origins and Evolution of the Korean Economic System’, pp.35-6. See also Kim, ‘Financial System 
and Policy (1961-79)’, pp.35-9.
41 interview with Nam Duck Woo in Seoul, 30 May 2002.
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A nother policy outcom e of the  d ec ree  with significant im plications 
for th e  working of th e  country’s  financial system  w as the  creation  from 
1972 of th ree  types of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) to  assim ila te  
curb-m arket funds into th e  regulated  financial system : (1) investm ent and 
finance com panies; (2) mutual savings and finance com panies; (3) cred it 
unions and m utual credits. Later in 1976, the  m erchant banking 
corporation w as also  allowed into th e  financial system  to  a t tra c t  further 
inflow of foreign capital. It w as regarded a s  a  ’departm ent s to re ’ for 
financial com m odities. Their b u sin esses ranged from international 
financing for firms; loans for equipm ent; and working cap ital for 
underwriting and brokerage of secu rities  sa le s .420
The NBFIs w ere given g rea te r freedom  in the  m anagem ent of their 
financial resou rces com pared with th e  banking organisations, which 
allowed them  to  gain a  com petitive edge.^ ’Since they  w ere  allow ed to  
offer higher deposit in te rest ra tes , their m arket sh are  expand rapidly. 
Their sh a re  of th e  country’s  to ta l deposits  rose from 18.3 p ercen t in 1972, 
to  30.9 percen t in 1980, and 59.5 percen t in 1990.422Additionally, the  NFBIs 
becam e im portant players in th e  s to ck  m arket. These seem ed  to  have 
been sufficient reasons to  a ttra c t th e  country’s  m ajor chaebol to  own and 
control m ost of the  NBFIs from th e  la te  1970s.423The chaeboPs s ta k e s  in 
th e  NBFIs ultim ately allowed them  to  borrow much of the ir working 
cap ital from th e se  sources, and in the  p rocess  becom e less  dependen t on 
state-contro lled  banks.
In summary, the  new  industrial s tra teg y  in th e  1970s produced 
significant policy and political outcom es, especially  in te rm s of pow er 
distribution within the  ac to rs  involved in th e  system  of socia lisation  of
420For an overview on the different non-banking financial institutions (NBFIs), see Kim, ‘Financial System and 
Policy (1961-79)’, pp.20-4. See also Cho, The Dynamics o f Korean Economic Development, pp.123-7.
421Byung-Sun Choi, ‘The Politics of Financial Control and Reform in Korea’; The Korean Journal o f  Policy 
Studies, 6 (1991), 41-73, p.47.
422Cho, The Dynamics o f Korean Economic Development, p. 126. Unlike Korea, in Taiwan, the share of total 
deposits in the NBFIs up until 1990 never surpassed 30 percent.
423Choi, ‘The Politics of Financial Control and Reform in Korea’, p.47. See also Seong Min Yoo, ‘Chaebol in 
Korea: Misconceptions, Realities and Policies’; KDI Working Paper, No.9507 (Seoul: Korea Development 
Institute, 1995), p.27.
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private risk. By concentrating  th e  country’s  resou rces in the  HCI and th e  
chaebol th a t had been se le c ted  to  undertake th e  industrial pro jects, th e  
Korean s ta te  eventually contributed, w hether or not intentionally, to  m ake 
the  country’s  econom y structurally  dependen t on th e  chaeboPs econom ic 
perform ance. This had th e  effect of increasing th e  chaeboPs leverage to  
negotia te  th e  rules of th e  gam e within the  system  of socialisation  of 
private risk. This power w as further s treng thened  by th e  chaeboPs 
growing s ta k e s  in th e  country’s  non-banking financial institu tions (NBFIs) 
th a t em erged a s  part of th e  em ergency order to  deal with th e  curb m arket. 
S ince th e  NBFIs w ere granted  g rea te r freedom  in th e  m anagem ent of their 
financial resources, the  chaeboPs s ta k e s  in th e se  dom estic financial 
institu tions reduced their dependence on sta te-contro lled  banks. In 
consequence, th e  disciplinarian capacity  of th e  Korean s ta te , based  in 
their control of capital flows, w as w eakened . In th is  context, th e  chaebol, 
fearing le ss  th e  potential penalties, w ere  also  le ss  bounded by the  
execu tive’s  econom ic guidelines.
By making the country’s  econom y structurally  dependent on the  
chaeboPs econom ic perform ance and w eakening th e  disciplinarian pow er 
of th e  Korean s ta te , th e se  policy and political ou tcom es w ere  the  first 
signs th a t th e  power equilibrium within th e  system  of socialisation of 
private risk w as changing and under challenge. Eventually, a s  will be 
shown in C hapters Five and Six, they  would hinder efforts by Korean 
leaders in th e  next d ecad es  to  induce institu tional reform in th e  face  of 
the political, econom ic and socia l changes taking p lace  in Korea.
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5. CHAPTER FIVE - T ransform ing th e  S ystem  of S o c ia lisa tio n  of 
P rivate  Risk: T he Kim Young Sam  P re sid en cy  (1993-1997)
5.1 Introduction
On November 21, 1997, in th e  m idst of w hat would com e to  be 
called th e  A sian  Financial Crisis’, Korea’s  Minister of Finance announced 
th a t th e  governm ent w as officially seeking  an IMF rescu e  package to  
avert the  co llapse of the  country’s  econom y in face of a depreciation  of 
th e  currency and liquidity crisis. In th e  following w eeks, th e  value of th e  
Korean won decreased  more than  50 percen t, the  s to ck  m arket price 
index plum m eted from 498 to  350 and th e  in terest ra te s  for short-term  
loans jum ped to  40 percen t a y ea r.424While Korea’s  financial troubles 
continued to  e sca la te , the  IMF m ade available a  rescue  package during 
the  first w eek  of December. Meanwhile, international c red it rating 
agencies  dow ngraded Korean bonds from A1 s ta tu s  to  ’junk bond’ s ta tu s  
by mid-December.428Consequently, Korean banks w ere suddenly cu t off 
from th e  international financial m arkets. International banks not only 
stopped renewing maturing loans, but a lso  s ta rted  to  rapidly w ithdraw  
funds from Korea. During th e  la st w eek  of Decem ber, th e  severity  of th e  
situation w as such th a t Korea w as on th e  verge of defaulting on its 
foreign deb ts. This w as only prevented by a  last-m inute loan by th e  IMF 
and several G-7 countries.
The nation, and the world, w as in shock  b ecau se  for th e  p as t th ree  
d ecad es  Korea had successfu lly  been transform ed from a  poor nation into 
one of the  world’s  largest econom ies. Yet, s ince  the  end of th e  regim e led 
by Park Chung Hee in 1979, th e  new  Korean leadership began to  adopt 
policies aim ed a t transform ing th e  rules of the  gam e of w hat stand  a t  the  
core of the  Korean developm ental s ta te , i.e., the  system  of socia lisation  of 
private risk. The econom ic s tra teg y  undertaken by Park Chung Hee
424Yung Chul Park, ‘Investment Boom, Financial Bust’; Brookings Review, 16 (1998), 14-17, p.14.
425Irma Adelman and Song Byung Nak, The Korean Financial Crisis o f1997-98, University of Berkeley, mimeo 
(August 1998).
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radically changed th e  country’s  econom ic structu re , but it also  nurtured 
serious econom ic and social s tructu ra l problem s th a t w ere left behind to  
be solved by th e  coming presidencies. It w as th is legacy, a s  it will be 
shown below, th a t significantly influenced th e  configuration of institutional 
reform in Korea pushed by Korean leaders s ince th e  1980s and continued 
during the  presidency of Kim Young Sam.
Two m ajor c au se s  are  identified here a s  having strongly 
contributed to th e  crisis  within Korea: th e  dism antling of industrial policy 
and financial liberalisation undertaken a t  a fa s t p ace  during the  
governm ent of Kim Young Sam. Under th is  new  environm ent, th e  capacity  
of th e  s ta te  to  guide and discipline th e  chaebol through th e  control of 
cred it allocation w eakened. The outcom e w as over-investm ent and high 
indebtedness of Korean conglom erates. Eventually, th is  th rea ten ed  the  
stability  of the country’s  financial system  built on tight tie s  betw een  the  
banks and industry. The policy outcom es of th e se  ch an g es ra ise  two 
major puzzles. First, if industrial policy and financial regulation 
underpinned the su c c e ss  of Korean developm ent, why did Kim Young Sam 
decide from th e  early  days of his m andate  to  transform  th e  system  of 
socialisation of private risk? Second, if successfu l developm ent in Korea 
w as a product of a  strong and disciplinarian s ta te , why then  did th e  s ta te  
fail to  supervise th e  financial and corporate  se c to rs  a s  w as  expected  
within th e  system  of socialisation  or private risk?
This ch ap te r begins by briefly exam ining in w hat w ay the  
dism antling of industrial policy and financial liberalisation contributed to 
the  Korean financial crisis. Then, I introduce an overview of th e  major 
adm inistrative and econom ic reform s undertaken by Kim Young Sam 
(1993-1997) and aim ed a t  transform ing th e  system  of socialisation  of 
private risk. I then  a ttem pt to  explain why Kim sought to  dram atically 
reform th e  system  th a t for m ore than  th ree  d ecad es  had been th e  
foundation of the  country’s  econom ic su c c e ss .
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For more than  th ree  decades, th e  system  of socialisation  of private 
risk drove Korean econom ic growth. This, a s  historical institutionalism  
points out, had path-dependent consequences. The policy cho ices m ade 
a t an early point in th is  period of ex tended  growth m ade changes la te r on 
m ore difficult. In th e  c a se  of Korea, a  core featu re  of th e  country’s  
developm ent w as th e  institutionalisation of a  system  of “socialisation  of 
private risk” th a t rested  on cooperative tie s  betw een presidential 
leadership, b u reaucra ts  and business groups. Any a ttem p t to  change th e  
institutional se tting  would thus be difficult and would necessarily  require 
an understanding among the  th ree  ac to rs. However, by seeking changes 
in th e  institutional fram ework by adm inistrative fia t w ithout first seeking 
a negotiation of th e  rules of th e  gam e with the  o ther involved parts, Kim 
Young Sam assum ed a risky political and policy s tra teg y  th a t ultim ately 
had a  negative im pact on the  im plem entation of th e  reform s.
I argue then  tha t, learning from failed reform s undertaken during 
the  presidencies of Chun Doo Hwan (1980-1987) and Roh Tae Woo (1988- 
1992), driven by ideological m otivations, and responding to  a new 
international econom ic con tex t, Kim Young Sam sought dram atically  to  
reform the  system  of socialisation  of private risk th a t had been th e  
foundation of th e  country’s  econom ic su c ce ss . Setting him self a s  a 
president who would lead by exam ple and who would b reak  with th e  old 
corruption p rac tices  betw een th e  s ta te  and business groups, Kim did not 
seek  to  build a  supporting coalition for his initiatives. The country’s  
dem ocratisation, nonetheless, m ade th e  policy p ro cess  m ore com plex a s  
new  ac to rs  gained prom inence to  influence policy cho ices.
The decision by Kim to  abandon cooperative tie s  w ith the  chaebol 
and his effort to  curb the ir econom ic concentration  w as strongly 
influenced by growing social dem ands for econom ic ju stice , in particular 
by very active non-governm ental organisations (NGOs). At th e  sam e time, 
the  country’s  econom y th a t depended on th e  chaeboPs perform ance could 
be hit if there  w as a slowdown of th e  ta tte r’s  investm ents and activ ities
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due to  c loser scrutiny by the  governm ent. D espite the  p ressure  from 
NGOs, an econom ic downturn could turn public opinion, a s  well a s  the  
country’s  vocal m ass m edia, aga inst th e  president. On th e  o ther hand, 
throughout th e  years, th e  chaebol had streng thened  their political 
influence by offering political donations to  th e  country’s  policym akers and 
politicians. As m em bers of th e  National Assembly which had increased  its 
power vis-a-vis the  presidential office, many of th e se  policym akers and 
politicians a s  m em bers of th e  National Assembly gained influence over 
the  policy process. In Figure Two (see  below) th e  policy p rocess  under 
President Kim Young Sam show ed a new  dynam ic environm ent a s  new  
ac to rs  with increasing political pow ers moved to  a s se r t  their in te re sts  
and to  influence policy choices. This w as the  c a s e  in particular of such 
Korean social ac to rs  a s  th e  NGOs, m edia and labour unions.
Although Kim Young Sam revealed a strong will to  push for the  
reforms, his s tra teg ic  failure to  build a  coalition in support of institutional 
change com bined with w eak  econom ic leadersh ip  resulting in 
inconsisten t policy decisions, ultim ately contributed to  the  
m ism anagem ent of th e  country’s  econom y th a t culm inated in th e  IMF 
crisis which erupted  in la te  1997.
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Figure Two: Presidential Leadership and Policy Process, Kim Young Sam (1993-1997)
5.2 The S y stem  of S o c ia lisa tio n  of P riva te  R isk an d  th e  IMF C risis
In th e  a f te rm a th  of th e  IMF c ris is  in 1997 and  th e  su b se q u e n t 
c o lla p se  of th e  K orean c o rp o ra te  and  financ ia l s e c to rs ,  it b eca m e  
a p p a re n t th a t Kim Young S am ’s  p res id en cy  u n d erto o k  tw o  m ajor po lic ies  
w hich  co n trib u ted  to  th e  co u n try ’s  eco n o m ic  m eltdow n: (1) th e
dism an tling  of industria l policy and ; (2) financ ia l lib e ra lisa tio n .426lndustria l 
policy had b een  a  c ru c ia l s ta t e  m ech an ism  to  c h e c k  ‘e x c e ss iv e  
co m p e titio n ’ and  ineffic ien t m a n ag em e n t. H ow ever, th e  declin ing  ro le of 
industria l policy during Kim Young S am ’s  ad m in is tra tio n  w a s  s e e n  a s  
having led to: over-in v estm en t by th e  b u s in e s s  se c to r ; falling profitab ility  
d u e  to  low  c a p a c ity  u tilisa tion ; and , finally, to  th e  c o lla p se  of a s e r ie s  of 
co rp o ra tio n s  in m ajor in d u s tr ie s  su ch  a s  e le c tro n ic s , c a rs , s te e l ,  
p e tro c h em ica ls , and sh ipbu ild ing .427This over-in v estm en t w a s  e x a c e rb a te d  
by s te p s  u n d erta k en  by th e  n ew  p res id en cy  to  lib e ra lise  th e  financia l
426See in particular Chang, Park and Yoo, ‘Interpreting the Korean Crisis’, and Wade, ‘International Institutions 
and the US Role in the Long Asian Crisis o f  1990-2000’.
427Chang, Park and Yoo, ‘Interpreting the Korean Crisis’, p.740.
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system  which eventually  w eakened th e  role of the  s ta te  in allocating 
credit to  the  b usiness  sec to r.
From 1993, th e  rapid liberalisation of the  financial system  
facilitated  a c c e s s  to  foreign borrowing by the  country’s  business  groups. 
In the  years preceding th e  crisis  (1994-1996), Korea experienced  an 
investm ent boom th a t contributed to  heavy foreign indeb tedness, and the  
subsequen t insolvency of Korean firms.428Foreign deb t grew  from around 
43 billion US dollars in 1992 to  c lose  a t 121 billion US dollars in 
1997 .421 However, while Korea’s  foreign debt figures w ere  not a t an 
unsustainable level by international s tandards, its  m aturity s tru c tu re  w as 
seriously poor. The sh a re  of short-term  debt (which is defined a s  debt 
with less  than a  year’s  m aturity) in to ta l ex ternal debt, rose from 43.2 
percen t in 1992 to  57.6 p ercen t in 1997. ^ C onsequen tly , th e  country’s  
a c c e s s  to  international cap ita l m arkets becam e particularly vulnerable to  
sh ifts in foreign confidence over th e  country’s  econom ic p rospects . Since 
liberalisation had been m ore ex tensive in relation to  short-term  lending, 
financial institu tions had an incentive to  engage in short-term  loan deals 
since  their use involved le ss  borrowing co s ts .
In sum, th e  ’dism antling’ of w hat w ere regarded a s  th e  pillars of the 
system  of socialisation  of private risk -  industrial policy and s tr ic t 
financial regulation -  a re  indicated a s  m ajor c a u se s  contributing to  the  
crisis  th a t hit Korea in 1997. For Robert Wade, U.S. p ressure, (in particular 
by th e  U.S. Treasury s ince  th e  early  1990s) w as behind the  policy p rocess 
th a t led to  the  dism antling of th e  rules of th e  gam e. T hese rules had 
sustained , for alm ost tw o d ecad es , th e  capacity  of th e  Korean s ta te  to  
influence the  country’s  developm ental path and industrial change.431 But 
th e  role played by ex ternal p ressure, in particu lar from th e  U.S., on 
Korea’s  policy cho ices is not sufficient to  explain th e  policy reform s th a t
428 Stephan Haggard and Jongryn Mo, ‘The political economy of the Korean financial crisis’; Review o f 
International Political Economy, 7 (2000), 197-218, p.200.
429Asian Development Bank, Rising to the Challenge in Asia, p.4 (table 1).
430Asia Development Bank, Rising to the Challenge in Asia, p. 11 (table 4).
431Wade, ‘International Institutions and the US Role in the Long Asian Crisis of 1990-2000’, pp.14-7.
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are  co rrelated  w ith th e  crisis. At least, a s  im portant a s  ex ternal p ressu res , 
a re  th e  policy p references of th e  country’s  leadership and how they  
sought to  im plem ent them .
5.3 Building a  ‘New Korea’ & a  ‘New Economy9: Kim Young Sam  (1993 -  
1997)
In a  p ress  conference shortly a fte r his victory in th e  D ecem ber 
1992 presidential elections, Kim Young Sam, th e  country’s  first civilian 
president s ince  1961, vowed to  im plem ent sw eeping reform s to  build a 
‘New Korea’. 432 Kim’s  vision for th e  country em phasised th e  need  to 
consolidate dem ocracy, with a  c lean  governm ent and politics, a  strong 
econom y, a morally healthy society , and a  unified nation.^’For Kim, who 
officially becam e president on 25 February 1993, th e  consolidation of 
dem ocracy called for an executive-led cam paign to  clean-up th e  country’s  
old political and econom ic patterns, hab its  and institutions.
5.3.1 Cleaning th e  Government, Reorganising th e  Administration
President Kim’s  m ajor goal w as to  institu te  political reform, by first 
targeting  political corruption. Quoting a  Korean adage, Kim m ade c lea r 
th a t his anti-corruption cam paign to  su cceed  had to  s ta r t  from above: 
‘The river upstream  m ust be clean  if it is to  be clean  dow nstream .,434Thus, 
he initiated his cam paign by exposing th e  unethical behaviour of civil 
servan ts, military personnel, high-ranking governm ent officials, bank 
officials, a s  well a s  m em bers of th e  National Assembly and even form er 
presidents. Setting the  exam ple, and early  on in his m andate, Kim 
voluntarily d isclosed his financial incom e and w ealth  following the  
prom ise th a t ‘for the  five years of my term  I will not receive money from 
any business firm or individual.’^ ’Kim further em phasised  th a t during his
432‘Kim YS To Take Reformative Steps’, KT, l January 1993, p.l.
433See also Sung Deuk Hahm and Kwang Woong Kim, ‘Institutional Reforms and Democratization in Korea: 
The Case of the Kim Young Sam Administration, 1993-1998’; Governance: An International Journal o f Policy 
and Administration, 12 (1999), 479-494, p.478.
434‘Corruption Will Not be Tolerated’, KT, 10 February 1993, p.2.
435‘Kim Won’t Accept Political Funds’, KT, 5 March 1993, p.l.
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adm inistration *you will not hear th e  phrase  tie-in betw een political power 
and business groups a s  long a s  I am in office’, and th a t ‘w ithout action 
against unlawful political fund-raising, it is im possible to  e rad ica te  
corruption and irregularities.’
Under th e  p ressu re  of th e  president, the  s taff a t th e  presidential 
office (Blue House), cabinet, m em bers of th e  National Assembly, high- 
ranking civil servan ts , p rosecu tors and judges w ere also  asked  to  m ake 
their financial and property a s s e ts  publicly known.^'The re lease  of the  
financial s ta tem en ts  shocked th e  nation by revealing th e  degree of w ealth  
accum ulated  by officialdom and the  s ta tem en ts  served a s  evidence for 
th e  growing susp icions th a t th e  country’s  e lites  had enriched them selves 
through unethical m eans. Sim ultaneously, th e  cam paign unveiled th e  
ex ten t to  which several bank p residen ts had m anipulated th e  rules of the  
country’s  financial system  afte r taking bribes and forced borrow ers to  
deposit with them  in return for lo an s.^T h e  reform s w ere so  sw eeping and 
unexpected, in term s of their m agnitude th a t th e  Korean population 
seem ed  to  have been caught by surprise.43*!! w as, nevertheless, a  highly 
popular move th a t only boosted  Kim’s  popularity ratings.439
In th e  new  spirit of breaking tie s  w ith th e  p a s t military regim es, 
Kim Young Sam further a sse rted  his dem ocratic  legitim acy by excluding 
form er military personnel from cab inet p o sts  (except a s  defence minister), 
and dissolving a  military inner circle originally founded by Park Chung Hee 
nam ed Hanohoe (One Society). 440 Sim ultaneously, Kim w eakened  the
436For anti-corruption initiatives in the administration, National Assembly, and Prosecution Office, see ‘Financial 
Statements to Be Audited’, KT 7 March 1993, p.3, ‘War Launched Against Corruption in Officialdom’, KT 9
March 1993, p.3, ‘Prosecutors Wealth Bigger than Thought’, KT 28 March 1993, p.3, ‘Ruling DLP Seals Up
Lawmakers’ Wealth Issue, Hoping Repercussions Peter Out’, KT 31 March 1993, p.2, ‘Assets and Anxiety’, Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 8 April 1993, p.20, ‘Opposition Lawmakers Not Any Better When It Comes to 
Speculative Investment’, KT, 7 April 1993, p.3.
Bank of Seoul President Resigns’, KT 19 March 1993, p.9, ‘Clean-Up Drive Chills Banking Circle’, KT, 20 
March 1993, p.9, ‘KFB President Park Resigns’, KT, 15 April 1993, p.9.
438‘People Dizzied by Pres.Kim’s Quick, Bold Reform Action’, KT, 26 March 1993, p.2.
439‘Pres.Kim Given High Marks for Brooming Out Past’, KT, 25 March 1993, p.3.
440Young-Chul Paik, ‘Political Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea’; Korea and World Affairs, 18 
(1994), 730-748, pp.735-8.The Hanahoe, seen as the most politicised private organisation within the army, was 
created by Park Chung Hee as his military supporting backbone. Former Presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Roh 
Tae Woo were members of Hanahoe.
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capacity  of the  National Security Agency (formerly KCIA), and o ther 
intelligence and military agencies th a t had been used by form er military 
leaders a s  their oppressive tool aga inst political opposition and civil 
society . The m ajor political case , however, occurred in la te  1995, when 
th e  tw o form er p residen ts, Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, w ere 
arres ted  in an unprecedented  m ove.^T hus illustrating Kim’s  com m itm ent 
to  political reform.
P ressed  by Kim Young Sam, th e  p assag e  in th e  National Assembly 
of th e  Public Official Ethics Act in May 1993 and of th e  Presidential 
Emergency Order on Real Name Financial T ransaction System  th ree  
m onths la te r helped streng then  the  im age of a governm ent com m itted to 
consolidating dem ocracy and establishing a clean  governm ent. 442 The 
Public Officials Ethics Act im plem ented a system  requiring the  
registration and d isclosure of th e  a s s e ts  of public officials on a yearly 
basis. The objective of th e  system  w as to  m onitor any efforts by public 
officials to  enrich them selves through public serv ice by com paring the  
figures for their w ealth  before and afte r their appointm ents. The second  
case , the  real nam e financial transaction  system , seen  by th e  presiden t 
a s  th e  ‘reform of the  reform s’, aim ed a t curbing ongoing corrupt tie s  
betw een governm ent officials and business groups. 443 The m easure 
a ttem pted  not only to  facilita te  th e  investigation of, but also  to  control, 
informal money flows by tracking down th e  so u rces  of th e  funds hidden 
behind false  nam e bank accounts.
In 1994, th e  New Election Law and the  Political Fund Law, tw o 
o ther m ajor law s aiming a t securing le ss  costly  and rigged elections
44lFor the trial of the two former presidents, ‘Arrests of Two Ex-Presidents’; Korea Focus 3:6 (1995), 113-5 
(originally published as editorial in The Chosun Ilbo, December 4, 1995), and Jung Hae-gu, ‘History on Trial: 
Convictions Set Record Straight’; Korea Focus 4:5 (September-October 1996), 49-54 (originally published in 
the monthly newsmagazine Win, September 1996).
^ F o r  the Public Officials Ethics Act, see Paik, ‘Political Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea’, 
p.738. See also Hahm and Kim, ‘Institutional Reforms and Democratization in Korea’, p.482.
443This reform is examined in detail in Chapter Six.
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p assed  in th e  National A ssem bly.444 The New Election Law aim ed a t 
securing clean, le ss  costly  and freer e lections by se tting  a spending limit 
during th e  cam paign and thus acting ag ain st previous money-dominated 
elections involving vote-buying, en terta inm ent and gifts. The Political 
Fund Law, with th e  purpose of promoting fairness during elections, 
rectified th e  previous im balance in th e  distribution of political funds by 
th e  Central Election M anagem ent Com m ittee th a t tended  to  benefit the  
ruling party.
Finally, Kim Young Sam also  actively pursued the  reform of the  
adm inistrative appara tus by se tting  up a  Presidential Commission on 
Adm inistrative Reform (PCAR) in April 1993 and reorganising th e  cen tral 
adm inistration betw een March 1993 and D ecem ber 1994. One of the  
policies advocated by Kim during his cam paign and re ite ra ted  soon afte r 
his victory w as ‘sm all governm ent with strong leadership’. 444 The 
reorganisation of th e  adm inistration led to  th e  reduction of cen tral 
governm ent positions. This involved the  removal of nine m inisters and 
vice-m inisters, 34 general d irectors, 127 division chiefs, and alm ost 1,000 
lower adm inistrative positions. 444 Another m otivation underlying th is 
reorganisation w as th e  search  for g rea te r adm inistrative efficiency by 
removing w hat w ere considered to  be overlapping organisational 
functions and achieving effective policy coordination, in particu lar in th e  
econom ic and industrial policy a reas .447Among the  solutions found w as the  
m erger of several m inistries. For exam ple: m erger of th e  Economic 
Planning Board (EPB) and the  Ministry of Finance (MOF) in Decem ber 1994 
into th e  new  Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE).
In sum, under the  leadership of Kim Young Sam, th e  Korean s ta te  
initiated im portant political and adm inistrative reform s. Alongside the
^P aik , ‘Political Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea’, pp.740-2. See also ‘All Change: Political 
reforms set to shake up campaigning’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 March 1994, p.20.
445‘Kim YS To Take Reformative Steps’, KT 1 January 1993, p.l. For the PACR, see Hahm and Kim, 
‘Institutional Reforms and Democratization in Korea’, p.483.
446 Yong-Duck Jung, ‘Reforming the Administrative Apparatus in Korea: The Case of the “Civilian 
Government’” ; Korean Review o f Public Administration, 1 (1996), 253-290, pp.255-7.
^H ahm  and Kim, ‘Institutional Reforms and Democratization in Korea’, p.483.
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anti-corruption cam paign, and th e  legislative and adm inistrative reform s, 
th e  new  leadership also  announced th a t it would build a ‘New Economy’ 
described  by Kim Young Sam a s  ‘th e  econom y in which business 
ac tiv ities are  freed from regulations, one can  harvest according to  his 
sw eat, and social ju stice  is realized.’44*
5.3.2 Instituting th e  ‘New Economy’, Curbing th e  Chaebol
In early 1993, desp ite  high econom ic growth ra te s  by international 
s tandards, th e re  w as a  sen se  of econom ic gloom affecting th e  country. 
This w as due to  growing aw aren ess  th a t Korea w as undergoing a 
‘com petitive c risis ’ a s  the  country’s  industries began to  loose 
com petitiveness in the  international m arkets. The Economic Planning 
Board (EPB) said  th a t industrial output and shipm ents hit a 10-year low in 
1992, and analysts  pointed out th a t in th e  international m arkets, Korean 
products faced  com petition from ch eap er products originated in 
developing countries, a s  well a s  from m ore soph istica ted  and high-quality 
ones from Jap an  and the  US. These tw o countries su cceed ed  in cutting 
production c o s ts  by relocating their fac to ries  to  S ou theast Asia and Latin 
America.
The main th ru st of th e  ‘New Economy Plan’ (1993-1997) launched in 
Ju n e  1993 w as to  prom ote econom ic ju s tice  through fair incom e 
distribution and change th e  national pattern  of developm ent from being 
led by th e  s ta te  to  allow th e  private se c to r  to  tak e  th e  initiative.449 The 
plan included th ree  m ajor policy reforms: deregulation, privatisation, and 
internationalisation. The deregulation initiative sought to  ad d ress  th e  
growing com plaints from th e  private sec to r  th a t num erous regulations 
had increased  th e  co s t of doing business in Korea and deregulation w as 
seen  a s  a s tep  to  improve th e  country’s  business environm ent a s  well a s
448Byung-Sun Choi, ‘From Euphoria to Atrophy: The Politics of Economic Reform in Korea’, in Byung-Sun 
Choi, Hakun Kim, Jaehong Kim, Iljoong Kim, eds, Economic Reforms And Political Hurdles in Korea (Seoul: 
Korea Economic Research Institute, 1997), pp.9-47, p. 16, and ‘Pres.Kim Demands Sweat, Tears, To Pull Off 
Economic Leap’, KT, 20 March 1993, p.2.
^ F o r  an overview of the Five-Year Economic Development Plan, see Yonhap News Agency, Korea Annual 
1994 (Seoul: Yonhap News Agency, 1994), pp.66-74.
158
to  stop  corruption.480 During the  four-year period of Kim Young Sam ’s 
presidency, 5,788 deregulatory  m easu res  w ere se lec ted , with 4,648 
im plem ented and th e  remaining 1,140 in the  p rocess  of being 
deregulated .^’The privatisation program launched in 1993 se le c ted  61 out 
of a to tal of 133 state-ow ned  en te rp rises .48^ ! !  th e  se lec ted  firms w ere 
expected  to  be sold to  th e  private se c to r  by 1998. The governm ent 
announced th a t it would sell all th e  governm ent sh a res  and th a t it would 
tran sfe r m anagem ent rights to  th e  private se c to r  to  enhance  m anagerial 
efficiency.^Finally, th e  in ternationalisation program involved not only the  
country’s  ratification of th e  General A greem ent on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) following th e  successfu l se ttlem en t of th e  Uruguay Round, but 
a lso  th e  application to  en te r  th e  Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), both of which required th e  liberalisation of the  
econom y.484
Consequently, in acco rd an ce  with th e  se ttlem en t of th e  Uruguay 
Round, Kim Young Sam ’s  governm ent opened th e  country’s  import 
m arkets for th e  m anufacturing and serv ice  sec to rs . Despite strong 
dom estic political opposition, th e  agricultural sec to r  w as also  
opened. 488 Export-promotion m easu res and industrial policies w ere 
transform ed from directly supporting specific  sec to rs  to  providing and 
supporting infra-structural and sc ien ce  and technology developm ent-^A s 
a  requirem ent for th e  country to  join th e  OECD, an event th a t took p lace
450Seong Min Yoo and Sung Soon Lee, ‘Evolution of Industrial Organization and Policy Response in Korea: 
1945-1995’, in Dong-Se Cha, Kwang Suk Kim, Dwight H. Perkins, eds, The Korean Economy 1945-1995: 
Performance and Vision for the 21st Century (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1997), pp.426-467, p.455. 
For deregulation policy, see also Kim Iljoong, ‘Deregulation in Korea: A Critique from the Public Choice 
Perspective’, in Choi et al., eds, Economic Reforms and Political Hurdles in Korea, pp. 107-146.
451Sung-hee Jwa and Jun-Il Kim, ‘Korea’s Economic Reform: Political Economy and Future Strategy’, in 
Chung-in Moon and Jongryn Mo, eds, Democratization and Globalization in Korea: Assessments and Prospects 
(Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999), pp.247-271, p.261.
452Jaehon Kim, ‘Privatization Policy in Korea: Political Motivations Behind Economic Goals’, in Choi et al., 
Economic Reforms and Political Hurdles in Korea, pp.74-105, p.80.
453Y o o  and Lee, ‘Evolution of Industrial Organization and Policy Response in Korea: 1945-1995’, p.456.
454Chung-in Moon, ‘In the shadow of broken cheers: the dynamics of globalization in South Korea’, in Aseem 
Prakash and Jeffrey A. Hart, eds, Responding to Globalization (London: Routledge, 2000), pp.65-94, pp.74-5. 
See Ha Dong-man, ‘Basic Steps to Internationalize Korean Economy’; Korea Focus 2:2 (1994), 69-74, pp.68-9 
(originally published in The Monthly Nara Kyungje on Economic Policy, January 1994).
455Kim In-june, ‘Impact of Uruguay Round on Korean Economy’; Korea Focus 2:2 (1994), 29-37, p.29 
(originally published in The Shin Dong-a Monthly, January 1994).
456Moon, ‘In the shadow of broken cheers: the dynamics of globalization in South Korea’, p.75.
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in 1996, th e  governm ent announced in May 1993 a  com prehensive five- 
year financial liberalisation program  th a t would be added to  th e  ‘New 
Economy Plan’. This plan clearly  envisioned th e  reduction of the  
interventionist role of th e  s ta te  in th e  financial system . The plan 
com prised of four m ajor areas: (1) liberalisation of in te rest ra tes; (2) 
term ination of all policy loans by 1997; (3) m anagem ent of banks to  gain 
m ore autonomy; (4) and liberalisation of cap ita l accoun ts .487
As part of th e  ‘New Economy’ and its goal to  realise socia l justice , 
Kim Young Sam ’s  presidency also  sought to  dilute th e  chaeboPs econom ic 
concentration .^’This intention took th e  form of a chaebol specialisation  
policy which included th ree  in terrelated  goals: (1) reduction of the 
dom inant chaeboPs role in th e  economy; (2) push for specia lisa tion  in a 
few  core business activ ities a s  a  w ay to  improve international 
com petitiveness; and (3) the  promotion of small and medium-sized 
firm s.^’The final plan to  deal w ith th e  chaebol w as a  policy of forced 
‘specialisation’, in which th e  30 la rgest business groups w ere barred from 
further diversification into a reas  ‘new’ and ‘unrelated’ to  the ir core 
b u sin ess .^A s an incentive, th e  governm ent proposed to  elim inate credit 
limits and m ake m ore funds available to  th o se  chaebol th a t decided to  
stream line their businesses. Conversely, it w arned th a t fair trading 
regulations would be streng thened  on new  investm ents or loan 
g u aran tees for th o se  th a t preferred to  keep to  old habits. These 
incentives and penalties aim ed a t  guaranteeing  th e  chaeboPs com pliance 
with th e  policy.
The adm inistrative and econom ic reform s pursued by Kim Young 
Sam th rea tened  th e  equilibrium th a t had susta ined  th e  system  of 
socialisation of private risk, by reducing the  role of th e  s ta te  and
457Ismail Dalla and Deena Khatkhate, ‘Regulated Deregulation of the Financial System in Korea’; World Bank 
Discussion Papers 292 (Washington: The World Bank, 1995), pp. 19-23. See also ‘5-Year Reform Plan Set: 
Chaebol Won't Be Able to Abuse Financial Cos.’, KT, 29 May 1993, p.9.
458‘5-Year Plan Envisages Keeping Tighter Grip on Chaebol’, KT 21 April 1993, p.7.
459‘Divide and Rule: Kim hopes to reduce chaebol power’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 January 1993, p.22.
460Choi, ‘From Euphoria to Atrophy: The Politics of Economic Reform in Korea’, p.28.
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challenging th e  econom ic role of th e  chaebol in the  country’s  econom y. In 
th e  next sections, I show  how Kim Young Sam ’s  a ttem p ts  to  transform  
th e  foundations of th e  system  w ere m otivated by a  com bination of 
factors: historic and dom estic legacies, ideological m otivations, and 
international context.
5.4 Moulding th e  'N ew Korea’: H istorical Legacies, Ideological M otivations 
and International C ontext
In la te  1970s, and still under th e  leadership of Park Chung Hee, 
Korea en tered  a m ajor econom ic crisis. After a  long period of susta ined  
econom ic growth during th e  1960s and 1970s, th e  situation began to  
reverse  in the  la tte r period of th e  1970s.4<1Growth ra te s  th a t had averaged
9.3 percen t from 1972 to  1978 fell to  3.1 p ercen t betw een  1979 and 1981. 
In 1980, for the  first tim e since  1962, th ere  w as a decline of 3.7 percen t. 
Inflation ra te s  soared  to  18.3 p ercen t in 1979, 28.7 percen t in 1980 and 
21.6 p ercen t in 1981. Export growth ra te s  th a t had rapidly increased  s ince  
th e  1960s also  began to  falter, from 44.4 p ercen t in 1972-1978 to  18.7 
p ercen t in 1979-1981. The current accoun t deficit of 1.085 billion US 
dollars in 1978 grew  rapidly to  4.151 billion US dollars in 1979, 5.321 
billion US dollars in 1980 and 4.646 billion US dollars in 1981.^E xogenous 
and unexpected  even ts  contributed to  the  declining s ta tu s  of the  
econom y. The second  oil shock  hastened  inflation and led to  a  sharp  
increase  in th e  balance of paym ents d e f ic it^ ’The abrupt rise of in te rest 
ra te s  following the  oil shock  affected  Korea in particu lar b ecau se  the  
country had borrowed heavily abroad to  finance th e  heavy and chem ical 
industrialization of th e  1970s. Additionally, a  m ajor decline in local rice 
production in 1980, the  nation’s  main food crop, contributed to  rising 
inflation.
46lFor an account of the crisis in the late 1970s, see Chung-in Moon, ‘The Korean Economy in Transition: 
Political Consequences of Neoconservative Reforms’; Working Papers in Asia/Pacific Studies, 27706 
(Asia/Pacific Studies Institute, Duke University, March 1988).
462Sakong, Korea and the World Economy, pp.264-5 (Table A.39).
463Moon, ‘The Korean Economy in Transition’,p.3.
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While, exogenous factors added to  th e  econom ic crisis, th e  rapid 
and unbalanced growth of HCI, and its  im pact on th e  country’s  pa tte rn  of 
developm ent, began to  be sub jec ted  to  dom estic criticism s.464Undoubtedly, 
th e  country’s  econom y grew  rapidly during the  im plem entation of th e  HCI 
during the  1970s. However, the  policy also  cam e to  be seen  a s  leading to 
excessive  credit expansion, overinvestm ent, and underutilisation of 
industrial capacity .^L abour sh o rtag es  rose a s  th e  HCI dem and for high- 
skilled w orkers could not be m atched  by th e  m arket. This pushed w ages 
up th a t w ere not m et by sim ilar productivity gains. During 1975-1980, 
while productivity grew  by 11.2 percent, real w ages increased  by 13.4 
p e rcen t.466Additionally, th e  concentration  of financial resou rces in the  
developm ent of export-oriented heavy and chem ical industrial sec to rs  
drained the  dom estic-focused industries, mainly housing and consum er 
goods, of much needed capital to  expand their production in response  to 
th e  growing dem and of an increasingly affluent Korean population.467
The crisis had th e  effect of leading to  a rea ssessm en t of the  
country’s  old model of developm ent based  in the  system  of socialisation  
of private risk, specifically the  in teractive role played by th e  s ta te  and th e  
chaeboL Yet, a s  Merilee Grindle and John W. Thom as point out, ra ther 
than  s ta te  the  obvious, i.e., th a t crisis g en era tes  reform s, th e  question is 
to  understand w hat crisis m eans for th e  leadership in te rm s of th e  policy 
process  and th e  types of decisions th a t c risis  is expected  to 
engender.468^  Korea, th e  crisis  led policym akers to  progressively shift th e  
country’s  econom ic orientation from state-led  to  m arket-oriented.^’This 
w as already evident in th e  la s t years of Park’s  regime, following the  
appointm ent in la te  1978 of Shin Hyon Hwak a s  th e  new  Deputy Prime
464For a critical view by one of the country’s most renowned economists and policymakers during the 1980s on 
the problems generated by the heavy and chemical industrialisation, see Sakong, Korea and the World Economy, 
pp.56-66. II Sakong was the Senior Counsellor to the Minister of Economic Planning Board in 1982 and Senior 
Secretary to the President for Economic Affairs between 1983 and 1987.
465Sakong, Korea and the World Economy, pp.58-9.
466Moon, ‘The Korean Economy in Transition’, p.4.
467For a description of the problems affecting the domestic industries at the time, see Clifford, Troubled Tiger, 
pp. 131-3.
4 8Grindle and Thomas, Public Choices and Policy Change, p.74.
469Choi, Institutionalizing A Liberal Economic Order in Korea, pp.250-7.
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M inister (DPM). In April 1979, Shin announced th e  ‘Comprehensive 
M easures for Economic Stabilisation’. 470
Among th e  m easures w ere: (1) price deregulation and import 
liberalisation; (2) m ore investm ent in light industries to  produce essen tia l 
com m odities and n ecessitie s  to  co rrec t investm ent im balances; (3) 
tem porary suspension  of all new  and large sca le  pro jects and 
restructuring of th e  heavy and chem ical industrialisation; (4) tight 
m onetary policy, re-evaluation of preferential policy loans and financial 
s ec to r  reforms; and (5) a  ban on real e s ta te  speculation  to  prom ote 
savings. An unexpected  se rie s  of dom estic and international events, 
however, im peded th e  full im plem entation of th e  plan. Among them  w ere 
th e  assassin a tio n  of Park Chung Hee in O ctober 1979, and th e  sudden 
in creases  in oil p rices th a t severely  hit an econom y trying to  fight 
inflation. N evertheless, th e  principles underpinning th e  proposals survived 
th e  even ts a s  they  would la te r inspire the  econom ic policy cho ices 
undertaken by Korean leaders s ince  th e  1980s.
Furtherm ore, in th e  c a se  of Korea, th e  HCI had essen tia lly  been 
driven by the  country’s  chaebol. One of the  m ost significant outcom es of 
th is  industrial policy w as to  in crease  th e  chaeboPs control of th e  
country’s  econom y. This led to  a  growing conviction in Korea th a t one of 
th e  policy outcom es of th e  HCI s tra teg y  w as to  produce econom ic 
concentration  in th e  hands of a few  com panies and to  contribute to  th e  
country’s  unbalanced developm ent. As S tephan Haggard and Chung-in 
Moon argue: ‘th e  'big push ' (as th e  HCI becam e commonly known) w as 
blam ed for th e  increasing concentration  of w ealth , the  widening gap 
betw een rural and urban incom es, the  growth of urban m arginalism , and- 
perhaps -  m ost im portantly, sharp  increases in th e  prices of basic 
n ecess itie s  and housing in urban a rea s .’471
470Choi, Institutionalizing a Liberal Economic Order in Korea, pp.256-7.
47lStephan Haggard and Chung-in Moon, ‘Institutions and Economic Growth: A Theory and the Korean Case’; 
World Politics, 42 (1990), 210-237, p.218.
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5.4.1 The Legacies of Chun Doo Hwan (1980-1987) and Roh Tae Woo (1988- 
1992)
Under th e se  conditions inherited from th e  regim e led by Park 
Chung Hee, th e  Fifth Republic under Chun Doo Hwan (1980-1987) and th e  
Sixth Republic under Roh Tae Woo (1988-1992) took th e  initiative to  a lte r 
th e  rules of the  gam e em bedded in th e  system  of socialisation of private 
risk. The new  econom ic policies involved changes in th e  ‘spoils’ system  
c rea ted  by Park Chung Hee not only due to  econom ic priorities, but also  in 
response  to  the  growing belief th a t previous chaebol-biased policies had 
intensified econom ic inequalities in th e  country. The new  s tra teg ie s  
began to  reflect the  ideological paradigm  shift from ‘growth-first’ th a t w as 
a t the  basis  of th e  Park’s  regim e to  ‘fairness of w ealth  distribution’. The 
la tte r  aim ed a t econom ic and socia l equity a s  well a s  balanced econom ic 
developm ent which included th e  reduction of th e  chaeboPs econom ic 
concentration .472 With ‘econom ic stability  and gradual liberalisation’ s e t  a s  
th e  new  econom ic orientation and ‘fairness of w ealth  distribution’ a s  th e  
new  ideological paradigm, th e  presidencies of Chun Doo Hwan and Roh 
Tae Woo w ere not only responding to  the  country’s  changing econom ic 
conditions, but also  trying to  gain political support and legitim acy among 
th e  growing and urbanised Korean middle c la ss .473
In th e  Korean political system  w henever a  new  leader em erged to  
tak e  over th e  presidency he sought to  c a s t off and to  d iscredit th e  form er 
p residen t’s  legacy by undertaking m ajor changes in th e  organisation of 
th e  s ta te  and its  policies. This ultim ately leads to  a  reconfiguration of th e  
s ta te ’s  tie s  with society. Hahm Sung Deuk argues th a t th is s tra teg y  by the  
new  presiden ts builds on the ir am bitions to  leave their m ark on history. 
Since the  new  leaders did not have strong political b ases, they  would 
a ttem p t to  expose the  wrongdoings of th e  p as t p residencies to  boost their
472 Byung-Sun Choi, ‘Political and Economic Democratization and Its Impact on Govemment-Business 
Relationship in Korea’; The Korean Journal o f Policy Studies, 3 (1988), 30-50, p.34.
473For Chun Doo Hwan and middle class, see Moon, ‘The Korean Economy in Transition’, p.9. In the case of 
Roh Tae Woo, among the main political goals of the Sixth Republic were distributive justice, promotion of 
labour’s welfare and die growth of middle class. See Lee,7Tie State, Society and Big Business in South Korea,
pp.60-1.
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own political legitim acy.474The political legitim acy of Chun Doo Hwan w as 
w eakened by th e  fac t th a t his regim e had illegally seized pow er through a 
military coup d 'e ta t a s  well a s  by its  d ictatorial and authoritarian  nature. 
On th e  o ther side, Roh Tae Woo, d esp ite  winning seem ingly open and fair 
dem ocratic  e lec tions, obtained only 36 p ercen t of the  to ta l vote and had 
still to  su cceed  in gaining the  tru s t of th e  socie ty  in face  of his personal 
t ie s  with Chun Doo Hwan and his military p as t.47SFurtherm ore, in th e  c a se  
of Roh, he had to  face  a new  and unfam iliar political terrain  a s  th e  
country’s  dem ocratic  transition beginning in 1987 estab lished  new  
conventions and custom s for political participation.
P residen ts Chun and Roh vowed to  estab lish  clean  governm ent in 
Korea by undertaking anti-corruption purges a s  well a s  adm inistrative 
reform s a s  a  w ay to  b u ttress  their political legitim acy.476For exam ple, in 
1981, under th e  au thoritarian  leadership  of Chun, th e  Korean governm ent 
initiated th e  country’s  first reduction-oriented adm inistrative reform th a t 
led to  th e  elim ination of many high-ranking positions.477Park Chung Hee 
had expanded th e  role of the  s ta te  in th e  econom y by: creating  several 
agencies; transform ing th e  bureaucracy  into a  m eritocratic  adm inistrative 
body and; changed th e  econom ic a rch itec tu re  to  allow g rea te r  s ta te  
intervention. In co n trast, Chun s e t  a  new  agenda of adm inistrative reform 
by defending th e  creation  of a ’sm all governm ent’. 478 Yong-Duck Jung 
argues th a t th e  ultim ate consequence  of Chun’s  policy initiative w as to
474Interview in Seoul with Hahm Sung Deuk, Director of the Centre for Presidential Studies (Korea University), 
26 June 2001.
475 Roh won because the opposition votes were split between Kim Young Sam from the Reunification 
Democratic Party and Kim Dae Jung from the Party for Peace and Democracy, who failed to present a unified 
political platform. The divided opposition votes together totalled 55 percent of the total votes.
476For a journalist’s account of the “purification campaign” during Chun Doo Hwan, see Clifford, Troubled 
Tiger, pp. 163-169. See also Kang, Crony Capitalism, pp. 104-106. Among the ones affected by the purge were 
former Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil, the former head of the Korean Central Agency (KCIA) and Presidential 
Chief of Staff in the Blue House, Lee Hu Rak, and former Presidential Economic Secretary and architect of the 
heavy and chemical industrialisation, Oh Won Choi. For a brief summary on the hearings at the National 
Assembly during the presidency of Roh Tae Woo, see ‘Hearings Bring Real Picture of 5th Republic Irregularities 
to Light’, KT, 11 November 1988, p.2. Revelations during the parliamentary inquiry led to the arrest and 
imprisonment of several ‘power brokers’ during the Fifth Republic and the ‘exile’ of President Chun in a 
Buddhist monastery. See ‘47 Arrested in Probe of Past Regime’s Scandals’, KT, 1 February 1989, p.l.For the 
process leading to the new democratic constitution, see Shin Doh C., Mass Politics and Culture in 
Democratizing Korea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.4.
477Chung-Kil Chung, ‘Conditions of Successful Administrative Reform -  A Historical Perspective The 
Korean Journal o f Policy Studies, 8 (1993), 1-14, pp.l 1-2.
478Jung, ‘Reforming the Administrative Apparatus in Korea’, p.257.
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imbue Korean socie ty  with a new  norm of adm inistrative reform entailing 
th e  reduction of th e  adm inistrative organisation, s ta ff and budget.479
Similarly, while Park’s  governm ent had developed a  cooperative 
understanding with the  chaebol to  g uaran tee  th e  m ain tenance and 
consolidation of th e  system  of ’socialisation  of private risk’, Chun and Roh 
decided to  publicly adopt an anti-chaebol posture to  ad d ress  th e  issue of 
fa irness of w ealth  distribution. Under Chun, and in face  of th e  country’s 
deteriorating econom ic conditions, th e  executive first im plem ented a 
successfu l stab ilisation  program th a t helped th e  econom y rebound, and 
la te r  s tructural ad justm ent reform s to  change th e  country’s  pattern  of 
industrial developm ent/^T he structu ra l ad justm ent program, in particular, 
by involving th e  restructuring of industry, financial liberalisation and 
gradual opening of the  dom estic m arket to  foreign im ports w as expected  
to  specifically affect the  activ ities of th e  country’s  chaebol-4*1
As with Chun, Roh Tae Woo also  pursued anti-chaebol policies, 
which included cred it restric tions and tax  probes to  fight th e  growing real 
e s ta te  and s to ck  m arket speculation , and to  push the  chaebol to 
undertake business specialisation  to  improve their international 
com petitiveness and reduce their econom ic concentration . 492 The 
governm ent asked  business groups to  d ispose of their idle land and 
buildings. In c a se  of non-com pliance, th e  governm ent th rea tened  a 
possible veto  over a c c e ss  to  bank loans; im m ediate repaym ent of
479Jung, ‘Reforming the Administrative Apparatus in Korea’, p.258.
480For a detailed analysis of the economic reforms undertaken during the regime of Chun Doo Hwan, see Moon, 
‘The Korean Economy in Transition’.
48lFor an overview on the financial reforms during Chun Doo Hwan, see Pyung Jo Kim, ‘Financial Institutions: 
Past, Present, and Future’, paper presented at the workshop on Comparative Analysis o f Development Policies in 
China, Japan, and Korea, Seoul, 16-20 May 1990, pp.29-40.
482For the fight against real estate speculation, see Hee-Nam Jung, Land, State And Capital: The Political 
Economy o f Land Policies in South Korea, 1960-1990, Doctoral dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1993, pp.6-8. 
See also Jae-young Son, ‘A Brave Experiment: Korea’s Recent Land Policy Reform And the Role of Land 
Holding Tax’; KDI Working Paper No.9302 (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, March 1993), p.8 (Table 2). 
A study on land distribution done by a committee set by the government in 1989 found out that the top 5 percent 
of land owners held 65.2 percent of all land area owned by individuals and that “the degree of land concentration 
probably exceeded even the most pessimistic of previous estimates, and is far worse than any indicators of 
income distribution.” See also ‘Top 30 Biz Conglomerates Front Runners in Buying Speculative Real Estate’, 
KT, 7 March 1990, p.7. On dealings in the stock market, see ‘Biz Groups’ Portfolio Income Doubled’, KT, 12 
October 1989, p.9.
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outstanding bank loans and; tax  investigations.^A dditionally, each  of the  
top 30 business groups w ere pushed to  nom inate tw o or th ree  
subsid iaries a s  their ‘core business’ and strongly urged to  sp ec ia lise  in 
th e se  industries, in exchange for th e  exclusion of th e se  subsid iaries from 
th e  list of cred it controls.4*4
The an ti-chaebol policies pursued by Chun and Roh failed to 
produce th e  desired  result. The country’s  conglom erates m anaged to 
overcom e the  o b s tac le s  e rec ted  by th e  governm ent and tak e  advantage 
of th e  liberalisation m easures. For exam ple, the  liberalisation of th e  non­
banking financial s e c to r  (e.g., short-term  finance com panies, secu rities  
corporations, insurance com panies) and th e  growing in ternationalisation 
of th e  country’s  financial system  offered th e  chaebol th e  opportunity to 
a c c e s s  new  so u rces  of corporate  financing desp ite  a ttem p ts  to  limit 
cred it flows to  th e  conglom erates. The cred it control system  
im plem ented in 1984 did not apply to  non-banking financial institu tions 
(NBFIs).4**By th e  end of 1989, Korea’s  30 m ajor conglom erates took on 39 
p ercen t of all outstanding  loans a t NBFIs, com pared with 32.4 p ercen t in 
1988.4**A trend th a t continued during the  presidency of Roh Tae Woo, as  
the  chaebol increased  their control of financial institu tions a s  a  medium 
to  ra ise  business funds.4*7
Furtherm ore, while both Chun and Roh publicly m aintained th a t 
they did not w an t econom ic pow er to  be co ncen tra ted  in th e  hands of a 
few  chaebol, they  nonethe less  continued to  favour a  se lec ted  few  am ong
483‘49 Big Firms Told to Dispose Of Idle Land Within 6 Months’, KT, 9 May 1990, p.l. See ‘30 Business 
Groups Asked to Report Hidden Real Estate’, KT, 9 May 1990, p.6.
484‘30 Large Business Groups Subject to Credit Control’, KT, 15 March 1990, ‘Biz Specialization To Be Freed 
from Credit Control’, KT, 29 March 1990, p.9.
485The liberalisation of the non-banking financial sector began in the early 1970s, as shown in the previous 
Chapter, but was accelerated during the 1980s. Following the “Madame Chang” scandal in 1982, which is 
analysed in Chapter Six, the government allowed the opening of more mutual savings and finance companies 
(MSFCs) and short-term finance companies (STFCs) as long as they had the minimum capital requirement as a 
way to attract funds from the underground money market. See ‘Gov’t Frees Establishment of Short-Term 
Finance Cos’, KT, 29 July 1982, p.l.
486‘Nonbanks Dominating Financial Marts’, KT, 16 March 1990, p.9.
487‘Large Business Groups’ Entry Into Financial Sector on Constant Rise’, KT, 16 September 1992, p.9. A report 
released by the Korea Development Institute in September 1992, revealed that the share of capital owned by the 
country’s largest 30 chaebol in 1990 in financial institutions had already increased to 45.04 percent from 38.73 
percent in 1986.
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th e  conglom erates through their control of th e  banking system  and 
perm its and licenses for lucrative investm ent pro jects. In exchange, th e  
favoured corporations would com e forward with political donations. This 
w as evident, first, in the  ca se  of Chun, with th e  im plem entation of the  
Industrial Rationalisation Program and th e  firms th a t w ere se lec ted  to 
tak e  over w eaker ones in m erger plans for certa in  business a rea s . In 
Rob’s  case , it w as seen  in the  ten d er announced for six  large governm ent 
pro jects in mid-1992. 489 During th e  Chun and Roh adm inistrations, the 
streng th  of th e  s ta te  began to progressively w ane a s  th e  country pursued 
a phased  liberalisation of th e  econom y. The s ta te  continued, nonetheless, 
through its  control of th e  financial system , to  hold enough pow er to  
negotia te  the  rules of th e  gam e with a  se le c ted  few. Additionally, and 
desp ite  the  anti-cfiaebol policies, the  econom ic and political pow er of th e  
conglom erates rem ained very much in ta c t .499 These w ere im portant 
institutional and political legacies left by Chun and Roh th a t a s  ‘policy 
feedback* helped shap e  Kim’s  policy initiatives to  challenge th e  status  
quo within th e  system  of “socialisation  of private risk”.
5.4.2 Moral Leadership and th e  Ideology of D em ocratic Reform
With a  long history a s  an opposition leader during th e  military 
regim es cam paigning for th e  dem ocratisation  of Korea, th e  election  of 
Kim Young Sam in 1993 rep resen ted  a  turning point in the  country’s 
history and a  further s tep  tow ards th e  consolidation of th e  dem ocratic  
p rocess  initiated in 1987 with th e  29th Ju n e ’s  D eclaration.490Soon afte r his
488For the political considerations influencing the Industrial Rationalisation Program during Chun Doo Hwan, 
see Chapter Two, pp.53-5. The 6 large government projects, known as the “Last Golden Eggs” included mobile 
telecommunications service, passenger car manufacturing, cable television service, high-speed railroad between 
Seoul and Pusan, an international airport in Inch’on, and the construction of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
carrier. The involvement in these public projects was expected to redefine the domestic business scenario in the 
21st century. With presidential elections in December 1992, the licensing of such public projects was seen by 
some as an opportunity for the ruling party to collect political funds. For the public projects, see ‘Conglomerates 
Lobbying for 6 Large Gov’t Projects’, KT, 26 June 1992, p.8 and ‘Big Public Projects’ Approvals Must Be 
Delegated to Next Gov’t’, KT, 30 June 1992, p.7.
489For an analysis of the continuing economic concentration in the hands of the chaebol by the early 1990s, see 
Min Byoung-moon, ‘How Should the Conglomerates be Dismantled?’; Korea Focus 1:1 (1993), pp.57-67 
(originally published in the Shin Dong-A Monthly, August 1992).
490For the full declaration, see Robert Bedeski, The Transformation o f South Korea, Reform and Reconstruction 
in the Sixth Republic under Roh Tae Woo, 1987-1992 (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 169-170. The Declaration, 
an eight-point pledge by Roh Tae Woo, then the presidential candidate for the ruling Democratic Justice Party
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victory, speaking to  journalists, Kim Young Sam em phasised th a t ‘my 
governm ent will be totally different from Roh’s and I will exerc ise  
presidential pow er fully and guide the  nation through strong 
leadership .’^ A s  Young-Chul Paik points out, ‘political reform under Kim’s  
adm inistration w as s ta r ted  under th e  initiative of th e  president him self 
and carried out by his personal drive. Kim’s  reform w as thus ‘reform from 
above’ often accom panied by th e  elem ent of surprise, even bypassing 
c lose  advisers.’^ D oh  C. Shin argues th a t, driving Kim Young Sam w as a 
se n se  th a t ‘dem ocratic  consolidation required th e  building of a truly moral 
com m unity by removing every authoritarian enclave ra ther than 
sustaining an alliance with it.’493
It w as a  vision not only based  on ‘legal legitim acy’ following his 
election through free and d irect e lections, but also  on morality.494!! w as a 
sty le  of leadership informed by traditional Confucian political d iscourse 
founded on the belief th a t when a  man reached  a  certa in  level of moral 
integrity then people w ere expected  to  follow him making it unnecessary  
for the  leader to  reso rt to  naked pow er or th e  use  of violence.49SKim Young 
Sam w anted  to  p resen t him self a s  a  moral ruler and root his presidency 
on w hat, in Confucian te rm s is known a s  th e  ‘rule of m an’. As Kim put it, 
‘it is my belief th a t a  leader can  ex e rt true  authority  and strong leadership 
only w hen he leads by exam ple and s e ts  high eth ical s tandards. My 
conviction is th a t the  eth ical integrity of th e  leader is essen tia l to building 
a  sound socie ty  and a  healthy socie ty .’496 Hence, and in an a ttem p t to  
a t te s t  to  his moral leadership, Kim opened the  a rea  near th e  previously 
secre tive  Blue House to  th e  public for th e  first tim e in decades, and
(DJP) in the country’s first direct presidential elections, served as the blueprint for the country’s new democratic 
Constitution. Drafted and approved by the National Assembly and ratified by more than 90 percent of the votes 
in a national referendum, the constitution underlined the principles of presidential democracy, i.e., the separation 
of powers and checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government. 
49,‘Kim YS To Take Reformative Steps’, KT, 1 January 1993, p.l.
492Paik, ‘Political Reforms and Democratic Consolidation in Korea’, p.739.
493Shin, Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea, p.201.
494Chaibong Hahm and Sang-young Rhyu, ‘Democratic Reform and Consolidation in South Korea: The Promise 
of Democracy’, in Chung-in Moon and Jongryn Mo, eds, Democratization and Globalization in Korea: 
Assessments and Prospects (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999), pp.69-88, pp.78-80.
495Hahm and Rhyu, ‘Democratic Reform and Consolidation in South Korea’, p.79.
496See Kim Young Sam, ‘Toward Resurrection of the National Economy’; Korea Focus, 1:5 (1993), p.128 
(speech at the National Assembly on September 21,1993).
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ordered th e  destruction  of a se rie s  of ‘safe  houses’ used by form er 
p residen ts for w hat w ere seen  a s  suspicious and informal political 
m eetings.497
5.4.3 Responding to  International Changes: Trade Conflicts, WTO, OECD and 
Seghewya
Since 1965, Korea has becom e increasingly in tegrated  in th e  
international econom y. That year, to ta l trad e  volume am ounted to  630 
million US dollars, or 21 percen t of th e  country’s  GDP. But thirty years 
later, in 1995, th e  volume had increased  to  260.18 billion US dollars, 
accounting for alm ost 57 percen t of th e  country’s  GDP. By 1997, trad e  
volume reached  63.5 percen t of GDP to  m ake the  country a ’truly trading 
s ta te ’.^'But th is increasing econom ic in terdependence exposed Korea to  
s tructu ra l limits of its  own pro tectionist m easures.499ln th e  afterm ath  of 
th e  country’s  trad e  surplus betw een 1985 and 1987, Korea’s  trading 
partners, in particu lar th e  US, began to  dem and reciprocal m arket 
opening under th re a t of voluntary export restra in ts, quantity  restric tions 
and anti-dumping m easu res .900 Sim ultaneously, m ultilateral p ressu res  to  
open th e  dom estic m arket intensified with the  em ergence of th e  World 
Trade Organization (WTO).S01While growing international p ressu res  might 
have played an im portant role in shaping Kim Young Sam ’s  initiative to  
open th e  dom estic m arkets, Kim himself seem s to  have been predisposed 
to  tak e  on an in ternationalist approach during his presidency. Speaking to  
reporters in February 1994, he clarified his thinking about th e  
internationalisation of Korea:
497‘Chong Wa Dae (Blue House) Safe Houses Not ‘Safe’ Anymore’, KT, 6 March 1993, p.2. See also Yonhap 
News Agency, Korea Annual 1994 (Seoul: Yonhap News Agency), pp.57-9.
498Moon, ‘In the shadow of broken cheers’, p.72.
499For an analysis of the extent of import controls within a case of export-oriented economy as Korea between 
the 1960s and early 1980s, see for example, Richard Luedde-Neurath, Import Controls and Export-Oriented 
Development: A Reassessment o f the South Korean Case (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1986).
500Ahn and Kim, ‘The Outward-Looking Trade Policy and the Industrial Development of South Korea’, p.355. 
For U.S and European Community (EC) trade actions against Korea during the 1980s, see C.S. Elliot Kang, 
‘Segyehwa Reform of the South Korean Developmental State’, in Samuel S. Kim, ed, Korea's Globalization 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.76-101, pp.80-4.
0lJwa and Kim, ‘Korea's Economic Reform’, p.258, and Ahn and Kim, ‘The Outward-Looking Trade Policy 
and the Industrial Development of South Korea’, p.361.
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I am chagrined to  find th a t the im portance of internationalization is ye t to 
be generally well understood and th a t a  solid co nsensus has ye t to  be 
formed on th is ta sk . A century  ago, w e failed to  internationalize on our 
own initiative and w ere thus forced by o th ers  to  open up our country. This 
is why Korea rem ained backw ard, soon to  be reduced to  a colony of a 
foreign power. If w e are  not to  rep ea t th e  m istakes w e m ade 100 years 
ago a t th e  tim e of Korea’s  first opening, w e m ust actively endeavour to  
accom plish Korea’s  second opening on our own initiative. We m ust learn 
th e  lessons of history. Instead of deploring th e  fac t th a t our doors are 
unlocking, w e should ourselves throw  our doors open and m arch out into 
th e  w ide world.602
Kim’s intentions to  ‘in ternationalise’ th e  country em erged soon 
afte r his election in 1993, a s  his presidency w ithout much national 
consultation decided to  push for th e  country’s  formal m em bership 
application to  th e  Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). The accessio n  happened in 1996, but a s  a  pre­
condition for entry, Korea proceeded with th e  liberalisation of capital 
acco u n ts  and undertook a se rie s  of o ther financial reform s. The idea of 
entering OECD w as first publicly advanced by Kim Young Sam  in his 
election platform in 1992.603Joining th e  OECD ultim ately rep resen ted  also  
the  country’s  b es t opportunity to  advance into th e  ranking of advanced 
nations, and to  realise  one of th e  core e lem en ts  of Kim’s  vision for the  
country: ‘My only desire  is th a t I will go down in history a s  th e  president 
who laid a solid foundation for an advanced country, a country of high 
eth ical s tandards. To have p assed  on a proud country to  posterity  is my 
so le dream  and w ish.’504
By the  end of 1994, dem ocratic  reform d iscourse began to  loose 
appeal within th e  population, a s  dem ocratic  consolidation s ta rted  to  be
502Kim Young Sam’s Opening Remarks at a Press Conference to Mark the First Anniversary of his presidency 
(February 25, 1994) in Yonhap News Agency, Korea Annual 1994, p.353.
03Andrew Horvart, ‘Living the sham of a free market’, Euromoney, September 1996, p.328.
504Kim, “Toward Resurrection of the National Economy’, p. 134.
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taken  for granted. Kim Young Sam then  began to  advocate  w hat becam e 
known as  segyehwa (globalisation), a s  th e  new  ideological fram ework 
underpinning his presidency.80SThe new  policy becam e a  ‘new  hegem onic 
ideology’ to  rep lace th e  old developm entalism .a°'Segye#iwa did not only 
ta rg e t th e  econom ic arena, but also  education , law, foreign policy, 
politics, culture, environm ent and quality of life. The new  ideological 
fram ew ork provided Kim Young Sam with a  new  political catch-phrase, to 
rep lace th e  dem ocratic  reform d iscourse. But it w as a lso  used to  
legitim ise political m anoeuvres n ecessary  in face  of th e  country’s  new 
international com m itm ents. For exam ple, in th e  afterm ath  of th e  Uruguay 
Round se ttlem en t, th e  governm ent fearing, retalia tion against Korean- 
m ade m anufactured products, decided to  open th e  dom estic rice m arket 
to  foreign im ports desp ite  strong dom estic opposition. The deliberation to  
open the  dom estic rice m arket could be justified in th e  nam e of 
segyehw a.507Thus, segyehwa becam e an instrum ent to  redefine existing 
and essen tia lly  inward-looking preferences w ithin th e  Korean socie ty  and 
to  help c rea te  new  ones welcom ing foreign fo rces.s0*At th e  sam e time, 
segyehwa also served  to  validate th e  im plem entation of sw eeping policy 
changes a s  th e  country opened its  dom estic m arkets.
In th is section , I show ed how Kim Young Sam ’s  actions to 
transform  the  system  of “socialisation of private risk” w ere moulded by 
the  in teraction of historical and dom estic  legacies, ideological 
m otivations, and international events. However, a s  I will point out in the 
nex t section , Kim’s  reform ist project w as m arred by w eak  econom ic 
leadership th a t produced inconsisten t and erra tic  policy choices. 
Sim ultaneously, Kim com m itted th e  s tra teg ic  error to  pursue his reform ist 
project by adm inistrative fiat w ithout building a  supporting coalition. This
505For an analysis of the emergence of segyehwa as the ideological leitmotiv sustaining the presidency of Kim 
Young Sam, see Davis B. Bobrow and James J. Na, ‘Korea’s Affair with Globalizaton: Deconstructing 
Segyehwa’, in Moon and Mo, eds, Democratization and Globalization in Korea: Assessments and Prospects, 
pp. 179-207.
06Moon, ‘Democratization and Globalization as Ideological and Political Foundations of Economic Policy’, p.l 1
507Moon, ‘In the shadow of broken cheers’, (2000), pp.75-6.
508See for example Lee Hong-Koo, ‘Attitudinal Reform Toward Globalization’; Korea Focus, 2:2 (1994), pp.85- 
94 (originally published in Sasang Quarterly, Winter 1993).
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had th e  effect of w eakening th e  capacity  of th e  s ta te  to  superv ise  the  
financial and corporate  sec to rs  which ultim ately contributed to  the  
m ism anagem ent of th e  econom y and th e  IMF crisis.
5.5 Blitzing Reforms From Above: W eak Leadership, Coalition Failures and 
Crisis
The segyehwa  policy Korea is pursuing rep resen ts  an effort to  
elim inate th e  inefficiency and m alpractice stem m ing from protectionism  
and regulation and improve and upgrade institutional sy stem s and 
p rac tices  to  a world level. The ultim ate objective is to  m ake Korea a 
country people all over th e  world would like to  visit, invest in and reside 
in. In th is  sen se , th e  segyehwa policy th a t Korea is pushing is not for the  
sak e  of Korea alone, but also  to  help th e  developm ent of th e  world a s  a 
w hole.809 (Kim Young Sam, May 1996)
In 1997, th e  country’s  m acro-econom ic situation  seem ed  to  be 
improving in com parison with previous years. The curren t accoun t deficit 
had decreased  from 23.7 billion US dollars in 1996 to  8.8 billion US dollars 
in 1997. Inflation had been s tab le  with an increase  of 4.4 p ercen t during 
th e  year, and th e  econom y w as expected  to  grow 7 percent. S1°Yet, on 
November 1997, th e  governm ent announced th a t it had appealed  for 
a ss is ta n c e  of the  International M onetary Fund (IMF). As Chung-in Moon 
put it, ‘the  myth of Korean econom ic m iracle w as sh a tte red , and national 
sham e prevailed.’911As m entioned in th e  introduction to  th e  chap ter, tw o 
m ajor c au se s  have been identified a s  contributing to  th e  crisis: the  
dism antling of industrial policy and financial liberalisation. Under th is  new  
environm ent, th e  capacity  of th e  s ta te  to  guide and discipline th e  chaebol 
through th e  control of cred it allocation w eakened. Hence, Korean 
conglom erates rapidly expanded their borrowing, which resu lted  in over-
509Kim Young Sam’s speech to the Seventh Annual Corporate Conference of the Asia Society Toward the 
Globalization of the Republic of Korea (Seoul, May 9, 1996) in Yonhap News Agency, Korea Annual 1996 
(Seoul: Yonhap News Agency, 1996), p.364.
5,0Joon-Ho Hahm, ‘Financial System Restructuring in Korea. The Crisis and Its Resolution’; KDI Working 
Paper No.9802 (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, Feb. 1998), p.4.
511Moon, ‘In the shadow of broken cheers’, p.77.
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investm ent and high indeb tedness in a move th a t endangered th e  stability  
of th e  country’s  financial system  built on tight tie s  betw een the  banks and 
industry.
I argue th a t th e  Korean s ta te  failed to  superv ise and discipline the  
corporate  and financial sec to rs  b ecau se  of w eak econom ic leadership 
th a t form ulated inconsisten t policy decisions alongside a s tra teg ic  failure 
in building a supporting coalition to  push th e  reform s ahead . In th e  Korean 
political system  w here th e  president is expected  to  be actively involved in 
th e  formulation, monitoring and im plem entation of public policies, 
P resident Kim Young Sam failed to  perform th a t role.
First, Kim Young Sam had many advisors, but his poor econom ic 
understanding contributed to  his lack of system atic  vision to  reform the  
econom y. s12The decision to  apply for th e  country’s  accessio n  to  th e  OECD 
serv es  well a s  an exam ple. While th e  decision to  en te r  th e  OECD could 
offer th e  opportunity to  ‘overcom e en trenched  bureaucra tic  and corporate  
o b stac le s  to  needed reform s’, a s  argued by th e  governm ent, it also  
involved w hat w as seen  a s  a  prem ature liberalisation of th e  cap ital 
accoun t.s13This policy w as seen  a s  highly risky and critic ised  by officials 
a t  th e  Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) and th e  Bank of Korea 
(BOK) for th e  negative im plications it could have for th e  country’s  
econom y. An official a t  the  MOFE said  th a t the  m inistry’s  g rea te s t fear 
w as ‘hot money from abroad’, which could cau se  ‘very high dam age if 
suddenly w ithdrawn. If th a t happens, w e cannot m aintain th e  soundness 
of m arkets.’s14Kim Young Sam, nevertheless, decided to  go ahead.
51 interview with Hahm Seung Deuk, Director of the Centre for Presidential Studies (Korea University) in Seoul, 
26 June 2001.
513,Korea’s OECD Entry and Tasks Ahead’; Korea Focus, 4:6 (1996), pp.120-1 (originally published as an 
editorial of The Korea Economic Daily, November 27,1996).
514Quoted in Peter McGill, ‘Joining the Club’, Euromoney, September 1995, pp.373-4. Mcgill quotes another 
economist from the BOK who said:
We have to be more competitive before we open our financial markets. The World Trade Organization and 
OECD are demanding we liberalize all regulations in the banking sector. We feel we have already opened too 
much, but we read in the newspapers that the OECD is still not happy. My view is that we have many things to 
lose if we hurry up to enter the OECD.
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Kim Young Sam ’s  image of w eak  econom ic leadership w as further 
accen tu a ted  by th e  fac t th a t he failed to  com m it him self to  several s tag e s  
of th e  econom ic policy process, and instead  delegated  authority  to  his 
sta ff in the  Blue House.""Comparing Kim Young Sam ’s  presidency with 
subsequen t adm inistration by Kim Dae Jung  (1998-2003), Kim Tae Hwan, 
a d irector a t MOFE, s ta ted  th a t in th e  la tte r  c a se , the  governm ent w as 
much more cen tralised . There w ere around 20 m inisters formally allowed 
to  s e t  independent policies, but in fac t they  had to  report to  th e  president 
anytim e they would com e up with a  new  p ro je c t.818 The continuous 
reshufflings of th e  country’s  econom ic bureaucracy  during Kim Young 
Sam ’s  m andate w as an indication of a leadership in disarray over 
econom ic policy cho ices, with Deputy Prime M inisters (DPMs) in charge of 
finance and econom y reshuffled seven  tim es and with an average tenure 
of less  than eight m onths. Consequently, it becam e practically  unfeasible 
for th e  MOFE to  form ulate and im plem ent co n sis ten t policies.817This w eak 
econom ic leadership eventually contributed to  bureaucratic  d ispu tes over 
policy choices and policy gridlock.t1*
Sim ultaneously, by rooting his leadership and reform initiatives in 
Confucian moral codes, Kim Young Sam tried  to  distinguish his 
presidency from p as t regim es and push for far-reaching reform s w ithout 
the  prerequisite of a supporting coalition .819 It w as a  s tra teg ic  failure 
becau se  w ithout a reliable and supporting coalition to  push ahead  with 
the  new  policies, th e  reform s initiated by Kim Young Sam would com e 
under th rea t. Capitalising on his w ide initial popularity a s  th e  country’s 
first civilian president s ince  the  1960s and a s  a  leading figure of the
See also ‘Korea’s Entry into OECD’; Korea Focus, 3:2 (1995), pp.l27-9.(originally published as an editorial in 
The Chosun Ilbo, Feb.25,1995).
515For the negative public perceptions about the executive’s economic policies, see ‘Public Perception of ‘New 
Economy” ; Korea Focus, 2:.2 (1994), pp.139-140 (originally published as an editorial in the Maeil Kyungje 
Shinmun, Feb.28,1994).
516Interview with Kim Tae Hwan in Seoul, 23 May 2001.
sl7Chung-in Moon and Sang-young Rhyu, ‘The state, structural rigidity, and the end of Asian capitalism: a 
comparative study of Japan and South Korea’, in Robinson et al, eds, Politics and Markets in the Wake o f the 
Asian Crisis, pp.77-98, p.92. See also Kim Kwang-woong, ‘Responsible Administration Needed’; Korea Focus, 
5:2 (1997), pp. 122-4 (originally published in The Munhwa Ilbo, March 6,1997).
518Jongryn Mo, ‘Political Culture, Democracy and the Economic Crisis in Korea’; International Studies Review, 
2:1 (1998), 85-100, p.90.
519Hahm and Rhyu, ‘Democratic Reform and Consolidation in South Korea: The Promise of Democracy’, pp.79- 
80.
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dem ocratic  m ovem ent for more than  th ree  decades, Kim Young Sam 
assum ed the  role of moral ruler and chose  unilaterally to  introduce 
reform s. Such w as th e  speed  of th e  reform s in th e  first years  of his 
presidency th a t Kim began to  be view ed as  a ‘civilian authoritarian 
leader’.520
The moral s tra teg y  w as, nonetheless, a highly risky stra tegy , 
b ecau se  th e  capacity  of Kim to  pursue th is  reform ist project would only 
go so  far a s  his moral integrity rem ained unchallenged by th e  population. 
As Kang Chun-suk, a political ed itor of one of th e  country’s  leading 
new spapers, The Chosun Ilbo , points out: ‘Kim Young Sam is a  people’s  
politician, thriving on support from th e  m asses .’ 521 One of th e  major 
consequences of th e  country’s  dem ocratisation  w as to  open th e  political 
a rena to  new  social groups. Among such groups w ere organisations such  
a s  th e  Coalition for Economic and Social Ju s tic e  (CCEJ) and the  People’s  
Solidarity for Participatory Dem ocracy (PSPD) th a t em erged to  call for 
new  policies, in particu lar in the  a rea  of econom ic equity and justice , in 
the  nam e of public in terest. 522 As im portant, the  Korean m ass m edia 
becam e im portant ac to rs  in politics and policymaking by offering a more 
critical reporting of governm ental activ ities. 823 Hence, within th is new  
dem ocratising political scenario , public opinion polls becam e an object of 
growing atten tion  by Kim Young Sam .524
Kim’s  rational seem ed to  have been based  on th e  belief th a t a s  
long a s  public opinion w as on his side, his reform ist policies would be 
legitim ate and did not have to  be constrained  by th e  in te re sts  of the
520Lee Hae-Han and Rhee In-jae, ‘President Kim Young Sam’s One Hundred Days of Reforms’; Korea Focus, 
1:3 (1993), p. 19 (originally published in The Chosun Ilbo, June 1, 1993). Lee Hae-Han for the main opposition 
Democratic Party (DP) and Rhee In-jae for the ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) were both seen as leading 
members of the National Assembly.
521Kang Chun-suk, ‘First Miles of the “Reform Marathon’”; Korea Focus, 1:3 (1993), 67-9, p.68 (originally 
published in Weekly Chosun, May 13).
For an analysis of the development of social movements in Korea from the late 1980s, see Bronwen Dalton 
and James Cotton, ‘New social movements and the changing nature of political opposition in South Korea’, in 
Garry Rodan, ed, Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia (London. Routledge, 1996), 272-299.
523Moon, ‘Democratization and Globalization as Ideological and Political Foundations of Economic Policy’, p.9.
524Hahn Bae-ho, ‘Assessing Kim Young-sam Administration’s First Four Years’; Korea Focus, 5:.2 (1997), 1- 
17, pp.6-7 (an abridged version of a paper presented at a symposium in the Seoul’s Youido Institute, Feb. 24, 
1997).
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political coalition th a t had backed his election. The rise of Kim Young 
Sam to  the  Korean presidency owed much to  the  support he received from 
th e  ruling party, Dem ocratic Liberal Party (DLP) th a t strongly financed his 
presidential cam paign.525Formed in Jan u ary  1990, a fter the  m erger of the  
then  ruling Dem ocratic Ju s tic e  Party (DJP) headed by Roh Tae Woo with 
tw o opposition parties, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) and 
D em ocratic Republican Party (DRP) led respectively  by Kim Young Sam 
and Kim Jong Pil, the  DLP becam e known as  th e  ‘Grand Conservative 
Coalition’.526Kim’s  decision to  m erge his party  with the  parties of an old 
guard closely related  to  the  previous military regim es and known to  be 
averse  to  changes in the institutional status quo w as seen  by many a s  no 
m ore than a political m anoeuvre and s tra teg y  to fulfil his power in terests , 
i.e., to  becom e th e  ruling party’s  presidential nominee and eventually win 
th e  presidential e lections. Kim Young Sam, nonetheless, su cceed ed  in 
separating  him self from the  conservative im age of th e  DLP and to  portray 
him self a s  a reform ist cand idate .927
Of the  th ree  presidential can d id a tes  (the o thers being Kim Dae 
Jung  and Hyundai's founder Chung Ju  Yung), Kim seem ed to  have had the  
im age m ost accep tab le  by Korean voters who regarded him a s  a  ‘clean, 
honest, virtuous, sincere  and decisive m an’.528Elected with 42 p ercen t of 
th e  votes, Kim Young Sam b ea t th e  second  m ost voted cand idate  Kim Dae 
Jung. He did th is by not only winning th e  votes, even if slightly, among 
th o se  in their tw en ties  and th irties th a t rep resen ted  57 percen t of the  
population, but a lso  overwhelmingly winning th e  vo tes  of vo ters over 40, 
who constitu ted  43 percen t of th e  population. The backbone of the
525John Kie-Chiang Oh, Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic Development (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 123-4.
526For the rise of the coalition, see Heng Lee, ‘Uncertain Promise: Democratic Consolidation in South Korea’, in 
Edward Friedman, ed, The Politics o f Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experiences (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1994), pp. 148-158, pp. 151-5.
527For an analysis of Kim Young Sam's quest for the presidency, see Manwoo Lee, ‘South Korea’s Politics of 
Succession and the December 1992 Presidential Election’, in James Cotton, ed, Politics and Policy in the New 
Korean State: From Roh Tae-woo to Kim Young-sam (Melbourne: Longman Australia Pty Ltd, 1995), pp.35-65. 
See also Lee and Rhee, ‘President Kim Young Sam’s One Hundred Days of Reforms’, p. 16. Lee Hae-han points 
out that the “forces” that were actively involved with the former military regimes and who had “developed a 
strong hold” on the Korean society were still within the administration of Kim Young Sam, thwarting its 
reforms.
528Lee, ‘South Korea's Politics of Succession and the December 1992 Presidential Election’, p.52.
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country’s  middle c la ss , in particular small- and medium-sized business 
ow ners, favoured Kim Young Sam over Kim Dae Jung .529Regionalism also 
played a  decisive role in th e  election of Kim Young Sam with v o te rs  voting 
in m ass for the ir native sons. In th is  c a se , while Kim Young Sam  gained 
70 percen t of th e  v o tes  in his home region of Kyongsang, Kim Dae Jung 
received 91 p e rcen t of th e  vo tes in Cholla.530However, Kim Young Sam 
had th e  advan tage of more vo ters in his home region (30 p ercen t of the  
country’s  to ta l population against 12 p ercen t in Cholla).
From 1996 onw ards, however, th e  moral legitim acy of Kim’s  
leadership w as challenged, with th e  d isclosure th a t his presidential 
election  in la te  1992 had received illegal political fu n d s.531 This w as 
reinforced by th e  au thoritarian  w ays through which his execu tive passed  
new  security  and labour law s in th e  National Assembly, and th e  outbreak  
of th e  major Hanbo S teel Corporation bribery scandal involving his second  
son. The im pact of th e se  even ts seem ed  to  have significantly affected  
Kim’s  popularity ratings, a s  support for his leadership d ec reased  from
88.3 percen t in 1993, to  28 p ercen t in 1996 and an even low er 13.9 
percen t in 1997.532 As Kim’s  main political backing, i.e., popular support, 
began to  fall apart, and s ince  he had failed to  m obilise a supporting and 
reform -oriented coalition within th e  country’s  e lites, Kim’s  legitim acy and 
capacity  to  push for th e  institutionalisation of his policy innovations w ere 
strongly reduced. 833 The reform -oriented policy p rocess  becam e 
increasingly sub jec ted  to  inconsistencies which ultim ately contributed to  
th e  m ism anagem ent of the  country’s  econom y.
529Lee, ‘South Korea's Politics of Succession and the December 1992 Presidential Election’, p.52.
530Lee and Brun, ‘Politics and Regions’, p. 100.
531 For a full account of these events, see Hahm and Kim, ‘Institutional Reforms and Democratization in Korea’, 
pp.484-8.
32Hahm and Rhyu, ‘Democratic Reform and Consolidation in South Korea: The Promise of Democracy’, p.81.
533Choi Sang-yong, ‘The Bankruptcy of Reform and of Common Sense’; Korea Focus, 5:2 (1997), 119-121 
(originally published in The Hankookllbo, March 25,1997).
178
5.5.1 Bureaucratic Failures, Agency D isputes and Policy Gridlock
Since the  country’s  dem ocratisation  in th e  la te  1980s, relations 
betw een th e  executive and bureaucracy  have significantly changed. As 
Hahm Sung Deuk points out, during the  military regim es, th e  presidential 
agenda would easily  filter down to  th e  lower levels of th e  bureaucracy  
m otivated by promotion opportunities: ‘We [Hahm who w as formerly a 
governm ent official] believed a t th e  tim e [that] he [Park Chung Hee] would 
be perm anent. We had to  ad just ourselves to  th e  party agenda and policy 
initiatives.’s34The dem ocratic  constitu tional changes in 1987 transform ed 
the  executive-bureaucracy dynam ics by establishing th a t p residen ts 
could only hold one five-year term . Consequently, Hahm adds, ‘young 
bureaucra ts  do not know how to  accom m odate them selves to  the  
com m and of th e  president. If they identify them selves with the  incum bent 
president’s  agenda, w hat will happen five years later? They will be kicked 
out by th e  new  president. They will not move now, they  do not ca re  
now....From middle to  th e  bottom  (of th e  bureaucracy), they  a re  more 
in terested  in their organizational in te re sts  than  in th e  presidential 
agenda....so  now, w e can  se e  inefficiency in th e  bureaucracy...N ow  the 
presiden ts cannot control th e  bureaucracy.’63*
The im plem entation of capital accoun t liberalisation a s  a 
prerequisite for the  country’s  accessio n  to  th e  OECD in 1996 is an 
exam ple of a  ca se  w here th e  executive, under a new  co n tex t of growing 
bureaucratic  leverage, failed to  rally th e  Korean bureaucracy  in support of 
th e  reform project. 636 One of th e  main elem ents of th e  plan w as to  
im plem ent a  sound system  of prudential supervision to  underpin the  
safe ty  and soundness of financial institu tions and organisations. The 
exam ple of the  non-banking financial institu tions (NBFIs) show s, however,
how the MOFE fell short of performing its  monitoring and supervision role.
From 1994, in accordance with th e  financial liberalisation plan, m erchant
534 Interview with Hahm Sung Deuk in Seoul, 26 June 2001.
535Interview with Hahm Sung Deuk in Seoul, 26 June 2001.
536For the characteristics of the plan drafted by the Presidential Commission for Financial Reform formed in 
1997,see Jwa and Kim, Korea's Economic Reform’, pp.264-6.
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banks w ere allowed to deal with foreign exchange tran sac tio n s  even 
though they  w ere inexperienced in international banking and 
finance.537These m erchant banks aggressively  borrowed short-term  loans 
and invested  them  in high-risk bonds from S ou theast Asia, Russia and 
Latin Am erica.838When the  econom y of th e se  countries’ collapsed, Korean 
financial institu tions lost their money. At th e  sam e tim e, they  also  lent 
short-term  loans to  local chaebol for long-term investm ent p ro jects.83*
As a  consequence, short-term  loans not only increased  fa s te r  than  
long-term loans, but also  took a higher sh a re  in th e  country’s  to ta l foreign 
debt. This ultim ately raised concern over th e  poor m aturity s tru c tu re  of 
th e  country’s  foreign debt. Foreign cred ito rs began to  dem and higher 
prem ium s on Korean financial institu tions’ borrowing ra te  in early  1997 to  
reflect th e  country’s  deteriorating cred it s ta tu s . However, it w as only in 
mid-1997 th a t th e  regulatory au thorities intervened by introducing a  rule 
limiting holdings of long-term a s s e ts  through short-term  borrowings.840
The reorganisation of th e  adm inistration launched by Kim Young 
Sam, while allowing th e  president to  p lace his allies in key bureaucratic  
positions through th e  traditional appointm ent s tra tegy , w as also  not 
w ithout its  shortcom ings.841The m erger of th e  Economic Planning Board 
(EPB) and th e  Ministry of Finance (MOF) w as supposed to  produce more 
effective policy coordination by creating  a super-m inistry, th e  Ministry of 
Economy and Finance (MOFE). Chung Duck-Koo, who sp en t tw enty  years 
in th e  MOFE and w as Vice Minister of Finance during the  presidency of 
Kim Dae Jung  (1998-2002), argues th a t it w as, however, a  h asty  and
537Kyung Yoon, The Role o f Government in the Korean Merchant Bank Crisis in 1997, Master thesis, Graduate 
School of International Studies (GSIS), Yonsei University, 2000. See also ‘Merchant Banks to Be Given More 
Leeway in Their Business’, KT, 30 April 1993, p.9. According to Kang Tae Soo, Policy Research Team, 
Monetary Policy Department, Bank of Korea (BOK), the merchants succeeded in entering the foreign exchange 
market, despite their lack of experience, after strongly having lobbied the MOFE. Interview with Kang Tae Soo 
in Seoul, 23 May 2001.
538Moon and Rhyu, ‘The state, structural rigidity, and the end of Asian capitalism’, p. 87.
5J9Asian Development Bank, Rising to the Challenge in Asia, p. 11 (table 4). As with banks, Korean non-banking 
financial institutions were used to lend money without necessarily checking the creditworthiness of the industrial 
conglomerates.
540Asian Development Bank, Rising to the Challenge in Asia, pp. 11-12.
541 Jung, ‘Reforming the Administrative Apparatus in Korea’, p.267. See also Kim Kwang-woong, ‘Government 
Restructuring Has Only Begun’; Korea Focus, 3:1 (1995), 40-8, pp.46-8 (originally published in The Shin Dong- 
a Monthly, January 1995).
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misguided m erger becau se  the  governm ent m erged th e  two agencies 
w ithout first restructuring them .s42The em ergence of the  foreign exchange 
crisis  provides a good exam ple of intra-agency fragm entation in policy 
coordination.
While th e  MOF side of th e  MOFE w as aw are of th e  country’s 
growing foreign exchange crisis and raised  th e  alarm , th e  EPB side of the  
MOFE ignored th e  w arnings arguing th a t the  m acroeconom ic 
fundam entals w ere healthy.s43As Chung-in Moon and Song-min Kim point 
out, Kim Young Sam w as not aw are of th e  severity  of th e  situation until 
P resident Bill Clinton phoned him about th e  need of an IMF rescu e  plan in 
la te  November 1997. 644 Another episode revealing th e  ex ten t of 
bureaucra tic  d ispu tes over policy cho ices, involved th e  MOFE and BOK in 
la te  1997 .548 The tw o got caught up in a  d ispute over organisational 
ch an g es  proposed in a new  law  limiting th e  pow er and autonom y of the  
country’s  cen tra l bank.s46The bureaucratic  infighting betw een  tw o of the  
m ost im portant agencies  in charge of econom ic policy had th e  im pact of 
producing policy gridlock, a t  a tim e w hen th e  country w as already 
undergoing th e  first signs of financial crisis  and the  s ta te  needed to  
actively intervene to  deal with th e  situation.
5.5.2 Chaebol R esistance and Path-D ependent Relations
The ’New Economy Plan’ launched in 1993 em phasised 
deregulation and th e  autonom y of the  private sec to r. The plan w as not 
w ithout its  inconsistencies a s  th e  governm ent decided also  to  include a
542Interview with Chung Duck-Woo in Seoul, 14 June 2001.
543By the end of September, the country’s foreign exchange holdings had declined to 30.43 billion US dollars, 
below the 37 billion-mark, an amount equivalent to the cost of three months’ worth of imports, as recommended 
by the International Monetary Fund. See Min Sang-kee, ‘Why the Fuss over Foreign Exchange?’; Korea Focus, 
5:5 (1997), 136-9 (originally published in The Chosun Ilbo, September 1,1997).
544Chung-in Moon and Song-min Kim, ‘Democracy and Economic Performance in South Korea’, in Larry 
Diamond and Byung-Kook Kim, eds, Consolidating Democracy in South Korea, pp. 139-172, p. 154.
545The dispute over whether or not the central bank should be independent from the government had already, in 
fact, started from the early days of Kim’s presidency. See Chung Un-chan, ‘Independence of the Bank of Korea: 
A Need for Checks and Balances’; Korea Focus, 3:2 (1995), pp.133-6 (originally published in The Chosun Ilbo, 
Feb.25, 1995), and Peter McGill, ‘Bank of Korea battles for independence’, Euromoney, September 1995, 
pp.374-6.
For the episode in late 1997, see Moon and Rhyu, ‘The state, structural rigidity, and the end of Asian 
capitalism’, p.94.
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program  to  force th e  chaebol to  spec ia lise  in core business a s  a  w ay to  
fight the ir business concentration  and improve their international 
com petitiveness.*47Failing to  mobilise th e  chaebol in support of corporate  
reform s eventually had im portant co n sequences for th e  country’s 
econom y in th e  period right before th e  1997 financial crisis. Credit 
lim itations, a  much used financial tool by previous regim es to  disciple th e  
chaebol and induce them  to  comply with adm inistrative guidance, w ere 
ineffective in th e  face  of the  availability of alternative financial so u rces  
such  as: non-banking financial institu tions (where th e  policy did not 
apply)! or overseas financing (further facilitated  with financial 
liberalisation).
During the  1990s, the  econom ic conditions of Korean 
conglom erates began to  deterio rate . Evidence of th is included: increasing 
trad e  d ispu tes with industrialised m arkets th a t affected  exports; loss of 
com petitiveness due to  rising labour c o s ts  and land prices; and growing 
foreign com petition. Betw een 1995 and 1996, Korean term s of trade  
d e terio ra ted  by around 25 percent, thus Korean com panies saw  their 
profitability plunge.s4sKim Jinyong, a re sea rch er a t th e  BOK, argues that, 
in face  of growing foreign com petition following th e  opening of the  
dom estic  m arket, th e  chaebol decided to  borrow abroad cheaply  to  
expand and “get bigger to  com pete”.549 Furtherm ore, th e  specialisation  
policy adopted  by the  governm ent, and a  legacy of the  previous
547For the inconsistencies of the New Economy Plan, see Choi ‘From Euphoria to Atrophy’, pp. 16-17. See also 
‘Figure in Focus: ‘People Need to Share Pains To Achieve Sustained Growth’, Lee Kyung-shik’, KT, 27 
February 1993, p. 17. The views of the new Deputy Prime Minister Lee Kyung-shik echoed well the dual-track 
approach that the government sought to pursue. He stressed that while the chaebol were needed to ‘survive fierce 
foreign competition’, they were warned against their ‘headlong expansion into diverse fields.’
548Young Back Choi, ‘Financial Crisis And Perspectives on Korean Economic Development’, in J.Jay Choi, ed, 
Asian Financial Crisis: Financial, Structural and International Dimension Vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science 
Inc., 2000),pp.357-378, p.362. See also G.W.Noble and J. Ravenhill, ‘The Good, the Bad and the Ugly? Korea, 
Taiwan and the Asian Financial Crisis’, in Gregory W. Noble and John Ravenhill, eds, The Asian Financial 
Crisis and the Architecture o f Global Finance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.80-107, 
pp.90-1.
Interview with Kim Jinyong, International Finance Team, Research Department, Bank of Korea (BOK), 
Seoul, 26 June 2001. For the country’s decreasing international competitiveness, see Kim Heung-chong, ‘10 
Problems Hindering Transformation of Korean Economy’; Korea Focus, 4:4 (1996), 76-85, p.84 (originally 
published in The Shing Dong-A Monthly, August 1996). One of the strategies used by Korean companies to 
remain competitive in face of rising labour costs and land prices at home, and to fight protectionist measures by 
developed countries, was to invest abroad, see Park Woo-hee, ‘Reckless Overseas Investment’; Korea Focus, 4:2 
(1996), 149-152 (originally published in The Munhwa Ilbo, February 27, 1996), Lee Eu-chul, ‘Exodus of Korean 
Conglomerates’; Korea Focus, 4:5 (1996), pp.75-88 (originally published in Monthly Chosun, September 1996).
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presidency led by Roh Tae Woo, did not su cceed  in curbing chaebol 
diversification. The num ber of subsid iaries controlled by th e  chaebol 
continued to  increase  with th e  governm ent failing to  enforce the  
policy. 850 Sim ultaneously, the  ‘New Economy Plan’ pursued v as t 
deregulation-liberalisation reform s in th e  a re a s  of licensing, m arket entry, 
price and adm inistrative intervention. This only helped to  further the  
econom ic concentration  of the chaebol. In 1986, th e  four la rg est chaebol 
added 5.7 p ercen t of Korea’s  gross national product, but in 1995 their 
sh a re  had increase  to  9.3 percen t of value-added to  GNP.5S1
As had occurred earlier with Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, the  
transform ation of th e  rules of th e  gam e in which th e  system  of 
socialisation  of private risk w as based  during th e  1960s and 1970s w as a 
difficult ta sk  becau se  of th e  path-dependent developm ent p a tte rn s  it had 
given risen to  during p as t decades. Not only had th e  chaebol built their 
political leverage through political donations needed for electoral 
cam paigns, but they also  played a  predom inant econom ic role a s  the  
country’s  main vehicle for econom ic recovery and grow th.SS2While publicly 
the  execu tive m aintained th a t it w anted  to  put an end to  th e  form er 
collusive tie s  betw een the  s ta te  and th e  private sec to r, its  ac tions 
implied th e  opposite. Despite Kim’s  repeated  prom ises th a t he would not 
receive any money from b usinesses during his term  in office, his own s taff
550Jae Woo Lee, ‘Chaebol Restructuring Revisited: A Coasian Perspective’, in Sung-Hee Jwa and In Kwon Lee, 
eds, Korean Chaebol in Transition: Road Ahead (Seoul: Korea Economic Research Institue, 2000), pp. 151-221, 
p.162 (table 1). By the end of Kim Young Sam’s mandate in 1997, the number of subsidiaries of Hyundai had 
increased to 57 from 45 in 1993 (the beginning of Kim Young Sam’s presidency), Daewoo to 30 from 22, 
Samsung to 80 from 55, SK to 46 from 33. The only exception among the top five was LG that saw the number 
of subsidiaries decreased from 54 in 1993 to 49 in 1997.
551Stephan Haggard and David Kang, ‘The Kim Young Sam Presidency in Comparative Perspective’, in Moon 
and Mo, Democratization and Globalization in Korea, pp.l 11-131, pp. 120-1.
5520ne of the signs that the chaebol were becoming increasingly confident about their political and economic 
leverage, in a pattern that had started in the 1980s, was their public calls for changes in the country’s economic 
and financial policies in support of less intervention by the state in the activities of the private sector and the 
banking sector. See ‘FKI Calls on Gov’t To Guarantee Businesses a Freer Hand’, KT, 26 February 1993, p.7 and 
‘FKI Urges Gov’t to Remove Grips on Banks’, KT, 12 May 1993, p.6. Earlier, during the presidency of Roh Tae 
Woo, the chaebol had already shown that they could fight back government attempts to curb their activities by 
withdrawing political donations. Koo Ja Kyung, chairman of the Lucky-Goldstar Group, and chairman of the 
Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) warned politicians from both the ruling and opposition parties that the 
business sector could retaliate against anti-chaebol policies by reconsidering their political donations. In a 
statement that would represent a turning point in business relations with the government due to its political 
implications, Koo announced that the FKI would in the future provide donations only to politicians willing to 
support and protect business freedom. See Chung-in Moon, ‘Changing Patterns of Business-Govemment 
Relations in South Korea’, pp. 154-5.
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in th e  Blue House continued with th e  old p rac tices  by receiving alm ost 4 
million US dollars from business a s  bribes and nearly 3 million US dollars 
from specia l in te rest groups a s  ‘courtesy’.6*3
The investigation of the  Hanbo S teel Corporation bribery scandal 
brought to  light th e  degree of informal tie s  linking business and 
governm ent officials. It w as discovered th a t in exchange for pressuring 
th e  banks to  ex tend  cred it to  Hanbo, presidential s taff m em bers, high- 
ranking officials and bankers, including th e  P resident’s  second  son, 
received bribes. Additionally, given th e  frequency of e lections in Korea 
(there a re  four e lections within th e  five-year presidential m andate), the  
execu tive had constan tly  to  be concerned  not only with raising funds for 
e lec to ra l cam paigns, but also  with short-term  econom ic perform ance, 
which both depended strongly on th e  role played by th e  chaebol. With th e  
chaebol resisting th e  reforms, and th e  executive increasingly failing to  
supervise and m onitor their activ ities, th e  chaebol rapidly expanded their 
investm ent, which resulted  in their over-investm ent and high 
indeb tedness th a t eventually underm ined th e  stability  of the  recently  
liberalised financial system .
5.5.3 D em ocratisation, National Assembly and Constrained Reforms
Kim Young Sam failed not only to  build a  supporting coalition 
within th e  core  group of th e  system  of “socialisation  of private risk”, the  
bureaucracy  and chaebol, but also  with ano ther im portant ac to r th a t had 
seen  its  policy influence strongly increased  since  th e  country’s  
dem ocratisation  in 1987: th e  National Assembly. Chang Wook Park points 
out th a t s in ce  the  dem ocratisation in 1987, tw o im ages have developed 
concerning th e  capacity  of the  National Assem bly to  influence 
policymaking.664One is of a  w eak  legislature th a t has no policy initiative 
and is unable to  exerc ise  policy influence independent of the
553Hahm and Kim, ‘Institutional Reforms and Democratization in Korea’, p.487.
554For an analysis of the role of the National Assembly in a democratic Korea, see Qian Wook Park, ‘The 
National Assembly in the Newly Democratized Korean Polity’; The Korean Journal o f  Policy Studies, 25 
(2000),25-42.
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executive.sssBut the  o ther im age is th a t of a  relevant and relatively strong 
policy ac to r th a t can  reac t to  th e  execu tive’s  policy initiatives. This is 
confirmed by Hahm Sung Deuk who points out th a t in order to  m anage th e  
governm ent within th e  new  Korean dem ocratic  setting , th e  only way for 
th e  presiden t to  achieve his goals is through w hat he calls ‘legislative 
presidency’, or to  turn a new  policy into a  law  by having it approved in th e  
National Assembly.
Once th e  new  policy becom es law, then  th e  bureaucracy will 
acknow ledge th a t if they do not im plem ent it they might be punished.**6 
Therefore, Hahm argues, successfu l p residencies in dem ocracy will 
depend on their capability to  engage, not only with m em bers of the  ruling 
political party but a lso  with m em bers of o ther parties rep resen ted  in th e  
National Assembly: ‘the  president needs to  change from com m ander to  
conciliator.’**7 In th e  c a s e  of th e  reform s pursued by Kim Young Sam, th e  
capacity  of th e  National Assembly to  influence policy becam e c lear in 
November 1997 afte r blocking th e  p assag e  of a financial reform bill th a t 
proposed th e  consolidation of the  activ ities of several existing regulatory 
agen c ies  under a single Financial Supervisory Board (FSB).***At issue w as 
w hether it would be under the  d irect control of the  Prime Minister’s  office 
or under th e  MOFE. Officials a t th e  BOK, reflecting a long-standing dispute 
w ith th e  MOFE, however, w anted  to  m aintain its authority to  regulate 
com m ercial banks. The em ployees of the  cen tra l bank a s  well a s  from th e  
regulatory agencies  ta rg e ted  by th e  new  policy held several 
dem onstrations and th rea tened  to  strike  im m ediately if th e  National 
Assem bly passed  th e  legislation. Although th e  M inister of Finance and 
Economy, Kang Kyung Shik, and his s taff continually ag ita ted  to  have th e  
National Assembly vote in favour of th e  legislation, th e  Financial and
555For a discussion on the problems affecting the working of the National Assembly, see Kim Kwang-woong, 
‘Structural Problems of the National Assembly’; Korea Focus, 4:6 (1996), pp.36-46 (originally published in the 
Korean Journal o f Legislative Studies vol.2, no. 1, 1996).
556The National Assembly is constitutionally granted with the power to supervise and control the bureaucracy 
through annual inspections, specially arranged investigations and interpellation for questioning ministers either 
orally or in writing. See Park, ‘The National Assembly in the Newly Democratized Korean Polity’, pp.36-9.
557Interview with Hahm Sung Deuk in Seoul, 26 June 2001.
558For this episode see Moon and Mo, Economic Crisis and Structural Reforms in South Korea, pp. 17-18.
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Economy Com m ittee did not send th e  bills to  th e  floor for discussion. Both 
th e  ruling party and the  opposition preferred to  avoid th e  issue, fearing 
th e  political c o s ts  of th e  p assag e  a s  th e  country prepared for new  
presidential e lec tions s e t  for the  end of th e  year.
5.6 Conclusion
For historical institutionalism , policy cho ices are, on th e  o ther hand, 
the  resu lt of th e  political interaction betw een  leadership and social 
in te re s ts  shaped  by the  institutional se tting , ideas and the  specific 
h istorical con tex t in which they  tak e  place. On th e  o ther hand, th is 
theoretica l fram ework also  s tre s se s  th a t policy ou tcom es can  them selves 
becom e so u rces  of political re-arrangem ents leading to  institutional 
change. When policy feedback  g en era tes  political conflicts then the  
ex isten t institutional equilibrium can  be challenged and th is  can open a 
"window of opportunity” for reform and change. Im plem entation of new  
policies, however, is not an easy  task . As pointed out in Chapter One, 
when considering policy changes, policy e lites  need to  consider th e  
feasibility of cho ices in term s of: w hat s ta k e s  they  have in th e  pursuit of 
reform; coalition support and opposition to  change; the  political and 
bureaucra tic  resou rces they hold to  m aintain such  reform initiatives.
In th e  c a se  of Kim Young Sam, his presidency took a risky s tra teg y  
by relying on the  morality of his leadership a s  th e  b asis  of his policy 
cho ices. Driven by Confucian moral codes, and th e  Korean traditional 
political culture, the  presidency led by Kim Young Sam decided to  force 
far-reaching reform s w ithout seeking to  reconcile differences and 
n ego tia te  agreem ents with bureaucratic , political and econom ic ac to rs. 
The rationale behind his approach w as then th a t a s  long a s  Kim’s  moral 
integrity rem ained in tact and popular support, m easured in term s of 
popularity ratings, m aintained high levels, the  im plem entation of reform s 
could succeed . Thus, the  presidency in its  early  days undertook an an ti­
corruption cam paign, sought to  cu t tie s  w ith p a s t military regim es,
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introduced new  law s to  fight m anipulation of voters and to  prom ote 
fairness during th e  electoral p rocess, and re-organised th e  bureaucra tic  
m achine. But when Kim’s  moral integrity s ta r te d  to  be den ted  by a se rie s  
of scandals, his leadership w eakened and the  im plem entation of the  
reform s becam e m ore difficult.
In te rm s of coalition support, one of th e  basic dilem m as in th e  
p rocess  of institutional change is th a t th e re  are  strong possibilities th a t 
th e  fo rces opposing reform will be m ore influential than th o se  supporting 
it. Therefore, those  who had benefited m ost from previous policies, and 
who risk losing m ost from the reform s, may mobilise to  block change and 
reform in support of m aintenance of th e  status quo. Additionally, the  
beneficiaries of th e  reform s may not becom e fully aw are of the  gains they 
may g e t w ith th e  changes and consequently  fail to  m anifest their support. 
In Korea, th is  w as exactly  w hat happened, a s  bureaucra ts , m em bers of 
the  national assem bly and chaebol, regarded a s  th o se  m ost affected  by 
Kim's adm inistrative and econom ic reform s, moved to  constrain  the  
reform s. The adm inistrative and econom ic reform s pursued by Kim Young 
Sam rep resen ted  a th rea t to  th e  equilibrium and the  “spoils” th a t had long 
susta ined  th e  system  of socialisation of private risk. The advocacy of a 
sm aller and less  interventionist s ta te , w hether through bureaucratic  re­
organisation or financial liberalisation initiatives, had th e  effect of 
w eakening th e  pow er of th e  bureaucracy within th e  system . The reform s 
not only reduced th e  capacity  of th e  bureaucracy  to  m anage industrial 
policy through financial control, but also  reduced their pow er vis-a-vis 
o ther socia l ac to rs. Additionally, it clearly decided to  fo rsake th e  
cooperative tie s  with the chaebol and challenge their role in th e  country’s  
econom y by restraining their econom ic concentration  in response  to  th e  
socie ty ’s  calls for econom ic justice .
On th e  o ther hand, th e  m ethods adopted by th e  governm ent to  
prom ote th e  reform s failed to  clearly identify th o se  who would m ore 
willingly support th e  reform s if they  w ere aw are of their potential
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windfalls. This, desp ite  th e  fac t th a t th e  majority of th e  Korean population 
strongly supported th e  reform drive by Kim Young Sam a s  w as show n in 
polls over th e  first years of th e  presidential term . In consequence, and in 
th e  ab sen ce  of information on the  possible positive im pact th a t reform s 
could rep resen t for their lives, the  potential beneficiaries failed to  be 
convinced and persuaded about th e  need to  support th e  governm ent in its  
policy choices.
Finally, th e  w eak econom ic leadership by Kim Young Sam and his 
inconsisten t policy decisions only contributed to  negatively ex ace rb a te  
th e  situation. Kim’s  lack of a system atic  vision on how to  reform th e  
econom y becam e visible during his presidential term . In a  political se tting  
a s  th e  Korean, th e  President is supposed to  be om nipresent throughout all 
the  policymaking and im plem entation p ro cesses. However, Kim not only 
preferred to  delegate  authority to  his s taff in th e  Blue House, many tim es 
not professionally com peten t for th e  task , but also  constan tly  reshuffled 
th e  position of DPM, the  country’s  top  econom ic position, which m ade it 
practically  unfeasible for th e  MOFE to  form ulate and im plem ent 
consisten tly  th e  reform initiatives. This outcom e ultim ately contributed to  
th e  m ism anagem ent of the  econom y and th e  IMF crisis.
The following ch ap te r aim s to  investigate  in-depth a  specific 
political and financial policy reform: the  Real Name Financial T ransaction 
System  in 1993. Regarded by Kim Young a s  th e  ‘reform of th e  reform s’ of 
his presidency, it aimed a t curbing long-lasting corrupt and informal tie s  
betw een  governm ent officials and business groups. The new  policy 
add ressed  also  th e  issue  of fa irness of w ealth  distribution by seeking 
ch an g es  in the  country’s  tax  system . Therefore, C hapter Six s e e k s  to  
understand  why and how President Kim stra teg ica lly  ac ted  to a lte r an 
im portant fea tu re  of the  system  of socia lisation  of private risk and with 
w hat political and econom ic outcom es.
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6. CHAPTER SIX - Reform ing th e  S y stem  of S o c ia lisa tio n  of P rivate  
Risk: The Real N am e Financial T ran sa c tio n  S ystem  of 1993
6.1 Introduction
On 12 August 1993, President Kim Young Sam unexpectedly 
announced th a t his governm ent would m ake th e  use  of real nam es 
m andatory in all financial transactions. Addressing th e  nation, during a  
broadcasted  s ta tem en t, Kim proclaim ed th a t, ‘from th is tim e on, all 
financial transac tions have to  be m ade in real nam es to  realize a  clean 
and ju s t society .’ss9President Kim declared  tha t, in acco rd an ce  with the 
Constitution, he w as invoking an em ergency financial and econom ic order 
to  implement th e  real nam e financial transac tion  system  b ecau se  it w as 
feared  th a t an open discussion of th e  new  policy would cau se  a 
w idespread and negative im pact on the  econom y, such  a s  cap ita l flight 
o verseas and real e s ta te  speculation. The decree  required th a t holders of 
all forms of financial transac tions - including deposits , instalm ent savings, 
checks, certifica tes  of deposits, s to ck s  and bonds - under fa lse  nam es or 
pseudonym s sw itch them  into real nam es within a  period of tw o m onths 
starting  from 8 p.m. on 12 August 1993.s6°
Investigations on the  source of funds would exclude th o se  who 
held financial a s s e ts  up to  a  maximum of 50 million won under a lia se s  and 
converted them  to  real nam es. The Office of National Tax Administration 
(ONTA), however, would conduct specia l tax  probes on th o se  who 
w ithdrew  money in e x c e ss  of 30 million Won from financial organisations 
during the two-month period. The d ecree  prohibited, however, the 
disclosure of financial information to  third parties w ithout the  co n sen t of 
th e  accoun t holder, to  p ro tect the  confidentiality of financial transac tions.
559‘Real Name Financial System Enforced’, KT, 13 August 1993, p.l.
560For the main features of the Real Name Financial Transactions System, see Bank of Korea, The Bank o f  
Korea, pp.217-218. See also Korea Institute of Finance, ‘Recent Financial Reforms in Korea: Real Name 
Financial System Launched’; Korean Financial Review (1993), 3-22, and Jongsoon Lee, ‘The Real Name 
Financial System and The Politics of Economic Reform in the Republic of Korea’; Pacific Focus, 10 (1995), 
101-128.
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President Kim added th a t financial incom es would not be levied until a 
new  com puterized d a ta  system  w as ready and able to  accoun t for all 
financial incom es. Additionally, a  Com prehensive Taxation System  for 
Financial Income, to  include unearned incom e, such a s  s to ck  or real 
e s ta te  dealings, would com e into force in January  1996, to  build a more 
equitab le ta x  system . The new  tax  system  w as expected  to  levy a 
se p a ra te  15 p ercen t tax  on financial income, if the com bined in terest and 
dividend incom e of a m arried couple am ounted to  less  than  40 million Won. 
However, for am ounts above 40 million Won, financial incom e would be 
added to  o ther incom e and a cum ulative tax  ra te  of 10-40 percen t 
im posed on taxpayers reaching th is category. Finally, and to  preserve th e  
stab ility  of th e  s to ck  m arket, th e  governm ent announced th a t a capital 
gains tax  on s to ck  dealings, would not be introduced during Kim Young 
Sam ’s  term  (1993-1997).
In their efforts to  prevent dam aging side effec ts  to  the  national 
econom y with th e  im plem entation of th e  system , th e  governm ent and th e  
country’s  cen tra l bank s e t  up com m ittees to  define policies to  restrain  
cap ital flight and speculation in real e s ta te , painting, an tiques and 
jew ellery. Com m ittees w ere also  asked  to  design m easures to  stabilize 
financial m arkets  in c a se  of a  m assive w ithdraw al of money deposited  in 
banks, or invested in s to ck  m arkets. The com m ittees w ere also  expected  
to  form ulate m easures to  provide financial relief to  small- and medium­
sized firms. It w as feared th a t SMEs could face  cash-flow problem s due to  
th e  paralysis of the  informal financial m arket w here m ost of them  secured  
their co rporate  capital, following th e  im plem entation of th e  decree . A 
to ta l of over two trillion Won in governm ent funds w ere la te r re leased  a s  
em ergency funds to  help small- and medium-sized firms and com m ercial 
banks w ere requested  by th e  governm ent to  ex tend  the ir loans and widen 
their c red it limits to  th e se  firm s.861
56'Korea Institute of Finance, ‘Recent Financial Reforms in Korea’, p.6.
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The Prosecution office and th e  ONTA announced th a t they would 
jointly investigate  and tak e  severe  m easu res aga inst speculation in real 
e s ta te , painting, an tiques and jew ellery m arkets. They would also  
com m ence c lo se  monitoring of o verseas tran sac tio n s  by dom estic firms 
to  ch eck  w hether or not they  w ere ‘cooking up’ export and import 
invoices to  divert funds out of Korea. Banks w ere also  instructed  to  report 
individual rem ittances of 3000 US dollars or more to  th e  ONTA, with th e  
nam es of th o se  sending more than 10,000 US dollars a year put on a 
w atching list.s<2Meanwhile, the cen tra l bank (BOK) expanded its financial 
support to  financial institu tions in order to  shield them  from a possible 
fund shortage. The BOK added th a t it would provide ‘lim itless’ funds to  
banks short of liquidity so  th a t they  could in return ex tend them  to  non­
banking financial institutions (NBFIs). Additionally, th e  BOK would e a se  
its  money supply control and reduce th e  banks’ legal deposit 
requirem ents in order to  lessen  th e  upw ards p ressu re  on money m arket 
ra te s . By th e  end of 1996, real nam e confirm ation ra te s  had reached  99.2 
percen t of all such  accoun ts and th e  transform ation of false-nam e 
acco u n ts  to  real nam e-based deposits  recorded 98.8 p ercen t.6'3
While the  d ecree  had a  sim ple m essage, in th a t it dem anded th e  
use  of a  real nam e in all types of financial transac tions, the  im plications 
of th e  financial reform w ere expected  to  be far-reaching. The new  system  
w as exp ec ted  to  fight the  conspicuous corrupt tie s  betw een governm ent 
officials, politicians and businessm en by facilitating th e  investigation of 
money flows. The investigation w as frequently im paired by th e  difficulty 
in tracking down th e  so u rces of funds hidden behind false nam es. The 
d ec ree  also  add ressed  socie ty ’s  growing dem ands for a  more fair 
distribution of w ealth . The country lacked a  com prehensive tax  system , 
and w ith th e  governm ent sanctioning th e  use  of fa lse  nam es in financial 
tran sac tio n s , the  ‘well-off could easily  hide their gains from financial and 
property investm ents under a liases  and consequently  evade taxation.
562Korea Institute of Finance, ‘Recent Financial Reforms in Korea’, p.6.
563&ank of Korea, The Bank o f Korea, p.219.
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Furtherm ore the  old system , by allowing v a s t am ounts of cap ital flows to  
rem ain untraceable , fed a growing informal financial m arket which 
affected  th e  governm ent’s  use  of financial policies to  control cap ita l 
allocation according to  its  industrial goals, due to  its  secre tive  nature.
As a  case-study, th is ch ap ter exam ines th e  active role of P resident 
Kim Young Sam in pushing for th e  im plem entation of th e  real nam e 
financial system . It then  exam ines how his cho ice w as moulded by th e  
im pact of m alpractices, generated  by th e  false  nam e financial system  on 
th e  country’s  financial structu re , econom y and socia l stability. The policy 
p ro cess and political lessons taken  from th e  failed a ttem p ts  of P residen ts 
Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo to  im plem ent th e  reform, and Kim’s  
ideologically driven approach to  th e  new  policy a re  also  explored a s  
shaping Kim’s  choice to  introduce th e  long-expected policy. In th e  last 
section  of th e  chap ter, I analyse why th e  im plem entation of th e  policy 
w as, however, only partially successfu l b ecau se  of Kim Young Sam ’s  
failure to  build a  reliable and reform -oriented coalition to  support his 
initiative.
6.2 Sculpting a  New Financial Policy: False Name Financial System ,
Presidential Policy Failures and Moral Leadership
6.2.1 The Legacies of the  False Name Financial System
During th e  presidency of Park Chung Hee, th e  governm ent s e t  tw o 
main priorities: full s ta te  control of the  financial system , and th e  
mobilization and allocation of financial reso u rces  to  s tra teg ic  industrial 
se c to rs . The introduction of a false nam e financial system  or ra ther, th e  
official sanction  of financial acco u n ts  under fa lse  nam es or pseudonym s, 
w as allow ed in order to  maximize dom estic cap ita l form ation. By 
a ttrac tin g  savings from th o se  who did not w ant to  have their identities 
revealed, the  policy w as expected  to  in crease  th e  ra te  of dom estic 
savings. This policy, together with in terest ra te  reform in 1965, sought to
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a ttra c t funds from th e  informal financial m arket to  th e  country’s  official 
financial institutions. The policy seem ed  to  contribute to  th e  
governm ent’s  original goal as  dom estic savings relative to  GNP increased  
from 7.37 percen t in 1965 to  27.2 p ercen t in 1978.SMAccording to  Nam 
Duck Woo, Minister of Finance betw een 1969 and 1974, th e  governm ent 
w as aw are of th e  consequences th a t such  a  policy could have in te rm s of 
w ealth  distribution, but th e  need to  in crease  cap ita l availability for 
econom ic growth and developm ent reaso n s  took precedence. Nam points 
out that:
...the specia l privilege of nondisclosure of th e  real nam e w as ex tended  to  
th e  ow ner of financial a s se ts  which m ade tax  exam ination of th o se  a s s e ts  
virtually im possible. Policy m akers w ere fully aw are of th e  im plication of 
such  m easure w ith re sp ec t to  social fa irness and ju stice , but th e  
overriding consideration a t the  tim e w as th a t maximizing mobilization of 
dom estic savings w as a  m atter of first priority. Setting the  order of 
priorities in th is  way may be a n ecessary  evil in a  w ar against poverty.8' 8
Under the  fa lse  nam e financial system , K oreans w ere  not required 
to  p resen t personal identification cards or personal s ignatu res  to  open 
bank acco u n ts .888They needed only to  carry  with them  initially-registered 
nam e se a ls  a s  an evidence of personal identification. There w ere  th ree  
kinds of acco u n ts  under the  system : (1) ’fictitious nam es’ (literally fa lse  
nam es); (2) ’borrowed nam es’ (accounts open under som eone e lse ’s  nam e 
-  usually of friends, relatives, and em ployees, supported  by their residen t 
reg istration  records, and which tended to  be used with the ir permission); 
and (3) ’sto len  nam es’ (accounts open under nam es of persons residing in 
o ther d istric ts, preferably d istan t ones and usually in low-income areas, 
here, their registration records w ere used w ithout their know ledge and 
consent).
564Cole and Park, Financial Development in Korea 1945-1978, p.267 (Table 48). For the interest rate reform in 
1965, see Chapter Three.
565Nam, Korea's Economic Growth in a Changing World, p. 119.
566Lee, ‘The Real Name Financial System and The Politics of Economic Reform in the Republic of Korea’,
p.101.
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The false  nam e financial system , in conjunction w ith th e  in te rest 
ra te  reform, seem ingly boosted dom estic savings, and its  su c c e ss  owed 
much to  th e  fac t th a t capital controls restra ined  overseas flight of capital. 
Inversely, the  system  w as also  the  ca ta ly s t for serious dom estic political 
and econom ic m alpractices over th e  y e a rs .,#7Tax evasion becam e th e  
m ost common problem asso c ia ted  with th e  false  nam e financial system . 
Under th e  system , w ealthy individuals could reso rt to  false  nam e 
acco u n ts  to  evade inheritance and gift tax e s , corporate ta x e s  a s  well a s  
value-added tax es . High-income individuals, such  a s  law yers and doctors, 
evaded ta x e s  by fabricating their incom e s ta te m en ts  in th e  ab sen ce  of a 
real nam e financial sy stem .5M Companies could easily  hide their sa le s  
revenues under fa lse  nam e acco u n ts  to  m ake their business volum es 
appear sm aller and avoid tax  authorities. The false  nam e financial system  
allowed w ealthy businessm en to  easily  violate fair tra d e  and security  
law s by holding a  large num ber of sh a re s  of their own and o ther 
com panies s to ck s  in ex cess  of legal restric tions.SHThis offered not only 
the  capacity  to  control th e se  firms, but also, during tim ely periods, and 
with a c c e s s  to  insider’s  information, the  possibility to  rapidly reap  huge 
profits by buying or selling s to ck s  from their own com panies.
By offering anonymity, false nam e acco u n ts  becam e a sanctuary  
for w ealth  obtained through illicit m eans, such  a s  bribery, political 
contributions, em bezzlem ent and real e s ta te  sp ecu la tio n .870 It w as  not 
uncommon for the  chaebol, to  use  false  nam e acco u n ts  a s  a conduit for 
slush funds to  back  th e se  illegitim ate activ ities. Park Byung Ok and Ko 
Kye Hyun, from the  Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Ju s tic e  (CCEJ) claim 
th a t businessm en resorted  to  several m eans to  estab lish  th e  ’slush
567Lee, ‘The Real Name Financial System and The Politics of Economic Reform in the Republic of Korea’, 
pp. 102-3.
568‘Real Name Financial System: President Kim’s Biggest Gamble’, Business Korea, Septembre 1993, pp.27-9.
569 Lee, ‘The Real Name Financial System and The Politics of Economic Reform in the Republic of Korea’, 
pp.101-3.
One of the most common ways to buy land and hide the identity was to do it in the name of minors. See ‘Land 
Transactions in Name of Minors Reach 83,179 Cases During ’86-88” , KT, 6 October 1989, p.2.
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funds’.S71One of the  c a se s , would be to  req u est from th e  state-contro lled  
financial institutions, for exam ple, 200 million US dollars to  buy som e new  
equipm ent when in fac t th e  real co s t w as only 100 million US dollars. The 
difference betw een th e  capital provided by the  financial institu tions and 
th e  real co s t of th e  equipm ent would then  be used as  slush funds. Another 
m echanism  would involve the  application for financial aid to  s e t  up a 
branch or office abroad. However, th is  operation would only occur 
formally on paper, with the  funds allocated  by the  financial institu tions 
s ta sh ed  under fa lse  nam e accoun ts  to  be m anaged for other, not alw ays 
legitim ate, purposes.
It is difficult to  offer accu ra te  figures for slush funds operated  by 
private com panies, but a report by th e  Com m ittee for th e  Prevention of 
Corruption in 1996 claim ed th a t slush funds rep resen ted  five to  seven 
percen t of th e  to ta l underground economy, or 0.5 to  5.25 percen t of the  
gross national p roduct.572 This environm ent led to  th e  im pression th a t 
c red it fungibility, i.e., ‘the Inability to  track  th e  flow of cred it to  a specific 
u se ’, w as a common featu re  in the  Korean financial system , in particular 
during th e  regim e of Park Chung H ee.S73For Park Yung Chul, a form er 
econom ic advisor to  President Chun Doo Hwan and head of th e  Korea 
Institu te  of Finance, the  fungibility issue in Korea can be exam ined a t  tw o 
s ta g e s  in th e  credit allocation process.
In the  first s tage , related  to  lending behaviour, financial institu tions 
could evade or ignore governm ent d irectives or guidelines. However, and 
due to  th e  governm ent’s  c lose supervision of their daily operations, Park 
argues th a t th is  did not seem  to  be a  problem in Korea. The second  s ta g e
57lInterview with Park Byung Ok and Ko Kye Hyun in Seoul, 8 June 2001. Park Byung Ok and Ko Kye Hyun 
Ko are the executive director and director of the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ). The CCEJ 
was founded in 1989 by some 500 people, including academics, lawyers, housewives, students, and 
businessmen. The movement’s main goal was to fight economic inequality in the Korean society. CCEJ gained 
national recognition after its efforts to get legislation implementing and enforcing the use of real names for 
financial and real estate transactions.
572The report is quoted in Kim Taewon, ‘Korea: Economic Consequences of Corruption in Korea’; Asia 
Solidarity Quarterly, 3 (2001), 68-90, p.73.
573For an analysis on credit fungibility in Korea, see Park, ‘The Development of Financial Institutions and the 
Role of Government in Credit Allocation’, pp.65-8.
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is re lated  with borrowers’ behaviour. Here, Park is clear: ’it is quite 
conceivable th a t a  large part of bank cred it w as diverted to  u ses  o ther 
than  th o se  predesignated by th e  governm ent.’S74Credit diversion would be 
possible not only because Korean financial interm ediaries lacked an 
effective system  to  supervise the  use of credit, but bank m anagers 
w ithout autonom y felt no responsibility to  a s s e s s  the  ac tua l u ses  of bank 
cred its .675According to Kang Tae Soo, from th e  Bank of Korea, before th e  
financial crisis  in 1997, Korean banks had a  loan officer formally in charge 
of checking regularly if the  corporations would use th e  loans according to  
plans. However, he points out, ’it w as fairly not like th a t’, becau se  since 
lending w as based  on collateral, banks did not have any incentive to  
superv ise  their loan portfolio. 676 The ex isten ce  of a  large unregulated 
money m arket in Korea during th e  1960s and 1970s can  be seen  a s  
evidence of a  considerable degree of cred it fungibility in Korea.677
It served  a s  a short-term  money m arket for large business 
borrow ers, when they needed a quick loan, free from paper work and with 
a fa s t turnaround time. It also  served  a s  a retail money m arket for 
consum ers and SMEs th a t had difficulties accessin g  bank loans, due to  
governm ent cred it restrictions. One of th e  common p rac tices  in th is 
unregulated money m arket, w ere th e  so-called ’disguised informal loans’ 
in which som e owners of private firms would lend personal funds, 
deposited  in banks under fa lse  nam es, to  their own firms a s  informal 
loans. This schem e allowed th e  ow ners to  tak e  advantage of th e  
corporate  tax  system  and th e  higher in te rest ra te s  in the  unregulated 
money m arket, also  known a s  th e  curb m arket. 87,The transaction  w as 
m ade possible because  it w as not uncommon for bank m anagers to  be 
involved a s  curb m arket brokers. David Cole and Yung Chul Park point out, 
however, th a t it w as not so  much th e  com m ission received for helping
574Park, ‘The Development of Financial Institutions and the Role of Government in Credit Allocation’, p.66.
575Park, ‘The Development of Financial Institutions and the Role of Government in Credit Allocation’, pp.66-7.
576 Interview with Kang Tae Soo, staff member of the Policy Research Team, Monetary Policy Department, 
Bank of Korea (BOK) in Seoul, 23 May 2001.
577Park, ‘The Development of Financial Institutions and the Role of Government in Credit Allocation’, p.67.
578Cole and Park, Financial Development in Korea 1945-1978, pp.162-3. See Chapter Four for a discussion on 
curb market.
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with th e  deal th a t a ttra c ted  th e  bank m anagers, but th e  fac t th a t th e se  
tran sac tio n s  w ere ‘m eans of expanding their deposits  and m eeting th e  
deposit quo tas  or ta rg e ts  often assigned  to  them .’S79After th e  Presidential 
Em ergency Order on Economic Stabilization and Growth on August 3, 
1972, around 113.7 billion won, or one third of the  to tal am ount of 
reported private loans, w ere found to  be ‘disguised informal loans’.880
In sum, th e  unregulated money m arket com plem ented the  s ta te -  
controlled official m arket to  facilita te  cap ital flows to  th o se  excluded by 
th e  governm ent guidelines. Ultimately, th e  curb m arket w as regarded "as 
a  lubricant for business operations by bridging the  money flow gap mainly 
cau sed  by th e  inadequate supply of cred it from th e  estab lished  banking 
institu tions”.881 By legally sanctioning th e  fa lse  nam e financial system , th e  
governm ent helped the  growth of th e  curb m arket and th e  developm ent of 
a tw o-tiered financial system  in th e  country. Over tim e, th e  unregulated 
money m arket grew  to form th e  so-called Underground econom y’ defined 
a s  incom e or w ealth  not reported to  au thorities for tax  a sse ssm e n ts  or 
incom e th a t re s ts  outside official e s tim a te s  of GNP. 882 After the  
im plem entation of the real nam e financial system , a  study by the  Korea 
Institu te  of Public Finance released  in 1996 claim ed th a t th e  size of th e  
underground econom y (in term s of GNP) had d ecreased  from 16.6 percen t 
in 1972 to  8.8 percen t in 1994.883Yi Insill, d irector of th e  Centre for Finance 
and Tax a t th e  Korea Economic R esearch Institu te, and who advised the  
ONTA during the  im plem entation of th e  real nam e financial system , s ta te s  
th a t ta x  evasion in fac t had becom e one of th e  country’s  major 
problem s.884Park Yung Chul adds th a t a s  long a s  th e  fa lse  nam e financial 
system  continued:
579Cole and Park, Financial Development in Korea 1945-1978, p.322 (fn.20).
580Cole and Park, Financial Development in Korea 1945-1978, p. 163.
581‘What is the curb money market’, KH, 4 July 1982, p.2.
582 Lee, ‘The Development of Financial Institutions and the Role of Government in Credit Allocation’, p. 106.
583The figures are quoted by Kim, ‘Korea: Economic Consequences of Corruption in Korea’, p.72.
584 Interview with Yi Insill in Seoul, 20 June 2001. The Korean Economic Research Institute is an affiliated 
think-tank with the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), the lobby group for the country’s major 
conglomerates.
197
...there w as no w ay of stopping m oney laundering or financial 
tran sac tio n s  related  to  underground and often criminal activ ities. 
B ecause of anonym ous tran sac tio n s  th e  m onetary au thorities felt they 
w ere deprived of essen tia l information needed  for safeguarding financial 
institu tions and conducting m onetary policy. Specifically, they  claim ed it 
w as difficult to  m onitor the  flow of funds betw een  m arkets, institutions, 
and businesses.*"
The fa lse  nam e financial system  w as a  way to  m axim ise th e  
m obilisation of dom estic savings and contributed to  fulfilling one of Park’s 
goals for th e  Korean s ta te  within th e  system  of socialisation  of private 
risk. Despite its  negative side effects , th is  officially sanctioned  financial 
policy w as nonetheless to lera ted  a s  a  ‘n ecessa ry  evil’. The view among 
the  au thorities began, however, to  change in th e  early 1980s following a 
m ajor financial scandal th a t highlighted the  m alp ractices nurtured by th e  
system  and its negative im pact on th e  country’s  financial system , 
econom y and social stability.
6.2.2 Presidential Policy Failures, V ested In te res ts  and Political Funds (1980- 
1993)
The first d eb a te  on th e  im plem entation of th e  real nam e financial 
system  em erged during th e  presidency of Chun Doo Hwan (1981-1987) 
following a m ajor financial scandal in May 1982. The episode involved a 
fam ous couple on the  Korean social scen e , Chang Yong J a  and her 
husband Lee Choi Hi, a form er National Assem bly m em ber and deputy 
head of th e  Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). The couple, 
claiming family tie s  with th e  acting President Chun Doo Hwan, succeeded  
in building an informal loan schem e. "* The couple, a lso  known a s  
‘M adame’ Chang and ‘General’ Lee lent money to  com panies a t  low
585Yung-Chul Park, ‘Korea: Development and Structural Change of the Financial System’, in Hugh T. Patrick 
and Yung Chul Park, eds, The Financial Development o f Japan, Korea, and Taiwan: Growth, Repression and 
Liberalization (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 129-172, p. 158.
586‘Businessman Couple Held for Flight of $400,000 to US’, KT, 8 May 1982, p.l, and ‘Loan Scandal Probe 
Focused on Fraud’, KT, 11 May 1982, p.3.
198
in te rest ra te s  under good repaym ent schedu les  in exchange for le tte rs  of 
c red it usually tw ice the  value of th e  ac tu a l loans.SS7As th e  governm ent 
pursued its tight m onetary policy a s  part of a  stab ilisation program, firms 
began to  experience liquidity problem s and turned to  th e  informal m arket 
to  m eet their short-term  funding sho rtages.
The le tte rs  of credit or prom issory no tes  w ere th e  m ost common 
tool used  by curb m arket lenders to  secu re  a loan, with th e  no tes usually 
cash ed  in before their due date . However, there  w as also  a  secondary  
m arket for th e se  notes, s ince they  could be discounted  a t  banks through 
money brokers. Companies tended to  tru s t th e  couple who boasted  about 
tie s  with th e  Blue House and vaunted their w ealth  by throw ing expensive 
p arties.888The couple succeeded  in obtaining le tte rs  of c red it from firms 
w orth 640 billion Won or about 800 million US dollars a s  collateral for 
bank loans. In addition, they obtained som e 170 billion Won (about 213 
million US dollars) from form er brokers of th e  previous Park governm ent 
by offering them  a com m ission of 500,000 Won per 10 million won of their 
funds.S89The couple invested th e se  funds in th e  s to ck  m arket, but a s  they 
began to  suffer lo sses  with their equity investm ents, ‘M adame’ Chang and 
‘G eneral’ Lee sold the  le tte rs  of credit, breaking th e  prom ise not to  
c ircu la te  and discount them  until th e  loan term  expired. Furthermore, 
even though they had already sold th e  prom issory no tes, Chang and Lee 
continued to  tak e  repaym ents from th e  firms.
587The loans could be paid in five-years, including two-year grace period and at an annual interest rate of 20 
percent, in contrast with the official market for commercial bills with interest rates at 35 percent and to be repaid 
in three months. See ‘Probe Result Still Leaves Many Questions Unanswered’, KT, 13 May 1982, p.6..
588The couple liked, in particular, to spread around their close relationship with Lee Kyu-kwang, president of the 
Korea Mining Promotion Corp, the husband of “Madame” Chang’s elder sister, and more importantly uncle of 
the First Lady Lee Soon Ja. The prosecutor, quoted by the Korea Times, said that:
By pretending to be in close relation with the Lees, Mrs. Chang earned the trust of business circles and was able 
to get the huge amounts of bills from financially unstable firms after making cash loans to them (...) Even some 
bankers extended loans to the couple without mortgage and provided them with forms of promissory notes in the 
wrong belief about their backgrounds, thus helping their fraudulent activities...
See ‘Lee-Chang Couple Accused of Fraud in Loan Scandal’, KT, 12 May 1982, pi.
589Lee, ‘The Development of Financial Institutions and the Role of Government in Credit Allocation’, pp. 107-8.
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The schem e amplified a s  th e  couple bribed officials in tw o of th e  
country’s  main financial institutions, the  Commercial Bank of Korea and 
th e  Cho-Hung Bank, to  provide loans to  th e  firms they  lent 
to .S90Additionally, they  borrowed money a t  preferential in terest ra te s  from 
th e  banks by playing up their connections in th e  Blue House, and lent the  
money, a t  higher ra te s , in the  curb m arket, to  com panies th a t could not 
borrow from banks because  they did not have enough influence or 
collateral. The schem e collapsed w hen a sm all com pany com plained to  
th e  au thorities th a t their prom issory no tes  w ere still in circulation 
although they  had repaid their loans to  th e  couple.s91The repercussions of 
th e  scandal on th e  financial system  w ere trem endous. One of th e  
country’s  leading s tee l com panies, llssin S teel Co., w ent bankrupt 
overnight, a  m ajor construction com pany involved in overseas pro jects, 
Kongyung Construction Co., w ent into court-appointed m anagem ent, and 
banks w ere asked  to  honour th e  le tte rs  of cred it issued by four o ther 
firms involved in the  scandal.
The dam age to  Korea’s  financial system  would have been far w orse 
had th e  governm ent not ac ted  quickly to  in ject liquidity into th e  m arket. 
B usinesses w ere expected  to  face  fund sh o rtages. The curb m arket, a 
m ajor c red it instrum ent for working capital, had been disrupted and its  
ac tiv ities w ere practically  frozen in th e  w ake of scandal. 992 Papers 
subm itted  to  the  National Assembly by th e  Ministry of Finance, show ed 
th a t th e  six  com panies involved in th e  scandal ow ed banks 939 billion
59°‘Lees gave 8.7 billion won in commissions to bankers’, KT, 13 May 1982, p.2. See also ‘Lees Draw W10 Bil. 
Loans in 3-4 Hours’, KT, 13 May 1982, p.7.
591Clifford, Troubled Tiger, p. 195.
592On the freeze of the curb market and impact on firms, see ‘Drain of Curb Loan Mart Plagues Business Firms’, 
KT, 18 May 1982, p.7. On the government’s rescue measures, see ‘BOK allocates W100 bil. relief funds in wake 
of FX scandal’, KH, 12 May 1982, p.7, ‘Gov’t increases business funds’, KH, 18 May 1982), ‘W20 bil. More To 
Stimulate Financial Mart’, KT, 18 May 1982, p.l, ‘W420 bil. fund to shore up farmers, small businesses’, KH, 
19 May 1982, p.l, ‘Gov’t efforts bring about rapid money mart stability’, KH, 30 May 1982, p.9, ‘Small 
industries to get 183 billion won in relief funds’, KH, 10 June 1982, p.9. Due to the importance of the curb 
market for the country’s economy, its disruption was seen as negatively affecting business transactions. In a 
report released in May 1982 right after the scandal, the Bank of Korea revealed that the curb market was 
estimated at between 603 billion Won and one trillion Won, or 16 to 25 percent of the total money in circulation. 
Bank officials, however, contested the report, claiming instead that the curb market could total more than two 
trillion won. They based their estimation on the fact that a big share of the money deposited in banks and other 
short-term financial institutions were de facto private loans. See ‘Curb market accounts for 16-25% of nation’s 
total money circulation’, KH, 21 May 1982, p.7.
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Won, desp ite  the  fac t th a t their collateral held by th e  banks totalled  only
226.2 billion Won. The m ost striking c a s e s  w ere Kongyung Construction 
Co. and llssin S teel Co. The first owed 306 billion Won. Yet it had only 
provided 8.1 billion Won in collateral. The la tte r ow ed 202.1 billion Won 
with 85.7 billion Won in co llateral.993
In th e  afterm ath  of the  scandal, police a rres ted  32 persons 
including an uncle-in-law of the  P resident a s  well a s  several top bank 
execu tives, including the  two form er p residen ts of tw o of th e  country’s  
m ajor banks, Cho Hung Bank and Commercial Bank of Korea.994When the  
p rosecu to rs raided th e  couple’s  m ansion in one of th e  m ost expensive 
a re a s  in Seoul, they found w hat could be ch arac te rised  a s  a  primitive 
bank. Among th e  findings w ere 400,000 US dollars, 37 kilogram s of gold 
bullion, 1.3 billion won in jewellery, a  1,500-piece an tique collection, and 
th ree  M ercedes-Benzes. ’Madame’ Chang w as also  sa id  to  own som e 600 
p ieces  of property ac ro ss  the  country w orth 32 billion won.s98Yet, desp ite  
all th e  w ealth , for th e  p as t years, th e  couple had only paid a very low 
incom e tax .996Such w as the gravity of the  episode th a t Prime-Minister Yoo 
Chang Soon and th e  entire cab inet offered their resignations to  tak e  
political and moral responsibility for th e  curb m arket scandal.
Sim ultaneously, the  ruling D em ocratic Ju s tic e  Party (DJP) led by 
P resident Chun, and launched in 1981 with a  goal to  c re a te  a  ’ju s t socie ty ’, 
in a  move seen  a s  aim ed a t regaining public confidence, reshuffled som e 
of its  key officers, including the  secretary-general, th e  ch ief policymaker, 
and th e  spokesm an .597 No public accusation  cam e forward against the  
P residen t and his wife. However, th e  scandal highlighted w hat w as 
already known among the country’s  e lite  about th e  illicit deals within th e
593‘6 companies mired in recent scandal owe banks 939 bil.won’, KH, 16 May 1982, p.9..
594For an excerpt of the verdict delivered by a judicial panel against the couple and the others involved in the 
scandal, see ‘Lee couple victimized entire people’, KH, 10 August 1982, p.10, and ‘Couple Given 15 Yrs in 
Jail’, KH, 10 August 1982, p.8
595Clifford, Troubled Tiger, p. 196.
596‘Chang Only Pays W4.2 Mil. In Income Tax Since '80’, KT, 15 May 1982, p.8.
597‘Premier Yoo, cabinet members tender resignations en bloc’, and ‘DJP hierarchy reorganized’, KH, 21 May 
1982, p.l and ‘Cabinet Refreshed, and Reshuffle to restore public confidence’, KH, 22 May 1982, p.4..
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ruling presidential families (Chun and Lee). However, it also  led the  
general public to  s ta r t  associating  th e  Fifth Republic w ith corruption.898ln 
an a ttem p t to  show  th a t th ere  w ere no ‘privileged persons’ during th e  
Chun presidency and to  remove relatives from influential positions, th e  
First Lady’s  uncle-in-law w as arres ted , her father, and brother of Lee Kyu 
Kwang, resigned from his position a s  head of th e  Korean Senior Citizens 
A ssociation, and the  president’s  younger brother also  offered his 
resignation from one of his minor posts . Heavy doubts rem ained, 
nonetheless, about the de facto  role played by th e  Blue House in the  
couple’s  d e a ls .899 The m agnitude of the  scandal highlighted tw o main 
fea tu res  of th e  Korean financial system .
First, government-run, Korean financial institu tions revealed 
them selves to  be backw ard, with poor interm ediation capacity  and 
financial technology.800They had also  failed to  respond to  th e  changing 
financial m arket conditions and needs of th e  real economy. During Park 
Chung Hee’s  reign, a s  part of th e  role of th e  Korean s ta te  within th e  
system  of socialisation of private risk, financial resou rces w ere tightly 
controlled and had to  be allocated  to  productive investm ent. Hence, 
available funds would be mainly used for fixed investm ent. The only way a 
firm could obtain a  loan to  finance daily operations w as to  offer land a s  
collateral. In principle, working cap ita l w as expected  to  com e from the  
investors’ original capital or from profits. However th e se  funds w ere 
insufficient to  respond to  any cash  sho rtages. Also th e se  funds did not 
m eet th e  financial needs of firms seeking to  invest in new  ven tures in th e
598tProbe Result Still Leaves Many Questions Unanswered’ and ‘Highly-Placed Official Involvement Denied’, 
KT, 13 May 1982, p.6 The prosecution denied the involvement of any high-placed government official, but those 
who attended the couple’s wedding in early 1982 recalled that among the guests were many known figures in the 
financial and political arenas, and this always raised suspicions of influence-peddling.
599‘Lee arrest attests to gov’t desire for just society’, KH, 9 May 1982, p.l. See ‘More Side Effects Seen in Biz 
World’, KT, 13 May 1982, p.l.
^T h is aspect was particularly important during the investigation of the scandal, with then Minister of Finance 
Rha Woong Bae, who for the first time mentioned the need of real names in the financial system. He claimed 
that the inexistence of a comprehensive information system did not allow banking institutions to exchange data 
on firms, and stopped them from obtaining correct figures on money flows in the insurance, short-term finance, 
stock and curb loan markets. See ‘Gov’t May Name Depositors At Banks, Finance Firms’, KT, 14 May 1982, 
p.l.
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rapidly growing Korean economy. For firms, a  private loan from the  curb 
m arket becam e a  ‘necessary  evil’.601
The second  feature  w as th a t th e  governm ent’s  policy of financial 
restriction  revealed itself to  be an invitation for fraud. Anyone who could 
obtain cap ital from banks a t below -m arket in terest ra te s  and then  lend 
them  in th e  curb m arket under a lia se s  w as  su re  to  gain hefty profits, a s  
‘M adame’ Chang and ’General’ Lee did. The likelihood of fraud in the  
country’s  financial system  w as further increased  due to  the  
adm inistrative sanction  allowing th e  use  of fa lse  nam es in real e s ta te , 
secu rities  and bank transactions. The scandal a lso  revealed how the  
sea rch  for cheap  bank cred it had led to  th e  developm ent of influence- 
peddling and rent-seeking tie s  betw een public officials and private 
businessm en. In sum, th is c a se  only served to  reveal th a t th e  governm ent- 
controlled banking se c to r  w as not only failing to  perform an efficient role 
a s  an interm ediary, but it w as also  nurturing th e  growth of an enorm ous 
unregulated money m arket a s  well a s  corrupt tie s  betw een  governm ent 
officials, bankers and businessm en.
In response  to  th e  unexpected  scandal, and its  far-reaching 
financial and econom ic consequences, th e  governm ent of Chun Doo Hwan 
announced on 3 July 1982, th e  so-called ’7.3’ m easure (seven indicating 
the  month of th e  year and, th ree  th e  day of th e  announcem ent). The ’7.3’ 
m easure w as a  m ajor reform of the  financial system , requiring th e  u se  of 
real nam es in all financial tran sac tio n s  from July 1983, and the  
application of progressive incom e ta x e s  to  financial incom e, which would 
include cap ital gains from in terest incom e.602 In an  effort to  fight tax  
evasion, th e  new  m easure also  planned a  reduction of th e  global incom e 
tax  ra te  to  50 percen t from th e  previous 76.5 percen t. According to  the  
acting  Minister of Finance Kang Kyung Shik th e  ’7.3’ m easure  w as devised
601‘Private money mart considered ‘necessary evil’ among businessmen’, KH, 14 May 1982, p.9.
602For the announcement of the new measure on July 3, see ‘Anonymous bank accounts banned effectively 
July'1983’, KH, 4 July 1982, p.l and ‘All Financial Transactions to Need Use of Real Names’, KT, 4 July 1982, 
p.l.
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to  estab lish  a new  order aimed a t th e  construction  of a ju s t society . In an 
expression of his confidence in its  im plem entation, he s ta te d  th a t ‘th ere  
will be no one to  oppose the  cau se  and th e  basic  spirit of th e  governm ent 
m easures.’603To becom e effective, th e  new  m easure had to  be voted and 
approved by the  National Assembly.
However, the  country’s  political estab lishm ent soon began to  
ex p ress  their opposition to  th e  new  measure.*04The financial com m ittee of 
th e  ruling Dem ocratic Ju s tic e  Party (DJP) argued th a t th e  m easures 
‘would shock the  national econom y greatly  and they  w ere drafted too 
hastily  without sufficient prior exam ination.’ It a lso  pointed out th a t the  
adm inistration lacked the  electronic-data processing system s n ecessary  
to  cover all businesses, a s  required by th e  new  taxation  procedures. 
Instead  of an im m ediate im plem entation, a s  proposed by th e  governm ent, 
th e  DJP called for a gradual p rocess. Political p ressu re  continued 
throughout the  sum m er, with the  ruling party announcing th a t it would 
form ulate ‘alternative com pensatory m easu res’, such  a s  keeping 
individual bank deposits  in secrecy  and limiting inquiries into the  source  
of bank deposits to  the only purpose of preventing overseas flight of 
capital.*09
Along with th e  political establishm ent, th e  business se c to r  voiced 
its  concern with the  side effects  th a t could be cau sed  by th e  m easure, 
specifically, decreasing  savings and specu lative investm ent in real 
esta te .*06The Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), the  main lobby group 
for th e  chaebol, issued a position paper on th e  m easure in la te  July, 
calling for a gradual im plem entation of the  real nam e financial system , 
suspension of the  com prehensive incom e taxation  and m ain tenance of 
th e  sep a ra te  taxation  system  which charged a relatively low tax  ra te  for
603‘Changes Necessary to Hike Development (interview to Kang Kyong-shik)’, KT, 7 July 1982, p.7. See also 
‘Financial reforms stir pros and cons’, KH, 21 July 1982, p.5..
604‘Parties Urge Gov’t to Put Off July 3 Economic Steps’, KT, 14 July 1982, p.l. and ‘Real Name Requirement 
Toe Hasty, Parties Say’, KT, 18 July 1982, p.4.
605‘DJP to formulate “July 3” alternatives’, KH, 21 July 1982, p.l.
606‘Biz Circles Fear Rise In Speculation’, KT 4 July 1982, p.9.
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financial income, it argued th a t ‘enforcing the  real-nam e system  by 
adm inistrative force seem s likely to  c h a se  aw ay th e  financial a s se ts , from 
th e  institutional financial m arket and disturb th e  existing financial order, 
adding to  th e  difficulties in business financing.’*07
On 17 August 1982, the  DJP p resen ted  w hat it called  a 
‘com prehensive com pensatory package’ to  th e  real nam e financial system , 
saying th a t it had already been agreed  with th e  governm ent. The package, 
however, diluted th e  goal of th e  original m easure. It not only s ta te d  th a t 
th e  so u rces  of th e  false  bank acco u n ts  and secu rities  should not be 
investigated  if th e  la tte r w ere changed into real nam e ones by July  1, 
1983, but a lso  proposed th e  postponem ent of th e  com prehensive taxation  
system , to  be ‘reserved for a considerable tim e’.*08By the  end of D ecem ber 
1982, already with th e  consen t of th e  executive, th e  ruling party  won a 
vote in th e  National Assembly supporting its  modified version for th e  new  
m easure  calling for th e  full enforcem ent of th e  real nam e financial system  
only a fte r January  1, 1986, instead  of th e  originally projected January  1, 
1983.608
Five years later, in O ctober 1987, th e  new  dem ocratically-elected  
presidency of Roh Tae Woo brought back  the  reform ist initiative by 
announcing th a t the  im plem entation of th e  real nam e financial system  
and a  progressive incom e taxation  schem e to  include financial incom es 
from 1991. Deputy Prime Minister Cho Soon em erged a s  th e  m ajor force 
pushing for the  im plem entation of th e  system . In early January  1990, th e  
Ministry of Finance announced th a t it had already drafted a se rie s  of 
m easu res to  m itigate the  afte rshocks tha t, such  a s  depression  of th e  curb 
m arket or intensification of real e s ta te  speculation , could be caused  
during th e  im plem entation of th e  real nam e financial transac tion
607‘FKI argues for gradual real-name system implementation’, KH, 30 July 1982, p.3.
608‘Gov’t, DJP Agree Not to Trace Origin of Deposits, Securities’, KT, 18 August 1982, p.l, and ‘Sources of 
deposits won’t be traced: DJP’, KH, 18 August 1982, p.l.
609‘Enforcement of real-name plan put off till after Jan.l, 1986’, KH, 14 December 1982, p.l, and ‘Real Name 
Deal Endorsed to Be Enforced After ’86’, KT 14 December 1982, p.l.
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sy stem .610 However, a s  had happened earlier with Chun Doo Hwan, the  
reform ist initiative cam e under th re a t and w as eventually postponed. On 
22 January  1990, th e  ruling DJP m erged with two opposition parties 
(Reunification Dem ocratic Party led by Kim Young Sam and the  
D em ocratic Republican Party headed by Kim Jong-pil) to  form th e  ‘Grand 
Conservative Coalition’ under th e  nam e of Dem ocratic Liberal Party  (DLP). 
Kim’s  move to  join the  coalition seem ed  to  have been th e  s tra teg y  he 
found to  becom e th e  ruling party’s  presidential nom inee and finally 
su cceed  in his bid to  becom e Korea’s  presiden t.<11The em ergence of th is 
coalition changed th e  country’s  political dynam ics.612As th e  coalition took 
shape, voices began to  surface in political and business c irc les calling for 
a reconsideration of the  im plem entation term s of the  new  policy.
Politicians, while claiming th a t th e  new  system  could lead to  
o v erseas  cap ital flight and real e s ta te  speculation, w ere m ore concerned 
th a t th e  im plem entation of the  new  m easure would severely  jeopard ise  
their political activ ities since they  w ere th e  major beneficiaries of 
political contributions, bribes, financial and real e s ta te  specu lation  under 
fa lse  nam es.<13Members of the  formerly ruling DJP, such a s  Park Tae Joon, 
DJP’s  chairm an, and Lee Seung Hoon, DJP’s  chairm an of policy research , 
supported  postponem ent of th e  new  policy, and the  chairm an of th e  FKI, 
Yoo Chang Soon, while officially supporting th e  policy, called  upon th e  
governm ent to  im plem ent it on a gradual basis .614Deputy Prime Minister 
Cho Soon also  denied reports suggesting the  postponem ent of th e  new  
system , and told reporters tha t, ‘th e  governm ent has no intention to  e a se
6l0‘Ministry Drafts Measures to Cushion Impacts of Real Name Reform System’, KT, 12 January 1990, p.9.
61'Lee, ‘South Korea's Politics of Succession and the December 1992 Presidential Election’, pp.40-50.
612Lee, ‘Uncertain Promise’.
613Shin Sang Min, ‘Dispute for 8 Years Between Chungwadae, Ministry of Finance, and Ruling Party Members 
over Implementing or Postponing Real Name Act’, Monthly Chosun, May 1990, pp.290-303. The author quotes 
a governmental official claiming that what drove the politicians to oppose the reform was the possibility of 
having the sources of their political funds revealed and this would not only bring problems for the business 
concerns but also affect the politicians’ activities. Additionally, most politicians did not seem to believe the 
government’s assurances that if the new system would go ahead, the government would restrain from 
investigating the sources of the funds.
614‘FKI Supports Public Concept of Land Ownership’, KT, 16 February 1990, p.6.
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or postpone on-going econom ic reform s. It will not be affected  by the  
m erger of th e  ruling party with two conservative political parties.’618
But in March 1990, only tw o m onths afte r the  formation of the 
coalition, a cab inet reshuffle led to  th e  departu re  of Cho Soon, who w as 
rep laced  by Lee Seung Hoo. The appointm ent of an open opponent of the  
reform for one of the  country’s  leading econom ic decision-making 
positions w as th e  first sign th a t th e  im plem entation of th e  real nam e 
financial system  w as under th rea t. The official confirm ation of the  
postponem ent cam e on 4 April 1990 following declarations by Lee Seung 
Hoon about the  dangers the  system  could have for th e  country’s 
econom y.616 After the  postponem ent of th e  real nam e financial system , a 
major land scam  em erged in Ju ly  1992. This tim e, th e  scam  involved 
officials a t  th e  Defence Ministry, real e s ta te  brokers, bank officials and 
th e  country’s  fifth biggest insurance com pany. 617During th e  investigation, 
th e  OBSE discovered more than 80 bank accoun ts  used by th e  culprits of 
which only 20 w ere under real nam es. The land scam  illustrated th a t the  
ab sen ce  of such a system  continued to  provide opportunities for the  
flourishing of th e  curb m arket and further financial frauds. In the  w ake of 
th e  land scam , and with presidential e lec tions scheduled  for December, 
th e  real nam e financial system  becam e again a  topical issue during the  
cam paign.616
In th e  w ake of th e  financial and fraud scan d a ls  em erging during 
their presidencies, the  im plem entation of the  real nam e financial system  
w as an opportunity to  boost the  political legitim acy within Korean socie ty  
for P residen ts Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo. S ince both Chun and
6l5‘New Land Policy, Real Name Financial Transaction Will Be Enforced as Scheduled: Cho’, KT, 31 January 
1990, p.8.
616For the declarations of Lee Seung Hoon, see ‘Ruling Camp to Shelve Real Name System’, KT, 24 March 
1990, p.l. See also ‘Real-Name Transaction Likely to Be Shelved’, KT, 21 March 1990, p.l.
617For the land fraud scam, see ‘Bank Official Swindles W23 billion’, KT, 5 July 1992, p.3., ‘JCS Employee 
Detained for Questioning’, KT, 7 July 1992, p.3, ‘Ex-JCS Employee Kim Received W8.1 Billion’, KT, 8 July 
1992, p.3, ‘Land Scam Engineered by Chongs, Kim YH’, KT, 9 July 1992, p.3, ‘Kim Yong-ho Viewed as Prime 
Culprit in Land Scam’ and ‘Land Scandal Feared to Slow Financial Liberalization Pace’, KT, 17 July 1992, p. 10, 
‘Prosecutors Confirm Double Fraud in JCS Land Scam’, KT, 18 July 1992, p.3, ‘Prosecutors Locate Flow of 
W63 Bil. From Insurance Co.’, KT, 19 July 1992, p.9, ‘W2 Bil. in Land Scam Unaccounted for’, KT, 21 July 
1992, p.3, and ‘Broker Im Forged Contract for Military Real Estate Sale’, KT, 22 July 1992, p.6.
618‘In Wake of Land Scam: Real Name Deposit System Emerges as Hot Topic’, KT, 21 July 1992, p.9.
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Roh w ere not known for being very confident in handling econom ic policy 
m atters , it w as thought th a t the  initiative to  im plem ent th e  real nam e 
financial transac tion  system  had been first brought up by their chief 
econom ic sec re ta r ie s  or deputy prime m in isters.'19ln th e  c a se  of Chun, 
Chief Economic S ecretary  Kim J a e  Ik w as seen  a s  th e  main arch itec t 
behind th e  reform, while during Roh Tae Woo’s  adm inistration, Deputy 
Prime M inister Cho Soon em erged a s  th e  leader of th e  initiative.*20Yet, 
both p residen ts who had earlier tacitly  approved th e  reform la ter decided 
to  postpone its  im plem entation. What seem ed to  have particularly 
determ ined their change of view w as th e  behind th e  sc en e  m anoeuvres in 
which they  w ere w arned about th e  negative im pact th e  reform could have 
on flows of political funds.
One of Korea’s  leading finance professors, Kim Pyung Joo, argues 
th a t Chun Doo Hwan reversed his earlier backing for th e  financial reform 
a fte r he w as convinced by Lee Won Jo , a  long-term friend from the  sam e 
region (Taegu), and who served a s  chief presidential financial sec re ta ry  
and head of th e  Office of Bank Supervision and Examination (OBSE) during 
his presidency.*21 According to  Kim, Lee w arned th e  president th a t if he 
endorsed  th e  new  system  his own political slush  funds could one day be 
exposed . Kim also  claim ed th a t th e  sam e Lee, who la ter becam e a 
m em ber of th e  National Assembly for th e  ruling party  under Roh Tae Woo, 
to g e th e r w ith Kim Chong In, then  Presidential Chief Economic Secretary , 
used  th e  sam e argum ent to push for the  postponem ent of th e  new  system  
during th e  Sixth Republic (1988-1992).
Lee Won Jo , who w as known a s  th e  ’crown prince of banking’, w as 
one of th e  m ost im portant figures in the  ruling party  due precisely to  his 
role in collecting political funds, a s  a tte s te d  by investigations undertaken
6l9Interview with Nam Duck Woo and Chung Duck Woo in Seoul, 30 May and 14 June 2001, respectively.
620For Chun Doo Hwan, see Shin, ‘Dispute for 8 Years Between Chungwadae, Ministry of Finance, and Ruling 
Party Members over Implementing or Postponing Real Name Act’.For Roh Tae Woo, see Lee Song Ho, ‘Policy 
Conflict and Its Settlement in Korea: The Case of Regulatory Reform’; The Korean Journal o f Policy Studies, 8 
(1993), 33-57.
621 Interview with Kim Pyung Joo in Seoul, 7 June 2001.
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by p rosecu to rs in 1989 and 1993.t22ln January  1989, a s  the  National 
Assem bly began to  push for investigations on irregularities com m itted 
during th e  Fifth Republic. The prosecution questioned Lee Won Jo  on 
allegations th a t, while in the  Blue House, he had diverted part of the  3.7 
billion W on-Petroleum Development Fund, consis ted  of revenues from 
im ported oil, to  be used a s  political funds.'23Additionally, th ere  w ere also  
susp icions th a t during his tenure  a s  p residen t of th e  OBSE he had 
provided large am ounts of bank loans to  debt-ridden business groups in 
return  for political funds. In w hat w as seen  a s  a  controversial ending to  
th e  investigation, raising doubts about th e  prosecution’s  work, Lee Won 
Jo  w as re leased  afte r two days of questioning, a s  th e  au thorities could 
not bring charges against him.624Later in O ctober 1989, th e  governm ent 
and th e  ruling party announced th a t they would se ek  his resignation, but 
Roh Tae Woo backed down since  Lee’s  political sacrifice  could have lead 
him to  go public and reveal all he knew  about political funds in the Sixth 
Republic. As he did during Chun’s  regime, Lee Won Jo  had helped ra ise  
funds for Roh’s  own 1987 presidential campaign.*2*
In April 1993, during the  first m onths of th e  Kim Young Sam 
presidency, th e  nam e of Lee Won Jo  em erged again linked with a  financial 
scandal in th e  sequence  of Kim’s  anti-corruption m easures. The scandal 
involved th e  chairm an of th e  private Donghwa Bank who w as accused  of 
having offered a to ta l of 2.27 billion Won to  Roh’s  c lo se  a sso c ia te s  on 
several occasions from 1989 to  la te  1992. According to  th e  P rosecu tors’ 
Office, th e  chairm an of th e  bank, Ahn Young Mo, said  th a t he had given 
Lee Won Jo  a to ta l of 880 million Won on 10 o ccasions since  November
622For investigation in 1989, see ‘DJP Rep. Lee WJ Faces Arrest For Petroleum Fund Diversion’, KT, 14 January 
1989, p.3, and ‘47 Arrested in Probe of Past Regime’s Scandals’, KT, 1 February 1989, p.l. For investigations in 
1993, see ‘Donghwa Bank Pres. Ahn Arrested For Taking Bribes In Return for Loans’, KT, 23 April 1993, p.3, 
‘Illegal Commissions to Donghwa Bank Pres. Presumed to Exceed W10 Billion’, KT, 25 April 1993, p.3, and 
‘Ex-Pres. Roh’s Aides bribed by Donghwa Bank’, KT, 4 May 1993, p.3, ‘Authorities Seek Return of Rep.Lee 
Ex-Finance Min. Rhee From Japan’, KT, 5 May 5, 1993, p.3, and ‘Peter’s Denial and Bureaucrats’ Passivism’, 
KT, 25 May 1993, p.7.
623‘DJP Rep. Lee WJ Faces Arrest For Petroleum Fund Diversion’, KT, 14 January 1989, p.3.
624‘47 Arrested in Probe of Past Regime’s Scandals’, p .l.
625‘DJP Seeks 2 Reps.’ Resignation To Put End to Past Legacies’, KT, 3 October 1989, p.2, and ‘Roh has failed 
to get the Chun years behind him: Small Steps Forward’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 October 1989, 
pp.40-2.
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1989 shortly a fter th e  foundation of th e  bank, and a  to ta l of 400 million 
Won on two occasions to  Kim Chong In, now a m em ber of th e  National 
Assembly. The prosecu tors believed th a t Ahn gave th e  money in return for 
their help launching the  bank during Roh’s  adm inistration and o ther 
financial favours from th e  governm ent. The Donghwa Bank w as 
estab lished  by citizens and businessm en w hose hom etow ns w ere  in North 
Korea. With Lee Won Jo  said  to  be under trea tm en t in Tokyo, the  
prosecution cam e under a tta c k  for not doing enough to  fully d isclose his 
involvement in th e se  illicit d ea ls .'2<The policy p rocess  and th e  political 
lessons of the  failed a ttem p ts  by P residen ts Chun and Roh to  im plem ent 
the  real nam e financial system  is seen  here a s  im portant policy feedback, 
which contributed to  shaping Kim’s  own approach to  the  reform.
6.2.3 Clean Politics, J u s t  Society and Moral Leadership
As a leader seeking to  legitim ise his leadership  on th e  Confucian 
political tradition of ’rule of m an’, th e  surprising announcem ent of th e  real 
nam e financial transac tion  well reflected  th e  ideological m otivation 
driving Kim Young Sam ’s  political behaviour.s27Soon afte r his victory, Kim 
Young Sam d istanced  him self from form er P resident Roh, whom he 
blamed for lacking leadership and for adm inistrative incom petence in 
dealing with the  ’country’s  ram pant corruption and moral decay’. Hahm 
Sung Deuk claim s th a t Kim Young Sam ’truly’ identified him self a s  a 
reform ist leader and th a t in order to  reform Korean society , th e  form er 
President ’strongly’ believed in the  need to  im plem ent th e  real nam e 
financial system . This, Hahm says, explains why he adopted a  top-down 
stra teg y  to push for th e  reform.62BKim Young Sam ’s  political history seem s 
to  confirm his conviction for th e  need of th is reform. After th e  em ergence 
of th e  ruling coalition Dem ocratic Liberal Party (DLP) and th e  
postponem ent of th e  real nam e financial system  in 1990, Kim and his
626‘Donghwa Bank Pres. Ahn Arrested For Taking Bribes In Return for Loans’, p.3, ‘Illegal Commissions to 
Donghwa Bank Pres. Presumed to Exceed WIO Billion’, p.3, and ‘Ex-Pres. Roh’s Aides bribed by Donghwa 
Bank’,p.3, ‘Authorities Seek Return of Rep.Lee Ex-Finance Min. Rhee From Japan’, p.3, and ‘Peter’s Denial 
and Bureaucrats’ Passivism’, p.7.
627See Chapter Five.
628Interview with Hahm Sung Deuk in Seoul, 26 June 2001.
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political faction within the DLP continued to  support th e  im plem entation 
of th e  system  and publicly voiced their opposition to  th e  decision taken  
by Roh’s  execu tive.629
As the  first dem ocratically-elected civilian president since  the  
1960s, Kim Young Sam cham pioned th e  principle of civilian authority  over 
th e  military, which over the  p as t th ree  d ecades, had dom inated Korean 
politics. Sim ultaneously, a s  the  new  head of a s ta te , th a t for th ree  
d ecad es  had grown accustom ed to  collusion betw een governm ent 
officials and businesses, Kim not only voluntarily disclosed his personal 
a s s e ts  to  th e  public but also vowed th a t he would not acc ep t any political 
donations. By deciding on th is approach, Kim Young Sam em erged a s  a 
m oral ruler seeking to build a  ‘New Korea’ with clean  politics and a  ju s t 
socie ty . As President Kim Young Sam s ta te d  w hen he announced th e  
decree: ‘w ithout th e  im plem entation of the  real nam e system , corruption 
and irregularities on th is soil canno t be uprooted and th e  chronic tie-in 
betw een  political power and th e  business c irc les canno t be severed . The 
real-nam e system  is a more im portant reform than  any o thers  in building a 
new  Korea. This is the  reform of reform s and th e  core and the  spine of 
reform s in our era .’630
The im pact of m alpractices facilitated  by th e  false  nam e financial 
system  on th e  country’s  financial structu re , econom y and social stability, 
th e  policy p rocess  and political lessons taken  from th e  failed a ttem p ts  of 
P residen ts Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo to  im plem ent th e  reform and 
Kim 's ideological m otivations are  here regarded a s  th e  m ajor variables 
th a t contributed to  shape his choice and approach to  im plem ent the  real 
nam e financial system . Yet, the  reform w as only partially successfu l. By 
assum ing th e  posture of a moral ruler and pursuing a  ‘top-down’ approach 
to  reform, Kim Young Sam com m itted tw o stra teg ic  failures.
629‘Criticisms Voiced Within DLP Over Deferment of ‘Real Name’ System’, KT, 22 March 1993, p.2.
63°‘Real Name Financial System Enforced’, KT, 13 August 1993, p.l.
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First, for th e  legitim acy of his leadership  and reform s to  succeed  he 
needed to  m aintain and consolidate popular support. However the  moral 
legitim acy of Kim’s  leadership began to  be challenged, not only by a 
se rie s  of scan d a ls  but also  due to  th e  inconsistencies of econom ic 
policies. Popular support for his presidency subsequently  began to  rapidly 
tum ble. This underm ined Kim’s  leadership and th e  capacity  to  push 
further for his reform ist program.
Second, any effort to  force institutional change would be an 
ex igent ta sk  in face  of th e  built-in political and econom ic path- 
dependences inherited from Park Chung Hee, a s  the  form er governm ents 
of Chun and Roh learned. The Korean political system  does concen tra te  
pow er in th e  executive. However, th e  streng th  of th e  system  of 
socia lisation  of private risk has rested  on th e  structurally  in terdependent 
and dynam ic tie s  especially  betw een th e  executive, bureaucra ts  and 
businessm en. The country’s  dem ocratisation added a  fourth ac to r to  th e  
system  by formally increasing its  policy power: th e  National Assembly.
Therefore, any a ttem p ts  to  a lte r th e  rules of th e  gam e within th e  
system , in particu lar its  informal side a s  would happen with th e  
im plem entation of th e  real nam e financial transac tion  system , required 
som e type of negotiation and agreem ent w ith th e  o ther ac to rs  within th e  
system  in face  of the ir potential re s is tan ce  and opposition. The reform 
w as, in fact, expected  to  negatively affect governm ent officials, 
businessm en and politicians, especially  in term s of taxation  and political 
funds. But its  im plem entation w as also  positively seen  by certain  sec to rs  
within th e  bureaucracy  and business a s  well a s  by th e  v as t majority of th e  
Korean population.
The new  system  w as favoured by th e  m onetary au thorities a s  it 
would bring more transparency  to  th e  financial system  helping them  to  
investigate  illicit financial flows, fight money laundering or o ther financial 
tran sac tio n s  related  to  th e  underground econom y. Some businessm en
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also  saw  in th e  new  system  th e  opportunity to  avoid being forced into 
providing political funds due to  th e  possible tax  investigations. For the  
m ajority of th e  Korean population, th e  new  system  w as exp ec ted  to 
ad d ress  ca lls  for a  more fair distribution of w ealth. Under th e  fa lse  nam e 
financial system , th e  country’s  w ealthy groups could hide their gains from 
financial and property investm ents under a liases  and easily  evade 
taxation .
Yet, Kim Young Sam’s  governm ent m ethods to  prom ote im portant 
reform s, including th e  real nam e financial transaction  system , failed to  
gain th e  support of w hat could be their m ajor beneficiaries. As Hahn Bae- 
ho, th e  presiden t of one of Korea’s  leading research  institu tions, Sejong 
Institu te, pu ts it: ’...prior to  and during the  im plem entation phase, the 
adm inistration failed to  provide ad equate  information about th e  reform s 
and persuade people of their im portance. The governm ent did not m ake 
an effort to  clearly identify who th e  beneficiaries would be in order to 
recru it them  a s  a  b ase  of support for th e  reform s.’631This becam e evident 
following th e  introduction of th e  reform with the  country’s  m iddle-class, 
i.e., th e  political b ase  of Kim’s  adm inistration, said  to  be anxious about 
th e  im plications of th e  new system .632 For exam ple, ow ners of SMEs, in 
particular, and who had favoured Kim Young Sam during th e  presidential 
e lec tions in 1992, feared th a t th e  full exposure of their finances would 
lead to  a  tw o or three-fold ta x  increase .633 Since Kim decided to  push the  
financial policy by adm inistrative fiat w ithout building a  reform -oriented 
alliance, th e  Korean s ta te  capacity  to  fully institu tionalise th e  real nam e 
financial transaction  system  becam e more difficult.
63lHahn, ‘Assessing Kim Young-sam Administration's First Four Years', p. 13.
632Nam Si-uk, ‘Don’t Make the Middle Class Nervous’; Korea Focus 1:5 (1993), 114-6 (originally published in 
The Dong-A Ilbo, September 7, 1993). See also Hahm Chaibong, ‘Future of Korean Political Reform Drive’; 
Korea Focus 4:1 (1996), 5-11 (originally published in Reform, December 1995).
633In fact, some like Kim Jong In, a former Minister of Finance during the presidency of Roh Tae Woo, claimed 
that due to their dependence on the curb market, the SMEs faced a shortage of funds following the adoption of 
the real name financial transaction system, leading many to bankruptcy which ultimately open the way for the 
country’s financial crisis in 1997. See Kim Yong-sam, ‘Roh Tae Woo Memoirs: 6th Republic Hidden Stories on 
Economic Policies -  Chaebol Reform and Resistance of Chaebol Leaders’, Monthly Chosun, July 1999, pp.422- 
459.
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6.3 Implementing Real Name Financial T ransaction  System : Business 
R esistance and Politicians’ Opposition
The even ts  prior to  the  announcem ent of the  real nam e financial 
transaction  system  illustrate well how Kim’s  ’reform from above’ w as 
often accom panied by an elem ent of surp rise  a s  he su cceed ed  in keeping 
sec re t a  ta sk  force to  draft the  new  policy.'34After Kim’s  inauguration, th e  
im plem entation of the  real nam e financial system  rapidly em erged a s  one 
the  goals of th e  new  adm inistration. However, within an econom ic 
scenario  exhibiting low growth, decreasing  exports, industrial activity  a t 
record lows, and an unem ploym ent ra te  ex pected  to  rise with increasing 
corporate bankruptcies, th e  d eb ate  on th e  reform w as blam ed for having a 
negative im pact in the  already struggling econom y. 639 Facing th is  
econom ic scenario , governm ent officials began to  re trea t from their 
earlier positions sta ting  th a t th e  im plem entation of th e  real nam e 
financial system  would occur in th e  first half of th e  year.*3*
D espite his continuous vow th a t th e  real nam e financial system  
would com e into force a s  early a s  possible, th e  P resident s ta r ted  to  say  
th a t it would be im plem ented only afte r an im provem ent in th e  country’s  
econom ic situation.*37By March 1993, in face  of w hat had earlier happened 
in 1982 and 1989, there  w as a  mounting public belief th a t th e  governm ent 
had decided to  postpone th e  financial reform. *3* In April 1993, the  
governm ent and th e  ruling party agreed  to  put off th e  introduction of th e
634‘When Drawing Up Real Name System: Pres.Kim Most Concerned About Leakage’, KT, 14 August 1993,
p.2.
635‘With No Sign of Improvement: Korean Economy Heading for Worst in A Decade’, KT, 5 February 1993, 
p.9, and ‘Investors Withdrawing Money from Stock Market’, KT, 20 February 1993, p.9. Following Kim Young 
Sam’s statement that the policy would be adopted in his first year in office, the stock market plunged allegedly 
as wealthy businessmen and big stock investors decided to withdraw their money from the market fearing tax 
investigations associated with the real name financial transaction system.
636‘Gov’t May Put Off Use of Real Name in Financial Transactions’, KT, 16 March 1993, p.l, ‘Use of Reai 
Name System Depends on Economy's State’, KT, 17 March 1993, p.9, ‘Kim YS Fails to Keep Election 
Campaign Pledges’, KT, 18 March 1993, p.8, ‘Investors Withdrawing Money from Stock Market’,p.9.
637‘Economic Burden Forces Real Name System Into Mouthballs’, KT, 20 March 1993, p.9, and ‘Real Name 
System to Follow Economic Recovery’, KT, 25 March 1993, p.3.
638‘Finance Minister Hong Accents Economic Revitalization Before Financial Reform’, KT, 18 March 1993, p.9, 
and ‘DPM Lee Vows Real-Name Financial Transaction System Will Be Put Into Action’, KT, 27 March 1993,
p. 16.
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real nam e financial transaction  sy stem .639 But on 3 August 1993, in a 
surprising move, Kim Young Sam announced the  Presidential Em ergency 
Order on Real Name Financial T ransactions and Protection of Their 
Confidentiality. By resorting to  an em ergency order, Kim seem ed  to  have 
learned from the  p a s t experiences of Chun and Roh, and aim ed to  prevent 
legislative debate  th a t could lead to  revisions of his original plan. 
According to  the  Constitution, the  National Assembly could only re jec t or 
endorse an em ergency order, but had no pow er to  am end it.640
The announcem ent of the  real nam e financial system  boosted  Kim 
Young Sam’s  popular ratings with 88 p ercen t of the  population showing a 
positive view of th e  P resident by th e  end of 1993.M1Most citizens saw  the  
reform program a s  th e  way forward to  help end the endem ic corruption 
affecting the country and growing econom ic inequalities.t42M embers of th e  
CCEJ, after years of cam paigning for the  introduction of the  real nam es in 
financial transactions, celebrated  in their office in Seoul the  realization of 
one of the  organization’s  main goals. They blamed th e  old system  for a 
se rie s  of bribery and banking scandals  th a t had hit th e  country’s  financial 
system  hard, and increased  national econom ic d isparities.643The d ecree  
w en t into effect imm ediately after its  approval on 19 August 1993 by the  
whole National Assembly.644
Financial so u rces  quoted by a  local new spaper claim ed th a t out of 
to ta l deposits of about 73.2 trillion Won in savings acco u n ts  a t  banks 
(excluding foreign banks), about one trillion Won or 1.4 p ercen t w as in 
fa lse  nam es a t th e  end of June  1992.<45This seem s to  confirm th e  claim s 
by Park Byung Ok and Ko Kye Hyun from th e  CCEJ th a t only a small 
minority of the  population (five percent) resorted  to  th e  use  of fa lse  nam e
639tDLP, Cabinet Agree to Put on Hold Implementation of Real Name System’, KT, 7 April 1993, p.2.
^L ee, ‘The Development of Financial Institutions and the Role of Government in Credit Allocation’, pp. 117-8.
^'Hahm and Rhyu, ‘Democratic Reform and Consolidation in Korea’, p.81.
642‘Real Name New Base for 2nd Take OfP, KT, 25 August 1993, p.6.
643‘After 4-Year Efforts for Economic Reform: CCEJ Celebrates ‘Real Name Triumph” , KT, 14 August 1993, 
p.l.
^ ‘Nat'l Assembly Passes Presidential Order Enforcing Real-Name System’, KT, 20 August 1993, p.2.
6451 When Will the Real Name System Come?’, KT, 1 January 1993, p.3.
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system s, though certainly  a  very w ealthy minority.64<A study by the  Korea 
Institu te  of Public Finance in 1996 claim ed th a t the  size of the  
underground econom y in term s of GNP had d ecreased  from 16.6 percen t 
in 1972 to  8.8 percen t in 1994 following th e  im plem entation of th e  real 
nam e financial system .647Additionally, w as it not for the  reform, th e  a rres t 
of form er P residents Chun and Roh, a s  well a s  several o ther politicians 
and businessm en on corruption ch arg es  would probably not have 
occurred.
However, a s  Hahm Sung Deuk argues, th e  problem with Kim’s  
s tra teg y  to push for ‘reform from above’ w as th a t once th e  P resident 
began to  lose popularity following a se rie s  of scan d a ls  his political 
capacity  w as also  w eakened. 646 Under th e se  conditions, it becam e 
increasingly difficult for him to  stand  for policy reform and much eas ie r  
for those  opposing the  reform to  rea c t and try  to  slow  the  
institutionalisation of the  new  system .^M eanw hile, Kim failed to  mobilise 
a  supporting alliance within the  im portant core group of th e  system  of 
socialisation of private risk to  spearhead  the  reform. One of the  basic  
dilem m as of the  reform process  is th a t th e  ch an ces  are  high th a t th e  
fo rces opposing reform will be m ore influential than  those  supporting 
reform. It may happen th a t those  who had benefited m ost from th e  
previous policies, and who tend  to  loose m ost from th e  reform s, by feeling 
a  strong sen se  of d ispossession  m obilise in support of program 
m aintenance ra ther than change and reform. This situation a rises  
becau se  institutional change of any type ten d s  usually to  redefine th e  
pow er relations betw een various social ac to rs. Furtherm ore, the  
beneficiaries of the  reform s may not becom e fully aw are of th e  
advan tages b ecause  their im pacts may be dispersed , and consequently  
fail to  m anifest their support for the  ongoing reform s. In face  of no visible
^Interview with Park Byun Ok and Ko Kye Hyun in Seoul, 8 June 2001.
647The figures are quoted by Kim, ‘Korea: Economic Consequences of Corruption in Korea’, p.72.
648For scandals, see Chapter Five.
^Interview with Hahm Sung Deuk in Seoul, 26 June 2001.
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support from th e  society , the  im plem entation, w hether partial or full, of 
th e  reforms may potentially run into trouble.
In Korea, th e  main opposition, although divided, to  th e  real nam e 
financial transaction  system  cam e from businessm en and the  ruling 
party’s politicians, tw o of the  fo rces th a t had benefited m ost from the  
previous policy in particular in term s of taxation  and political funding.
6.3.1 Business R esistance and Keeping Up Old P rac tices
For the  business sec to r, and in particu lar th e  chaebol, th e  
m aintenance of th e  old system  w as preferable s in ce  it offered th e  
opportunity to  evade high taxation  and pay lower ta x e s  on financial 
income. Additionally, in a  country w here th e  s ta te  w as in control of 
capital allocation, the  old system  served th e  chaebol well. They could buy, 
more easily  and in an anonym ous m anner, favours from bureaucra ts  and 
politicians. Favours included a c c e s s  to  policy loans, th e  acquisition of 
licences to partic ipate  in highly profitable governm ent-regulated sec to rs  
and the  right to  tak e  part in bidding and land co n trac ts  on public projects. 
Yi Insill pointed out th a t th e  se lection  of com panies to  undertake 
investm ents in certain  business sec to rs  depended on the  will of 
politicians and bureaucra ts , and consequently , if b u sin esses w ere on 
good term s with bu reaucra ts  they could be picked up a s  long a s  they paid 
a com m ission usually estim ated  a t 10 p ercen t of th e  value involved in th e  
deal."0
Yi Insill, nonetheless, found out in conversations with business 
leaders before th e  im plem entation of th e  system  in 1993 th a t while som e 
w ere against th e  new  policy, o thers  supported  it due to  th e  im pact in 
term s of political funds. This seem s to  be confirmed by new spaper reports 
describing conflicts within the  Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) over
650Interview with Yi Insill in Seoul, 20 June 2001.
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th e  reform before its  im plem entation. *51 While th e  chairm en of Hyundai, 
Lucky-Goldstar and Kumho supported  its  im plem entation, th e  chairm en of 
Daewoo, Sunkyong and Samyang argued th a t it w as still prem ature to  put 
th e  system  in effect. For the  former, a s  long a s  th e  old system  w as in 
p lace, th e  high c o s ts  a sso c ia ted  with th e  need to  provide political funds 
to  parties  would rem ain. But, if they could tell political parties th a t the 
new  system  forced them  to  report to  th e  tax  office how much money they 
donated  a s  political funds, politicians would not be so  eag er to  request 
v a s t am ounts of money.692
After th e  election of Kim Young Sam, th e  FKI, under a  new  leader, 
Chey Jong  Hyon, th e  chairm an of Sunkyong, one of Korea’s  largest 
chaebol, reaffirmed its  opposition to  an early  im plem entation of the  
reform .t93Likewise, th e  Korea Cham ber of Com m erce and Industry (KCCI) 
a lso  proposed the  gradual Im plem entation of th e  real nam e financial 
tran sac tio n  system . The KCCI claim ed th a t if the  system  w as introduced 
suddenly during a tim e of econom ic lethargy, th e  curb m arket would 
freeze and many sm all and medium-sized firms, i.e., th e  m ajor client of the  
curb m arket, would go bankrupt and money m arket ra te s  would again 
rise .6S4D espite the  business view, Kim Young Sam decided to  go ahead  
with th e  decree . However, evidence th a t th e  business se c to r  would not
651‘Real Name financial trading system splits business leaders’, KH, 14 August 1992, p.6, and ‘Polemics Over 
Real Name System’, KT, 14 August 1992, p.3.
652Interview with Yi Insill, Seoul, 20 June 2001. The problem, however, with this view is that businessmen could 
hardly trust the tax office which was not uncommonly used by the President (who happened to be also the 
chairman of the ruling party) to prosecute firms that would lose political favour with the leadership at the time. 
See for example the case of Hyundai during the presidency of Roh Tae Woo. See ‘Hyundai’s Chung M.H. gets 
suspended term’, KH, 15 August 1992, p.3. Hyundai’s Chung Mong Hun was arrested on charges of evading 5.8 
billion Won in taxes and using forged documents to divert company funds totalling 11.2 billion Won into secret 
bank accounts. He was accused of ordering his assistants to forge income records and shipping charges to cover 
up the secret funds. On the other side, the tax office could also be used to let tax evasion go unpunished to 
benefit political allies, as also happened during Roh. In May 1990, a former inspector at the Board of Audit and 
Inspection (BAI), under the direct jurisdiction of the president and in charge of examining the settlement of 
revenues and expenditures of the state, told a local newspaper that BAI had suspended investigations on tax 
irregularities by major chaebol due to what he called “higher” pressures. Lee Mun Ok alleged that while 
Samsung Life Insurance Co was supposed to pay 300 billion Won in taxes, it paid only 8 billion. He also said 
that tax investigations of the Sunkyong Group had been suspended on grounds that the group was owned by a 
relative by marriage of President Roh Tae Woo. Lee was later arrested accused of leaking secrets of his official 
duties to the press. The court said the content of the stories revealed by Lee were judged to be “official secrets” 
whose leakage constituted a law violation. See ‘Lee's Act of Revealing BAI Data To Press Illegal, Court Rules’ 
and ‘BAI Official’s Allegations’, KT, 25 May 1990, p.3 and p.4, respectively.
653‘FKI Chairman Voices Concern Over Early Use of Real Name System’, KT, 5 March 1993, p.9.
654‘KCCI Proposes Gradual Use of Real Names’, KT, 5 March 1993, p.9.
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willingly coopera te  with the  institutionalisation of the  new  financial policy 
em erged right a fte r th e  announcem ent of th e  decree, a s  com panies w ere 
reported  to  have rapidly begun to  look for loopholes in th e  system.*"
One popular m easure to  m anage s e c re t funds w as to  borrow nam es 
for bank deposits. According to  a new spaper report, in deals usually 
involving th e  top m anagers of com panies or their confidants and senior 
officials of banks, com panies would w ithdraw  money deposited  in false 
nam e acco u n ts  and deposit them  again with borrowed nam es one after 
ano ther.C56Banks cooperate  with th e se  p rac tices  in order to  m aintain their 
level of deposits. According to  Park Byung Ok and Ko Kye Hun, while th e  
reform banned th e  use  of pseudonym s, people could still use borrowed 
nam es and th e  new  system  does not include any provision to  probe this. 
Additionally, th e se  p ractices, contrary  to  common belief, are  well 
p ro tec ted  by privacy rights, and th e se  tw o m em bers of th e  CCEJ argue 
th a t even if th e re  is a  crim e it is very difficult to  investigate.**7
6.3.2 Politicians’ Opposition and Slowing Down the Real Name Financial 
System
In Korea, th e  president, m em bers of th e  National Assembly, and 
heads of local governm ents tend  to  be ca ree r politicians.***The co s t of 
m aintaining a local office in one’s  constituency , keeping up with th e  
political s ta tu s  and cultivating social relations with his or her 
co n s titu en ts  easily  ex ceed s th e  salary  and allow ance received from th e  
s ta te  a s  a  m em ber of the  National Assembly.***Hence, Korean politicians 
need large am ounts of money to  rem ain in politics. Except for a  small 
minority of w ealthy ones, Korean politicians find it difficult to  avoid
655‘Companies Rack Brains to Find How to Create ‘Secret Funds” , KT, 17 August 1993, p.8 and ‘Techniques to 
Cheat New System Prevalent’, KT, 23 August 1993, p.9.
656‘Companies Rack Brains to Find How to Create ‘Secret Funds” ,p.8.
657Interview with Park Byung Ok and Ko Kye Hyun in Seoul, 8 June 2001.
658Kim Myoung-soo, ‘Causes of Corruption and Irregularities’; Korea Focus, 8:1 (2000), 37-47 (originally 
published in a book in 1999 by the Center for International Studies, Policy Research Series, Yonsei University).
659‘Parties Try to Conform to Post ‘Real Name’ Political Culture’, KT, 21 August 1993, p.2. It reports that in 
1993 while most members of the National Assembly need some 20 million won a month on average for 
management of their district offices, they receive for their assembly activities little more than 5 million won.
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accep ting  th e  so-called ‘black funds’, i.e., bribes in return for econom ic 
favours from th e  authorities. "°The adoption of the  real nam e financial 
transac tion  would simply th rea ten  their political livelihood. As Kang Tae 
Soo points out, th e  re sis tan ce  to  th e  new  financial policy by m ost Korean 
politicians is understood b ecause  they  would receive their funds from 
various bank acco u n ts  w hose holders could hide their identities behind 
th e  fa lse  nam e registration .<61With th e  real nam e financial system , the  
so u rces  of th e se  funds could be tracked  down and reveal th e  illicit ties  
and jeopardize their political activ ities. Despite th e  agreem ent s e t  w ith 
th e  ruling party th a t the  real nam e financial system  would be postponed, 
Kim Young Sam opted to  issue th e  new  financial policy by surprise.
The behaviour of the  ruling DJP and how it rapidly moved to  a lte r 
and postpone th e  im plem entation of th e  financial reform during the  
p residencies of Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo canno t be ruled out a s  
policy lesso n s for Kim Young S am .8,2 By pushing the  reform through 
adm inistrative fiat, he a ttem pted  to  avoid th e  re s is tan ce  from many 
politicians a t  the  National Assembly, especially  from the  ruling DLP. The 
DLP, although it had supported Kim’s  election, w as still m ade up of many 
m em bers of the  form er DJP still opposed to  th e  real nam e financial 
tran sac tio n  system  with only a small minority supporting Kim Young 
Sam ’s  initiative.6S3ln fact, Kim’s  anti-corruption m easures w ere seen  a s  an 
a ttem p t to  p rosecu te  the  (old guard’ of th e  ruling DLP with ties  with th e  
p a s t military regim es.6MAn exam ple w as the  investigation of irregularities 
com m itted by th e  already m entioned Park Tae-Joo, then chairm an of th e  
DLP and honorary chairm an of Pohang Iron and S teel Co."5 The National 
Assembly, nonetheless, su cceed ed  in slowing down th e
660Kim, ‘Causes of Corruption and Irregularities’, p.41.
“ 'interview with Kang Tae Soo in Seoul, 23 May 2001.
662For the reactions within the ruling party in face of top-down reform strategy undertake by President Kim, see 
‘Ruling Party Alienated From Important Decision-Making’, KH, 23 August 1993, p.3.
“ interview with Park Byung-Ok and Ko Kye-Hyun, Seoul, June 8, 2001.For the factional divisions within the 
ruling DLP, see ‘Jockeying for Power’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 January 1990, pp.22-5, and ‘DLP 
Lawmakers Alarmed About Property Disclosure’, KT, 9 March 1993, p.3.
664‘DLP Old Guard Feels End Closing In’, KT, 25 March 1993, p.2, and ‘Pres. Kim’s Unswerving Reform Drive 
Leaves DLP Old Guard Out in Cold’, KT, 14 April 1993, p.2.
665Yonhap News Agency, Korea Annual 1994, pp.64-5.
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institutionalisation of the  real nam e financial transaction  system  and 
politicians seem  to  have found w ays to  evade th e  system .
Firstly, th e  presidential em ergency order rem ained a s  such  for four 
years  until it w as finally voted a s  a law  by th e  National Assem bly in 1997 
in a  p rocess seen  a s  irregular. According to  Park Byung Ok and Ko Kye 
Hyun, the  em ergency decree  has a  limited duration, and legally afte r th a t 
period it should have been institutionalised into the  system  or 
abo lished ."6However, th a t did not happen becau se  of opposition within 
th e  National Assembly. Since the  National Assembly had already been 
"p ressed” to  endorse the  new  system  desp ite  vast opposition am ong its 
m em bers, w hat it could still do w as delay its  institutionalisation. The 
National Assembly legalised the  em ergency order in 1997 only afte r a 
growing feeling within th e  public opinion th a t the postponem ent, due to 
its  implications in te rm s of financial transparency, had in fac t been 
responsible for the  country’s  financial crisis.667 Secondly, a fte r th e  1997 
financial crisis, th e  com prehensive taxation  system  w as postponed until 
2002 due to  opposition from th e  United Liberal D em ocrats (ULD) of Kim 
Jong  Pil. The party argued th a t the im plem entation of th e  new  ta x  system , 
in tim es of crisis, would have a negative im pact on the  country’s  financial 
m arket and economy. 666 Finally, th e  system  did not seem  to  have 
d ecreased  illegal political funds. As Sohn Hyuk Ja e , Deputy S ecretary  
G eneral of the  People’s  Solidarity for Participatory Dem ocracy (PSPD), 
points out w hat the  new  system  added w as more inconvenience in th e  
p ro cess  of operating political funds. Now, instead  of using bank acco u n ts  
under false nam es, cash  is being used, a s  evidenced by the  c a s e  of the  
apple boxes full of money th a t w ere found in th e  possession  of Chun Doo 
Hwan.669
666Interview with Park Byung Ok and Ko Kye Hyun, Seoul, 8 June 2001.
^Interview with Park Byung Ok and Ko Kye Hyun, Seoul, 8 June 2001.
^Interview with Yi Insill in Seoul, 20 June 2001.
669 Interview with Hyuk Jae Sohn in Seoul, 3 July 2001. The PSPD is a non-profit, non-partisan civic 
organisation dedicated to the promotion of participatory democracy and securing human rights in Korea. 
Founded on September 10, 1994, the PSPD seeks to prevent abuse of power by the government, judiciary, and
business through advocacy of social justice, presentation of alternative policies, and encouragement of social
participation by the population.Seoul, July 3,2001.
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6.4 Conclusion
The real nam e financial transaction  system  rep resen ted  a  policy 
reform th a t would significantly transform  the  nature and th e  relationships 
within th e  system  of socialisation of private risk. By introducing a  more 
com prehensive taxation  system , th e  system  addressed  th e  socie ty ’s  
growing dem ands for a more equitable distribution of w ealth . Additionally, 
th e  false nam e financial system  c rea ted  th e  conditions for the  grow th of 
an informal and unregulated financial m arket th a t due to  its sec re tiv e  and 
difficult to  tra c e  nature, negatively affected  the  governm ent’s  cap acity  to  
implement financial policies. But by increasing transparency  in th e  
financial system , a  major im pact of th e  new  system  would be to  em pow er 
the  authorities to  investigate th e  sou rces of funds hidden behind false 
nam es usually a t  th e  basis  of corrupt tie s  developed betw een governm ent 
officials, politicians and businessm en. Since th e  1980s th ere  have been 
a ttem p ts  to  deal with the  negative outcom es of th e  fa lse  nam e financial 
system , ironically not forbidden but legally sanctioned  by th e  governm ent 
of Park Chung Hee, not only to  encourage g rea te r financial transparency  
but also  to  prom ote a  more equitable distribution of w ealth .
I argue th a t Kim Young Sam ’s  choice to  im plem ent th e  new  
financial policy w as shaped by th e  legacies of th e  fa lse  nam e financial 
system , the  policy p rocess  and political lessons from th e  failed a ttem p ts  
by Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, and his ideological and moral 
m otivations. However, any effort to  change the  rules of the  gam e within 
the  system , in particu lar its  informal side n ecess ita ted  som e type of 
negotiation and deal se ttlem en t w ith o ther partic ipan ts in th e  system  in 
the  face  of their potential re s is tan ce  and opposition. By targeting  tax  
evasion and illicit political funds, th e  reform w as, in fact, ex p ec ted  to  
directly affect governm ent officials, businessm en and politicians, core 
m em bers of the  system  of socialisation of private risk. Since Kim decided 
to  force the financial policy by adm inistrative fiat w ithout building a 
reform-oriented alliance within th is core group, th e  presiden t com m itted a
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s tra te g ic  failure a s  th e  Korean s ta te  capacity  to  fully institu tionalise the  
real nam e financial transaction  system  becam e more difficult. The c a se  of 
real nam e financial transaction  system  rep resen ts  a  good exam ple of how 
a n ecessa ry  policy innovation w ithout th e  right political support has faced 
re s is ta n ce  to  change from vested  in te re sts  th a t have been ingrained with 
a se rie s  of path-dependent m alpractices developed and consolidated 
within th e  system  of socialisation of private risk during th e  1960s and 
1970s.
Additionally, th is  c a se  study reveals well how th e  issue  of the  curb 
m arket w as dealt differently by the  p residencies of Park Chung Hee and 
Kim Young Sam due to  their divergent com m itm ents to  th e  system  of 
socia lisation  of private risk. Park Chung Hee s tra teg ically  ac ted  to  freeze 
th e  curb m arket in th e  early 1970s to  rescu e  a  debt-ridden business 
s e c to r  th a t had borrowed strongly from th e  unregulated financial m arket. 
The s tra teg y  not only aim ed a t alleviating th e  business sec to r’s  financial 
problem s, but also  a t consolidating tie s  betw een  th e  governm ent and th e  
country’s  m ajor firms within th e  system . Conversely, by stra teg ically  
acting  to  underm ine the  workings of th e  curb m arket in 1993 with th e  
announcem ent of th e  real nam e financial transac tion  system , Kim 
intended to  seriously dam age th e  corrupt tie s  th a t had developed 
betw een  politicians, businessm en and bu reaucra ts  s ince  th e  regim e of 
Park Chung Hee. Unlike Park, Kim sought to  end th e  close tie s  betw een 
governm ent and b u sin esses and radically transform  of th e  status quo 
within th e  system  of socialisation  of private risk.
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7. CHAPTER SEVEN -  C onclusion
For nearly four d ecades, Korea’s  rem arkable econom ic 
perform ance has a ttra c ted  international atten tion . Leading th is econom ic 
su c c e ss  has been the  ‘visible hand’ of a strong, interventionist, and 
developm ental s ta te  th a t w as capab le  of promoting fa s t econom ic growth 
by: identifying s tra teg ic  industrial sec to rs ; providing preferential
allocation of reso u rces  to  th o se  sec to rs ; and reducing collective action 
dilem m as unlike th o se  experienced by m ost developing countries. The 
ultim ate consequence of th is intervention w as the  institutionalisation of a 
system  of socialisation of private risk, in which th e  s ta te  supported th e  
potential risks a sso c ia ted  with industrial ven tures undertaken by th e  
private secto r. This socialised  risk took several form s such  a s  deposit 
guarantee; lender-of-last-resort; s ta te  guaran tees; and financial rescue of 
debt-ridden corporations. Conversely, th is socia lised  private risk w as 
balanced by th e  s ta te ’s  disciplinarian capacity  through its  control of 
financial flows. The system  of socialisation of private risk encouraged 
private investm ent. However, th e  Korean s ta te  also  im posed perform ance 
s tan d ard s  in exchange for a c c e ss  to  financial support. The developm ental 
s ta te  literature has offered convincing evidence illustrating th e  high 
degree  of intervention by the  Korean s ta te  in the  workings of the  m arket. 
Yet, how th e  developm ental s ta te ’s  policy goals w ere designed, 
negotiated  and im plem ented rem ained much of a  ‘black box’ in th is 
literature.
In the  c a se  of Korea, the  P resident and his s ta ff a t  the  presidential 
office have been the  cen tral figures in the  p rocess of decision-making, to  
th e  ex ten t th a t the  country’s  presidency is usually regarded a s  an 
‘imperial presidency’. Korean p residen ts a re  usually ex pected  to  be active 
players in the  p rocess  of decision-m aking through the ir involvement in th e  
design, negotiation, im plem entation and monitoring of public policies. 
This th esis  w as particularly in terested  in understanding the  role of 
Korean leaders in th e  policy p rocess  and how they  a ttem p t to  bring about
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institutional change. To accom plish this, a  polished version of historical 
institutionalism  a s  th e  theoretical fram ew ork underpinning th e  research  
w as introduced. Five main propositions are  a t the  core of th is theoretica l 
fram ework:
1) Institutions are  relevant not only b ecau se  they im pose 
constra in ts  but also  b ecau se  they  open opportunities for 
political behaviour;
2) Political ac to rs  are  both su b jec ts  and ag en ts  of historical 
change, in th e  sen se  th a t they can  a c t stra teg ically  to  define, 
pursue and achieve institutional change;
3) Political s tra teg y  is moulded by th e  institutional se ttin g  in
which ac to rs  are  em bedded, a s  well a s  by ideas and the
specific historical con tex t within which th e  action ta k e s  place;
4) Policies a re  so u rces of political rearrangem ents th a t ultim ately 
may g en era te  institutional change; and
5) The in teraction of formal and informal politics is relevant to
the  understanding not only of ‘who g e ts  w hat, when, how, a t
w hose expense’, but also  to  evaluate  how th e se  p a tte rn s  of 
political behaviour influence p a tte rn s of institutional change.
From th is  theoretica l fram ework, th is study has opened the  
developm ental s ta te  ’black box’, to  understand tw o m ajor issues: firstly, 
how th e  policy cho ices of Korean leaders are  shaped  by the  in teraction  of 
institutional constra in ts  and opportunities, th e  dom estic  and international 
con tex t, ideas and coalition politics; and secondly, how Korean leaders 
a c t s tra teg ically  to  im plem ent their policy choices.
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To realise  th is  research  objective, I focused my analysis on th e  
political, econom ic and social dynam ics behind th e  creation, 
consolidation and transform ation of th e  ru les em bedded in th e  system  of 
socia lisation  of private risk, a t  th e  core of th e  Korean developm ental 
s ta te . Underlying th e  analysis w ere four m ajor questions:
(1) What drove Korean political leaders during th e  early
1960s to  c rea te  and develop th e  system  of socialisation  
of private risk, which becam e asso c ia ted  with the  
country’s  successfu l econom ic perform ance?
(2) How did th e  rules sustaining th e  system  mould th e
behaviour of contending groups in Korean socie ty , in 
particular th e  Korean executive?
(3) How did th e se  rules influence th e  distribution of pow er
and, with w hat co n seq u en ces in te rm s of policy and 
political outcom es?
(4) Why and how did Korean leaders s in ce  the  early 1990s
move to  transform  th e  rules of th e  gam e of th e  system , 
and with w hat policy and political co n sequences?
This study then  looked a t tw o m ajor periods w here Korean 
P residen ts actively pursued institutional change with a major im pact on 
th e  country’s  econom ic growth and developm ent. The first period covered 
th e  presidency of Park Chung Hee (1961-1979) w here I exam ined the  
form ation and consolidation of the  system  of socialisation  of private risk. 
The second  period encom passed  the  presidency of Kim Young Sam (1993- 
1997) w here I explored Kim’s  initiatives to  transform  the  rules of the  
gam e em bedded in th is system  in th e  period preceding the  IMF crisis  in 
1997.
226
The d iscussion of the  pre-1980s period w as seen  a s  im portant to 
highlight th e  significant fea tu res  and institutional path dependencies built 
in th e  previous tw o d ecad es  and how their outcom es eventually moulded 
Kim Young Sam ’s  policy cho ices a s  he sought to  reform the  Korean 
developm ental s ta te .
I took a  three-tiered approach to  exam ine th e  policy p rocess  in 
each  period. First, I described the  fea tu res  of th e  institutional and policy 
reform s undertaken during th e  p residencies of Park Chung Hee and Kim 
Young Sam, respectively. In th e  second  tier, I explored the  decision­
making p rocess and how the  s tra teg ie s  and cho ices of th e se  Korean 
leaders  to  pursue such reform s w ere shaped  by th e  interaction of 
institu tions, history, con tex t and ideas. Finally, a t th e  third tier, I analysed 
th e  im plem entation phase and th e  s tra te g ie s  configured by Park and Kim 
to  put into effect the  reform ist initiatives. For each  presidency, I u se  a 
c a s e  study to  tra ce  how the  decision w as designed, negotiated and 
im plem ented.
The first period, covering the  presidency of Park Chung Hee (1961- 
1979) w as exam ined in Chapters Three and Four. In Chapter Three, I 
show ed how Park Chung Hee behaved a s  an ag en t of historical change by 
actively seeking th e  formation of th e  system  of socia lisation  of private 
risk. I argued th a t shaping Park’s  political s tra teg y  to  form the  system  of 
socia lisation  of private risk w as: (1) th e  institutional legacies of Syngman 
Rhee and Chang Myon; (2) th e  country’s  difficult econom ic conditions and 
U.S p ressu re  for econom ic reform; and (3) the  ideological motivation to  
pursue sta te-led  econom ic nationalism  and a ‘grow th-first’ econom ic 
policy.
Thus, Park crea ted  th e  system  by redefining th e  role of the  Korean 
s ta te  and strengthening his autonom y and cap ac ity  through four main 
s tra teg ies : (1) the  concentration of pow er in th e  executive; (2) the
developm ent of effective c lu sters  em bracing professional econom ic
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bureaucrats; (3) s ta te  control of th e  financial system ; and (4) an alliance 
with bureaucrats, farm ers and business groups. The institutionalisation of 
the  system , however, rested  on th e  capacity  of Park Chung Hee to  
maintain the  system  through a  credible com m itm ent to  an alliance with 
bureaucrats, farm ers and the  chaebol. This credible com m itm ent w as 
com prised of m ore than  incentives. Penalties would also  be applied if, for 
exam ple, bu reaucra ts  or chaebol failed to  a tta in , or comply with, certain  
planned ta rg e ts  or guidelines.
Chapter Four a sse s se d  a particular c a se  of policy reform, the  heavy 
and chem ical industrialisation in the  1970s, a s  a w ay to  tra ce  in detail 
why and how President Park behaved stra teg ically  to  design, negotiate  
and implement th e  HCI and with w hat political and econom ic 
consequences. First, I argued th a t Park Chung Hee’s  decision to  push for 
HCI w as moulded by: growing dom estic econom ic and political problems; 
rising international protectionism  and com petition; a  changing security  
environm ent and; a  nationalistic-oriented ideological drive to  develop a 
rich nation with a strong army. Afterwards, I show ed how th e  need to  
pursue and im plem ent HCI during th e  1970s led Park Chung Hee to  a c t 
s tra teg ically  to  consolidate  th e  system  of socialisation  of private risk”. In 
th is sen se , the  system  served well a s  an institutional opportunity to  help 
reshape the  country’s  industrial s tructu re .
The consolidation of the  system  involved guaranteeing  the  
cooperation of th e  bureaucracy  and the  chaebol. Park not only su cceed ed  
in rallying the  econom ic bureaucracy, but also  the  chaebol in support of 
the  new  industrial s tra tegy . The cooperation of th e  la tte r  only em erged 
after Park m anaged to  overcom e th e  chaeboFs initial re s is tan ce  born from 
the fac t th a t they saw  their inexperience in the  se c to r  a s  a potential 
financial and econom ic liability. The regim e led by Park show ed th a t it 
w as ready to re sp ec t its  role within th e  system  of socialisation  of private 
risk. Park did th is by rescuing the  debt-ridden corporate  sec to r (through 
an em ergency order) and offering them  financial benefits to  ge t involved 
in the  HCI. N onetheless, th e  concentration  of th e  country’s  resou rces in
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th e  HCI and in th e  chaebol th a t had been se le c ted  to  partic ipate  in th e  
new  industrial s tra teg y  produced significant policy and political outcom es, 
especially  in te rm s of pow er distribution within th e  system . Ultimately, 
th e  new  industrial s tra tegy  pursued by th e  Korean s ta te  m ade th e  
country’s  econom y structurally  dependent on the  chaeboFs econom ic 
perform ance.
Within th is context, th e  chaeboFs capacity  to  negotiate  the  rules of 
th e  gam e within th e  system  of socialisation  of private risk increased  vis- 
a-vis th e  s ta te . This w as further ex acerb a ted  by th e  chaeboFs growing 
control of non-banking financial institu tions (NBFIs) th a t began to  surface 
in th e  early  1970s, following th e  em ergency order to  deal with the  curb 
m arket. S ince th e  NBFIs w ere given g rea te r  freedom  in th e  m anagem ent 
of the ir financial resources, chaeboFs a c c e s s  to  th e se  financial 
institu tions reduced th e  conglom erates’ dependence on state-controlled  
banks. This allowed the  chaebol to  e sca p e  th e  disciplinarian m easures of 
th e  Korean s ta te  (usually based  on the  th re a t to  block a c c e s s  to  s ta te - 
controlled finance). Additionally, fearing th e  potential cred it penalties 
less , th e  chaebol becam e le ss  restrained  by th e  execu tive’s  econom ic 
guidelines. In sum, policy and political ou tcom es of th e  HCI represen ted  
th e  first signs of a shifting in th e  pow er equilibrium within th e  system  and 
in political rearrangem ents th a t eventually led to  institutional change. As 
show n in C hapters Five and Six, a s  th e  chaebol s treng thened  their pow er 
vis-a-vis th e  Korean s ta te , their growing econom ic concentration  began to  
em erge in th e  early 1980s a s  a thorny issue. The country’s  policym akers 
increasingly saw  the  need to  deal with th e  situation , not only due to  th e  
econom ic im balances it had produced but also  in response to  th e  
soc ie ty ’s  dem ands for a  m ore fair distribution of w ealth .
The second  period covered by th is th esis  exam ined th e  presidency 
of Kim Young Sam (1993-1997) in C hapters Five and Six. In Chapter Five I 
show ed why and how President Kim Young Sam, a s  an ag en t of historical 
change actively sought to  transform  the  Korean developm ental s ta te  and
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with w hat political and econom ic consequences. He pursued an an ti­
corruption cam paign, sought to  cu t tie s  with p as t military regim es, 
a ttem pted  to  forge new  law s to  fight m anipulation of voters and prom ote 
fa irness during th e  electoral p rocess, and re-structured th e  adm inistrative 
apparatus. Additionally, th e  new  econom ic plan involved th e  deregulation, 
privatisation and internationalisation of th e  country’s  econom y, along 
with a  policy to  curb th e  econom ic pow er of th e  chaebol.
I argued th a t informing Kim’s  political s tra teg y  w as: (1) the  
institutional legacies of form er p residen ts Chun Doo Hwan (1980-1987) 
and Roh Tae Woo (1988-1992); (2) moral codes of behaviour and th e  
ideological m otivation to  pursue dem ocratic  reform; and (3) a  need to  
respond to  changes in th e  international trad e  and econom ic arena. 
However, unlike Park Chung Hee, th e  reform ist project led by Kim Young 
Sam  m et two m ajor shortcom ings: first, Kim’s  w eak  econom ic leadership  
produced inconsisten t policy decisions; and second, in his a ttem p t to  
im plem ent reform from above, Kim com m itted th e  s tra teg ic  failure of not 
building a coalition in support of th e  initiative. The majority of th e  Korean 
population, including certain  se c to rs  within th e  bureaucracy  and business, 
strongly supported th e  reform drive by th e  presidency of Kim Young Sam 
a s  dem onstrated  by his popularity ratings in the  first years of his term . 
However, the m ethods adopted by th e  governm ent to  prom ote th e  reform s 
failed to  clearly identify who could be th e  major beneficiaries in order to  
gain their support for the  policy changes. In th e  ab sen ce  of ad eq u a te  and 
proper information about th e  reforms, the  potential beneficiaries failed to  
be convinced and persuaded about th e  need to  support the  governm ent in 
the ir institutionalisation.
In the Korean political system , the  P resident is expected  to  lead 
th e  policy p rocess in its  various s tag e s; from policy design to  
im plem entation. Kim Young Sam, unlike Park Chung Hee, provided w eak  
leadership in th e  policy p rocess by failing to  com m it him self to  th e  
several s tag e s  of the  p rocess. Kim’s  lack of a sy stem atic  vision on how to
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reform the  econom y becam e evident during his term  of office. He not only 
preferred to  de leg a te  authority to  his s ta ff in th e  Blue House, but also  
constan tly  reshuffled the  position of Deputy Prime Minister (DPM), the  
country’s  top econom ic position. With an average tenu re  of less  than eight 
m onths for each  DPM, it becam e practically  im possible for th e  MOFE to  
form ulate and im plem ent co n sis ten t policies.
Furtherm ore, by advocating a  sm aller and le ss  interventionist s ta te , 
w hether through bureaucratic  re-organisation or financial liberalisation 
initiatives, th e  adm inistrative and econom ic reform s undertaken by Kim 
Young Sam had th e  effect of w eakening th e  pow er of th e  s ta te . The 
reform s, however, not only failed to  produce a m ore effective policy 
coordination, but a lso  reduced th e  capacity  of the  s ta te  to  intervene in 
th e  chaeboPs inefficient m anagem ent through industrial policy and 
financial control. This explains why a  supposedly strong and 
disciplinarian s ta te  failed to  intervene to  check  on th e  chaeboPs over­
investm ents, rapid overseas expansion and heavy foreign indebtedness, 
a s  well a s  failing to  supervise financial institu tions in the  period right 
before the financial crisis.
Additionally, driven by Confucian moral codes, and th e  Korean 
traditional political culture, Kim Young Sam decided to  push th e  reform 
from above, i.e., by adm inistrative fiat, w ithout seeking to  build a 
supporting coalition to  help push for th e  policy agenda. The rationale 
behind th is approach w as: As long a s  Kim’s  moral integrity rem ained 
in tac t and popular support, m easured in te rm s of popularity ratings 
m aintained high levels, the  im plem entation of reform s could su cceed . Yet, 
it w as a risky s tra teg y  becau se  w hen his moral legitim acy began to  erode 
in th e  afterm ath of a se rie s  of scandals, Kim’s  leadership  w eakened and, 
w ithout a reliable and supporting coalition, th e  im plem entation of th e  
reform s becam e more difficult. Furtherm ore, Kim’s  reform s faced  th e  
co n stra in ts  im posed by th e  system  of “socialisation of private risk”.
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The execu tive’s  policies tow ards th e  chaebol well illustrated the  
constra in ts  faced  by the  reform ist s tra teg y  followed by Kim Young Sam. 
As had already happened earlier with Chun and Roh, Kim decided to  
abandon cooperative tie s  with the  chaebol and sought to  curb their 
econom ic concentration  in response to  th e  growing social dem ands for 
econom ic justice . However any a ttem p t to  transform  th e  path-dependent 
developm ent p a tte rn s  s e t  during th e  1960s and 1970s a s  a policy and 
political outcom e of th e  system  of “socialisation  of private risk” proved to  
be a difficult ta sk . The chaebol had su cceed ed  by strengthening their 
political leverage through political donations to  th e  country’s  
policym akers and politicians. Additionally, th e  chaebol had becom e a 
predom inant econom ic player a s  th e  country’s  main vehicle for econom ic 
recovery and growth.
Therefore, governm ental efforts to  im pose cred it lim itations to  
discipline the  chaebol and induce them  to  comply with adm inistrative 
guidance w ere ineffective. Not only could th e  chaebol reso rt to  NBFIs but 
also  to  overseas financing, further facilita ted  with th e  governm ent’s  
financial liberalisation program. By failing to  gain th e  cooperation of the  
chaebol to  undertake th e  corporate  reform s, a s  well a s  failing to  
discipline the  chaebol for resisting  them , th e  executive increasingly failed 
to  supervise and monitor th e  behaviour of th e  country’s  m ajor 
conglom erates. Resisting the  reform s, the  chaebol rapidly expanded their 
investm ent, which resu lted  in over-investm ent and high indeb tedness th a t 
eventually underm ined th e  stab ility  of th e  recently  liberalised financial 
system .
C hapter Six investigated  in-depth a  specific reform, th e  real nam e 
financial transaction  system  in 1993. This w as an a ttem p t to  clearly 
understand why and how the  presidency of Kim Young Sam designed, 
bargained and im plem ented th e  new  financial policy and with w hat 
political and econom ic outcom es. The im plem entation of th e  real nam e 
financial transaction  system  w as expected  to  radically change th e  nature
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and th e  relationships within th e  system  of “socialisation  of private risk”. 
It would m ake th e  financial system  m ore tran sp aren t to  give th e  
au thorities increasing capacity  to  investigate  th e  so u rces  of funds hidden 
behind fa lse  nam es th a t had informally tied governm ent officials, 
politicians and businessm en. Additionally, th e  new  financial policy 
involved th e  introduction of a  more com prehensive taxation  system  th a t 
would tack le  th e  issue  of tax  evasion and deal with th e  socie ty ’s  calls for 
a fairer distribution of w ealth . Finally, it would offer th e  governm ent 
further pow er to  m anage financial policies, a s  the  introduction of a  real 
nam e financial system  w as likely to  curb a  secre tive , informal and 
unregulated  financial m arket.
In th is  chap ter, I first argued th a t Kim Young Sam ’s  choice to  
im plem ent th e  new  financial policy w as shaped  by th e  changing 
percep tions of th e  legacies of the  false nam e financial system  as  its  
legitim acy began to  be sub jec ted  to  public inquiry and criticism  following 
a se rie s  of scandals. Further influences w ere: th e  policy p rocess and 
political lessons from the  failed a ttem p ts  to  institu tionalise th e  real nam e 
financial system  by Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo; and Kim’s 
ideological and moral m otivations to  se ek  clean  politics and a  ju s t society . 
For th e  reform to  su cceed  it would be n ecessa ry  for som e type of 
negotiation and agreem ent betw een m ajor ac to rs  within th e  system  in th e  
face  of the ir potential re sis tan ce  and opposition to  th e  end of built-in 
‘spoils’ over d ecades. By specifically aiming a t fighting tax  evasion and 
illicit political funds, th e  reform w as, in fac t, exp ec ted  to  negatively affect 
governm ent officials, businessm en and politicians.
However, Kim Young Sam preferred to  go ahead  with the  reform 
w ithout first forging a coalition. The issuance  of a  presidential decree  
w as a  s tra teg ic  move to  overcom e the  potential re s is tan ce  th a t could 
em erge in th e  National Assembly a s  had happened during th e  regim es of 
Chun and Roh. The su c c e ss  of the  stra tegy , however, depended on th e  
m ain tenance of Kim’s  moral legitim acy to  enforce th e  reform. However
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w hen th a t moral legitim acy s ta rted  to  w ane, in the  ab sen ce  of a reformist- 
oriented alliance, Kim’s  capacity  to  institu tionalise th e  real nam e 
financial transac tion  system  becam e m ore difficult.
This exam ination of the  policy experiences of Park Chung Hee and 
Kim Young Sam reveals th a t to  understand  th e  policy w orkings of th e  
Korean developm ental s ta te , it is crucial to  tak e  into consideration th e  
role played by leadership. This th es is  does so  by: advancing our insight of 
th e  variables accounting for the  ac tions of Korean political leaders th a t 
inspired them  to  com m ence p ro cesses  of institutional change; the  
m otivations and p references th a t led them  to  favour and consolidate 
som e institu tions but not others; th e  s tra teg ic  actions, w hether or not 
successfu l, they  pursued to  im plem ent the ir choices; and th e  im pact of 
institu tional change on th e  country’s  political arrangem ents.
In concluding th is last chapter, I first analyse the  new  insights 
brought by historical institutionalism  to  our understanding of Korean 
developm ent, and secondly I exam ine th e  significance of the  Korean c a se  
to  advance th e  historical institu tionalist perspective. This will serve to  
su g g est new  research  directions th a t could help overcom e the  
w ea k n e sse s  of the  developm ental s ta te  and institu tionalist perspectives 
and open th e  possibility for a b e tte r  and m ore com prehensive explanation 
of th e  political econom y of growth and developm ent in Korea.
The developm ental s ta te  paradigm  has offered an im portant 
contribution for th e  understanding of th e  role of th e  Korean s ta te  in 
nurturing econom ic growth and developm ent. The paradigm  often 
c o n s tru c ts  a  model of th e  Korean s ta te  underlining the  role of an 
autonom ous, capable, united and coheren t bureaucracy  th a t se lec ted  and 
im plem ented policy goals th a t did not necessarily  mirror the  dom inant 
in te re s ts  in society . However, by clinging to  th is  idea of the  Korean s ta te , 
th e  paradigm  com m its an im portant analytical oversight. Autonomy and 
cap ac ity  do not necessarily  com e together. The s ta te  might have the
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autonom y to  choose  policies, but it might not have the  capacity  to  
im plem ent them .
In its  a ttem p ts  to  reify th e  role of th e  s ta te , th e  s ta tis t  paradigm 
w eak en s th e  explanatory pow er of th e  s ta te  by presenting a limited 
in terpretation  of its  s truc tu re  and streng th . This is due to  th e  tendency to  
overlook th e  multiple, dynamic, com plex and in teractive tie s  within th e  
s ta te  appara tus, and betw een th is  appara tus and th e  society .
H istorical institutionalism  has allowed us to  go beyond the  idea of 
a  reified s ta te , a t th e  core of the  developm ental s ta te  perspective, to  
em phasise  th e  role of th e  institutional fram ework, ideas and historical 
co n tex t in structuring  politics. Within th is  view, institutions, ideas and 
co n tex t affect the  capacity  of governm ents to  en ac t law s and im plem ent 
policies, to  mould th e  perceptions, preferences, ac tions of individuals or 
groups, a s  well a s  to  s tru c tu re  th e  dynamic pow er relations betw een the  
varied and multiple ac to rs  within th e  s ta te  m achine and betw een th e se  
and o th er individuals or groups in society . Institutions a re  also  path- 
dependent, i.e., institutions are  relatively enduring fea tu res  th a t by 
carrying developm ent along a  particu lar tra jectory  m ake future changes 
m ore difficult.
In th is  sen se , the  tw o historical m om ents of institutional change 
analysed  in th is th e s is  show  clearly  how an institutional arrangem ent 
shaped  by a particu lar historical co n tex t and ideology, i.e., the  system  of 
socia lisation  of private risk, influenced th e  political arrangem ents and 
dynam ics em bedded in th e  Korean policy process. The system  th a t 
em erged during th e  presidency of Park Chung Hee streng thened  th e  
cap ac ity  and autonom y of th e  Korean s ta te  to  design and im plem ent 
econom ic policies. N onetheless, th e  successfu l im plem entation of th e  
policy initiative rested  on P ark 's  carefully o rch estra ted  balance of pow er 
betw een  several ac to rs: presidential office, business groups, bureaucra ts  
and farm ers. At the  sam e tim e, by organising pow er relations, th e  system
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of socia lisation  of private risk increasingly fram ed the  perceptions, 
p references and actions of th e  involved parties in th e  country’s  policy 
p rocess.
Thus, th e  su c c e ss  of the  system  depended on th e  capacity  of th e  
s ta te  to  support its  m ain tenance through a credible com m itm ent to  an 
alliance w here the  presidential office, bureaucra ts , chaebol and farm ers 
exchanged  political and econom ic favours. This credible com m itm ent 
involved positive incentives a s  well a s  penalties. For exam ple, 
b u reau cra ts  w ere offered prom otions in return for su c c e ss  in achieving 
perform ance ta rg e ts . However they could also  be sack ed  if they failed to  
a tta in  planned ta rg e ts . Meanwhile, th e  chaebol traded  econom ic 
perform ance and political funds for financial incentives, tax  savings and 
tariff protection. Conversely, if they  a ttem pted  to  e sca p e  adm inistrative 
guidance, they  could face  tax  investigations or even a c c e s s  to  credit 
blocked by banks.
Ultimately, th e  system  of socialisation of private risk which w as 
institu tionalised  to  s e t  th e  country’s  growth and developm ent path 
depended on the  econom ic perform ance of th e  country’s  business 
conglom erates. This had th e  effect of curtailing institutional change a s  it 
w as discovered by President Kim Young Sam. The country’s  
adm inistrative and econom ic reform s pursued during his leadership 
betw een  1993 and 1997 em erged a s  a th re a t to  th e  equilibrium th a t had 
long su sta in ed  the  system  of socialisation of private risk by challenging 
one of its  core featu res: cooperative tie s  betw een  th e  bureaucracy and 
chaebol. For exam ple, while badly m anaged bureaucra tic  re-organisation 
led to  growing d issatisfaction  among civil se rv an ts  with th e  country 's 
leadership , policies aiming a t curbing econom ic concentration , by th e  
chaebol, such  a s  cred it lim itations, w ere strongly resis ted  by th e  family- 
ow ned conglom erates. Without th e  support of w hat had been a s tra teg ic  
alliance and fundam ental to  m ake th e  reform s viable, Kim’s  a ttem p ts  to  
build a  ‘New Korea’ w ere m arred by policy inconsistencies and failures
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th a t ultim ately contributed to  th e  financial crisis in 1997. What historical 
institutionalism  show s is th a t for institutional reform to  tak e  p lace  it is 
crucial to  build a  supporting coalition, and in th e  c a se  of Kim Young Sam, 
though he ac ted  a s  an agen t of change, his failure to  build s tra teg ic  tie s  
w ith o ther s ta te  and social ac to rs  in th e  im plem entation p rocess  
contributed  to  stalling the reforms.
Historical institutionalism  also  provides an opportunity to  go beyond 
th e  tendency  of th e  developm ental s ta te  perspective to  build a  s ta tic  
view  of th e  s ta te  in term s of its  autonom y and capacity , when th e se  
fea tu res  should be regarded a s  transien t. S ta te  dom ination over socie ty  is 
far from being a fixed condition in Korea. It varies over tim e and sp ace , 
depending on institutional constra in ts  and opportunities, historical 
legacies, con tex t, ideas, coalition politics and how th e  dynamic 
in teraction  of th e se  variables im pact on th e  s tra teg ic  behaviour of 
political leaders in the  p rocess  of designing, negotiating and 
im plem enting public policies.
While historical institutionalism  su g g ests  new  w ays to  look a t the  
political dynam ics involved in th e  Korean policy p rocess, th e  analysis of 
Korea’s  developm ent history also  su g g ests  th ree  w ays in which th is 
theo re tica l fram ew ork can  be enhanced:
First, by showing how Korean leaders stra teg ically  pursued 
institutional change, w hether or not w ith su cc e ss , I have 
shown a  need to  develop a  s tronger conception  of th e  role 
played by agency in political and policy outcom es, i.e., ac to rs  
are  not only su b jec ts  but also  ag en ts  of institutional change. 
This approach allows us then to  ad d ress  th e  am biguous mode 
through which historical institutionalism  in terp re ts  the  
recurren t ontological d ebate  in social sc ien ces , i.e., th e  nature 
of the  relationship betw een institu tions and individuals. The 
Korean c a se  reveals how political leaders, desp ite  the
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constraining institutional scenario , s tra teg ically  undertook 
reform ist program s to  becom e a rch itec ts  of institutional 
transform ation;
Secondly, historical institutionalism  regards institu tions a s  
path-dependent and therefore decisions taken  a t som e point in 
tim e can  limit policy cho ices in th e  future. But th is  path- 
dependency has policy and political outcom es th a t may lead 
to  th e  co llapse of institutional equilibrium and produce change. 
In Korea, the  institutionalisation of th e  system  of socia lisation  
of private risk had th e  effect of leading to  econom ic 
concentration  by th e  chaebol and subjecting th e  country’s  
econom ic growth and developm ent to  their business 
perform ance. It w as th is situation th a t led to  growing 
criticism s and p ro te sts  by th e  country’s  socie ty  in th e  la te  
1970s dem anding econom ic policy change and which strongly 
influenced th e  ideological paradigm  shift from ‘grow th-first’ to  
‘fa irness distribution of w ealth ’;
Finally, historical institutionalism  is essen tia lly  a theory  s e t  to  
explain policymaking in industrialised and w estern  nations 
w here in teractions within th e  policy p ro cess  betw een  the  
different s ta te  and social ac to rs  tend  to  be relatively 
transparen t. The Korean c a se  provides, however, an 
opportunity to  apply historical institutionalism  to  developing 
and non-w estern nations by incorporating one of the ir m ajor 
features: informal politics, i.e., the  in teractions betw een  a 
com plex s ta te  and socie ty  th a t are  not formal, visible and 
traceab le .
As seen  in th e  c a se  of Korea, th e  s tra teg ic  ac tions of political 
leaders to pursue their m otivations and p references a re  im portant and 
deserve further analysis, but ju s t a s  im portant, and ever more pronounced
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in th e  face  of th e  country’s  dem ocratisation , and therefore in need of 
further research , is the  role played by o ther ac to rs  such  a s  bureaucrats, 
businessm en, m em bers of the  National Assem bly and civil socie ty  and 
how they  behave during th e  policy bargaining and im plem entation process.
This th esis  m akes the  c a se  th a t s tu d ies  of th e  s ta te  cannot ignore 
th e  fac t th a t s ta te  autonom y and streng th  a re  th e  outcom e of th e  dynamic 
and com plex exchanges betw een th e  s ta te  and socie ty . Therefore, s ta te  
streng th  and autonom y is neither abso lu te  nor s tag n an t, but will vary 
according to  the  capacity  dem onstrated  by political leaders to  negotiate 
conflict and se ttle  a  com prom ise in multiple political, econom ic and 
social arenas.
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